Notes On The Strategic Importance of Afghanistan

On China’s long-term plans to establish a robust presence in South and West Asia

From Foreign Affairs magazine January/February 2000 sponsored section page 7.  “Pakistan’s ports: Gateway to markets of billions.” This is an advertisement.

“Pakistani ports namely Karachi, neighboring Bin Qasim and the new deep water port at Gwadar — are set to become the regional entrepôt; with the Chinese market of 1.2 billion on the doorstep and one billion Central Asians to the north, Pakistan can easily service the landlocked Central Asian republics and capture trade to the Middle East and Africa…. the government is committed to accelerate the economy by upgrading the nation’s ports. … The implementation agreement finalizing construction of a floating LNG terminal at Port Qasim within a brisk 24-hour time-frame.”

“The Karachi Port trust … has an ambitious program of infrastructure development, encompassing a host of showcase projects underway … foremost among these are: the dredging of the world’s first 18 m container port, set for completion by 2013, the construction of a 1947-feet high Port Tower, Asia’s largest food street, a leisure complex along a scenic coastal stretch, and eye catching plans to connect the deep water container terminal with a cargo village via a cross harbor bridge spanning 300 m, and a berth reconstruction plan giving the Port the ability to accommodate the most modern vessels.

“The state-owned Pakistan national shipping Corporation is profitable despite a difficult global environment and has an extensive fleet modernization program…. Port Qasim Authority is Pakistan’s largest container handling and bulk cargo Port… The Port … will expand its operational capability further by increasing its all weather draught to 14 m, enabling larger vessels to birth. Port Qasim has attracted large foreign direct investment to the amount of US dollars 600 million for the development of a second container terminal, a grain and fertilizer terminal, and a coal and cement terminal, construction of which is underway.”

 

“Rethinking regional concerns in Central Eurasia”

For the symposium on “From the Hindu Kush to the Ganges:  Soldiers and traders, workers and poets, pilgrims and refugees” to take place in the 2010 meetings of the Association for Asian Studies in Philadelphia, March 25-28.

http://www.bgr.bund.de/nn_335082/EN/Themen/Energie/Erdoel/erdoel__inhalt__en.html

Robert L. Canfield

Preliminaries[1]

In my attempts to explain to friends and colleagues the significance of the current war in Afghanistan and Pakistan I have often had to turn to the wider context of the war.  For many people it hardly seems wise to carry on a war in a land so distant as Afghanistan and Pakistan, whose residents are so notorious for fierce opposition to foreign influences.  On the face of it the war seems costly and of little significance.

 

Such a view is mistaken, I think.  To make the case adequately I would actually have to address a number of issues, such as the attitudes and preferences of the local populations involved; the capabilities and agendas of the insurgent groups [Al Qaeda, the several Taliban groups, and the other “foreign fighters” who have found refuge among them]; the commitment and real agendas of the respective governments, and so on.  In this case I want to examine the geopolitical setting of the Afghanistan-Pakistan war, the wider neighborhood within which it is taking place.

 

As it happens, this is a strategic neighborhood.  In it are situated enormous reserves of oil and gas, most of which are underdeveloped.  The agreements now being made for the exploitation and transport of these resources will affect and be affected by the war, as the arrangements for exploiting the resources both reflect the way states align and constrain them to retain ties.  The instruments by which these resources are developed and transported constitute the material means by which military and political interests converge and populations are brought closer together.  They are the instruments of world shrinkage and of international alliance, capable of influencing the course of affairs by the options they open or foreclose by their very existence.

 

I present my argument in a series of maps.

 

Map 1: The Strategic Ellipsis[2]

This image was produced by the German firm BGR to show how the energy resources of the world are concentrated.  This edition of the map indicates that the large ellipsis covering most of western Eurasia [the “strategic ellipsis”] encloses 70% of the worlds known oil resources and 65% of the world’s known gas resources.  BGR has recently corrected these numbers upward:  74% for oil, 70% for gas.[3]

 

 

 

 

Countries in the Strategic Ellipse with the largest OIL reserves, in metric tons, in order of their rank in the world
1 Saudi Arabia			36 287
2 Iran			18 524
3 Iraq			15 646
4 Kuwait			14 150
5 United Arab Emirates			13 306
6 Russia			10 309
7 Libya			5 940
8 Venezuela			5 605
9 Kazakhstan			5 415
14 Qatar			2 068
18 Azerbaijan			1 300

 

Countries in the Strategic Ellipse with the largest GAS reserves, in Bcm,* in order of their rank in the world
1	Russia				106 000
3	Iran				11 000
4	Saudi Arabia				11 000
7	Turkmenistan				5 000
9	Iraq				4 000
14	Kazakhstan				2 500
15	Qatar				2 500
19	Azerbaijan				1 900
20	Uzbekistan				1 500
	United Arab Emirates		1 500
* Billions of normal cubic meters

 

This map merely represents known gas and oil reserves.  Of course more fossil fuel resources exist elsewhere and further exploration could expose other important concentrations.  What is important about this map is that, referring to the world’s reserves in so far as they are known, it portrays the way the world’s leaders think about the location of gas and oil supplies.  Map I can be read as an image of the relative importance accorded to the various localities around the globe and so reveals the places that the industrial powers are most likely to want access to.  The ellipsis encloses a zone of intense competition for access to such resources, “access” meaning the negotiated rights to the oil and gas reserves as well as to the technical means that will be used to produce these fuels and transmit them to the places where they can be consumed.

 

Map 2:  Pipelines of the Strategic Ellipse

This importance is displayed another way in Map 2.

 

The competition currently takes form as political and military posturing as well as diplomatic maneuvering.  In the end the pipelines that are built will “signify and embody alliances and cooperation” that will enable the respective powers to establish “axes for the international projection of influence” (Cutler 2007: 110).[4]

The social and political implications of these pipelines are numerous.

 

Some of the policy issues are the following.

 

The Americans and other western powers have tried to ensure that pipelines were diverted away from Russia, to minimize possibilities of interdiction, and away from Iran, as the Americans have seen Iran as an adversary ever since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 (Klare 2002: 90).

• Owing to American involvement, the 1700 km pipeline from Baku servicing Europe, which was completed in 2005, successfully avoided both Russia and Iran, passing through Tbilisi to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea.
• The Americans also have favored the establishment of a Transcaspian link of Kazakhstan’s giant off-shore Kashagan field into the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.[5] But these routes are more expensive than the shorter ones through Russia and Iran (which would connect to the Persian Gulf; Naughten 2008: 431).
• A six-company consortium sponsored by the EU, Nabucco, has announced plans to begin construction in 2011 of a 3300 km pipeline from the Caspian Basin via Turkey to Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia, and western Hungary.

But American and European wishes have not always been accepted.

• In May, 2007, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia jointly announced that they will cooperate in building a gas pipeline from the Caspian Sea into Kazakhstan and Russia.[6]
• Also, in response to the Nabucco announcement, Russian-owned Gazprom has proposed to build a pipeline from Russia under the Black Sea to Bulgaria and thence to central Europe.[7]

Any deals the Iranians work out frustrates American policy.

• In March, 2010, Iran opened the Dauletabad-Sarakhs-Khangiran pipeline that connected Iran’s northern region with a vast Turkmenistan gas field.
• The deal between Iran and Turkmenistan opens up possibilities for Turkmenistan to develop transportation routes to the world market through Iran, an strategic advantage to both countries.[8]
• Iran is now the second largest oil supplier for China, which in return provides military assistance (Djalili and Kellner 2006).[9]
• In March, 2009, the two countries announced a $3.2 billion deal in which China will help develop the South Pars field, a huge cavity beneath the Persian Gulf that geologists believe is the world’s largest gas reservoir.[10]

Turkmenistan also has been making deals contrary to the interests of the Americans and the EU.

• As recently as February and March, 2010, Turkmenistan was making deals that committed its entire gas exports to China, Russia and Iran – not what the Western powers had hoped for.

The Chinese have actively sought a firm position in Central Asia.

• They have won permission to develop several oil fields in Uzbekistan (Atal 2005), and they have already completed a 1000-kilometer oil pipeline from Atasu, Kazakhstan, into Xinjiang that will deliver up to 200,000 barrels of oil per day (Kazakhstan-China oil 2006).

• They built a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan that became operational in 2009.[11]
• China’s largest state-owned oil company has acquired PetroKazakhstan, one of Kazakhstan’s major energy producers (Blank 2006).
• Despite staggering costs, China is willing to construct an oil pipeline across Kazakhstan into its homelands.
• And they have initiated talks about constructing a natural gas pipeline all the way from Kazakhstan to Shanghai (Appelbaum 2005).

India has no less need requirement for energy, its demand being expected to rise more than three-fold by 2020. Having lost out to the Chinese in the bidding for PetroKazakhstan, the Indian government has turned to Iran and Turkmenistan.

• In 2005 the Indians signed a 25-year agreement to obtain 5 million tons of liquefied natural gas annually from Iran, and they plan to develop two Iranian oil fields.
• In another deal they have acquired rights to develop a portion of Iran’s North Pars gas field. By 2010 they will be importing about 60 million standard cubic meters of Iranian gas per day.
• The Indians also had an interest in a plan to run a 1,750 mile natural gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan (which the Americans opposed), but because of the strained relations with Pakistan they have more recently toyed with the idea of a more direct undersea line from Iran.[12]
• India has also arranged to buy five to six million tons of oil from Azerbaijan annually.[13]
• Like so many other countries, the Indian government has an interest in the projected natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan and Pakistan whenever it can be built.

The Pakistanis are active in Central Asia for the same reasons.

• They have a desperate interest in the projected Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan pipeline, as they would garner transit fees as well as gas for its own uses (Cutler 2007: 122).
• And they, with help from the Chinese, have developed Gwadar as the Indian Ocean terminus for this pipeline.
• Moreover, China wants to build a pipeline from Iran to China through Pakistan. [That would be a huge project: it would mean taking the pipeline through the Northern Areas of Gilgit-Baltistan over one of the highest mountain ranges in the world where the Khunjerab Pass is over 15,000 feet. Such is China’s interest in energy. And such is China’s belief that Pakistan is a “safe” territory over the long term — safe politically.  For China Iran and Pakistan are long term partners with whom it is necessary to develop enduring ties.]

The Japanese likewise have a desperate interest in the oil and gas of this region.

• They import almost all their crude oil from the Middle East.
• They have invested in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.
• And in 2004 the Japanese inked a $2 billion deal to develop Iran’s massive Azadegan oilfield.
• Like so many other nations, Japan looks forward to the time when oil and gas can be transported through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the port of Gwadar, a plan that cannot advance as long as fighting persists in these countries.[14], [15]

The South Koreans are no less dependent on fossil fuels from this region.

• Currently they import 97% of their energy, most of it from the Gulf region.
• The Koreans have established a 50-50 joint oil exploration venture in Uzbekistan and a joint project to mine molybdenum and tungsten there.[16]

Map 3:  Further Plans for Pipeline Construction in the Strategic Ellipse[17]

 

 

 

Map 3 is an addendum to Map 2.  It merely indicates visually some of the trajectories of the pipelines to be built in the future.

Routes through Russia:

• Kazakhstan hopes to expand its existing pipelines to link them with the Russian network of pipelines.[18]
• Azerbaijan wants to build a pipeline from Baku to Novorossiysk.

But Azerbaijan in general, along with Turkey, Georgia, and the United States, favors a western route, which avoids both Russia and Iran.[19]

 

The American oil company Unocal has proposed the construction of oil and gas pipelines from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan and later to India.[20]

 

Map 4.  Routes through Afghanistan

We are now in a position to examine Maps of the pipelines planned for Afghanistan.  These maps clarify the special importance Afghanistan has for Pakistan, whose future depends on its access to the resources of Central Asia.  Afghanistan is crucial to the Pakistanis.  Hence, the concerted attempts of the Pakistanis to ensure that a friendly administration is ensconced in Kabul.  Map 4 focuses specifically on two planned gas pipeline routes from Turkmenistan to Pakistan [and possibly from there to India, if the two sides could ever lay aside their feud over Kashmir].  Both turn eastward into Pakistan’s industrial heartland, and both avoid the troublesome area of Baluchistan.

 

 

 

Map 5 The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-IndianOcean route

But Baluchistan cannot be ignored because it is Pakistan’s frontage on the Indian Ocean.  Map 4 omits the direct route to the Indian Ocean that must pass through Baluchistan, a route indicated on Map 5, which was produced by the Bridas Corporation in 1997 when it was negotiating with the Taliban for the contract to build the pipeline.

 

 

This pipeline will terminate at Gwadar on the Indian Ocean.  Gwadar, in fact, has been built (finished in 2008) to be both a deep sea port and the terminus of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Baluchistan pipeline to the Indian Ocean, assuming it will eventually be built.

 

Conclusion

In this brief visual review of the major locations of fossil fuels and of the competing interests over pipeline construction in Greater Central Eurasia we have said that the Afghanistan-Pakistan war is situated in a zone of vital and continuing interest to the industrial world, and especially to the rapidly industrializing countries of Asia.  The war is not situated in a vacuum, and its progress and outcome will directly affect the competition among the world’s powers over access to the vital resources in its neighborhood.  This is a war of great significance for the world generally as well as the United States.

 

Note, in conclusion, what we have not said.  We have said nothing about the agendas and threat of Al Qaeda; or the long-running low-grade war between Pakistan and India, two countries already armed with nuclear weapons; or the risk of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of extremists; or Iran’s apparent race to acquire nuclear power; or the notorious and many-sided tug of war in the Middle East involving Israel – or any of the many other complicated issues in the region.  But what we have tried to demonstrate is that, with respect to the vital energy resources that the world expects to need in the near future, social and political conditions in Greater Central Eurasia, including Afghanistan and Pakistan, will profoundly affect the options of many countries of the world, the United States as much as any other.  This is at least one reason why the Americans and their allies have decided to invest in the struggle against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

 

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[1] I have benefitted from the the assistance of Sami Siddiq, who provided some the information included here and offered useful comments on the text.

[2] I reproduce this map because it describes both oil and gas within the ellipse.  BGR also produces a similar map of oil reserves.  It has been reproduced for other purposes at the following site:

http://www.oilcrisis.com/rempel/

[3] GDR defines “reserves” as “the amount currently technologically and economically recoverable”.  They use the term “resources” for “quantities that cannot be profitably recovered with current technology but might be recoverable in the future, as well as quantities that are geologically possible but not yet found.”   http://www.whymap.org/cln_109/nn_336024/EN/Themen/Energie/Produkte/annual__report__2009-summary__en.html

 

[4] The 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia, during which flows were briefly interrupted, demonstrated how crucial the pipelines in the Caucasus are to the Russian government (Mouawad 2008).

[5] The 1,760-kilometer Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was constructed to supply the needs of Europe. Eventually able to carry as much a 75 million tons of oil a year, it is projected to bring to Azerbaijan as much as $160 billion in revenue by 2030, a dramatic infusion of wealth that could transform the Caucasus (Abbasov and Ismailova 2005; Howden and Thornton 2005).

[6] Russia Clinches (2007).

[7] Update 1-U.S. Throws Weight (2008).

[8] Asia Times Online, January 8, 2010 “Russia, China, Iran redraw energy map,”
by M K Bhadrakumar. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/LA08Ag01.html.

[9] In the original deal China agreed to provide help with nuclear technology, but in April, 2008, China provided the United Nations with intelligence on Iran’s nuclear efforts after documents were published on how to “shape” uranium metal into warheads. [http://www.telegragh.co.uk/news/worldnews/1583682/China-reveals …]

[10] In addition to these activities China is Afghanistan’s largest investor, building highways to Iran and developing the giant copper mine at Aynak.

[11] Naughten 2008: 433 was an early source for this information on this project.

[12] On May 24, 2009 Iran and Pakistan announced an agreement to build a 2,100-kilometer long pipeline from Iran’s South Pars gas field into Pakistan — at an estimated $7.5 billion. India so far has no part in the deal (Pannier 2009).  On India’s antics see Kripalani 2004, Ranjan 2010, Zafir 2010.

[13] Besides the deals made with the Central Asian, the Indians have sought crude oil from Israel’s Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline as well as natural gas from Qatar (Blank 2005a).

[14] Moreover, the Japanese are pursuing Central Asian uranium, another source of energy over which there is growing interest. Uranium prices are climbing as China and India are stepping up construction of nuclear power plants, and some nations in the west, including the United States, are revisiting the question of nuclear power as an energy source (Uranium 2009).

[15] Masaki (2006).

[16] Won-sup (2007); South Korea Scouts (2008); Prime Minister Han (2008). The Koreans are pursuing other mineral resources in the region. They have bought copper mines and a smelting plant in Kazakhstan (Alaolmulki 2001: 8-10), and the governments of Korea and Uzbekistan have agreed on several other cooperative projects. In 2008 they signed a $400 million deal for Korea to purchase 2600 tonnes of uranium between 2010 and 2016, an amount that will supply about 9% of South Korea’s annual demand for uranium. Already Korea has 20 nuclear reactors, which provide 40% of their electricity, and three more are in construction.

[17]  For another useful map of planned contruction see:  http://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National_Office_Pubs/2008/A_Pipeline_Through_a_ Troubled_Land.pdf.

 

[18] http://www.worldpress.org/specials/pp/pipelines.htm

[19] http://www.worldpress.org/specials/pp/pipelines.htm

[20] From http://www.rumormillnews.com/cgi-bin/archive.cgi?read=32187.