Category: Anthropology

5/6/2020

A verse for me:

“Behold, I am sending an angel before you, to guide you on the way, and to bring you into the place that I have prepared. Watch for him and listen to his voice. Do not rebel against him because he will not pardon your transgressions, for My Name is in him. But if you will listen closely to his voice, and do all that I say, I will be an enemy to your enemies and an adversary to your adversaries.” Ex 23: 20-22.

I feel such a need for guidance. My life is changing and many prospects for my future are frightening; much seems uncertain, as my world is changing in unpredicted and unpredictable ways. So I respond to this passage, “Yes! I want that angel! But I am so flawed. “Watch for him, listen to his voice” – how? I know for sure that I will mess it up. I’m sure to get it wrong. OK, I’ll watch, but how will I “see” him, and how will I “hear” his voice?

Of course, this statement was not given to me; it was given to the runaway slaves from Egypt who were now relatively lost in the desert. In the Exodus story they had just received the awesome and mysterious commandments brought down from the mount of Sinai by Moses. The text then enumerates a series of “laws.” Now, abruptly, the laws are interrupted by a promise, which reveals that the God who delivered them has given them new regulations to live by and has further plans for them beyond what they had envisioned. They are going to a new land, one that is to be allocated to them, and the vehicle for their finding it and appropriating it – it’s going to entail conflict! – is an “angel.” They are in fact unready for all that that will entail, so God is giving them someone — a person, not a principle or a regulation — who will lead them through the trials that lie ahead as they advance into the land of promise.

Only by analogy can I claim this passage for myself. What I can say, though, is that this story tells me that Yahweh, the Hebrew God, is a Person who has designs and protections for the people who belong to him. Seeing here that he is such a Person, I come to him and beg for a similar mercy: Lord, please grant me the kind of guidance and protection you provided the ancient Hebrew runaways that the book of Exodus tells me about. Yes, I don’t deserve your kindness; but I see that neither did they.

So by analogy and by the hubris of faith, I appeal to the God of the Hebrews to give me help for my life, my times, just as he did for them in their times. Like them I am confronting situations for which I am unready and unequipped. I want to be guided, I want to be led through the frightening, uncertain times ahead. And without his guidance I will surely get it wrong. So I appeal for his merciful presence and guidance like that provided to the Hebrews in the wilderness.

The meanings of objects in our living room to me, as an illustration of how objective forms serve as devices of cultural memory. For the interest of our grandchildren when they become curious about what their grandparents must have been like.

They are cultural in the sense that the objects in our living room are creations of the human imagination, and also mnemonic devices to which meanings are ascribed variously for individuals and societies. Here I describe what they mean to me. They will mean different things to Rita, even though in certain respects the meanings she ascribes to them are like what I ascribe to them, which makes them devices through which we together share common memories.

Two helpful definitions of culture:

Geertz:

This is a long discussion about things in our house that reflect our lives and our history, which I want to put together for the benefit of our family. But also it’s an illustration of how culture works. Culture in a sense is in the mind in the sense that what we carry with us in our experiences is all private, and when we die, all those experiences and all that history that is unique to us dies with us.

:              At the same time, it’s not just all in the mind. In fact, what we have in the mind is cues that bring to mind various associations, and those cues are all material. So the mind thought even itself is material in the sense that we have to make use of symbols or tokens to represent the things that we think about. So language is itself physical, but it stands for things that are [inaudible 00:01:22] what we remember stands for memories.

:              In that sense, it’s the bridge between something very material and something marvelous. That is consciousness. I keep hearing a [inaudible 00:01:41] what consciousness is. But consciousness is not possible without the material devices through which the think, through which the remember. So I want to talk about the things that are brought to mind when I see them in our own living room. As an example, again, of how marvelous the mind is. And behind the things that we take so for granted, language, thought, simply consciousness are parts of our character and our world and our experience that are a kind of miracle.

:              They’re marvelous if you don’t want to call it a miracle. We can at least call it a marvel, because we don’t have a way to explain how consciousness somehow bridges into the material world. But science is a certain way of looking at the material world, looking at it in material terms. We assume that the universe can be understood in its own terms, and so we understand the universe as a material reality whose properties can be understood in terms of each other.

:              That doesn’t get very far when it comes to the great questions of the human experience, human private imagination, as I say, is a marvel. So I’m standing at the window, on the front window next to the front window, and I’m looking out upon the living room. I see, for example, far to my right, a hanging. Really it’s a prayer cloth that Rita bought in Afghanistan. We’ve seem some in museums, and this is as good as anything as we have seen in various museums.

:              It tells something about Rita. Rita would never call herself an artist, but she went around in Kabul with a dear friend and those days, Virginia Pruitt. Virginia Pruitt was a professor of home economics in Teachers College. I think she was in Teachers College. She graduated from Teachers College, but I think really she taught somewhere in Kentucky, because I think that’s where she was from.

:              Rita and she went around to Kabul, looking in the various shops where old things were kept or where pretty things were kept, craftwork and so on were kept. Rita found this, and brought it home. I’m sure that some of the things that reflect Rita’s taste come from her association with Virginia, because Virginia helped her to grasp something of what was desirable and appealing. So there’s that one thing.

:              Something else on the wall to my left is a [inaudible 00:05:42] This is, some people might call it a tablecloth, although it’s hanging against the wall. The other one I was looking at is a deep purple. This one is a rust color with all kinds of other handy work around it. Again, this is something Rita got, so when I look at these things, I think of my wife. I not only think of Rita, I think of her charm and grace and her subtle appreciation of nice things.

:              To explain what this [inaudible 00:06:22] is, it’s since the Afghans eat on the floor, they sit on the floor, and they bring their food and lay it on the floor. They sit around in a circle around it. This is usually, bread is wrapped in something like this and laid out on the floor, and then they put their dishes on that or around it. So it stands for, in the Afghan setting, this is what the Afghans would enjoy as part of their every day management of food. So I consider that a delightful memory of what Rita is like.

:              So something else that is an illustration of what Rita’s like, straight to the far end of the room on the wall is a [inaudible 00:07:26] board. There’s another one to my right on the side of the wall facing me, next to the carpet. Both of those, called [inaudible 00:07:39] boards, at least in English. I’m not sure what they’re called in Farsi. It’s interesting that I don’t know that. These were built, in the old Afghan tradition, they were built in the walls between the kitchen area and the [inaudible 00:08:07], the guest room, where guests were entertained.

:              It made it possible so that the women could peek through these boards into the room without showing themselves, because they were not usually … If it was not family, they probably wouldn’t come into the room, but they could look into the room and see what the food needs, or what the needs of people were. Rita, again, found those charming and illustrative of the creativity of the Afghans and their way in solving a social problem, but also of course you see the beauty of their work, of the craftsmen.

:              Also if I look back toward the window to my right, hanging on a tree horse, are some clothing, Afghan clothes. Most of these are of interest to me, although Rita saved some beautiful blouses hanging here. Again, you see the taste of the Afghans, the beauty, the capability, the artwork of Afghans, women. Again, the taste of my wife in choosing interesting kinds of clothes to bring home as souvenirs of our experience in Afghanistan.

:              Among these things hanging on this tree horse are two chapans, one of them more ornate than the other. Chapan is the word for an Afghan coat, and when I was in Hazarajat, some of those were considered priceless gifts. The nice ones that were given away, and I remember the peer would give to people, was felt white, felt warm coats. Notice they have long arms. That was a way of making sure if it really got cold they could crawl in it and wrap themselves in it. Even in summer though, men would wear them loosely around their shoulders, and especially if you’re walking in the heat. The sweat provided a way for them to survive wearing those coats.

:              The more ornate one, I bought as a birthday gift to Rita. I looked all over the place trying to find something nice for her, and I just couldn’t be satisfied. But this one I saw, I was told it was made in Nuristan. It’s a distinctive pattern, not like the other patterns, and it’s a very heavy wool. This wool is hand woven and there’s a name for it. I used to know the name. I’ve now forgotten what the name is for this wool. But they are, it’s of course a heavy wool and very, very warm.

:              I meant for it to be a bath robe for Rita, but if you were to put it on, you would see it weighs about 11 pounds [?]. So in the end she didn’t really use it as a bath robe, but it’s a memorial piece to me, of my intent anyway to do something nice for Rita and the discovery of something that appears to have been made in Nuristan. It’s certainly not the usual kind of thing you find in Kabul.

:              Next to that are the double doors that Rita got for me. It was an amazing decision on her part, and it’s a sign of her thoughtfulness and love for me to come home with these amazing doors. They are like the kinds of doors that we used to see in Afghanistan. They’re actually hanging upside down, I think, but in any case, they’re characteristic of the kinds of doors that you find all over Afghanistan. I’m not sure they’re from Afghanistan. They are from some place in that part of the world, but it was a big expenditure that Rita just somehow couldn’t pass up. Of course I cherish it as a special gift to me.

:              Just to remind you, none of this means anything to anybody else. But to Rita and mean, and what it means to Rita’s going to be a little different than what it means to me. Each one of us has a history, a view on history and a history we would tell. It’s an example to me what a marvel it is of the human mind to retain memory, to attach to specific objects all kinds of subtle sentiments, and for them to represent what we are.

:              So when I’m gone, this will be gone. Except however much I can remember to tell you about what’s here. I use the room as a way of providing a record of something of what our lives have been like. Obviously you look around the room and you see objects that tell that the Middle East Central Asia is an important part of the world for us.

:              I see hanging at my right a thin layer of, I’m not sure it’s wool, but hanging over covering a little lightweight door just to the right of the fireplace. This I got when I was this, and the one to the far end of the room hanging behind the bookcase, I believe I got them both at the time when I was in Kabul for the last time. I was in Kabul, I don’t know, six years, seven years ago. I was invited to give a paper for a conference on Tarzi.

:              That’s kind of another part of my life and experience that I think is interesting to say. I was invited to give a paper in Kabul as part of a conference on Mahmud Tarzi. He was the founder of the Office of Foreign Affairs in the time of Habibullāh. They were celebrating the founding of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Somehow they seemed to have lots of money and they invited a bunch of us to come and write about Mahmud Tarzi. Well I don’t know anything about Tarzi, although I know I read in a … There’s a very nice book about Tarzi by an Italian woman whose name I don’t remember.

:              All I know about Tarzi is what I read there, so I wrote them a note back and said, “I’d love to come. I’m flattered that you asked me to come, but I can’t say anything about Tarzi. If you would accept a paper, since I do want to go, I can give a paper on what was going on in Bamyan in the 1920s about the time when Tarzi was founding the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Habibullāh was the king.” So that seemed to me the only relevant topic I could offer.

:              I didn’t get an answer back. I thought … I actually got my passport up to date, started growing a beard so I would fit in with the scene in Afghanistan, and waited. I didn’t get an answer. Nothing came through to me, and so after several weeks, I gave up. I shaved off my beard and forgot about it. On the Monday before the conference, which was to begin on Saturday, I got a note in my email from the Ministry, from the Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington saying, “We’re so thankful you’re coming to conference.” They told me what to do.

:              Of course, I was thrilled to go, but I was totally unprepared. I didn’t have a paper, but nevertheless I scurried around and got some shots and so on. Fortunately I had a passport that was up to date, and I went. I wrote the paper on the plane and gave the paper. I arrived filthy dirty because I’d been traveling 24 hours, stopping overnight in Delhi, where I sat around for eight hours and then got on the plane. I was so embarrassed to arrive there, because as soon as I arrived, they drove a limousine up to the plane to pick me up and to take me to the conference.

:              I said, “No, no, no. I have to go my hotel. I have to get a shower. I have to get cleaned up. I’m so unworthy.” “No, no,” they said, “You have to go.” So they take me to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with all my baggage in total disarray. They did let me use the bathroom, so I brought all my baggage into the bathroom, and for half an hour did my best to clean myself up and change clothes. Then I went to the conference and I had to give a paper, so I gave that paper because they said they were going to publish all this. As far as I know, it was never published.

:              But in the end of course, I had time to meet other friends while I was there. It was a great time for me sort of as closure to the years I’d spent in Afghanistan. We stayed in a hotel that just above the hill was a little shrine. I went up there to … These shrines have all these hanging cloths that people would come up to the shrine and pray and leave a cloth and pray something will happen. Whatever they’re suffering with, whatever their pain is, crisis in the family, they’re coming there to pray.

:              For me it was a moment for me to give thanks for the great privilege I had of being in Afghanistan for so many years, and not only that, but I had the privilege of studying Afghanistan, learning more about the country that I hadn’t known when I was there. So it was a special privilege. In the meantime, a dear friend, Afghan woman whose name I’ll have to recover, invited me to go with her into the Bazaar. We went together to look what was there, and that’s when I bought these two hanging cloths in the Bazaar.

:              In the meantime, she took me to meet friends of hers, and I was entertained by a truly … a woman who was a member of the royal family. Didn’t meet her husband. She was tall, stately, graceful, and I thought she was even pretty. I thought, “What a wonderful tribute she is to the royal family.” She was married in. She actually was not born into the family, but she took me around her garden and showed me the things that she had there. I found a time when several other guests were there, and I was just privileged to be with them and enjoy the friendship that they provided, the graceful. They were so gracious. Of course the Afghans are always great [inaudible 00:23:00] I love to provide many good things to guests.

:              Now something else in the room, to my left is a [inaudible 00:23:20], this brass boiler. When I got it, I was so privileged to find it, and it turns out the man that he was doing it on, selling it on consignment for, someone in the family. It’s the family of the King of Bohara, who fled, who was driven out by the communists in the 1920s. The King of Bohara was driven out by the communists. After the Bolshevik Revolution, there was all through Central Asia, a number of uprisings against the communist regime. Those, they were known as, and I’ve forgotten the name. I’ll have to look it up.

:              But this [inaudible 00:24:36] from Bohara, you can see the insignia on it in Russian somewhere. In any case, it’s a beautiful piece of brass work that I was thrilled to have. It works. In Kabul, when we had a bunch of guests, we put it out and used it. It’s made for you to put charcoal in the bottom. You light the charcoal and then the air is drawn out through the center and heats the water. In order to make it heat faster, you use this handle that’s now formally attached to it, because I turned it into a lamp. It’s much nicer as a [inaudible 00:25:52] and it goes back to the 1920s in Central Asia. I don’t know if the story that it came from the family of the King of Bohara is true, but that’s what I was told. In any case, it obviously was owned by somebody of wealth.

:              On the floor in front of me is a tray, a copper tray, which we bought in Peshawar. Rita found it and because you can’t eat on copper, because whatever it does, all of these trays were covered with tin. This is very heavy copper, but was covered with tin so that it could be used. That’s in the local setting, it would be used as a tray for a feast. There would be a pile of rice, huge pile of rice on that tray, and people would dip into it. Inside that rice, of course, the way the Afghans do it, is the meat was hidden inside. People had to reach inside to find all the goodies that were inside. It was always delicious.

:              Rita didn’t want it for that purpose. She saw the value and charm of the copper base. So she had someone take that tin cover off with steel wool, and what it now has is copper. If it were cleaned up for guests, this would be gleaming copper, just as the brass [inaudible 00:28:12] would be gleaming brass if we would take the time to burnish it. So anyways, again a sign of Rita’s taste and Rita’s imagination in putting together, taking something local and using it for our own purposes. The frame, the legs under it come also from Peshawar. I think it was [Hyot 00:28:46] is the place where they’d make, they take very hard woods and make very beautiful cabinets and these legs.

:              When were away in Kabul another later time, we rented our house to some people, some girls for the first year. They were not very nice so the Wegmans, who managed it for us, got someone else, some guys. They were very nice except that somebody sat on this tray until the legs broke, so we had to have them repaired. But, poor thing. I’m so thankful for it.

:              Now to my right is a, hanging above the fireplace, is a print from the work of a British artist some time probably mid-to-late 19th century. It has been colored by hand, and it reflects what the British were doing. They always had artists to go with them when the military went out so that they would have a visual record of the places where their armies fought. I remember friends who would scour the old book sections of London looking for these kinds of pictures, and some of them a large price was paid for it.

:              I just said it was mid 19th century. On the lower left corner, the artist has provided his own name, David Roberts. March 18, ’39. This is Petra. Petra being the old Eden in Biblical times and Biblical history. There have been studies of Petra now to show that in fact they had a very elaborate water management system, which made it possible for the large population that lived here to survive. It’s a hidden place. It’s a great natural fortification area, and in fact in the Bible sometimes the word Eden was used to refer simply to a … metaphorically, as a metaphorical extension of the concept of fortress.

:              Then to my left, to my feet, you will see on the left and right side of the fireplace are more relics of our Afghanistan period. The pitcher on the left, we would love to use it but it’s full of holes. It’s rotted out so that it wouldn’t work, but that’s the kind of device that is used when dinner is served. They take one of these things around and pour it over everyone’s hands with, they have a basin under it to go with it. We don’t have the basin. They would pour it over … Everyone would wash hands. So it’s a memorial of mnemonic device of those times, again.

:              But to the left of that is something else. This is a pot that was given to me by my boss, the dean of the faculty. He had been brought in by the chancellor to make some major changes in a way that the university was managed. Turns out the way he did things offended a lot of people. He wanted to completely restructure and reexamine all the departments in the university under his authority, which is the liberal arts departments. I was chair of anthropology at the time, and virtually all over the university nobody wanted him to get into the file, into the department and began to tell them how they ought to reorganize.

:              We had a discussion, a faculty discussion. In the end, we decided to invite him to come and spend some money on getting counsel on what our department should look like and how to improve it. That gave us a special relationship to him. Until that took place, our department was a very marginal department in the university. Once we got his interest and the department began to prosper, we actually got a couple of positions out of it in the long run, and he brought in several people to look at the department and make suggestions.

:              One of them was Laura. This was Laura Nader, N-A-D-E-R. Sister of Ralph Nader, the famous guy who ran for president against Al Gore and probably caused his defeat. But Laura was a well known anthropologist in her own right. Her special area was the Arab Middle East. She is herself Lebanese. The Naders are from Lebanon. So, all other Middle East specialists, her recommendation was, “It’s a great department of anthropology. You have several really good people on the Islamic world, but you don’t have anybody that’s a specialist in the Arab Middle East, so it’ll be a great department if you bring in an Arabist anthropologist.”

:              We never did, but it was typical the way everyone who deals with the Arab Middle East thinks. In any case, the dean put a lot of effort into trying to give us support, and I think that was the beginning of what the department eventually became. It became the most popular department with respect to undergraduate majors proportionate to the student body anywhere in the country. The department of anthropology became the third largest major in the liberal arts college after biology and psychology.

:              The dean told me one time, a different dean, told me one time that … He pointed out that students come to the university knowing what biology was and what psychology was, but they had no idea what anthropology was. But once they began to find out what it was, it began to be very popular. It is very popular even now. In any case, we had a good relationship with the dean who was trying to transform the university. In the meantime, he made lots of enemies. At the certain moment, to this great surprise while he was traveling in the far east, he was fired.

:              Most chairs of departments rejoiced. I was conflicted about all that. He had been so nice to us, so I wrote a note to him telling him how much we appreciated what he had done, and especially regret that he was fired. I sent a carbon copy of that to the chancellor who had fired him. I worried about it, what would that do, I didn’t really know what it meant. I actually didn’t have any impression with that respect. But the dean was so grateful that I would in any case, and our department would in any case, express regret that he had been fired. We took him to lunch as a group one time afterwards, and then he called me over to come to his house.

:              I had no idea what he was doing. He asked Rita and me to come over for coffee and for drinks I think he said, and to the house. I didn’t know what to take, so I got a bottle of wine. Well, I don’t know what wines are. So I paid $20 for a bottle of wine. This guy turns out, is a connoisseur of wines. He’d never heard of it, and I suspect he found out it was not anything special. In any case, what he gave me when we came over to the house was this pot. This pot he bought I’m sure for several hundred dollars in Mexico. It’s a pot in which the locals, some tribe, he didn’t know, I say paperwork goes with it. This is how they make beer. The beer is made out of corn, and you can see around the edge of the pot the ways that it has actually been used.

:              The scorching on the bottom is evident, and you can also see places around the edge where people reached in and got something, some of the beer and dripped onto the edge. It was of course very hot. So it’s a really beautiful piece. It’s a beautiful piece for an anthropologist to have because it’s, again, physical manifestation of the handiwork of a certain group of people in Mexico. But also for me it stands a lot for a special relationship we had with this dean and the ways in which he treated us. One of the things that I also noticed was he thought my wife was very pretty. And she was.

:              So anyway, this stands for a lot of things. There are many other things I could tell you about what it stands for to me, but it’s a relic, a memorial of a special moment in my own history, and relationship with somebody. This man was a close friend of … He was an economist himself, and he’s a close friend of Douglass North, who got The Nobel Prize at one time. The Norths had invited us over for dinner to meet them. The reason I knew the Norths was because as chair, one of the signs of the dean’s support for us was he provided me a small stipend for my own research so I could continue to doing research.

:              I used that to ask for the editorial help of Elisabeth Case. Elisabeth Case had been an editor for Cambridge Press many years ago, many years prior to this. Then she had married Douglass North, and so I came to know her. She was a great critic of my own work. I learned a lot by working with her. It was thanks to her, I think in the long run, that the School of American Research agreed to publish the Turko-Persia book.

Second Half of my exposition of the meanings of souvenirs in our living room.

:              This begins the second portion of my dictation on what exists in our living room that reminds me of our life and our affairs. And I want to just look around the room and point out some of the things that I have not yet commented on.

One of the things that we appreciate so much is a pillow that Kim produced for us with a picture of Kim, Howard, and Steve on it, and everyone who comes into this room notices it and makes some kind of comment on it. We’re grateful for that.

As I stand here looking with the window at my back, I’m looking at the far end of the room, and at the center of the room, of course, is this cabinet of things that Rita has mostly inherited from her mother and her great aunts. Above that is [inaudible 00:01:13] board there, I’ve already said something about. And on either side of this are gifts that were given to me. The bow that’s on the wall there is a replica of Ottoman work given to me. It’s modern. It’s not old. It was given to me by one of my graduate students who’s Turkish herself. She did her work in Kyrgyzstan, and I appreciate very much to see it.

She also wove a scarf for me at one time, which made out of local wool. I suppose that a lot of times when we’re in the field we don’t know what to do with our time. And often we have time, we write up our notes, and we have lots of times when we’re sort of marginal to everything that’s going on. And she must’ve been making scarves for people. So it was very nice to have that. It’s been stolen by now.

The other side is a panel of a Chinese, I guess, it’s meant to be a wall hanging, given to me by another student of mine. He had already had a PhD when he came into anthropology, and he had a hard time getting out of the abstract mode of philosophy into the more empirical mode of what we do in anthropology. We’d go out and talk to people, and it’s what we have to say and what we find out in our conversations with people that are sort of the fundamental baseline of what ethnographic work is. And he gave that to me.

His wife is Chinese. He didn’t do his researching on China, as he at one time had intended to. But his wife is Chinese, and they spent a lot of time in Taiwan, and this comes, I think, from Taiwan. So it’s another relic of a relationship that I appreciate it very much from the past.

On the walls to my right and to my left are other pictures that remind us of special things. On the wall to my right, came to us from Eloise James. Eloise was in Kabul with us for much of the time we were there. She was a teacher of, I think, Howard and later on Steve because she taught in the international school, I think, second and third grade. And she had, in Kabul, collected many interesting things. And also I think this comes from London. The British saved… As I mentioned before, the British had artists to go with them to produce images of the world that these military people were living with. So it’s not the original, but it is a print from it, and it has been colored by hand, and is an image of Kabul in about 1841 or 1842 when the British were there about the time of the first Afghan war.

This is downtown Kabul. I don’t know why I thought so, but I thought it was [inaudible 00:05:15]. [inaudible 00:05:16] was a place that did exist the first time I went there, but it was torn out later and a major hotel was built there later. In any case, it’s a treasure that reminds us of the many years we spent in Kabul.

And then I had a very interesting experience that also I attach to this picture. Several years ago, I got a note from a man who had decided he wanted to translate into Farsi an article that I wrote in anthropology. He liked it well enough that.. He himself has a PhD from Germany, did not have a stable teaching job, but nevertheless was still interested in academic affairs. I, of course, was flattered that he would want to do that. And at one time he then presented me with a Farsi translation of this article.

Actually, it’s a difficult article, and so I’m sure that he had a lot of trouble figuring out the kind of terms he wanted to use. It’s about spatial relations and the way that special relations affected the way that power was exerted out from Kabul to its provincial areas. So in any case, I was flattered.

Then one day he wrote, and he said he wants to come and visit me. And it turns out that the time he was going to come was the weekend of Easter. And I thought he was coming by himself then it turns out he’s bringing his wife, and I said, “Okay, well then, you will be our guest at Washington University. We’ll find a place to put you up, and it’ll be great to have you here.”

Then he sent me a note and said, well, his son who is a student in California wants to come, so they will be coming. And he has a daughter who was a student at Boston University, it turned out, she wants to come. So here is a whole family of five that wants to be my guest on Easter weekend.

And so they showed up, and we decided we had no choice but to put them up at the Knight Center at Washington University, which a very nice place. And so then I said, “I don’t know how much time I can give you because it turns out it’s Easter, and we will be going to church on Easter Sunday, and you’re welcome to join us if you want or not.” And so he said, “Well, we will join you.”

So here this Afghan family comes and joins us to go to an Easter service produced by The Journey. There were probably six or 7,000 people there in the Shabbat Sabbath Center because The Journey at that time had several satellite areas, and they all came together for one major Easter service. And so this family came with me. Fahim was in town, and he came as well, so we all had a huge [inaudible 00:08:51] that then went to the Easter service.

I don’t know how we managed lunch. Did we have lunch here? We must have had lunch here because they came to the house, and it was nice to see them. They were certainly interesting people. And I pointed out this painting. They all were dazzled by this painting and they wanted to have their picture taken with it.

So they came, their whole family arrayed around the picture, and we took a picture of them for their benefit. What I don’t know is did I get one for myself? I’m not sure that I did. In any case, what I remember is this weekend when what I thought would be a man coming himself to visit, but his whole family came, and they were our guests for that weekend. It was a privilege to be with them, and it was fun to see how much they enjoyed being able to see this picture, which of course, reminded them of many things that have long passed in Afghanistan.

Opposite this picture, on the other wall, is a painting of a young girl wearing Kalash dress. Kalash are the peoples who lived up in the mountains between the northern part of Pakistan and of Afghanistan. And she was on the Pakistani side. On the Pakistani side, they’re called Kalash or sometimes called Kafir, Kafir Kalash, unbeliever Kalash. But the unbelievers and the Kafirs point goes back to the days when they were being harassed by a Muslim population. They had retained all traditions that went back before the founding, before the arrival of Islam into Afghanistan and Pakistan.

On the Afghanistan side, Abdur Rahman, in the late 1890s, decided that as a way of securing his credentials as a proper Muslim ruler, he decided that he would convert the people of Nuristan, what is now called Nuristan. It was then called Kalfitistan, and he took an army up into Nuristan and forcibly converted the people in that area to be Muslims and changed the name from what he was calling Kalfitistan to now Nuristan, the place of light. And here she is, she represents that old tradition which is better preserved on the Pakistani side where Abdur Rahman did not venture in his war against unbelievers.

Now I want to say something about the carpet that is hanging on the wall near the fireplace. When we were in Kabul, this would have been in about 1960, I decided I wanted a really nice carpet. And I looked all through the bazaar and negotiated at various times. Never bought anything until I finally found a carpet that was the finest, most beautiful carpet I could find anywhere. It was just glorious. The Turkmen were out, of course. That’s what are available in Afghanistan, and I brought it home.

I was so proud of it. We put it on the wall and turns out after a while the gardener, [Imam Ali 00:00:13:40], wasn’t paying attention and somehow he poured water…. He was watering the lawn. He wasn’t paying attention and the water came into the house and got all over this glorious carpet. And I was humiliated. Of course, it’s shriveled up and it began to have parts of it that need to be straightened. It could be straightened, but nonetheless, it wasn’t straight at that. It was all messed up.

So I took it. I realized that for me, for my family, with three kids, to have something this nice was just too much. So I took it back. The man who sold it to me had said that he would buy it back at that price, so I could take it back. I took it back, and he straightened it, and he gave me my money back. But I did decide with that money I would buy several less perfect carpets. This was one of my favorites of those that I retrieved from that experience. I bought two or three. And this is pretty old. It was old when I bought it, old in the sense it was like 30 years old when I bought it.

I bought it, as I said, about 1960. So it’s probably getting close to a hundred years old and I like it very much. It reminds me of many of the beautiful things about Afghanistan. There are lots of better carpets and finer carpets around, but the colors fit our color scheme here, and it certainly represents the fine workmanship of the Turkmens in Northern Afghanistan.

As far as I can note right now, this concludes my comments, my discussion of the memories that I bring to the souvenirs of my mind in the many years and times past. And as I say, they are mnemonic devices that remind me of my affairs, my life, and my experience because they are shared because in various ways each one shares something about the mnemonic device for me with other people. They’re Cultural. They’re devices that bring to mind significant memories and associations. But they’re different for each one of us. So when I’m gone, maybe somebody will be interested. I can’t believe there are very many people that would care about our experience, but I assume that we will someday have grandchildren or great grandchildren that will want to know all of this.

Let me add one more thing. There is a table in this room. We call it the red rosewood table. I can’t remember what part of it is rosewood. The legs were not invented to go with this table, but it’s a nice combination, and Rita was delighted to have it. She was thrilled. Rita went through a time when she wanted to… She loved furniture, and she wanted to get an additional few things. And so this is one of them.

I think that she is really proud of of it. And you’ll notice the lion claw legs. The lion claw legs are sort of like the lion claw legs that Kim has in her house on the table that Kim has in her house that was made by my grandfather on my mother’s side, a man whom I never knew because he died young. I understand he had been a painter, mostly busy on the Oklahoma A and M Campus, now named Oklahoma State University, in Stillwater.

 

 

[Friday, February 21, 2020]

Zohrab and Roy networks; find also the details on the swindle of the Soviet Union by the Uzbek bureaucrats [???]

2006. F. Robertson. 2006. Misunderstanding Corruption.  AT 22(2): 8-11. See

The JI was founded in Malaysia on 1 January 1993 by Abdullah Sungkar who was there in exile from Indonesia with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (Conboy, 2005: 34). [FROM:  Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asia, Jamaah Islamiyah and Regional Terrorism: Kinship and Family Links, By Noor Huda Ismail, Jan 8, 07:  http://japanfocus.org/products/details/2318, accessed Jan 10,2007]

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The Underside of State Power in Greater Central Asia

1. Preliminaries

The collapse of the Soviet Union was an event of public note, not only formally announced by Gorbachev but also widely remarked around the world, but since then some very non-public developments have been taking place in Central Asia that may equal it in importance.  As the ex-Soviet states in Central Asia have sought to exercise their new sovereignty, as Iran and Pakistan have sought to establish new positions in the world, and as Afghanistan has tried to form a viable state, other developments have been taking place on the underside of these public affairs.  Secret activities — non-legal, illegal, criminal practices – have been becoming a way of life for growing numbers of otherwise ordinary “law-abiding” citizens.

What Nordstrom has called “shadow networks” have become a powerful force in many parts of the world.  Shadow networks are “vast extra-state networks who move goods and services worldwide – networks that broker power comparable to, and in many cases greater than, a number of the world’s states.”[1]  “While these networks are not comprised by states themselves, neither are they entirely distinct from, or opposite to states – they work both through and around formal state representatives and institutions.”  “They cross various divides between legal, quasi-legal, gray markets and downright illegal activities.”[2]  They “forge economic policies, … operate within political realms, … fashion foreign policy. … [develop] dispute resolution systems and systems of enforcements… [and] have codes of conduct and rules of behavior set in social and cultural systems …”[3]  Because they persist even when states collapse they provide vital mechanisms of social integration.  Black markets are, in effect, “more powerful than formal institutions:  they set the ‘true’ currency prices for an entire nation.”  Such extra-state mechanisms of pricing are “both vast and powerful, transmitting untold fortunes through family and ethnic linkages, business partnership and triad associations.”[4]

They are significant in their economic importance and, owing to their informal connections with powerful people, in their political influence.  Altogether they “employ millions of people and generate more than a trillion dollars annually”; the combined annual value of illicit drug and weapons sales, for instance, amounts to one trillion dollars.[5]  The scale of the underground economy and its political mechanisms is something new.  As Manuel Castells puts it, “Crime is as old as humankind.  But global crime, the networking of powerful criminal organizations, and their associates, in shared activities throughout the planet, is a new phenomenon that profoundly affects international and natural economies, politics, security, and ultimately, societies at large.”[6]

Considered illicit in some contexts these networks are nonetheless integrated into the world market system, which operates outside the reach of all state controls.  Susan Strange says, “… the impersonal forces of world markets, integrated over the post-war period more by private enterprise in finance, industry and trade than by the cooperative decisions of government, are now more powerful than the state to whom ultimate political authority over society and economy is supposed to belong.”[7]

In this article I point out the significance of such networks in the region of our concern, Greater Central Asia, by examining the evidence for the rising power of shadow networks in the last few decades.

My project does have an obvious problem, however:  the inaccessibility and unreliability of information.  Shadow networks exist of course by avoiding public scrutiny and escaping state controls so that an attempt to describe how they are constituted, what they do, and how they have grown is hampered by the paucity of reliable information.  Enough is available, however – and much of it is undisputed even if it is of necessity only speculative – so that it is possible to construct from secondary sources a narrative of their activities over the last few decades in Greater Central Asia.

1. A fragmentary social history of shadow developments in Central Asia

I review the growth of these networks — non-statal “protection rackets” [8] – in the following periods:  (1) notable shadow activities extant in the 1970s; (2) the decade of the 1980s ending in 1991 when the Soviet Union evaporated; (3) the first half of the 1990s to 1996 when the Taliban seized Kabul and Osama bin Laden returned to Afghanistan; (4) the latter half of the 1990s up to autumn, 2001, when the Americans attacked the Taliban; and finally (5) the period from late 2001 to the present (2006).

(1) Some notable shadow activities in the 1970s. 

As a general rule it appears that many ordinary people in the countries of greater Central Asia fear and resent their governments and use various devices of holding officials at a distance.  Subterfuge is a way of life.  But it takes different forms in different places.  In the Central Asian states of the Soviet Union the government had in the 1970s so thoroughly penetrated local affairs and the economy that most people effectively worked in the service of the Soviet Union.  We know little about how carefully ordinary people complied with government regulations, but we do know that some officials in the Soviet system found ways to subvert the system to their own benefit, the most famous of them being Sharif Rashidov, head of the Communist Party, Uzbekistan, from 1959 to 1983, who bilked the Soviet Union of millions of dollars by over reporting cotton production.[9]

In the countries to the south of the Soviet Union political affairs were generally unsettled in the 1980s.  In 1978 and 1979 Iran and Afghanistan were in the throes of “revolutions”.  The Iranian Revolution was a broadly supported popular movement, although the specific nature of the new system being established under Ayatollah Khomeini was as yet unclear.  But Afghanistan’s “revolution” was something different altogether.  Despite their “revolutionary” claims, those who seized power in spring, 1978, were a relatively unknown group of Communists, and hardly had they come to power than they faced rebellions in many rural communities.  By mid-1979 they were losing their army to desertions and defections, a situation that prompted the Soviet Union to make the fatal decision to send troops into Afghanistan to stabilize the situation.  The war that continued for the next decade provided a context for the development of shadow activities that have become important today.

Pakistan, whose fortunes became more linked with inner Asia, was closely involved in activities in the Afghanistan war.  But another development that would become a vital secret project for the country started in 1976.  Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan had recently returned to Pakistan from Europe bringing “stolen uranium enrichment technologies from Europe,” acquired through his position at the classified URENCO uranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands.  Put in charge of building, equipping and operating Pakistan’s Kahuta facility, he developed an extensive clandestine network in order to obtain the necessary materials and technology to enrich uranium preparatory to developing a nuclear bomb.[10]  As a government sponsored program this project was kept under wraps for years, but Dr. Khan would – perhaps without the knowledge of Pakistani authorities (?) – eventually peddle his nuclear expertise to other countries, notably (as far as we know so far) to Libya, North Korea, and Iran.  What was a state-sponsored clandestine activity in the 1970s became a private “shadow” enterprise unmonitored by any state in the 1980s and 1990s.

Another sub rosa activity, with the Pakistan government’s consent if not connivance, was the anti-American activity of the Jamaat-i Islami party – a small elite party in which “full membership … was given only after years of proven service …”  The party had, according to Abbas “thousands of adherents, mostly among the student community, many of whom were toughs adept at strong-arm tactics.”[11]  They showed off their skills in November, 1979, when they organized a mob to storm and burn down the United States Embassy in Islamabad, killing two Americans and two Pakistani employees.  Mobs also attacked American cultural centers in Rawalpindi and Lahore.  The demonstrations had apparently been prompted by Iranian-inspired rumors that Americans were responsible for an attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca, but they were less spontaneous than they appeared:  the Jama’at-i Islami party had been looking for an excuse to mimic the student attack on the American in Tehran few weeks earlier and the rumors provided it.[12]

1980 -1991:  A decade of many changes

In the 1980s new conflicts and abrupt shifts in social and political situations would upset the lives of people in many parts of the region, culminating in one of the momentous events in history, the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Intending to remain in Afghanistan for only a brief period, the Soviets had found themselves bogged down in what became an unwinable war.  American support for the opposition was one of the reasons and its involvement gave birth to several important “shadow” movements that would affect the rest of the world.  Essentially to punish the Soviets for their part in the Viet Nam war, the American CIA was  pouring billions of dollars into the opposition groups who called themselves “mujahedin.”  The conduit for this wealth was Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), originally a modest agency that was transformed by the war effort into a huge “parallel structure to the Pakistani state”[13] that funneled billions of dollars worth of assistance to the mujahedin.

But as the war dragged on, despite the large infusions of cash, more was required.  The CIA/ISI hatched the idea of expanding the financial resources of the opposition effort by encouraging the Afghan peasants to produce opium for international consumption.  The relatively limited practice by a few peasants of cultivating some opium poppies for local consumption, often for medicinal purposes, was transformed into a huge international drug industry that nourished the insatiable demand of the capitalist world.  “As the Mujahedin advanced and conquered new regions, they were told to impose a levy on opium to finance the revolution.  To pay the tax, farmers planted more poppies.  Drug merchants from Iran… offered growers credit in advance of their crops … [W]ith the help of the ISI the Mujahedin opened hundreds of heroin laboratories.  Within two years the Pakistan –Afghanistan borderland had become the biggest center for the production of heroin in the world … Annual profits were estimated between $100 billion and $200 billion.”[14]

Broadening of the drug trade:  Global corrupt networks

N93  “Between 1983 and 1992, narcotics revenues for Pakistan rose from $384 million to $1.8 Billion thanks to the intervention of the ISI.  “

The opium/heroin industry in turn financed other forms of illicit trade.  “While heroin was smuggled out of the region, high-tech equipment was smuggled in.  … [The ISI started] a prosperous smuggling business of duty-free goods.  The trucks were ‘taxed’ at various roadblocks by corrupt Pakistani customs officers and the transport Mafia; warlords who controlled the territories they had to cross levied their own taxes and even customs officials in Kabul took their own cut.”[15]  By the 1990s the smuggling network would “extend into Central Asia, Iran and the Persian Gulf, [and would represent] a crippling loss of revenue for all these countries but particularly Pakistan, where local industry has been decimated by the smuggling of foreign consumer goods.”  It became the biggest smuggling racket in the world.  Rashid reports that in the 1990s “[m]any of the huge Mercedes and Bedford trucks [passing through the Afghanistan-Pakistan border] are stolen and have false number plates.  The goods they carry have no invoices.  The drivers may cross up to six international frontiers on false driving licenses and without route permits or passports.  The consignments range from Japanese camcorders to English underwear and Earl Grey tea, Chinese silk to American computer parts, Afghan heroin to Pakistani wheat and sugar, East European Kalashnikovs to Iranian petroleum – and nobody pays customs duties or sales tax.”[16]

N86:  “The costs throughout the anti-Soviet Jihad were phenomenal. … To function, the pipeline relied on complex and expensive infrastructures located around the world.  The keep arms, drugs, duty-free good, smuggled products and cash moving, money had to change hands many times, and each exchange had a cost.  … handled by very expensive hidden banking structures … Theft was rampant …”

The impact of this contraband industry was to corrupt a widening circle of Pakistani officials, especially those directly engaged in the war effort.   “Pakistani customs officers at the various borders with Afghanistan … often demanded bribes to let the convoys of supplies pass. Commanders and fighters needed cash to buy their way out of jail.”[17]  “All the Pakistani agencies involved were taking bribes – Customs, Customs Intelligence, CBR [Central Board of Revenue], the Frontier Constabulary and the administrators in the tribal belt.  Lucrative customs jobs on the Afghan border were ‘bought’ by applicants who paid bribes to senior bureaucrats ….”[18]

To enable the flow of cash for this enterprise the CIA sought “an ad hoc infrastructure” of international finance.  The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) turned out to be an ideal vehicle for transferring and laundering money.  “[T]he CIA regularly utilized BCCI accounts to fund its covert operations.  Moreover, the BCCI was extremely well connected in the murky underworld of illegal arms.  … its ‘black network’ [was] virtually a secret banking institution within the bank [BCCI].”   “By the mid-1980s, the black network had gained control of the port of Karachi and handled all customs operations for CIA shipments to Afghanistan, including the necessary bribes for the ISI.”[19]

Another underground funding activity of the BCCI was the nuclear project already underway in Pakistan.  “From the mid-1980s, the bank [BCCI] donated large sums of money (up to $10 million) to finance a secret science laboratory run by Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan …”[20]  Its support would have been vital to the success of the project.  “In 1985 Pakistan crossed the threshold of weapons-grade uranium production, and by 1986 it is thought to have produced enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Pakistan continued advancing its uranium enrichment program, and according to Pakistani sources, the nation acquired the ability to carry out a nuclear explosion in 1987.”[21]

There was another source of shadow activity that would be born and nourished in this setting and then exported to many other places.  In “[a] joint venture between the Saudis, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-e-Islami, put together by the ISI”[22] Muslims from other countries were invited to participate in the “holy war” against the Soviets.  Most of them came from the Arab world, although many were from elsewhere.  Rashid calls those who came “radicals”:  “Between 1982 and 1992 some 35,000 Muslim radicals from 43 Islamic countries in the Middle East, North and East Africa, Central Asia and the Far East would pass their baptism under fire with the Afghan Mujahedin.  Tens of thousands more foreign Muslim radicals came to study in the hundreds of new madrassas that Zia’s military government began to fund in Pakistan and along the Afghan border.  Eventually more than 100,000 Muslim radicals were to have direct contact with Pakistan and Afghanistan and be influenced by the jihad.”[23]  But I wonder if some of them were perhaps less radical Islamists than disaffected progressives, frustrated with the repressions of their own Middle Eastern governments.  In those countries mere criticism was taken as evidence of disloyalty, even treason, so that those who objected to state abuses of power were effectively criminalized.  Kohlman says that “[a]mong these radical youth, talk of overthrowing hated Middle Eastern governments in a suicidal wave of terror resonated much more clearly than manning an artillery post … in Afghanistan.”[24]  No wonder their governments were happy to ship off such people to fight “holy war” elsewhere.[25]

The arrival of the “Arab-Afghans” in Afghanistan was facilitated by a devout Wahhabi cleric from Saudi Arabia named Sheikh Abdullah Azzam.  In 1984 with funds received from Saudi Intelligence, the Saudi Red Crescent, the World Muslim League and individual Saudi princes, he established an organization in Peshawar, Makhtab al Khidmat (“services center”), to support the Arab-Afghan project.  In 1985 he reached an agreement with Abd-i-Rab Rasoul Sayyaf, head of the “Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen” organization, for one of its training camps to be used to train the first twenty-five Arab-Afghans.  At about that time, among those who came from the Middle East[26] was a former student of Azzam, Osama Bin Laden, whose wealth and connections gave him prominence and influence among the Arab-Afghan visitors.  When Azzam was mysteriously assassinated in November, 1989, Bin Ladin took over the organization, and under his leadership the organization transform into something new.  Wht began as an organization to support the holy war against the Soviet Union became an international “web of radical organizations that helped carry out the World Trade Centre bombing and the bombings of US Embassies in Africa in 1998.”[27]  And more.

Thus, in the 1980s several notable shadow enterprises took form and rose in scale and financial importance in greater Central Asia.  The CIA’s “secret” supply system for the mujahedin was developed in this period; the illicit drug industry and the attendant system of smuggling manufactured goods into the area was encouraged and financially enabled by the CIA/ISI and the BCCI; and Dr. Khan’s secret nuclear project for the Pakistan government and his private marketing network to other governments began to develop in this period.

1989-1992

But systemic changes were in the offing throughout the region that would allow and in some cases require adjustments in the shadow already operating.  In 1988 it became clear to everyone that the effort in Afghanistan against the Soviets was paying off, for on January 11 Gorbachev announced that the Soviets would withdraw their troops from Afghanistan and be completely out by spring of the next year.  Also, the Soviets and Americans jointly announced an agreement to cease support for their respective sides by December, 1991.   That alignments would have to change was now clear.  Everyone would have to scramble for new ways to protect themselves and their interests as the old relations of power gave way.  On element of the coming realignment could scarcely have been foreseen by many:  The mighty Soviet Union would expire with scarcely a whimper.

Momentous events began to take place in rapid succession.  By February, 1989, Soviet troops had quit Afghanistan.  Within the Soviet Union there were signs that the integrity of the empire was weakening:  In 1987 the Polish government recognized the Solidarity movement and within a few months the Communists would be voted out in Poland.

1988:  In Tajikistan a three-sided struggle for dominance was already underway – Communists (centered in Khojand), officially recognized Islamic leaders (centered in Dushambe), and revivalist-democratic forces (centered in Kulab).

In 1988 there is ethnic unrest in the Baltic republics; the Nagorno-Karabakh soviet breaks for Azerbaijan to join with the Armenian republic, creating a violent conflict.  In June Gorbachev becomes president of the Soviet Union.  In 1989 the first multi-candidate elections are held in various sectors of the Soviet Union; Yeltsin and Sakharov overwhelmingly win seats in the Congress of People’s Deputies.  In the mean time protesters in Georgia demand independence; Coal miners strike in Siberia, Ukraine, Central Asia; there are demonstrations in the Baltic states and the Ukraine for independence; Armenia and Azerbaijani engaged in civil war.  And in eastern Europe the Berlin Wall comes down.  In 1990 Lithuania declares independence; Yeltsin resigns from the Communist Party; the Russian republic declares its own sovereignty.  The year 1991 was decisive: Boris Yeltsin became the first democratically elected President of independent Russia; an attempted coup fails; Latvia declares its independence; Gorbachev resigns as head of CP and Yeltsin closes Pravda and disbands CP; the independence of the Baltic states is  recognized; Ukraine becomes independent; the Presidents of Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, without consulting any other republic presidents, sign a treaty to abolish USSR and form themselves as a Commonwealth of Independent States; Gorbachev announces his resignation and USSR ceases to exist.

In 1989 the Berlin Wall fell.  The Soviet bloc collapsed as communist governments lost elections or underwent democratization in Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  The first elections for the Congress of People’s Deputies were held in the USSR.  In June, 1989, riots and other disturbances broke out in Soviet Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan).  New political parties were formed in Soviet Central Asia:  Birlik in Uzbekistan (May, 1989), Rastokhiz (Rebirth) National Front, which would become important in Tajikistan (September, 1989), the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (January, 1990), Erk, which broke away from Birlik in February, 1990.  In May, 1991, Boris Yeltsin was elected President of the Russian Republic in the first free election in the Soviet Union.  In August, 1991, a putsch attempt against Gorbachev collapsed in four days, but not before several leaders of Central Asian republics had embarrassed themselves by supporting the putsch.   In December Kazakhstan seceded from the Soviet Union, several Slavic republic leaders formed the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Gorbachev resigned as President of the Soviet Union, effectively announcing its final expiration.  The Communist government of Afghanistan survives for three more months but finally falls in April, 1992, marking the conclusion of a long struggle in Afghanistan, and of an era.  But it would almost immediately segue into another painful war, only perhaps even more cruel than ever, among the mujahedin themselves.

The impact on the Islamist imagination was extreme elation.  As the Muslims who had fought the Soviets saw it, they had defeated the second most powerful empire in the world.  Some of them now believed they were ready to take on the other great world empire in the name of Islam, the United States.  But also it was perhaps time to bring their skills to bear on the apostate regimes in their various home countries.  Many of the “Arab Afghans” began to disperse back to their home countries, where they would promote Islamism.

They were a new kind of ideological force.  By 1990 “a small group of motivated fundamentalists, upset by the degraded state of the Muslim world, had been transformed in five short years into an influential transnational terrorist army backed by the fabulous wealth of Usama Bin Laden, ….”[28]  What the Arab-Afghans took back to their respective countries was a knowledge of warfare and a commitment to Islamism that would generate crises wherever they went.  “[T]he Afghan jihad, with the support of the CIA, had spawned dozens of fundamentalist movements across the Muslim world which were led by militants who had grievances, not so much against the Americans, but their own corrupt, incompetent regimes.”[29]  The first notable indication of their impact would take place in Algeria in 1991, when the Islamic Salvation Front won the first round of parliamentary elections, prompting a military crackdown and a civil war that in the next seven years would take the lives of  70,000 Algerians.[30]  Similarly, the activities of “Afghan Arabs” in Egypt, Chechnya, Bosnia, and the Philippines would be expressed in violent activities.

In the mean time they had become unwelcome back in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  By 1993 the Pakistani government was closing down the Arab-Afghan offices, creating a problem for the unbroken flow of new volunteers for holy war coming from virtually all over the world by now.  The Bosnian civil war conveniently provided a new site for them to fight in the name of God. [31]

Osama Bin Laden himself had left Afghanistan in 1990, disappointed at the internal bickering among the mujahedin.  His return to Saudi Arabia at that time seemed to be fortuitous, as it was just before Saddam Hussein’s August invasion of Kuwait.  Bin Laden volunteered the services of the Arab-Afghans, confident of their ability to repulse the Iraqi army.  He opposed the use of American troops as they become ensconced on the sacred soil where Islam began.  But his proposal was rejected, and the clash that eventuated between him and the Saudi establishement became so intense that the was expelled from the country and deprived of his citizenship.  [Griffin]

These events stimulated the imagination of young Muslims all over the Middle East and Central and South Asia.  Young volunteers were still coming forward to join the holy war, inspired by the successes of the Afghanistan war.  They reflected the growing sense among many that the secular tradition that had dominated public affairs in the Muslim world had not worked, and they were ready to consider Islam as a way to deal with the problems of their world.  Young people in many parts of the Muslim world were reading the works of Ibn Taymiya and Sayyed Qutb[32].  In Pakistan “The jihad literature became a popular genre in the 1990s …Readers of these materials are often younger people who are searching for meaning in their lives and who have little to look forward to in a stagnant economy and disintegrating society.”[33]  Zia’s emphasis on Islam as a way of legitimating his claims on power and of directing attention to Kashmir no doublt contributed to this new interest in Islam.

As the war in Afghanistan wound down the Pakistan government in 1989 instigated a new “Kashmir insurgency”[34] where the young warriors graduating from the many local madrassas of the country could be absorbed.  They had been educated in the Saudi Arabian funded madrassas that become every more important to the citizenry as the Pakistan government failed to provide sufficient funds for its own educational system.[35]

Moreover, the Pakistan government committed itself clandestinely to promoting Islam all over the Central Asian world left high and dry by the demise of the Soviet Union.

1. 89: “The ISI continued to export Islamist warriors from Pakistan to Central Asia and the Caucasus.  While Soviet troops began a painful retreat from Afghanistan, a stream of covert operations was launched in Central Asia.  The ISI acted as ‘a catalyst for the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new republics in Central Asia’.  … [with the demise of the Sov Un] the ISI played a pivotal role in supporting Islamist armed insurgencies which destabilized [the Central Asian republics].”

N94  [re Chechnya] The Pakistani plan was to encourage Islamist insurgency in Chechnya, forcing the Russians to fight in the Caucasus.  Accordingly, in 1994 the ISI began nurturing Shamil Basayev, a young Chechen field commander.  He was trained and indoctrinated among with a small group of lieutenants at the Amir Muawi camp in the Khost province in Afghanistan.  … Experienced instructors … were also sent to Chechnya to train future fighters. … [95] The master plan for Islamist insurgency in the Caucasus and Kashmir was drawn up at a meeting held in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1996 and attended by the ISI and various Islamist armed groups.  Osama bin Laden and high-ranking Iranian intelligence officers were also present.”

N 95 [in 1995] Basyev, and later Khattab [his deputy], linked up with criminal organizations in Russia as well as with Albanian organized crime and the Kosovo Liberation Army… These alliances proved fruitful in generating profits from the drug trade and contraband, especially that of arms.  Chechnya soon became an important hub for various rackets, including kidnapping and the trade in counterfeit dollars…”

N96:  “… from Chechnya, Mujahedin fighters would continue to move west along the drug route to Albania and Kosovo, reaching the eastern frontier of Europe

Moreover, inside Pakistan many local Islamist organizations took form.  For instance, Lashkar-i Tayba.

1. 213: LT “receives grants from around the world, mostly from well-to-do Ahle-Hadith/Wahhabi sympathizers, though their primary source has been contributions from Saudi Arabia. … Handsome monetary rewards to the families of boys who sacrificed their lives in Kashmir and regular monthly income for the families of jihadis fighting in Kashmir made jihad an attractive venture for unemployed youth …”[36]

Another factor in the grown numbers of young men committing themselves to holy war was the weak economy.  In the region of the former Soviet states of Central Asia, as Pakistan survived by soaking up funds for holy war from the oil-rich Muslim nations, the economy faltered.  All across Central Asia there was a collapse of employment opportunity created by the collapse of the Soviet Union.

N 109  “from 1990 to 2000, income inequality more than tripled, a third of the world population was forced to live below the poverty line …  Along the periphery of the former Soviet Union, extreme poverty supplied armed groups with fertile ground for recruitment. Secessionist movements inside the new federation, as in the Caucasus, produced ethnic conflicts, as did nationalist movements within newly formed states.”

While Pakistan was skimping on funds for its own educational system it was funding Islamist groups in the ex-Soviet states of Central Asia, especially the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

N 92 “Financially and militarily backed by ISI, the IMU found widespread support among the local tribes of the Fergana valley in its fight against the newly formed governments of the republics.

N 92 “Given that 60 percent of the [Fergana] valley’s population is below the age of 25, it is a fertile recruitment ground for Islamist armed groups.

Criminal connections with Islamism

P207:  “Realizing that sectarian outfits were untouchable entities, professional criminals hastened to join these groups and benefit from this window of opportunity.  For instance, when about five hundred trained gunmen belonging to MQM [????] were abandoned by their masters [date???] , they tentatively turned to the SSP [Sepahi Sahaba] in search of a job.  They found it to be a promising career.  All they had to do was grow beards and learn a few anti-Shia lessons.  The rest they were accustomed to – butchering people.”

P206:  “local criminals and thugs were hired [by the SSP] to do the “needful” [eliminate Shias].  Criminal elements soon realized that this was a mutually beneficial deal – coming under the umbrella of religious outfits provided a perfect cover for their own activities.  Over time, the drug traders also developed their ties with sectarian groups, especially the SSP, reproducing in Pakistan relationships between militant groups and drug traffickers that had already evolved in Afghanistan.”

p.207:  “… other small outfits were mainly ‘personal mafias of influential feudals, led by local mullahs’” [source:  Herald, Karachi, June 1994, p. 29].

P 206-7:  Riaz Basra [who murdered someone on behalf of SSP] was arrested “but he had ‘influential’ friends … who helped Basra escape …  Basra was operating in league with some junior ISI agents …”

The illicit trade that linked Afghanistan and Pakistan with the rest of the world was matched by some specifidc attempts of Pakistani intelligence to foster Islamist movements in Kashmir but also in Chechnya and elsewhere.

Islamism and illicit support is exported to Central Asia and elsewhere

N 119:  Partnership in the Afghan heroin trade financed Islamist groups all over Asia, including China.  Opium and heroin flooded the province of Xinjiang and also helped to support the Uighur rebellion against the government of Beijing.”

2.23 Afghanistan

2.23.1  1992-96:  Afghanistan – Mujahedin war

Destruction of Kabul [Rashid, griffin]

All these affairs were taking place as the Mujahedin were fighting over control of Kabul, destroying the city.

2.23.2  1994:   Rise of the Taliban

>  Taliban:  appeal to local demand for order, Islamic ideals [early Taliban, later Pak Taliban, ;

Powerful link with Pakistan:

Benazir’s involvement:  linking up of Pakistan’s NWFP to Afghanistan

2.3 1996-2001

In Afghanistan:

>  1996:

Two critical events in 1996:  Taliban take Kabul; Osama returns.  This time to wage holy war against the U.S.

Taliban vs Northern Alliance

N119:  “… relations between state-shells, Muslim and Islamic states tend to be cooperative and characterized by trust, sometimes even among enemies. … A delegation from [the two sides] met and negotiated a deal.  Accordingly, a corridor was opened between the two forces to allow the drug couriers through, while Northern Alliance and Taliban warriors continued killing each other.”

Osama returns from Sudan

Bin Laden himself left Afghanistan in 1990 disillusioned by the local bickering among the parties and many were already establishing themselves elsewhere.

1996-2001:  the radicalization of Islamism in Afghanistan and the wider region

>  1996-2001  Northern Alliance vs Taliban

>  1998: [1996?]

Osama declares war

In Pakistan?

Pak has acquired the bomb?  When?

Abbas 232:  A possible “Pakistani hand in the development of North Korea’s nuclear program…“It is widely known that Pak had imported North Korean missle technology, and its nuclear-capable missile “Ghauri” greatly resembles North Korea’s Nodong …

Abbas 231:  “… Pakistan nuclear scientists’ links with Iranian and Libyan nuclear programs were unearthed in late 2003….

Nuclear Tests:  “On May 28, 1998 Pakistan announced that it had successfully conducted five nuclear tests.”  http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/index.html

Lee 2006:27-28:  “state-sponsored proliferation” [of corruption] ‘in which high government officials covertly transfer strategic nuclear goods to client states or groups, either for personal gain or as a matter of policy.  The black market network run by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan … pioneered the centrifuge enrichment program that enabled Pakistan to prodeuce nuclear arms.  Khan is known to have sold key components of a nuclear weapons program … to Iran, North Korea and Lybia.  Libya also received blueprints … .  [A]n Iranian exile group claims that the network provided an undisclosed quantity of HEU [????] to the Iranian government in 2001.

P293:  “… a U.S. State Department report [released April 2000]… pinpointed South Asia for the first time as a major center of international terrorism… asserted that Pakistan ‘has tolerated terrorists living and moving freely within its territory’ besides supporting ‘groups that engage in violence in Kashmir’… The report concluded that the treat of terrorism now came less from state-sponsored attacks than form ‘loose networks’ of groups and individuals motivated more by religion or ideology than by politics and financed increasingly by drug trafficking, crime, and illegal trade.”

>  Central Asian movements:  Chechnya

By this time the deals were done and the secrets [all of them?] were out.  In March, 2001, Qadeer Khan was removed from his position in the Khan research laboratories  and given a ceremonial positon… … to a majority of Pakistanis, Qadeer Khan continues to be viewed as a national hero because very few people in Pakistan are ready to believe that he did all this [deception] on his own.””

2. history

2.4  2001 – 2006.  After the attacks of 9/11/01.

2.41.  Pakistan and Afghanistan.  At this time the two countries – at least the southern part of Afghanistan – were linked up.  Phone exchange.

2.41.1 After the attack:

P223-4:  “General Hamed Gul …[argued] that, besides Zionist collaborators, elements from within the U.S. government were involved in the terrorist act.”

2.41.2  Musharaf changes course

Musharraf forced to change course away from Taliban [but not Kashmir]

Internally Pak is conflicted:  Islamists vs secular/westernized Pak

Kashmir continues

2.41.3:  Continued popular support fort the Taliban in Pakistan

>  Taliban, with many Pakistanis helping:  popular and government

Abbas 223: “… the call for jihad in support of the Taliban [against the Americans in Oct, 2001] resounded from mosques all across Pakistan. …. It is estimated that around ten thousand Pakistani jihadis crossed into Afghanistan to fight along with the Taliban.”

2.41.4:   Taliban defeated:  Pakistan allowed to bring out its people [gov’t and popular] [Griffin??]

2.42  Afghanistan

2.42.1     In Afghanistan a government is formed, elections

“warlords” and tribal elements

Progressives come in, with support of outside $

Local drug industry continues

2.42.2 Iraq war upstages the Afghanistan war

2002:  Americans start leaving even though they have not caught Osama

Madrassahs gain in importance and Pak $ goes into armaments

Criminal elements join the cause

Pakistan public objects

2002/??  American attack on Iraq

Pak public objects

2.43 Central Asian states
Uzbekistan gives airport to Americans [date??]

2.5  Contemporary picture

Mihalka 2006:  136.  In addition to corruption, drug trafficking and criminality continue to destabilize the countries in the region. … In 2001, 26 metric tons of heroin and morphine were seized in the countries surrounding Afghanistan, 48 percent in Iran and 33 pe3rcent in Pakistan.  Tajikistan accounted for 16 percent …  Of opium seizures 84 percent were in Iran, 9 percent in Pakistan and 4 percent in Tajikistan … UNODC estimates that 23 percent of Afghanistan’s drugs transit Tajikistan … … [G]ross profits from illegal drug trade in Central Asia exceed US$2 billion a year and make up more than 7 percent of the region’s GDP … Moreover, the relative size of the drug abusing population in Central Asia is about three times higher than in Western Europe, with 2.3 percent of the population over 15 in Kyrgyzstan, 1.2 percent on Tajikistan and 1.1 percent in Kazakhstan estimated to be drug users.

2.50 Blank 2006:  122:  “… at least three states in Central Asia: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan appear to be increasingly unstable. …[and] far too many of [Tajikistan’s] people and to much of its economy depend on the drug trade for sustenance to be complacent about its chance.”

2.50 Guang 2006: 22.  “…the new surge of terrorist attacks sweeping the world following the Iraq War, the formation of a ‘terrorist arc’ stretching across the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia is being formed. … [entailing] intellectual connections, organizational networks, and activities.”

2.50 Another part is that so many issues in the region are contested:  the several wars in the region generate, of course, various and competing “official” definitions of the situation, all of them presumably driven by particular interests.

2.50 Blank 2006: 115:  “… in Central Asia … there is already what Lord George Robertson, as Secretary General of NATO, called ‘a guaranteed supply chain of instability.’”

2.51  Afghanistan

In Afghanistan:  state institutions have been formed, hope for an independent government

Jalal, and women

Still:  drug industry, little development

2.52  China, Xinjiang

Shichor 2006: 108.  “Chinese have underlined Uyghur activism and Islamic radicalism and have frequently exaggerated their threat.  For one reason, they want to forestall and preempt a likely deterioration in the ethno-religious power balance in Xinjiang … For another, …to justify and legitimize a further crackdown campaign – ultimately aimed at integrating China’s restive nationalists into the ‘people’ .. or to educate and …  warn other nationalists about the consequences… Finally by depicting national separatism and religious radicalism as a threat  … Beijing can (and does) scare potential external supporters … This has opened the door for the PRC to join the U.S.-led international crusade against terrorism…”

2.53 In Pak:  gov’t and criminal elements are both involved in the same institutions [parliament, military]

2.53.1  Pakistan on the ground, local levels

I Pak growing resentment

Tribal Territory

Abbas 234:  “The military operation against Al-Qaeda operators in the Waziristan region in March-April 2004 resulted in heavy casualties for the Pakistan army.”  [p230, was “For the first time the Pak Army is operating in the Waziristan region.”

Zeb 2006: 72.  Talk of building a fence between Pakistan and Afghanistan [can’t be serious]

Pakistan’s independent Islamist movements, now out of control [or too strong for M. to control?]

Abbas 240:  “No one has a clear idea about their exact numbers [the Jehadis of Pakistan], but their potential capability resides in the subconscious of those in authority [in Pakistan], and this stays there because the reality of it is too hard to confront.  Their funding will not dry up because thousands of Pakistanis and Arabs believe in them and contribute to them.”

N105.  “The country’s [Pakistan] formal economy is on the verge of collapse; with 65.5 percent of GDP takern up by debt servicing and 40 percent by defense, the financial year starts with a negative balance.  The country’s wealth has been depleted by a deeply corrupted oligarchy… Over $88 billion has been deposited in American and European banks, more than the $67 billion and the $82 billion of the country’s total domestic and foreign debt respectively.  Unemployment is rampant; of the 800,000 people who enter the labor market every year, very few find work.  …Every year 135,000 women die in childbirth due to lack of medical assistance…. [106] Against this bleak background, the black economy has been growing steadily and, at the end of the 1990s, was three times the size of the formal economy.”

Abbas 229:  “The military campaign in Iraq created such an anti-American perception in Pakistan that Musharraf’s pro-U.S. policies came under increasing attack.”

Abbas 232:  “General Aziz Khan, Musharraf’s longtime right-hand man … said that America was the No. 1 enemy of the Muslim world…”

Nek M.  Paracha/Dalrymple

Abbas 214:  “LT… around half a million people attend this gathering annual, which is second only to Tableeghi-Jamaat’s (preaching group) assembly, which attracts around a million people every year.  LT used these occasions to expand its network …, by linking up wht extremist groups oerating in other parts of the world…”

Abbas 240:  “Resulting from a lack of educational opportunities, and ongoing sense of strategic insecurity, and streams of financial support from Wahhabi sources in the Arab states, the Madrasa industry [in Pakistan] … was producing tens of thousands of deadly earnest future “heroes.”  Their one unity is their common hatred of the westernized Pakistani elite, India, America, and Israel.

Islamist beliefs / claims NOW

Abbas 211-12:  “Hafiz Saeed,.. [creator of Lashkar-i Taiba, the militant wing of the group Markaz Dawat-ul-Irshad] [212] [asserted that] ‘We believe in Huntington’s clash of civilizations, and our jihad will continue until Islam becomes the dominant religion.”

Who the jehadis are:

P202:  “These jehadis belong to all social classes, … the majority come from the nonweapon-bearing areas of the country [Pakistan], as opposed to the ‘marital’ areas, indicating that the generally peace-loving people of the country had been sufficiently militarized in the aftermath of the Afghan war. … On the news of the martyrdom of one sone, the family of the deceased celebrated the event by distributing sweets and offered another son to the cause. The unemployed youth of Pakistan had found an occupation, an ideology, and a new family in which they found bounding and brotherhood. … they consider themselves the elite in the cause of Allah, and they have developed the infectious pride to inspire thousands of others into following them.”[37]

Criminal connections in government

Mihalka 2006:  137. “Criminals have also been more aggressive in entering politics  For example, a reputed criminal boss. Ryspek Akmatbayev, won a special by-election with almost 80 percent of the vote in Kyrgyzstan on April 9, 2006.”

Pakistan power structures

P 228:  “… both Irfanullah Marwat, a despicable criminal, and Maulana Azam Tariq, a committed and self-advertised terrorist, became members of the houses of the legislature while some of the most corrupt politicians were also inducted into the King’s party.  It was obvious that Musharraf had not just forgiven corruption but sanctified it.”

1. 225: “The obstacle in the way of a complete and effective clampdown on jihadi outfits was Pakistan’ Kashmir policy. … giving up jihadis who had been groomed and financed to operate in Kashmir was considered a suicidal step for Musharraf and the army. … extremism inside Pakistan was inherently and inextricably linked with the actions and ideology of jihadi groups operating in Kashmir.”

Afghan after 2002

Afghan in Kandahar who misses the Taliban

>  Al Qaeda:  appeal to ME concerns (Saudi Arabian leadership, Israel), Islamist/Muslim ideals, networks, imagination around Muslim world

>  Osama’s original struggle with the royal family, Saudi Arabia.

>  IMU:  appeal to local struggle against repression, for Muslim regional integrity [early Islamist movement]

>  HT:  appeal to struggle against local oppression [woman’s comment]

 

III.  The trajectory, prospects

3.1  Principles, or general propositions that seem to be worth following.

“As war gives way to peace in the conflict zones … people begin to rebuild war- devastated economies … often rely on buying and selling the same goods they did during war, along the same non-state channels …Those most successful … amass economic fortunes that can be translated into political power, fortunes that can reshape social, economic and political landscapes.”[36]

Contemporary situation in CA:  instability.  Stephen Blank.

“Business people who profit from shadow transactions are unlikely to give up shadow sources of power, profit and supply as they develop legitimate enterprises, and in fact, their success may depend on keeping these networks current.”[43]

Ordinary people are involved in shadow systems

“Average people, to survive, must trade outside formal state channels.” [41]  “… drug and illicit weapons trade … is often the means by which citizens gain the currency to buy industrial necessities, agricultural supplies and development goods… purchase hard currency,.. broker power, … allow investments into land, legal industries and political partnerships.  They spawn and support subsidiary industries, both legal and illicit…”[43]

“Profiteers, smugglers and black/gray market merchants are not isolated actors loosely linked into a web of profit.  Farmers who plant drug related crops or miners … have families and children they must provide for… from paying mortgages to celebrating birthdays.  Truckers who transport illicit goods need tires and tune-ups for their trucks, and dental work …Pilots … fly smuggled goods, …  The banker that launders the money and the college student who buys a smuggled [object]… are as essential to the whole enterprise as the growers and transporters.  All of these polpe are deeply immersed in society and civil life.”[46] [these are not ] “merely markets – devoid of social, cultural, political and legal ramifications.”  “… up to a third of global transactional exchanges.” [46]

Shadow systems link into legitimate systems

Nordstrom has tried to show “links across areas of politico-economic activity that are traditionally divided in theory and analysis – links that show complex socio-cultural and political as well as economic organization …” [39].  “Networks overlap.  The dangerously criminal, the illicit and the informally mundane cannot, in actual practice, be always or easily disaggregated.” [40].

Conclusion

In fact, these social networks are not haphazard and are not without important social controls:  “From diamonds to drugs, dominions exist that follow hierarchies of authority, rules of conduct, ways of punishing transgression and codes of behavior.  Within these dominions, communities forms, ideologies evolve and worldwide alliances and antagonisms are developed.  These cannot be confused with states, but [they]… do have governing structures, law-like apparatuses and security forces.”[46]

The broadening of networks around the world and linking up criminal and state interests

CNp48 quotes Strange [1996:111]:  “what is new and of importance in the international political economy is the networks of links being forged between organized crime in different parts of the world.” CNp48 quotes Castells [1998:167] “there is money laundering by the hundreds of billions (maybe trillions) of dollars.  Complex financial schemes and international trade networks link up the criminal economy to the formal economy.”  CN: “I can stand in the most remote war zones of the world and watch a veritab le supermarket of goods move into and out of this country along extra-state lines. … it would appear that non-formal economies play a formidable role in countries like Japan, Germany and the USA as well as in areas of more rapid economic and political change and development.”[49]

Remember to end with the rapid pace of change in the modern world

========================

Blank, Stephen.  2006.  Strategic surprise?  Central Asia in 2006.  China and Eurasiua Forum Quarterly 4(2): 109-130.

Evans-Pritchard, E. E.  1962.  Social anthropology:  Past and present.  In:  Social Anthropology and Other Essays.  New York:  Free Press.

Guang, Pan. 2006.  East Turkestan terrorism and the terrorist arc:  China’s post-9/11 anti-terror strategy.  China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4(2):19-24.

Lee, Rensselaer.  2006.  Nuclear smuggling, rogue states and terrorists.  China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4(2): 25-32.

Nordstrom, Carolyn.  2000.  Shadows and Sovereigns.  Theory, Culture & Society 17(4): 35-74.

Shichor, Yitzhak.  2006.  Fact and fiction:  A Chinese documentary on Eastern Turkestan terrorism.  China and Eurasia Forum        Quarterly 4(2):80-108.

Sivan, Emmanuel.  1985.  Radical Islam:  Medieval Theology and Modern Politics.  New Haven:  Yale University.

Strange, Susan.  1996.  The Retreat of the State:  The Diffusions of Power in the World Economy.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University.

Tilly, Charles.  1985.  “War making and state making as organized crime”, in PB. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (eds.), Bring the State Back In.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University.

Zeb, Rizwan.  2006.  Cross border terrorism issues plaguing Pakistan-Afghanistan relations.  China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4(2): 69-74.

===============

CN51:    “What theory lacks is an understanding of the ways in which shadow networks function in daily international life – how for example, disputes are settled and judgments enforced; who wields authority …; and how extra-state realities shape global markets and fashion political power.”

One informed observer of the region says “the pace of political developments [in Central Asia] has greatly accelerated and could develop in faster and even unpredictable ways in 2006.”[38]

Surprising turns of events, Stephen Blank has argued, “is intrinsic to the nature of the contemporary world order…”[39]

Charles Tilly’s terms,

===========

ICSSA.org ???

Lesson from ISI’s killing of a Journalist in Pakistan By abid ullah jan June 19, 2006. ——————————————————————————– It seems the conscience of humanity doesn’t stir until someone pays the price for resisting oppression and our right to know and tell the truth. On June 16, 2006, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) silenced another journalist, Hidayatullah Khan, forever. He was handcuffed and shot from behind after experiencing unknown torment at the hands of his abductors for six months. That is why you are reading this column, which I am writing with utter shame for not having said a word in Mr. Khan’s favor when he was alive. The question, however, is: What type of words would have saved his life? Appeals, protests, or exposing the real faces of his persecutors? Read at: http://www.icssa.org/isi_murder.html Also see: Journalism in Pakistan: http://www.icssa.org/Journalism%20in%20Pakistan.htm Unlearn old lessons of journalism: http://www.icssa.org/unlearn_old_lessons.htm

===========

Rashid Taliban 135-6:  on Arab-Afghans that went to Algeria [Islamic Salvation Front] and to Egypt[where they bombed…]

====================

Bin Laden himself left Afghanistan in 1990 disillusioned by the local bickering among the parties and many were already establishing themselves elsewhere.

=============

In July, 1977, Army chief of staff General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq deposed the duly elected Prime Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, appointing himself Chief Marshall Law Administrator.  And in April, 1979 – another fatal decision — he hanged Bhutto, whom he accused of corruption.

[1] Nordstrom 2000: 36.

[2] Nordstrom 2000: 36.  Shadow powers are similar to what Napoleoni (2005:255) describes as “state shells”:  armed organizations that resemble the socio-economic infrastructure (taxation, employment services, etc.) of a state without the political claims of sovereignty and self-determination.

[3] Nordstrom 2000: 51.

[4] Nordstrom 2000: 45.

[5] Nordstrom 2000: 36-37.

[6] Castells 1998: 166, quoted in Nordstrom 2000: 38.  See also Wm Reno “shadow states” [“nation-based systems of power and patronage paralleling state power” Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone [Cambridge]; Warlord Politics and African States [Reinner]]]

[7] Strange 1996:4, quoted in Nordstrom 2000: 38)

[8] The term comes from Charles Tilly (1985:169) who actually used it for governments, calling them “quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy.”  His provocative language effectively places shadow networks on a par with states.  Certainly shadow networks are the real “protection rackets,” only lacking of course any semblance of legitimacy, which of course one reason they carry on their affairs surreptitiously and welcome all appearances of legitimacy they can muster.

[9] Rashid 2002:80.

[10] Pakistan Nuclear Weapons; A Brief History of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/index.html

[11] Abbas 2005: 100.

[12] Steve Coll ????.  On the Jamaat-i Islami party of Pakistan see Abbas 2005: 100-101 and elsewhere.

[13] Napoleoni 2005: 82

[14] Napoleoni 2005:85

[15] Napoleoni 2005: 85, 86

[16] Rashid 2000:189.

[17] Napoleoni 2005: 83.

[18] Rashid 2000: 191.

[19] Napoleoni 2005: 84.

[20] Napoleoni 2005: 122

[21] http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/index.html.

[22] Roy 1995:86.

[23] Rashid 2000:130.

[24] Kohlman 2004: 10.

[25] Rashid 2000:129.

[26] Kohlman 2004: 7.

[27] Rashid 2000:131.

[28] Kohlman 2004: 11.

[29] Rashid 2000: 135.

[30] Rashid 2000: 135.

[31] Kohlman 2004:16-18.

[32] Sivan 1985.

[33] Abbas 2005: 213.

[34] Abbas 2005: 212.

[35] Abbas 2005: 203.

[36] Abbas 2005: 213.

[37] Darfur renegade groups:  P…Darfur:  97:  “Sociologically the Janjaweed seems to have been of six main origins:  former bandits and highwaymen who had been ‘in the trade’, since the 1980s; demobilized soldiers from the regular army; young members of Arab tribes having a running land conflict with a neighbouring ‘African’ group – most appeared to be members of the smaller Arab tribes; common criminals who were pardoned and released from gaol if they joined the militia; fanatical members of the Tajammu al-Arabi; and young unemployed ‘Arab’ men, quite similar to those who joined the rebels on the ‘African’ side.”

[38] Blank 2006:109.

[39] Blank 2006: 115.

Notes for future research 9/11/07

 

Shumbul hanging file, selections

 

10-5.  … with him was a man from labi-aw (Wakil’s place) who said he is a chaprasti in UN school at DarulAman road in Kabul.  He also had told the merchant [Tajik] about the rumer [re MGHW and me.  The news is vicious, where it originated is not clear.  A;sp om the Dukaan-i Bulola they were talking about me and this story.  Thus the story spreads.

 

4-34 and 4-62.  [Shia] Conversation with Laal M –i- Sayed M –i- M Aamad … about his land and family members.  He was 55, w was ~30, were married 20 years ago.  She was ~12 years old. … His F and M had selected the girl for him and contracted her parents who agreed the first time. If they had refused it that would have been final.  He was about 20-21 years old at the time [nb the discrepancy in age references] .  … the Mullah from Sar-I Kotal did the nekaa… The people – all from Shumbul [came] – from his own millat but in that time all were the same sect… [NB the time frame, 55 now, 21 at time of marriage: i.e. 24 years ago].  [Q:  was he simply blowing off the question?  Or was he telling the truth?]

 

[at another time [??] he said he threw the food of the Ismailis [given to them on some occasion] into the river …]

 

Chronology

 

== my notes, ap5,87

Several kinds of Islamin Af:

> Traditional:  pir-morid; ulama, mullah, etc.

> Government controlled, fostered:  gov’t ulama, legitimating, accrediting, support for mosques, judiciary, qazis,

> “Secular” Islami:  sep of church/state, secular, civil, Progressive, western

> Islamist:

 

 

In each period I will note the changes/patterns in the formally instituted structures of government; and the informally or locally instituted and enforced sociopolitical relations [within which the patterns of leadership and followership can be separately discussed].

 

1. 1949 to 1964: 1949-1952: The “Liberal Parliament” period

 

@1949-64: Formal institutional conditions

 

Islamism in the period between 1949 and 1973

 

     First attempts at Islamic revolution

 

HK 91?: “Islamism, or Islamic radicalism, is the story of response to society in transition from the traditional to the modern, which sets the state on a major scale on the road toward secularization, but in Afganistan the overriding concern of the Islamists was to defend Islam from the encroachment of atheism, which had begun to permeate the educated population in the late 1950’s after the country had become dependent on the Soviet Union for its schemes of modernization”

 

Balkhi

== Attempted coup by a Shiite group:  1949.  Sayyed Ismail-i Balkhi, Ibrahim (Bache-ye) Gausawar (a Hazara), Khwada Muhammad Na’im, Lt. Mir Ahmad Shah Rizwni; some other Shia leaders implicated or arrested for presumed involvement were Mir Ali Ahman Gauhar, Mir Ali Ahmad Zia, Abdul Latif Sarbaz.

 

== In prison Balkhi starts [DEdwards] Payam-i Islami [The Message of Islam] and Gausawar starts Qiyam-i Islami [The Uprising of Islam];

 

DE1986:228:  “a religiously based political culture began gradually to emerge among the Shi’i population during the 1940s and 1950s.  The first stage in this process was the establishment of the Takyah Khanahs in the city, which provided a focus for communal activities and exposed many Shii’is for the first time to their religious traditions.  In this sense, the takyah khana served as the incubator in the formation of Shi’i political ideology in Afhganistan.”  Their innaguration “provided a forum for the dramatic remembrance of the sacrifice of Husain and … laid the groundwork for the subsequent development of an ideology of Shi’i poliical activitsm”

 

@1949-64:  Informally organized and locally based social conditions

 

     The trend of progressive thought in the 1950s

Shahrani 1986: 60

… the availability of foreign scholarships, the expansion of mass media, and the availability of books and propaganda from foreign cultural missions in Kabul made the penetration of a wide range of such ideologies possible.  The emergence of Khalq and other communist parties … the movement that emerged to oppose the Communist parties was a Muslim Youth movement inspired by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and organized by several professors of the Facultry of Shari`iyat (Islamic Studies) at Kaul University, who had studied on scholarships at al‑Azhar University in Cairo during the 1950s and 1960s.  Thuys began the polititicaization of Kabul University …”

 

Shahrani 1986: 61

“Thus, the traditional political idioms of tribe, ethnicity, region, and sect were not replaced by augmented by new political ideological sympathies and loyalties.”

 

Shahrani 1986: 61

“Rural populations had successfully created their own parallel power structures at the village level to resolve local disputes with the aid of their own respected local leaders, thereby avoiding extensive and costly relations with the government whenever possible.  Consequently, during the 1960s and 1970s the nature of political conflict was no longer that of periphery versus the center, or tribe versus the state.  Instead, there were new bases for political conflicts, most concerned with the questions of the legitimacy of the government, and articulated by the newly educated youth of  Afghanistan, … manifested on two levels:  the ideological … and the generational‑class level …”

 

Early secular reform movements

 

==There was a dispute involving these people.  Faiz M. Angaar; Gul Padcha‑y Ulfat; Abdul Haadi Daa’wi; A. Rahman Mahmudi; Dr. G. M. Ghobar; S. Qaasim‑i Rishtiya; Siddiq‑i Farhang.  They began in the time of Nadir Shah.

Faiz M. Angaar) (started?): Wish Zaalmayan (“Young awakened”).  They were Pushtun fascists.  They divided into many part of which two are important:

== Afghan Millat [first paper published Ap5, 1966, LDpree1973:602] (edited by) [Papa?] Engineer Gholam Muhammad Farhaad; Hizb‑i Khalq.  A. R. Mahmudi, M. G. M. Ghobar.  These people became founders of Sholey Jawed [ed by Dr. Rahim Mahmudi; paper first published Ap4, 1968. LDupree1973:605].

 

== The orginal struggle was between Pushtun  Saalaari and anti Pushtuni Saalaari (There is not one communism)  Russian influence was not present in this.???)

 

‑‑ Sholey Jawed:  in the office of A. R. Mohmadi, Karmal was a clerk.

 

[‑‑ It was with the help of Anaita that Babrak made contact with the communists. Her husband was Dr. Kiramuddin Kakar.]

 

‑‑ Sholey‑Jawed moved toward the Chinese maoists but Karmal moved toward Russian/USSR.  (Taheri i K doesn’t think Abdul Rahman Mahmudi was a socialist).  When Sholey‑Jawed divided a part related to China.  Mahmudi still believed in God.  Faiz M. Awgaar also believed in God.  That M. believed in God was evident in his use of such terms as Walla, Billa, Tilla, etc.

 

 

 

2. 1964 to 1973: experiment in parliamentary democracy and the clash of left and right.

 

2.1 Overview:

Jawaanaan-e Musulmaan had both Sunni and Shi’a members.  There were inspired by teachings of Prof. Ghulam Muhammad Niazi, who remained publically uninvolved.

 

Communist students [??] DE:p217 “had become actively engaged in organizing students on campus a few years earlier”.

 

@1964-73: Formal institutional conditions

 

Progressive democracy groups in about 1345/1967

Hashem Maywandwal

Demokratik Mashrafi [Progressive democracy]

Musaawaat [equality, justice]

 

Radical progressives in about 1345/1967

 

Nur M. Taraki [publisher]:  Khalq

Suleiman Layeq [ed], and Mir Akbar Khaybar:  Parcham

Karmal

? Jeryaan-i Demokratik-i Khalq

 

Gholaam Muhammad Farhaad

Afghaan Millat

Split into two groups:  Afghan Millat [Shamul Huda Shams in 1989 was editor of magazine; M. Amin Wakman, author of the book, now works for VOA;  and Millat [head in 1989: Rahim Pushtunyar]; Nasim Ludin was in this party, his place was taken by his brother Wasim Ludin in 1989 when he was killed.

 

Sholey Jawed groups in about 1345/1967

Rahim Mahmudi

Akram Yaari

Enginar Eshaan

Jeryaan-i Demokratik-i Nawin

  (Sho’ley-i Jawed)

‑‑ Parcham people were from Kabul city.  Karmal was a follower of Mahmudi, joined Khalq as they both contacted the Russians.

 

‑‑ Sholey Jawed broke into several parts, of which two are important:

SAMA:  Majid‑i Kalakani was the head.

Guruy Rihayi:  they were known as Guruy‑Inqilabi.  Came from Sholey Jawad, besides SAMA.  head of Guruy Inqilabi was Dr. Haji Faiz from Kandahar.  Two yrs ago [from 1989] he was killed by Hizb‑i Islami.  He was Durrani.

‑‑ Settami‑Milli.  Persian speakers.  Uzbek from north.  In time of Nadir Kahn and Zahe Shah these people had suffered under M. Gul Muhammad, who was the Ra’is‑i Tanzim‑i Shandal [?], precurser of the Wali, only much more powerful, controlled a wider area.  Sittam‑i Milli was started by these people [??], but later than this period, but they remembered their sufferings.  Different from Sholey Jawed in 2 ways:  1.  Diff in thought.  Sholey Jawed wanted socialism, education.  Sittam‑i Milli wanted Qawm of the Tajiks and accepted Uzbeks and Hazaras.  2.  Soley Jawed. was copying China (maoist).  Sittam‑i Milli looked to Russia.  Behind these parties there were Persian ‑ Pushtun differences.  The differece also in the Islamist parties: JamI vs. HzbI.

 

1350/1972

 

     Shu’la-ye Jawed groups as of about 1350/1972;

>  HK119:  Shu’la-e-Jawid [the eternal flame]:  Maoist communists; aimed at socialism through revolutionary and violent means.  They divided into the following:  Surkha [later Rihayee], SAMA [led by Majid Kalakani, “more of a social bandit than a leader of a group of pro-Chinese leftists”, p120], Akhgar, Paikar, SAWO, Khurasan.

 

DE: 1986:219 says another similar organization established in this time [??] was Jawanan-i Mughal.

 

 

> Mahmudi — Akram Yaari

Saazmaan-i Jawaanann-i Mashriqi[??]

 

> Enginar Osmaan — Baa ‘Ays-i Bad Khushi/ Settam-i haa

 

> Daaktar Faiz (Guruh-i Enqelaabi)

 

     Groups that sprang from Sho’ley Jawed

These three subgroups unite, or at least have a common fate as:  Saazmaan-i SAMA, or Saazmaan-i Rahaayi *5

*5:  These movements, which are on the side of China and Maoist thought from 1350 on were divided into three branches, and after the coup de etat of the Russian dependants fell into many troubles.  And their efforts in the direction of establishing a communist movement ran into dead ends.  After the year 1359/1980 the sections of the remainders of these movements announced their existance by the names of the Organization of SAMA and the Organization of Rahbari, and their activities they carried on in other groups and charitable organizations.

 

HK53 The steady decline of the orginal attraction for Sittam

-e-milli may account for the change of its name to the organization of The Toilers of Afganistan or SAZA (Sazman-e-Zachmankashani Afghanistan).  For the followers of Badachi, and the commando organization of the Liberation of Afghanistan or SARFA (Sazman-e-Rehaeebakhsh’e Fedayee Afghanistan) for the followers of Bawhess

 

Progressive demoncracy as of about 1350/1972

> Hashem Maywandwaal *3  Maywanwal in 1352/1974 was arrested and murdered under the accusation of [attempting] a coup de etat.

 

Radical progressives [??] as of about 1350/1972

> Gholaam Muhammad Farhaad *4

Some people of this group continued their political activities in the form of cultural and informational [services/activities] outside of Afghanistan.

 

Communist groups as of about 1350/1972

> Taraki / Khalq

Kaarmal / Paarcham

Dastagir Panjsheri / Khalq-i Kaargar

Taher Badakhshi / Settamihaa [Ayeen:  In the north they were extremists]

 

@1964-73:  Informally organized and locally based sociopolitical conditions

 

1342/1964

Balkhi is released from prison.  DEdwards 1986:215 “Balkhi provided the focus and inspiration for the more potent political movement that was then emerging in Kabul.  He accomplished this primarily through his poetry, which was widely circulated among both Shi’is and Sunnis, particularly students …”.  DE1986:216 “Balkhi became the first figure in the modern era of Afghan history to embody personally the Islamic conception of sacrifice by refusing to compromise his beliefs … In this respect, Blkhi actualized the Karbala paradigm.  … Balkhi transformed politcal ideology and action in Afghanistan and provided a potent symbol in a society that was in the mids of fundamental structural changes.”  Balkhi started Payman-i Islami [Islamic Alliance] headed by Mir Ali Ahmad Gouhar, Shi’a “spiritual leader” from Ghorband.  Gen Mir Ahmad Shah Rizwani secretly reestablishes [DE “resurrected”] Qiyam-i Islami

 

 

1345/1967

 

Islamist groups in about 1345/1967

 

Shi’ite or merged groups in about 1345/1967

Sayyed Isma’el-i Balkhi, was in prison until 1964

Sahiqi [??]:  Qiyam-i Islami [???]

== In Iraq in 1345,46 [1966‑7] or ?1945‑6? a group started called Shabaab at Hazara (?).

 

     Sunni Islamist groups in about 1345/1967

 

Rahim Niazi

Abdul Rasul Sayyaf

Burhan ul din Rabbani

Known as Ikhwaan ul Muslemin [Muslim Brotherhood]

 

Faizani [??Sunni?]

DE217: Mawlana Faizani:  started Madrasah-yi Qur’an, which started as a sufi circle, of which he was the pir, later became a political organ.  He taught that “political progress culd come only after personal spiritual advancement.”  Dealt with problems of reconciling science with Islam.  “tried to demonstrate both how scientific knowledge is presaged in the Qur’an and how the Qur’an contains a philosophy that is coherent in the light of scientific knowledge.”  Apparently developed later:  “implicitly messianic quality of his personality and message”, for to his followers he was “considered the representative of the Mahdi himself …”  In ftnot on the page: “Faizani’s ability to transcend sectarian divisions was that he had no connection to any established sufi tariqat and claimed to have attained his own spiritual progress individually without the guidance of a pir.  His path therefore remained basically uncategorizable, and this presumably helped break down traditional divisions, including that of Sunni and Shi’i.”  DE said several people told him they believed him to be the khalifa-i mahdi akhir al-zaman [the representative of the Mahdi at the end of the age].  Held zhikr’s in his home.

 

> Other leaders active before this, as individuals, outside the Islamists:

— Sibghatullah Mujaddidi, future “amir” of the Front for National Liberation, was imprisoned in 1960.

— Pir of Tagao,

— Pir of Qalay-e Biland, Hafiz Sahib of Kapisa

— Mawlawi Fayzani in Kabul.  HK, p 271 note26:  Mawlawi Habib al-Rahman Fayzani, known as Mawlana Fayzani, was arrested in 1973, “dominated the soul and body of his numerous followers first as a school teacher and principal in Herat and later as a reformer, pir and polticial leader”.  “composed some books and traveled extensively in the country before he resided in Kabul where he opened a library and set up Madrasa-e-Quran, a seminary for the teaching of Quran, which increasingly took on an active political dimension among his followers of traditional mullas and artisans.  His teachings transcended the communal line of Sunni and Shi’a and to his followers of both sects he appeared as a messianic personality.  He played a leading role in the anti-communist agitations of the traditional mullahs in 1970.  By the time of the Da’ud coup in 1973 he had become so successful in his activitires that he was able to unite a number of secret Islamic associations under the name of the School of Monotheism (Maktab-e-Twheed) who which he was elected Amir.  Shortly after the coup he was arrested on a charge of plotting to overthrow the regime.  it was in the Khalqi rule that Fayzani along with over 100 Ikhwanis including Dr. Niazi were Executed.”  HK’s source:  D. Edwards, pp 217-220: “The Evolution of Shi’i Political Dissent in Afghanistan”, in Shi’ism and Social Protest, edited by R. I Cole and N.R. Keddie, Yale UP, 1986. [HK, p271-2].

 

1346/1968

 

DE1986:219 notes that the Islamic groups being founded in this period were only one type among many others at this time.

 

1347/1969

DEdwards1986:218:  Members of Faizani’s group and student members of Paiman-i Islami and Qiyam-i Islami worked with Jawaanaan-i Musulman in the university elections of 1969, in which they won.  “What united these groups … was the belief that they shared a common cause — the advancement of Islam — and that the furtherance of that cause outweighed watever divisions existed among them.”  [they represented ] “the emergence of new interest groups and sodalities that were partly replacing or tranforming traditional ethnic and tribal structures in Kabul society”.

 

Taher Khdri:  Musa Shafiq was very smart.  He knew the USSR would not remain quiet [in AFghanistan].  he started the Ikhwani school in Afghanistan.  A. Rahim Niazi was in the university; they both taught together. in the same faculty.

 

two stories re founding of the Islamist parties:  professors founded a secret organization in 1969, The Islamic Association. Other story by Hikmatyar:  Students founded the movement, 12, no professors; he calls it the Islamic Movement [not Jamiat].  Both were in 1969.

37. Kakar ms 92: attributes “Islamic Radicalism” to three thinkers: Abul Hassan `Ali Dadawi, Abul A’la Mawdudi (1903-79), and Sayyed Qutb c.1906-66).  “made the seizure of power their main goal.”  Sayyed Qutb: Islam is “presented to humanity a complete cure for all [humanity’s] ills” [Shepard, W.E. “Islam as a System in the Latter Writigns of Sayed Qutb” Middle East Studies vol 25, No.1, Jan, 1989, p. 37.] [for more on this see Choueirei, Y. 1990.  Islamic Fundamentalism.  Twayne Publishers [London?].  The Islamists, … “consider the state as an instrument of reform”.[HK, p 92].  Mawdudi [helped undermine the advantage of the mullahs by stating] “every Muslim who is capable and qualitied to give a sound opinion on matters of law, is entitled to interpret the law of God …” [quoted in Choueiri, p 111].  According to Mawdudi “only a mal Muslim is considered qualified tofr the post of Amir” [HK p.93].  According to S. Qutb, jehad is to “disarm the enemy so that Islam is allowed to apply its Sharia unhindered” [HK wording p94].  According to Mawdudi Islam is a”a revolutionary ideology”, and so Muslims [should] constitute an “international revolutionary party”, which has as its main aim a world-wide revolution that transcends artificial boundaries and national territories [from Choueiri, p 138].  Sayyed Qutb:  the common people cannot be trusted, are swayed by demagogues, especially by mass media.  The seizure of power is the work of the “chosen elite”:  “the summoners to God must be distinct and a community unto themselves” [quoted in Choueiri p135, cited in Kakar ms.].

The Afghan Islamists:  associated neither with the political ruling circles nor depend on the state … unlike the ulama, who had accommodate dwith the state, the Islamists held the state to be the source of all corruptions and tyrannies, so set up a goal to replace it with an Islamic order [nizam-e-Islam] [HK 97].

 

1348/1970

 

There was a mulla demonstration in this year, Faizani involved; more??

 

DE1986:218.  Shi’i and Sunni students in university began to split as it became known that the student association had ties with Jama’at-i Islami of Pakistan; the Shi’i were offended by introduction of a “foreign ideology”.  Some Shi’a disengaged from Jawanan-i Musulman; these were Farid, Akhtar Muhammad Sulaimankhel, Sayyid Isma’il Pasikh.

 

Me:  But events in the 1970s revealed that beneath the evident and enduring centralizing and secularizing structures that formed the fabric of power in the urban centers (notably Kabul) and most vitally among the educated elites the established social alignments that had so strongly affected public affairs in previous periods remained.  The events of the 1970s revealed not only that the elite-controled fabric of power in the urban centers was confronting the established configurations of power in the provincial areas, but also that the rurally based patterns of loyalty and obligation were able to transform the enlarging structure of power based at the center.  In this process the Islamic authorities and their clients participated, exerting a particular and distinctive influence on social affairs.  How much the dramatic and catclyzmic events of the late 1970s and the 1980s and 90s have affected the relations of Islamic authorities to each other and their clients is only partially known.

A series of events took place in the 1970s that revealed a growing disquiet and frustration among some of the leading Islamic authorities.  These leaders were of course expressing concerns of their own, but as the broadly presumed authorities on God’s law and moral order, they couched their concerns in terms that represented, with some effect, the distresses of the wider populations.

 

>anti-communist agitations vs communists by mullahs, Fayzani taking and leading role [see him above]

 

1349/1971

> Taher-i Khidr remembers that he was in the 12th grade when Jawaanaan-i Musulman “began” [he probably means became prominent, outspoken].  Shiites were getting books from Iran then, by Shariati, Muhandis, Mehdi Buzargan, Murtaza Mutahed.  They collected these books;presumably they were hot items.

The ruhani of the Shiites then were Alam Shu’a from Chindawul, Mir Ali Ahmad, Ismaili Balkhi, M. Yusufi Binish, Ismaili Mubaligh, a Hazara.

 

> Taher?:  There was much disputing among people then.  Jawanani Musliman were getting ideas from Egypt.  These criticized some of the Caliphs, especially Osman, said he was cruel.  They were all Hanifa.  The Ikhwan[is?] of Afghanistan said that Hanifa and Mazhab have no poiint.  They drifted away from the original idea.  People began to think this was Wahabism and secretly from the USA [??].  Other people disagreed.  Thought that USSR had intensions of taking Afghn.  His father said the day that Bulgannin came to Afghanistan he said the fatya for Afghan.

 

> me: nb. the emergence of political parties, the left manifested by the marxist parties Khaq, Parcham and Shole-Jawen, etc., and the right manifested by the Jawanan-i Musulman.

(Note that this dispute was framed by issues arising out of the discourse about development and the relations of Afghanistan with outside cultures and polities among the urban educated elite in Kabul; the Islamic authorities and their concerns attracted scarce interest among the young nation-oriented elite, even those most agressively defending Islamic culture against the communists.  {cf article by Sayyed Majruh on evolution of the society; cite it and use it somewhere})  Indeed, the young Islamists, as these people are now being called, had only scorn for the ulama and their approach to public issues.  It is this contrast, between the viewpoint and tactics of the Islamists and the those of the established Islamic authorities who are the focus of this book, that requires that this chapter be written.  Events that transpired since that time require that a particular distinction be made between the established Islamic authorities, whom I will sometimes call the “religious establishment”, and the Islamist leaders, who appeared as the opposition to the communists.

 

“Balkhi” Groups as of about 1350/1972

> Paasdaaraan-i Enqelaab-i Islaami

Mubalegh [a Hazara leader] — Fazilat [giving??] — Aaqaa-y Aalem *1

*1:  In the time of Taraki and Amin was imprisoned and thereafter disappeared.

 

> Jenraal Mir Ahmad Shah

??? — Isma’el-i Paasih

Sahifi [??] — Mir Ali Gohar

(NB: contact with Ikhwaan ul Muslemin) *2

Involved in several unsuccessful coups de etat in the time of Da’ud.

 

Islamist Groups as of about 1350/1972

> Gulbuddin — Habib ul Rahman …

(Saazmaan-i Jawaanaan-i Muslemin)

>  Burhaan ul din Rabbani —

> Sayyaf …

 

 

 

3. 1351/1973 to 1356/1978: Da’ud coup de etat and the rise of Parchamis to prominence

In the time of Da’ud:

 

@1973-78: Formal institutional conditions

 

> represented the entrance of Parchamis to power.

 

The first, led by M. Da’ud, Zaher Shah’s cousin and brother-in-law, was in 1973.  Da’ud continued to press the trend toward the secularization of the administration.  The most notable development in this regard was the adoption in 1977 of a constitution that gave even less place to Islam than the previous one.  Islam was mentioned only seven times and the Hanafi legal tradition only once.  Unlike any previous constitution it explicitly guaranteed non‑Muslims the right to worship freely.* {*Dupree 1979 (Taqiyya)}  The sentiments of the learned elite and middle class in the 1970s were expressed by one Afghan scholar:  “In comtemporary Afghanistan, neither the Hazrat nor any other individual religious personage or personages enjoy paramount influence among the people.* {*Kakar 1974 (Alberts): 19}

 

Government of Da’ud from 1352/1973 to 1357/1978 *6:  The coup de etat of the 26th of Saratan within the dynasty.

KGB *7:  The coup de etat of the 7th of Saur by the dependants of Russia.

 

Shiite progressive group

== Tanzim‑i Nasl‑i Naw‑i Hazara was started from Iraq/Iran; purpose was to awaken political sensitivity of the Hazaras.  In time of Bhutto [i.e., after 1973?] the purpose was to take back the Hazarajat.  But they were in Quetta and had no popularity within Afghanistan.  [Dr. Zia Jaghori left Jaghori and went to Chindawul Kabul and Shamali.]  They were with Sholey‑Jawed.  Bhutto could not start an organization in the Hazarajat.

 

> Hazara groups also supported by Pakistan:  Tanzim-e Nasl-e Naw-e Hazaara

> This generated Etehaadi-ye Mujahedin-e Islami-ye Afghaanistaan [??]

 

[in 1989? or 1984?  this may be from DE 1986]  Sholey-Jawid:  there are some small groups left, but they have no strength.

 

@1973-78:  Informally organized and locally based sociopolitical conditions

 

1351/1973 to 1356/1978 The more radical Islamic elements in Afghanistan society seemed to regard the accession of Da’ud to power as a threat, for some of them went underground.*  {*Male 1982: 98, 121}  The young leaders of an abortive coup attempt in 1974??? fled to Pakistan and with the help of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto began to develop anti-Da’ud activities in the name of Islam. [[check here with Rajan??]

 

>HK12  the first reaction [to the Daud coup de etat] was shown by the Islamic fundamentalists who staged an armed uprising in 1975.  The uprising . . . disillusioned Daud about his comradeship with the Communists and his policies in general.

 

HK says it is because of the support of the leading pirs/ Great mullas that a number of ulama held demonstrations for over a month in streets of Kabul vs the communists.

HK:  Prime Minister M. Hashem Maiwandwal, with about 40 senior colleages of his Social Demo part [Musawat]  were Da’ud’s first victims [HK p100].  Da’ud then wanted to destroy the Islamists, most of them fled to Pak.  Organized what they hoped would be a revolt:  On Jul 22, 1975 in Badakhshan, Laghman, Logar, Panjsher, attacked govt headquarters.  In Panjsher occupied hq for a short time; elsehwere no gains whatever.  No locals supported them, and no military groups.  Serious defeat: several were caught and tried, and some executed [HK 101], rest split up, recriminations; some established relations with “some authorities” of Pak govt., got money.  Shia and Sunni activitsts split up, distrusted ea other. [Edwards, p 222]

Islamists were weakened:  by defeat in coup attempt, by divisions among themselves, loss of credibility in eyes of their patrons the Pakistans as Da’ud sought closer ties with islamic states, including Pak, in order to distance himself from Soviet bloc.  Even after the communists came to power in Afghanistan the Islamists had no support; it was the Soviet invasion that gave them support [HK 103].

 

> DE1986:219.  Jawanan-i Musulman were vulnerable, many of them left Kabul for Pakistan.  Members of Paiman-i Islami, Qiyam-i Islami, Madrasah-yi Qur’an had not been involved in confrontations on campus, distressed by Da’ud coup, but did not leave.  These three formed an alliance called Madrasah-ye Tauhid (The School of Monotheism), with Faizani as Amir, developed plans to topple Da’ud.  Engineer Habib al-Rahman who supported Faizani and others were imprisoned for attempted plot.

 

> Note the role of Pakistan in the internal affairs of Afghan.  Such activities are common around the world, and it was not new that the neighboring power in South Asia should take an interest in activities inside Afghanistan.  The point here, however, is to note a phenomenon whose importance would grow dramatically in the 1980s, when the United States and Saudi Arabia and other states would fund the resistance activities of the opposition to the Afghan government.

 

Conversation with M. Taher‑i Khidri at his house (date?).  His father is from Turughman, although he himself has been there only a few days altogether.

== G.H. Rabbani, Khaawari, Mas’ud came to Pakistan in time of Daud.  They had ties w/ Z. Bhutto.  Bhutto had two agendas: to get Ikhwanis started to oppose Daud; and to encourage Hazaras to rise against Da’ud.  He didn’t succeed in getting the Hazaras to rise up.

 

In that time [1973??] Jamiat‑Islami (Pak) was weak.  G. Hikmatyar and Rabbani approached Jama’at‑i Pakistan.  the head of Jama’at-i Islami Pakistan was Qazi (Haji?) Hosayn Ahmad.  He received some $ from GHikm. and Rabbani, who had received $ from Bhutto.  It was the Jamiat‑i Islami P that provided the link between Zia and G.H and the Ikhwanis.  Later, when Bhutto was down, G.H. cursed him.

 

Small scale provincial insurrections of the Jawanan-i Musulman.  They had supposed they would be supported by the populace; instead were captured by the local populaces and turned over to Kabul government.  See above.

 

1354/1976

Gen Mir Ahmad Shah Rizwani organized a coup; he and the following were caught and imprisoned:  Sayyed Isma’il Pasikh, Akhtar Muhammad Sulaimankhel, and other members of Qiyam-i Islami.

 

1355/1977

By this time there was “almost complete separation” between the Shi’a and Sunni opponents of the government.  Sunnis in Peshawar; Shia based in Quetta.  Madrasah-yi Tauhid, which had included both groups split, with Sunni Pushtun members setting up in Peshawar and Shi’a group led by Asadullah Nuktadan setting up in Iran after the overthrow of the Shah.

 

 

 

 

4. 1356/1978 to 1367/1989 Khalqi coup de etat

 

 

@1978-89: Formal institutional conditions

== Sky knew Mir Ahmad Kishtmand [??] at the police academy.  He was a teacher there when Sky was there.  At one time he began talking about social change and socialism with Sky, who wondered about that, and eventually decided he was just trying to test him to see what he would say.  It was only later, when Kishtmand became the editor of a socialist newspaper, that he realized that he had been serious.  It was Kishtmand’s death that stimulated the riots that let to Daud’s putting Taraki and Amin (and others) in jail and then set in motion the “Saur Revolution.”

 

> The coup de etat of a group of young Marxists in 1978 represented an even more radically progressive orientation among the elite and educated middle class of Kabul.  Their attitude toward Islam was expressed in the new flag they introduced to represent their regime: its background was solid red, instead of the black, green and red background of the previous flag:  and the pulpit which had stood at its center for almost a half century was omitted.  Their attitude was also expressed in their treatment of the Hazrat family of Shor Bazaar, Muhammad Ibrahim Mujaddidi.  They violently attacked his residence, arrested him, and “more than 100 of his followers.”  He was executed in prison.*

 

*Newell (art on Islam ): 254‑5; Koshan 1990 [Prison Memoir]

 

The Communist coup in April, 1978, marked a major turning point in Afghn history.

>  Sultan Ali Kistmand was member of the politburo, made PM by Karmal in June, 1981.  two daughters married Russians, founder of Sitam-e-Milli was his borther in law.  He himself was Parchami, hated Khalqis, He was a “Gadee” from Qala-e-Sultan in Chardeh area; they are believed to be Ismailis.  He was known to be atheist and communist.  However he was excummunicated by his own people. HK167-8.

 

Tanzims in early formation

 

In the process of seeking arms and support from the outside the alignments already set up by the Islamists in Pakistan quickly became strategic.  The Islamist organizations — popularly called organizations [tanzims], not parties — provided the conduit between the local resistance groups inside Afghanistan and the external powers interested in embarrassing the Soviet Union in this war and, if possible, to force them to withdraw.  The resistance organizations became the conduits of support from outside powers for the resistance movements among the Afghanistan peoples.  In the process the resistance organizations hardened into political institutions that served the interests of the Islamist leaders.  The tanzims therefore became new institutions in Afghanistan society.  their importance was enforced by the policies of Paksitan.  Pakistan, that is, in particular General Zia, chose the organizations that would be the official channels of support to the Afghanistan resistance groups.  Zia chose a particular group of leaders that in his opinion were unlikely to be able to unite, lest they join into a collective power within Pakistan’s borders and disrupt Pakistanis society and politics.

 

The Islamist parties as channels of external support

Here, ISI, Pak, USCIA, etc.

 

== Maruf:  The parties are themselves intolerant of criticism.  They don’t want intellectuals to say things about what is going on.  In fact, if they do, then the parties, or the Pakistatn ISI will start rumous against them, that they are communists or maoists, or Khad, etc.  This is why the intellectuals are quiet.  They are afraid of the influence of the mujahedin parties and the Pak government.

 

Tanzims and their leaders

Certain prominent Islamic authorities were chosen to lead the organizations for the transfer of resources to the resistance groups inside Afghanistan.  Who they were:  Islamic authorities, whose Islamic bases of power contributed to their importance as political leaders:  Muj, Gailani, Muhammadi, Khales, Rabbani.  Also, the Islamists who were vital were the following:  Hikmatyar, and Masud, and Sayyaf.  The sequence of the development of parties [from interview].  These orgainzational leaders fell into two groups, one called by outside observers “moderates” the other “Islamists”.  In fact, in many ways they were all Islamist to varying degrees.

 

> HK 104:  Under presure by King of Saudi Arabia, a broad coalition, “The Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen” was formed, 4 Islamists, 3 Moderate.  Lasted until Feb, 1989 when Pak and Saudi Arabia patronage led to formation of AIG.

 

Moderat, “establishment” parties:  Sunni

HK 102.  The Islamic Movement that formed as a jehad against the Soviets; they were loosely structured organizations, not parties.  “The ulama, community elders, the intelligentsia, army officers, and former government employees formed their rank and file.  But their top leaders were either members of known religious families which had a considerable number of followers among the common people, or religious scholars.  A degree of toleration, compromise, and a democratic way of life were also features of these organizations.  They also stood for national sovereignty and independence.  They were thus basically Islamic, national and to a certian extent democratic.  They came to be known as traditionalists or moderates a distinct form Islamists.”  These orgainations were set up in 1979.

 

The following belong to Tawaafeq-e Rasmi, 1362/1984, qabuli-e rahbari-ye Zaaher Shah

 

> Jabha-ye Nejaat-e Milli-ye Islaami-ye AFghanistan (Sebghatullah Mujaddidi)

 

>  Front for National Liberation [Jabha-e Nejat-e Milli], led by S. Mujaddidi [his family headed Naqshbandi order in Afgh]; many of this family executed under Khalqis.  Known as Hazrats.

 

On Mujaddidi, see his ms. notes in “war“, and ntsmjddi.1.

 

== 7/3/89  dinner at the American club with Paul Ickx and his wife Laurence‑Lamercier and their guest Jean‑Jose Puig and R and Howie.  Most of this is from Puig

== Mujaddidi is really an Ikhawani.  Trained in same place as Rabbani and Niazi, he has same agendas.  His real difference from the “Islamists” is that he is Naqshbandi.  Also he is a large landowner.

 

> Mahaaz-e Milli Islaami-ye Afghaanistaan (Sayyed Ahmad Gailaani)

Conversation with Abdul Ghafur Maruf

== Pir Gailani’s party was founded by the young pir (Ishaq?) Gilani and his brother.  Only they asked their uncle to come and chair the party (they were of course too marginal and too young.)

 

== The Gailani party is different in being pro‑American.  The Muhammadi party is different in being tradition, establishment.

 

>  National Islamic Front [Mahaz-e Milli-ye Islami] led by Pir Sayyed Ahmad Gailani [head of Qadiriayya order in Afghan.]. [HK: the first time for a Gailani to emerge in national politics]

 

== The Gailani party is different in being pro‑American.  The Muhammadi is different in being tradition, establishment.

 

== “: Gailani’s people are more educated and therefore more able to plan and work together.

 

> Harakat-e Enqelaab-e Islaami-ye Afghaanistaan (Mowlawi Nabi Muhammadi) [NB:  he is not referred to as “Pir”]

== We talked about mullahs.  Benedicte confirmed what I have been told about the disrespect of mullahs among Pushtuns.  I raised the problem of how Mohammadi could have a party in Paktia.  She agreed that the difference was in the role of pirs.  She thought that the pirs have great influence and respect and people fear them as well as respect them because of their powers.  Also their followings were more the “maraboutic” style that Roy describes.

 

>  Revolutinary Islamic Movement [harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami], led by Mowlawi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi.  Severed as a member of parliament in the constitutional decade.  “For this as well as for his personal assault on Babrak karmal in the parliament in late 1966 he became popular particularly among hte numerous mullas in his own province, Logar”. HK 104.

 

== Maruf:  Support for Mowlai M. Nabi is from his students and he is from Logar.  he is a big mullah, so that is his base of pwoer.  But he has no real support except as a party leader.  He wasn’t all that important before the war.

 

== Karzai:  Muhammadi was once a Khalifa for Mujaddidi

 

== Dr. Aziz Lodin:  The [M. Nabi] party started in the early days when there were only 2 parties, H-I [GH] and J-I [Rabbani].  Pak goverment told them they had to form one party and they claled it Harakat-i Inqelabi-i Islami.  But GhH and R. could not allow the other to head this party, so they decided to ask an outsider to head it.  Mowlawi M. Nabi was amullah in Baluchistan.  They thought he would be harless and safe to run the party so they asked him to coome.  He came but the other two gve up non of their control fo their own party.  So in the edn there was a 3rd party.  then at that time and in those days [after 1980] this was the beggest party .. But then there was trbouble w/in the party.  The right hadn man of Mowlawi MNM was Mowlawi Nurullah Mansur.  he became dissatisfied evetually split and set up his own party.  and called it by the same name.  theyn another major Mullah Mowlawi Ma’izin split with him and starteda 3rd party by the same name.  These other 2 parties were never recognzied by Pakistan, so languished.  but these splits weakened the party.  The real problem was the MMNM had no ability to run the party.  he gave all authority to one son.  he didn’t come in, stayed at his home, left all affairs to his son. in fact sent all communications through his son.  But the 1st son became dewana.  And that caused all the problems.  Basically his son wrecked the party.  Now the other son runs the party.  And still M. MNM stays at home and depends on his S to lead. [NB the style of leadership here:  the tradition is that the top person stays at home and is solicited by others, whereas the administrative duties are done by an underling.  this is not different from the pir situation, when the pir leaves mundane things to an underling.  M. MNM is simply acting like a pir!]

 

Azizullah Ludin:  All the fundamtentlaisth parties have prisons.  Even MNM has a prison.  the guards are not supposed to fraternize with anyone else in the party and no one is allowed in the area.

 

Islamist organizations: Sunni

 

Islamist Groups as of 1357-8/1979-80

 

> Jami’at-e Islaami-ye Afghaanistaan (Burhaan ud din Rabbaani) [support from Pakistan]

— J-I has three kinds of elements in it:  Masud, whose leanings are leftist; Rabbani, in the middle; and a few Ikhwanis, the main one is Ershad, but also Lafraiyi.  but they are differen, former is Pushtun the latter is tajik.  People say to her the real difference between fundamentalist and moderate is the Pushtun-Persian split.

 

an element of Rabbani’s support is Settami Milli [perhaps those in the north, who Ayeen says were once extremists?]

 

>  Masud’s bro’s w is daughter of Rabbani

>  there are two Jamiats:  one around Rabbani, a few commanders only; and the Commanders like Masud and Isam’il and others.  They are not well connected

 

> Hezb-e Islaami-ye Afghanistan (Hekmatyaar)

== Gulb. H. is the son of a man who was the servant or attache of the former Naibul Hukumat (Viceroy”) of Badakshan, Qataghan, in the days before it was broken into two provinces.  GH was a Pushtun, but he knowns nothing of tribal life and tribal rule.  His rival, Qari M. Amin WAqad, is a Mohmand from a place where there is real tribal life.

 

== Gulbuddin has lost several commanders in the last couple of years.  They have gone over to the other side because they got fed up with him.  He also has connections with Libya.  Ghaddafi has been helping him.

 

== Gulbuddin is very cruel.  He has cases against him, knows of occaasions, has definite information, when eyes were cut out, when fingers were cut off.  He is very cruel.  AAS agrees that GH would be willing to kill, not only Mujeddidi but also Gailani ‑‑ it means nothing to him.

== But Gulbuddin has no power.  He naturally oppses the king because the king would take over when Gulbudding wants power.  He is worse than Najib or Babrak.  But the people will not accept him.

== Hikmatyar’s party is in ethnic copmosition, class and educational profile “exactly” the same as Khalq.  They are Ghilzai Pushtuns (and Pushtun chavanists?) and have strong lineage ties, and come from the same parts of the country.

== Hikmatyar’s party has essentially dissapated inside the country.  Those in his party in the north have gone over to Mujaddidi (except for those in Gulbahar (?) who now guard the governent textile factory.  Those in Ghorband have split into warring factions.l  The ones in Gulbahar who guard for the gov”t were formerly aligned with the gov’t as militia.  They were collected from among the Kharoti tribe in several parts of the eastern provinces and then palced in the N (Qunduz?) as a militia for the PDPA by hafixullah Amin.  These people were :: with the govt first, then shifted to HzbIslmi when the rest of the party began to dissipate.  They could not join another party because of their past alliances with amin so joined the govt again.  These people of course fought J.Islami.

 

GH tried to destroy the tribal structure in order to institute his party in its place, succeeded in destroying it in Kunar but not in replacing that with his party.  In Kandahar and Paktia and Nangarhar party membership is not mentioned … within the camps party membership is not mentioned.

 

== GH’s family is from the south, he is from Qunduz.  He was known as a Parchami before 1349 (1970) when he joined the Jawaanaan‑i Musulman.  For the previous 2 or 3 years he was Parchami.  (NB: Parchami, Ikhawani; Bhutto, Zia:: “he has no character”).

== Until the Shora of Feb 1989 he used to say death to America, in the Shora he was the strongest supporter of the USA.  It became known that GH would take what he could.

 

> Hezb-e Islaami-ye Afghanistan 2 (Mowlawi Khaales)

Koshan:  Khalis said that all the Hazaras should be run out of the country.

 

FRom: Metaxis:  Khalis said that Iranian Islam is irrational; Islam is not like that, he said.  Islam is very rational, he said.

 

== Khalis’s groups murder of 70+ men who had given themselves up.  This was in the area w of Torkham.  Then the government retook the area and found out about the people killed. Now talk about how prisoners are being treated by muj.

 

==Azmat: Khalis is discretited in this battle, because they were supposed to be the main fighters.  Khalis himself is from Nangarhar and most of his support is from there.  And they have not done well.  Instead Gailani’s people have done better, have born the brunt of the battle.

 

> Etehaad-e Islaami-ye Mujaahedin-e Afghaanistaan (Sayyaf)  [spin-off from Jami’at and from Hezb-e Islaami-ye Afghanistan (Hekmatyaar)]

Sayyaf was really a late comer.  He was in GH’s party group and with several other leaders was put into prison by N.Taraki.  All of them were eventually killed by the communists except Sayyaf, as he was a cousin of Amin.  When Babrak came into power the political prisoners were released and Sayyaf was among them.  When he came out of the country the 5 party alliance (at that time) was just forming.  Khalis introduced him to the alliance and he was made a member of the steering council (or whatever it was at that time).  H.A was a member of that council, and one night some of the other members came to him and suggested that when the new alliance was formed they thought Sayyaf would be a good choice to be the head of it.  He counseled against it, as Sayyaf was an unknown quantity.  He soon left to go back to the St. but he heard afterwards that Sayyaf had been elected president.  The new alliance lasted about 9 months.  But when it collapsed Sayyaf had a lot of money which he used to establish a new party.  It was Saudi money.  He has a lot of money now.  But no loyal followers.

 

> HK 104:  coalition of six Islamic organization, under name of Islamic Unity for the Liberation of Afghanistan, was set up with Abd al-Rab Rasool Sayyaf as head; he was an origianl founder of the Islamic Movement, recently released from Kabul prison and came to Peshwar.

 

Sayyaf’s name used to be Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (??).  But the Wahabbis don’t think you can be servant of the prophet so he changed his name to Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf, because Rabb is a name for God, and it’s OK to say that.

 

— Sayyaf’s influence has been to disrupt some shoras that had otherwise been working fine, united.  He has a lot of wealth in his camp at Pubi.

 

Sayyaf.  Strength of his party is in Konar and Laghman.  He is from Paghman. didn’t try to lead a movement there.  Without the help of Pakistan, Saudi A. he has no power to govern, but he has enough power to cause trouble.  (GH has power but has given up his legitimacy.)

 

== Conversation in Quetta (at New Lourdes Hotel) with Haji M. Nawroz Khan.

== He came here 11 years ago, i.e., soon after the communist coup.  Came with essentially nothing, had no place to stay and for many days had literally no place to sleep.

== early he met Sayyaf (I don’t know where), who was at that time the head of the previously abortive alliance.  Sayyaf was then trying to make one party, to bring all the Mujahedin together.  He asked Haji saheb to represent him (i.e., the alliance) in Quetta.

 

== Wahabbis involved in the resistance

Under the aegis of Sayyaf

 

May 29, 1989:  Kent Obee “only today met an Arab Wahabi who passed himself off as an Afghan refugee and has travelled all over with a refugee passport.”

 

== They should at least not have Wahabbi and not Ikhwani.  These people didn’t want them.

 

==Arabs, Wahabis in the resistance:

There are Arabs within Afghanistan who have several times tried (and sometimes succeeded) to kill foreign correspondents they have found within the country.  Donatella L. he said was almost killed by Arabs but were restrained by the Mujahedin.

 

== A man at the party was talking loudly with a foreign woman in Farsi about the situation in the country.  He said that there are very few real Wahabbis in the country.  They are Wahabi as long as the Saudis provide the money.  Ditto for Ikhwanis.  He didn’t think there were very many true believers.

 

== Dr. Hosayn Mohmand [head of OBGYN hospital]:  the Arabs are a dangerous influence in Afghanistan.  They are wahabbis and Ikhwanis.  Afghanistan Islam is not so strict.

 

== Amini, Hosaini:

one time a Wahabbi group came to them and proposed that they become Sunni.  They said it was good they were fighting the jehad but actually Shia wasn’t real Islam.  They should become Sunni, and if they would they would get a lot of money.  KThe Hazaras thought that was just laughable.

 

 

On internal party members and structure of the Sunni parties

== Homum:

it is characteristic of all the parties that the leadership and key persons in the party are related.  In fact, they are all structured in kinship groups.  Mujaddidi’s family controls his party, and Gailani’s his party.  And Mohammadi’s his.  He didn’t say anything about Khalis; I’ll bet that many of his mullahs are students, etc. and possibly are married into each other.  Jamiat has some of that, but I wonder if it is as strong as in the others.  And Hizb‑ Hikmatyar is probably not closely intermarried.  But in these cases the parties look like extensions of the family networks of prominent families in Afghanistan; and like the Islamic networks surrounding a Pir, as in the case of Gailani’s party.  So the internal structure of the parties is more like the old network patterns than is often noted.  They are mainly based on kinship relations and locality associations.  Even the Parchamis are basically kin‑based groups, as well as the Parchamis.

 

==Metaxis:

Some parties are mainly held together by tribal loyalties.  Khalis’s support is mainly in Nangarhar, where he is from himself ‑‑ and so for that reason his people are most involved in the Jalalbad battle now.  Mullah M. Nabi is from Paktia and his support is mainly from there.  Some of the parties are more ideologically based; mainly this is Hikmatyar’s party and Khalis and Jamiat and Sayyaf (!???I thought Sayyaf’s support came from the Saudis and was largely “bought” support.)

 

== Maruf:  The parties are themselves intolerant of criticism.  They don’t want intellectuals to say things about what is going on.  In fact, if they do, then the parties, or the Pakistatn ISI will start rumous against them, that they are communists or maoists, or Khad, etc.  This is why the intellectuals are quiet.  They are afraid of the influence of the mujahedin parties and the Pak government.

 

Minority parties

 

     Besides the resistance organizations officially approved by Pakistan, there were other organizations that were not official conduits of support for the Mujahedin.

 

     Minority Sunni parties

Some notable organizations not officially accepted by the Pakistani government were the following:

Waqad …; other?

 

== Qazi Muhammad Amin Wiqaad, who is the head of the party which he calls “Da’ye Ittehad‑i Islami‑ Afghanistan” (Invitation to Afghanistan Islamic Unity).  This man’s assistant is Engineer M. Amin Munsif.  (Khakmal was also present.)  Wiqaad and his assistant speak Pushtu mainly.

 

== Khakmal also said (without much clarification of how it happened) that the orginal party was Hizb‑i Islami and Qazi M. Amin Wiqaad was the head of that (verified elsewhere?), then it split and Hikmatyar was head of it.  And all the other parites split from it.

 

== These men are associated with none of the Peshawar parties, only with a man who they said was the teacher of many of the leaders, of Gulbuddin and Rabbani and Sayyaf: Mowlawi Tara Kheal, who is Sheykhul Ahdi, Asharaful Madas, Sheykhul Haddies (Hadith?), “the commander of Kabul.”

 

??== Haji Hazarat is a former merchant who has used his fortune to fight the war.  He has used his own funds.  They have lands in Shamali, but it is all destroyed now.  They can be separate because they use their own funds, and it is about gone now.  they support Mowlawi Tara Khael.

 

 

Saazmaan-e Aazaadibakhsh-e Islami (Al-Hadid).  A spin-off from Jami’at:    ??who is this??

 

     The Shi’a parties, all of which are in a sense minority parties

 

An alliance of eight Shi’ite parties, all influenced to some degree by Shi’ite leaders outside of Afghanistan.  Most of them have strong ties to Iran and several were formed late, about the time of the Geneva Accords.  One party, however, never joined this alliance.

 

Sponsored by the government of Iran:

 

== me:  The Shiite resistance organizations, all of them except Harakati Islami, were obliged by the neglect the suffered from the Paksitan government and its sponsors, the United States and Saudi Arabis, to turn to Iran.  The relations of the Afghanistan Shiites to Iran, however, were mixed, and the story of the involvement of the Iranian government in the Shiite resistance organizations inside Afghanistan reveals again the significance of the pir murid network in the formation of resistance organizations early in the war, and the the powerful effect that an outside power can have on the internal structure within the country.  The Shura organization, the coalescence of sayyeds in the formation of the new organization.  The problems with the leadership, mismanagement, and dispute with Khomeini, breakup with Iranian supporters.  The commitment of Iran to form its own organization, Nasr, and then Pasadaran, etc.  Eventually, the withdrawal of many Shiites from Iranian support.  The smaller organizations that formed.  Eventually, the Wahdat organization, united with Iranian support, but clearly independent of Iranian control.

 

== the Hazara/Shia parties mainly went to iran.  At first the Sunni parties helped in Pakistan, but not much.  Then when Iran began to help the Pakistan parties reduced even that much help.  But for the last two years Pakistan has been trying to help the Hazara/Shia more, in order to counter the influence of Iran.  But even now they get only a half a percent or one percent.

 

> Also, support for Sunni party Hizb-e Islami Afghanistan [Hikmatyar]:  DE1986:225:  Rather than backing the indigenous Shura or one of the Shi’i parties such as Harakat-i Islami Afghanistan, the Iranina government threw its support to Hizb-i Islami Afghanistan …”

 

== So the Iranians not only made a deal to get help from the Soviets but also to get munitions for their three parties ‑‑ Shora‑Ittifaq, Nasr, and Harakat‑i Islami.

 

The members of the eight party Shi’ite alliance are the following:

 

     The larger parties

 

Harakat‑i Islami (“Islamic Movement”).  Founded about 1358 (1979).  Started in Qandahar, led by Ayatollah Mohsini, affiliated with Ayatollah Khowi, who resides in Iraq.  Has drifted away from close ties with Khomeini.

 

>  Ayatullah Shaykh Asif Muhsini, head of Harakat-i-Islami (Islamic Movement).  Followed his own independent line, not Khomeni.  Strained relations with iran, and in 1980 Iran banned his party from being active in Iran.

> Harakat-i Islami-ye Afghaanistaan [some support from Pakistan], led by Ayatullah Shaikh Asaf Muhsini.  Iran’s failure to support Muhsini was “puzzling”:  DE1986:225:  [Muhsini is] “a relitious scholar of some repute, Muhsini is from Qandahar, and although he was apparently not actively engaged in politics prior to the communist revolution, [p226] he had organized a cultural group known as Subh-i Danish (Dawn of Knowledge) whose members became early and vigorous opponents of the communist regime.  nevertheless, in Agust 1980, Iran banned Muhsini’s Harakat-i Islami party from Iran and backed Hikmatyar …”  Apparently, “there was no organized group among the Shi’is that could adequately serve as an appropriate representative of their position.”  The first such party was Saazmaan-i Nasr Islami-ye Afghanistan.

 

Harakat I: Mohsini is their leader.  Khowi is helper.  Jawed is assistant to Muhsini.  S. Hasan i Faazil (is a prominent mullah), Aghay Haadi is a prominent Commander from Behsud (has wealth and land).

This party has former maoists, and former dawlati [govt] also.  Dr. Shah Jahan in Ghazni is set up against the government (positions?).  sent 2 cars to Anwar at Sanglaakh.  There was crisis among their spies in Kabul. Some one squealed and pointed out 70 of their people, were caught.  This created a crisis.  People from the party gathered in Peshawar.  Some wanted to disown (and punish?) the person who revealed the names.  Another group protected him.  Eventually there was no decision.

 

— The strongest Shiite party is Harakat Islami of Muhsini, who is close to J-I.  effective underground in Kabul.

 

== People expressed their separation from Iran by following anyother ayatullah: Khoyi.

 

== Abdul Wahid of Inst of Hazara studies in Q.:  The leader of the Harakat‑i Islami party is Sayyed Abul Qasim‑i Khoyi, who resides in Iraq, but is Iranian.  I said that he must therefore be against Khomaini, but he said no, that he just was distant, didn’t approve or disapprove of Khomaini.  he said the party that was dependent on Khomaini was the Nasr party.  The said the Pasdaran‑i … party was just a group of people that the Iranians put together, they were a few mullahs and some straggling Afghans whom they gave guns to.

 

==  Harakat seems to be loosely overganized; their commanders not always taking the same sides.

 

== There appears to be some division among the Harakat people (generally under the command of Ansari) in Kabul.

 

begun 1358 (79) in Kandahar

 

 

Saazmaan‑i Nasr (“Organization of Victory”).  Founded in 1356 or 57.  Was initially called Na’zat‑i Hosayni.  Has a central committee made up of representatives from different places.  Most notable figure is Sheykh Abdul Karim Khalili (from Qul‑i Khesh of Behsud), who is spokesman for the eight party alliance.  Other prominent leaders are: Sheykh Mir Hosayn Saadiqi (from Turughman), Azizullah Shafiz (from Behsud), Abdul Ali Mazaari (from Dara‑i Suf), Naatiqi (from Waras), Rahimi (from Khujmiri of Ghazni), Shaykh Qurbaan Irfaani (from Yak Awlang).  formed in 1356 or 55.

> Saazmaan-i Nasr-i Islami-ye Afghaanistaan.  DE1986:226: “composed primarily of young, ideolgoically committed fundamtentalists.”  These include former deputy of Ayatually Bihishti named Sadiqi, and Mazari, “who is reported to have spent time in an Iranian prison with the current president of Iran, Hujjat al-Islam Ali Khamene’i.  This party has been accused of attacking other parties [DE1986:226].  “gradually increased its influence in the [Hazarajat], in part through superior organization but largely because of the financial and logistical backing received from Iran. … accomplished in the face of opposition from the Hazara people in general and the Shura in particualr…”  “…managed to strike a decisive blow against the Shura in the summer of 10984, when it forced Ayatullah Bihishti to flee his headquarters in Waras.”  [227]: ..main opposition has come [more recently] … from another Iranian product, Sipah-i Pasdaran.”

>  Sazman-e-Nasr-e-Islami was ideologically motivated Shiites funded by Iran

== Nasr (and the Iranian parties?) entered in two ways; 1. It is common for Hazaras to go for a year to work (study?) in Iran, so when they come back they have Iranian contacts and they say good things about Iran; 2. the mullahs from there get money from Iran which they distributed

== people were happy with Iran (their success against the west?) and they supported Iran.

     Saazmaan-i Nasr

>First order leaders of this party, the Central Committee:  Shaykh Mir Hosayn Saadiqi (from Turughman), Azizullah Shafaq (Besud), Abdul Ali Mazaari (Dare Suf), Naafiqi (Waras), Hakimi (Ghazni- Khujmiri), Rahimi (Saryaabi-Ghazni), Shaykh Abdul Karim, Khalili (Behsud- Qul-i Kheysh), Shekh Qurbaan Irfaani (Yak Awlang).

>Second order leaders: in Behsud, Shora-i Wulayat, 3 people; in Ghazni, 1 imp person (a commander); in Jaghori-Qarabaagh, 1 person (This commander took 4 Arabs from a fight between Nasr and HzbIslami after HzbIslami wrecked 700 houses.  He is keeping the Arabs prisoners until the weapons are paid for.  This has disturbed HzbI. Sayyaf has gotten into it, also Saudi Arabia.  The fight took place in Qarabaagh); in Turughman, 2 people (in some places there are shoras, in others commanders; Bamian, commanders are weak, subservient to Yak Awlang or Behsud; Yak Awlang, 3 men; DehZangi ??.

>(my own comment: nb how the rural has come to dominate the “urban” of Bamian.  Bamian has historically been easily held by the government, perhaps because it was (then) on the main road.  Now it is further off, and it has been the first provincial headquarters overtaken by the opposition.  It can be viewed as a tension b/n rural and urban influences, and so far the people from neighboring areas have been able to muster the strength of opposition to dominate Bamian.))

 

> Sipah-i Pasdaaraan.  DE1986:227:  ” … was initiated in 1982 because of Iranian dissatisfaction with Nasir.”  This is “an Afghan contingent” of the semi-military organization by the same name in Iran, “using mostly Afghan personnel but operating directly under the command of the Iranians”.  Sipah-e-Pasdaran, same organiaation as the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Party.

Paasdaaraan-i Jehad-i Islami (Sepaa)

Started 1361-2, January.  Three important men: Akbari and his son from Waras; Sheykh Qurbani Muhaqiq from Turughman (he was a rival of Saadiqi of Nasr in Turughman); Zaidi from Ghazni.

Paasdaaraan‑i Jehaad‑i Islami [also called “Sapaa“] (“Guardians of Islamic Holy War”).  Founded in Iran in 1361 (January, 1982).  Three important men:  Akbari and his son (from Waras), Shaykh Qurbaani Mushaqiq (from Turughman), Zaidi (from Ghazni).

Iran supported groups by 1360/1982.  These become:  Paasdaaraan-e Jehaad-e Islaami; (they are under the influence of the administration of Iran); they receive further influences [clients? members?] from Harakat-i Islaami and Shoraay- Enqelaab-e Etefaaq-e Islaami-ye Afghaanistaan

 

     The smaller parties (most of them founded in 1358 (1979).

 

Na’zat‑i Islami Afghaanistaan (“Islamic Movement of Afghanistan”).  Leaders are from Jaaghori; most notable one is Iftikhaari, also (a representative in Peshawar) Rahimi.

Nahzat‑i Islami Afghaanistaan (“Islamic Movement of Afghanistan”); started in 1358.

> All leaders are from Jaghori: one imp leader, Iftikhaari; one rep in Peshawar, Rahimi.

 

Nerui‑yi Islam‑i Afghaanistaan (“Islamic Force of Afghanistan”).  Prominent leaders are: Sayyed Zaaher‑i Muhaqiq and his son Sayyed Hosayn Muhaqiq (from Behsud), and Hashemi (from Sang Charak in Jowzjaan).  Nairo was another [Shiite?] organiation that was considered “very successful” quoted from Haqshinas 1986, p36 on HK 273.  Haqshinas, N.  1985.  Russia’s Intrigues and Crimes in Afghanistn.  [Dari].  Cultural Committee, The Islamic Association of Afghanistan.  Tehran.  But Iran was not pleased they could get control of hazaras, the Shiites, and set up an umbrella organization, Nasr, which they supported until 1982, but gave up on it when found out they had no real control of Afghan Shiites.  so set up another party.

Neru‑i Islam‑i Afghaanistaan (“Islamic Force of Afghanistan”)

> These are Amini’s relatives.  from Behsud.  S. Zae-i Muhaqiq and his son S. Hosayni Muhaqiq; Hashem (from Sang Charak in Jowzjan Shibarghan (??Behsud?);

 

Da’wat‑i Ittehaad‑i Islami‑ye Afghaanistaan (“Invitation to the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan”).  Only strength is in Angora, Ghazni province.

 

Hizb‑i Islami‑ye Ra’d‑i Afghaanistaan (“Party of Islamic Thunder of Afghanistan”).  Leader is Qari Ahmad, also known as Qari Yakdista.

 

Jabhaa‑i Mujtahed-i Enqelaab-i Islami Afghanistan (“United Mujahedin Front”).  This is a party formed last year from four very small parties, all of which had formed in 1358 or 1359 (1978 or 1979).  These were the following:

Ruhaaniyat wa Jawaanaan‑i Afghanistan (“The Spirituality and Youth of Afghanistan”).

Islam Maktab‑i Tawhid (“Islam, School of Unity”).

Itehaad‑i Ulamaa (“Union of Islamic scholars”).

Jambesh‑i Mustazafin‑i Islami‑ye Afghanistan (“Association of the Islamic Oppressed of Afghanistan”).

     Fedaayaan-i Islam (“Zealots [??] for Islam”)

 

== The Shiite parties have formed the following united party:  now [1989] called Shoraa‑i Itilaafi‑ Musulmani‑ye Afghanistan, founded about a year ago at about the time of the Geneva accords:

Harakat‑i Islami, Saazmaan-i Nasr, Paasdaaraan-i Jehaad-i Islami (“Sepaa”):

== The groups that worked together were Harakat, and Shura and ???; later Nasr entered.

 

Shi’ite Groups as of 1357-8/1979-80

> Shoraay- Enqelaab-e Etefaaq-e Islaami-ye Afghaanistaan (“Council of the Islamic Revolutionary Alliance”)  DE1986:223:  “comprised mostly sayyids, tribal chiefs, and anumber of nationally prominent Hazaras, including some former parliamentary represeantaives, all of whom began assembling in Waras from throughout the Hazarajat in June 1979.  Of these component groups, the nonreligious elements intially dominated the council.  However, within a short period of time, leadership of the Shura was taken over by the sayyid contingent, and one of their number, Ayatullah Bihishiti, who had been educated in iraq, was chosen as the president of the council.  Bhishti’s deputy (Ayatullah Husain Nasiri) and chief military commander are also sayyids,  … [meaning Sayyid Muhammad Hasan jagran, one of the leaders of the popular uprising in Ghazni …”  DE1986:228: “The Shura, the political assembly that was set up to coordinate resistance activities in 1979, was controlled by traditional religous and secular leaders and probably had more in common with the Hazara coalition that opposed ‘Abdu al-Rahman than with any fo the political parties that emerged in the 1960s.”  DE86:229:  “From the perspective of Iran and her Afghan proxies, this may represent the last stirrings of a corrupt band of sayyids with vested interest in maintaining their authority over the illiterate Hazara peasantry.  To the majortiy of Hazaras, hwoever, the radical ideology emanating frmo Iran represents a dangerous innovation …”

 

Shoraay- Enqelaab-e Etefaaq-e Islaami-ye Afghaanistaan [some support from Pakistan; but they lost their support from Iran fairly early.]

 

== The Hazaras rose up in Saur (spring) of 58 (in the winter of 58 the Russians invaded; :: 58 is probably 1980??).  They gathered in Waras.  took Waras then took Yak Awlang.  then went to Bamian, by the end of Saur were in Bamian.  They took it and held it for about 5 days.  Leader was Sayyed Lamalam from Yak Awlang, from another family of Sayyeds near Yak Awolang, (not same as Agha RAis).  And Chaman Ali, a teacher from Yak Awlang, was his assistant.  But many were killed in Bamian.  The government bombarded them and they had poor weapons and didn’t know about what planes could do.

 

== Then many people rose up against the governemnt.

 

== The Hazaras rose up in Saur (spring) of 58 (in the winter of 58 the Russians invaded; :: 58 is probably 1980??).  They gathered in Waras.  took Waras then took Yak Awlang.  then went to Bamian, by the end of Saur were in Bamian.  They took it and held it for about 5 days.  Leader was Sayyed Lamalam from Yak Awlang, from another family of Sayyeds near Yak Awolang, (not same as Agha RAis).  And Chaman Ali, a teacher from Yak Awlang, was his assistant.  But many were killed in Bamian.  The government bombarded them and they had poor weapons and didn’t know about what planes could do.

 

== Then many people rose up against the governemnt.

 

The Shi’ite party that has fought bitterly against the Iranian based parties is:

Shoraa‑i Enqelaab‑i Itefaaq‑i Islami (“Council of the Islamic Revolutionary Alliance”).  Founded in 1357 (1978) in Waras, Bamian, Hazarajat.  [Amini said Jan,79].  Was founded by some mullahs, some arbabs, some intellectuals/teachers.  Later the mullahs took over because Iran mullahs took over there.  The people agaist Iran opposed them.  They prepared tashkilaat, in which divided the Hazarajat into 7 wulayats: each with one wali, one qazi, one shaharwaal [mayor].  It was strong then.  They announced that everyone should have a gun, every two families one rifle.  One year later, the took the rifles from the people for the “army”.  Told them they couldn’t keep books by Shariati [because he was against mullahs, was a socialist and opposed fundamentalism.]  New groups came into the Hazarajt then, in 1360 [+/-1982].  Iran asked if the Shura followed Iran.  Behisti claimed he was the leader in Afghanistan like Khomeini.  Iran sent people into Afghn to take it for Iran.  1361 [approx. 1983] they started fighting.  Two years later [1985?] the shura was very weak.  Most prominent leader: Sayyed Behishti.  (A recent attempt at rapprochement with Iran by one leader was repudiated by other members of the party.)  Book by Ralhp Bindemann in German, a 7 year study of the Hazarajat [Mullah Gharjistani had it in Quetta].

     Shoraa-i Enqelaabi-i Itefaaq-i Islami

Formed by the Arbaabs in the end of the year 1357, Jan 79.  There was a large mtg in Waras, made up of mullahs, arbaabs, intellectuals (teachers).  Later the mullahs took over because in Iran the mullahs had taken over (or, I’m not sure which: because the mullahs had taken over the Iran-based parties).  Those against Iran opposed them, as they mimed Iran.  There was a Tashkilaat (division) of territories.  Divided the Hazarajat into 7 wulayats in which there was one wali, one Qaazi, one sharwaal (mayor).  It was strong then.  Announced that everyone should have a weapon.  Every two families should have at least one rifle.  One year later they took all the rifles away from the people for the “army”; told them they couldn’t keep books by Shariati (because he was against the mullahs, and a socialist and opposed fundamentalism).  New groups came into existence in the Hazarajat then.  In 1360 Iran asked if Shora party followed Iran. Behishti claimed he was the leader in Afghanistan in the same way that Khomeini was leader of Iran.  Iran sent people into Af. to take it for Iran.  In 1361 they started fighting; two years later Shora was very weak.

 

== The Kochis in the spirng of 1979 seem to have worried about coming into the Hazarajat.  They approached S. Behishti and asked permission to go in , as they have since the 1880s, and he refused, He was of course leading the mobilizaiton of Hazarajat as part of the Shory Itelfaqi Islami.

== Dilawar himself paid a visit on S. Behishti.  He said he is incapable of leading a party, has no political awareness. is a mully only.  a pir to some people.  He is from Waras.

== Dilawar was ready to disimulate and tell him he was Shiite, but Behishti didn’t ask.

 

== Behishti has in the last 2 weeks gone over to the government(!).  This was announced by Amin Wardak who has been Behishti’s protector in the Hazarajat.  When Behishti needed help against the Nasr and Sepasdaran people he got it from Wardak, and so Wardak’s announcement comes from his most loyal defender.  It is therefore true, the Frenchmen believe.

 

== Hosaini and M. Amin Amini:  Early in the war the main party was Shura‑Ittifaq.  When they became weak some people went to Harakat‑Islami; they helped the Shura (vs Nasr?).

 

conversation with Hosaini and M. Amini.

== The Shura‑ittefaq party has made a deal with the government in Ghazni to get arms.  Hosaini’s friend was present when they signed with Kishtmand (the Hazara second in command in Kabul government) for arms.  They had to make this deal, they felt, because Khomeini had promised to give the other 8 parties about 70,000 weapons and some money to keep fighting.  These groups have been fighting with the Shora, so they had to get help somewhere and they don’t care where.  In fact, also Maadani of the office here has gone to Tehran (on same place with Rabboni) to get arms from Iran.  Of course, they lie on both ends, he said.  Evidence that Shora is actually supporting the government is that they have fired some rounds into the positions of the Mustazafin.

 

== The Shura‑Ittefaq party has been for some time getting arms from a Hazara official (general?) in Ghazni.  However, Sayed Jadran appeared on BBC radio last night to deny that they have joined the government.  Howver, the commanders in the area are unsure how Sura will behave in the planned attack on Ghazni.  They are not sure whether Shura will hang back, join them, or help the government in the battle.  This is their main worry in the attack.

 

United groups of Shi’a in 1989:

== In Iran the leadership of the 8 parties has rotated and the head of Pasdaran is now spokesman.  The former leader, from Nasr, was easier to deal with.  That could spell more trouble in Teheran for Rabani and his people in trying to bring the Iranian supported parties into the government.

 

> Another party emerges [sources unspecified]:  Jumbesh-i Muqaawamat-i Afghanistan

 

> A party supporting Hazaras with support from Pakistan:  Ittihadi-ye Mujahidin-e Islami-ye Afghanistan [ Union of islamic Mujahedin of Afghanistan] led by Abdul Husain Maqsudi [DE1986:225]

 

>  Other parties the Shiites set up:  the Party of God, some connected to Mujahedin-i-Khalq.

 

The Mustazafin Group as of 1357/1979

 

> Saazmaan-i Mujahedin-i Khalq-i Afghanistan

 

== Mustazafin:  They said the party was started by Eng. Hashemi when he was a student at the U. of Kabul (in the early years of Taraki or before?); he is from Ghazni.  They don’t have another center, no connection with Iran.

 

== The Mustazafin are not well regarded, have fought with Harakat‑i Islami.  People have distrusted them; I said I thought they were all from outside Bamian, but he said he felt sure there would be some from Bamian because otherwise the people would not let them be there.  He believed their headquarters was in France; they are really run by non‑believers, he thought.

 

== There is a Qizilbash [Mustazafin?] community in Sheshpul, have moved in from Kabul and set up shops and trying to be active in the area.  Now are serving as the rps of the Ismailis in Kalu to PS, are young, graduatesof Engineering school, not Isms but serve the PS work.  :: need to distinguish Ism peasants from the education and progressive Ismailis, many of whom are now in govt. [1985]

 

Paul Ikx:

== The mustazafin were started in Kabul University, were largely Qizilbash, were like 2 other Shia groups Sittam‑i Milli (from Badakhshan) and Sholey Jawed (Hazara)  They have changed a lot, were formerly aligned with Mujahedin‑i Khalq of Iran but now not aligned with them.  Have taken on some new qualities.  They have a large number of Hazaras now.

 

== In Bamian they have been influential even though numerically small.  It was a mustazafin commander who coordinated the attack on Bamian Markaz.  Also, he says they continue to be influential, even though weak and small.

 

== the mustazafin are accused of being maoist.  They also sound maoist to Fredrick.  They don’t want major industrial development but local industrial development.  They in other ways use the terminology of the maoists..  They also deny any connection with the Mujahedin‑i Khalq of Iran.  they believe the industry should be locally based, not large industry.

 

Re: mustazafarin:

== People say they are Khalqi, Parchami and Maoist because they are educated.  Most of them are educated, and so they were distrusted by the people for a while.

 

— Saazmaan-i Mujaahedin-i Mustazafin-i Afghanistan.  “Organization of the Oppressed Holy Warriors of Afghanistan.”  A small group, mostly Shiite, iwth a secular bias; members are from various places in Ghazni and the eastern Hazarat but working mainly in Bamian; formerly connected with the anti-Khomeini Mujahedin-i Khalq part of Iran, but now separate.  Led by a council.  Principle representative is Sayyed Hosayni of Jalrez. [this was done for MEJ]

 

Another party with a strong Shi`ite background:

Saazmaan‑i mujaahedin‑i mustazafin‑i Afghaanistaan (Organization of holy warriors for the oppressed of Afghanistan”).  A small group, mostly Shi`ite, with a secular orientation; members are from various places in Ghazni province and the eastern Hazarajat, working mainly in Bamian.  They were formerly connected with the anti‑Khomeini Mujahedin‑i Khalq party of Iran, but now separate.  Led by a council.  Principle representative in Peshawar is Sayyed Hosayni of Jalrez.

 

1360/1982

 

Mustazafin as of 1360/1982

> Saazmaan-i Mujahedin-i Khalq-i Afghanistan becomes Saazmaan-i Mujahedin-i Mustazafin-i Afghanistan

 

Remaining comments on the Shiite parties/groups

== The Shiite parties are the following.  Now called Shoraa‑i Itilaafi‑ Musulmani‑ye Afghanistan, founded about ayear ago at about the time of the Geneva accords:

–Recently, about the time of the Geneva accords, the parties affiliated with iran formed an alliance called Shoraayi-Itilaaf-i Musulmaan-i Afghanistan

 

== The Shiite parties are the following.  Now called Shoraa‑i Itilaafi‑ Musulmani‑ye Afghanistan, founded about ayear ago at about the time of the Geneva accords:

 

== In Iran the leadership of the 8 parties has rotated and the head of Pasdaran is now spokesman.  The former leader, from Nasr, was easier to deal with.  That could spell more trouble in Teheran for Rabani and his people in trying to bring the Iranian supported parties into the government.

Ismailis

 

When the communists came in they saw him [S. Kayan] as a feudal lord and wanted to destroy him.  Shi and Sunnis saw them as Kafirs.  But Sayyed i Kayan tried to keep going with both sides, the government and the mujahedin.  Several times the commanders of Harakat-i Islami attacked Kayan.  Because Sayyed i Kayan was weak and the government wanted his support they offered him arms.  Now Sayyed i Kayan gives them money to allow the mujahedin to get through and and to be accepting of each other.

 

== In Taraki’s time they imprisoned the son of Sayyed Kayan (Sayyed Mansur Nadiri, not Sayyed Manucher who was his enemy).  In jail he agreed to help and work with the government.  They killed several (5 or 6) of his family in jail.  then he agreed and was let out.  The government built mosques for them in Kabul, so the Isms were happy with the government, at least they became betaraf.

 

Dilawar Khan:, 25JUN89

The Ismailis of Shibar early in the war against the government had formed a fighting group that fought well in Bamian and some were killed against the government.  They lost some at Shahari Gholghola.  They fought in shesh Pul and at the Markaz.

— But the Kabul regime captured the sons of Sayyed-i kayan and killed a number of them.  Only the oldest, S. Naasir Naderi (Shah Saheb) and S.  Mansur (Khan Agha), these two capitulated to the government.  When htey got out S. Nasir fled and went to WEurope.  Now lives in London.  S. Mansur then took over the leadership fo the Ismailis.  His strength is in the north, Shibarghan, Doshi, Kayan.  But because he supported the government it created a problem for the Ismailis of Shibar.  He sent Khad agents to kill Nur Ahmand [leader of the Ismaili resistance group in Shibar].  also Mir Mir Ahmad was killed in Kabul by Khad agents.  The killer was from Iraq, a reltiave.  The son of MMA is still living in Iraq.  But one son was killed with him.  Then when the news was out that the Ismailis supported the government the Harakat-i Islami attacked Shibar and disarmed the Ismailis.  ten of them were killed and 1 of the Harakat-i Islami was killed.  When they came into the valley someone beat up Mir Gholam Hasan, hit him with the but of a rifle, wanted him as rish safed to tel where the guns were. // so the Ismailis suffered a lot becuase of S. Mansur’s joining of the government.  Dilawar is very much against S. Mansur.  When S. Nasir [Mansur?] Naderi went to see the Agha Khan in Paris the Agha Khan refused to see him because he had agreed to support the government.  And when Dilwar was in Karachi he saw a wakil of the Agha Khan and asked if there was amukki in Afghn he said no, that S. Mansur was not a mukki.  But the Ismailis of Afhgnaistaqn suppose that Mansur is the mukki.  In the mean time the onld rival, S. Manucher, who is a Bache Kaka to S. Mansur and who was trying to get recognized as the pir, now has lost almost everything.  s. Mansur has taken his land and his house[s].

 

The Ismaili experience was unique in the Afghanistan war, for they played, as they often have in the past, an intermediate role in public affairs, particularly in the regions where they had secure dominance.  The Shah Saheb, beaten in prison, and brother killed.  Shah Saheb fled to Europe.  Younger brother took over .  The intermediate roll the Ismailis played:  supported by the government, becoming the head of government militia in the north, but at the same time passing information to Masud, to help him in his resistance activities.  During the course of the war, therefore, Sayyed ??? has led the Ismailis and effected their relations to the government and the resistance groups.  However, there is a dispute among some of the Ismailis whether he is a properly appointed mukki [define???].

 

== Sayyed Manucher has followers in Iraq and Turughman.  One of his followers works in the office of Prince Sadruddin.

 

== there are in Kalu Harakat Islami, Nasr, Shora; and the Ismailis are for whoever is the strongest; because they are weakest in the whole area (although not weakest in their own area).

 

Conversation with Dilawar Azimi from Pushti Mazar of Shumbul at our house, July 8, 1989

==The Mir for Pushti Mazar before MGH was, be believes, Sohbat.  Then there was MGH.  Then still in the time of Zaher Shah a man came from Kabul, Sultan Ali, who wanted to do miri.  He was in Shumbul (Shibar?) for a time, but did not succeed to become mir.  Then another man from Pushti Mazar rose up to be mir.  But the people wanted him instead of MGH. they couldn’t go to himn directly because he would be mad, so they went o Kahn Afgha in Kayan (he was acting Pir then?) and he arranged for the change.

== Recently the father of Sultan Ali has become the rep of Harakat-i Islami.  He collects $ (and I think a tax of the crops?) for Harakat i Islami and pays it to the commander of the Shibar front.  ((NB. he must be an Ismaili working for the Harakat-i Islami after the region was taken over by HrktIslmi))

== S. Mansur of Turughman, who had allied himself w Sayyed Manucher, the old man who objected to the Pir of Kayyan and wanted to be his heir instead of Shah Saheb, Nasir[?] Naderi.  But eventually S. Mansur became the mukki of Turughman.  The usual situation is that there is a mukki for every jamaat Khana, and apparently S. Mansur built one in Turughman, and became mukki there.  But S. Mansur was picked up and jailed by Taraki’s governemnt, along with the sons of S.i Kayyan.  And as several of those sons were killed, so also was S. Mansur (apparently S. Manucher the rival of the PirSaheb was not picked up).  Anyway, the older sons of S i Kayyan, Shah Saheb and Khaan Agha were terrorized into capitulating to Kabul’s side and were released.

When Dilawar asked the Wakil of the Aga Khan, he said there is now no mukki in Afghanistan.  Dilawar wants to bring a group of elders to Karachi to hear this themselves, because no one will believe him if he tries to tell them.

== The people decided to support S. Mnsur of Turughman because they began to feel that S. Kayyan was not watching out for the people.  There was some disappointment with the S. Kayan )after the old man died? and therefore with his sons, who were more worldly?)  So this is how S. Mansur got the right to be mukki in Turughman.

— Prince Karim is the 49th Imam from Ali

 

— the Ismailis from Badakhshan support the resistance, but Kaynis support the government.

–Bruce Wannell:  soon after he left [in 1987?] the Ismilis got in a fight with the others and were disarmed.  Commander of Abbas from Dar-e Abbas [above Shumbul] was an Ism commander trying to organize a party to control the pass, on behalf of S. Kayan.  In a big fight the Ismailis were disarmed.  Fight occurred in Iraq.  Bruce was in shekh Ali at the time.  there wasw a major Sayyed brouth in to mediate between the Eastern Shekh Ali who were Sunni and the westerh Shekh ali who were Shii. [boy from BandiAmir said there were few Ismailis in Shekh Ali.

— Shah-iZohak is inhabited by people from PayMuri.

 

Maruf:  A friend of his in Baghlan, Amir Raoof, has accepted arms from Sayyed-i Kayan.  Sayyed it Kayan is head of all Militia forces for Kabul in norther.  Raoof has accepted arms from government, but has fought for 10 years against it.  he is head of HizbIslami forces in Baghland

Maruf:  People don’t like the parties.  they resent them, and the party leaders know that, he says.  He said 6-9 months ago [i.e. mid 1988] some commanders wrote to Hikmatyar stating their objections to him and what he was doing.  They openly and directly critcized him.

 

==Sayyed‑i Kayyan has been aligned with the opposition sides, trying to identify with the stongest side.  He was a liason with the govt on behalf of mas’ud.  but now that Najib and has become stronger has aligned with Najib and attacked Jamiat‑iIslami.

 

2/24/89.  In Juma bazar, Islamabad, antique seller from Bamian:  A lot of fighting among the Isms in Shibar 2 years ago [1985?].  They were with Najib’s govt and the Imamis.  In fight PS had moved tanks, etc. into Shibar.  hewas at that time for Najibullah.  After that the Ism’s stoppoed supporting him [Najib?]  Now the Isms have left Shibar; scattered, but most have gone to karachi.

 

Puig: Oct 12, 1985

Leader of the resistance group in Barfak and further west is Mowlawi Malang, local leader under him is Baz M.  People of Barfack and Tala [mainly Ismaili] have long been at odds, recently [1982] they got together, agreed on a cease fire.  Last time they fought on the same side was against BacheSaqwow

— Sa. Manucher, who opposed th4e PS has few followers.  Owns territory in Dahan-i Ghori.  Now cooperates with Gailani and has close ties to Mujeddidi.

 

== Sultan Ali the man who tired to supplant him (from Birgilic?) is now in Kabul, is struggling against Sayyedi Kayan on behalf of S. Manucher.

 

— Sayyed Manucher has been abandoned by nearly everyone, is near death.

 

— Isms are not wit any party, cooperate with the governemnt, receive arms from Sviets.  SM/PS has good connections w/in govt.  Many Parchamis are Ismailis … Masud gets support from PS and followers.

== Ism of Kalu have left Kalu and moved into Iraq becaus ethey can be just out of range of the guns.

== There is a Qizilbash [Mustazafin?] community in Sheshput, have moved in from Kabul and set up shops and trying to be active in the area.  Now are serving as the rps of the Ismailis in Kalu to PS, are young, graduatesof Engineering school, not Isms but serve the PS work.  :: need to distinguish Ism peasants from the education and progressiv Ismailis, many of whom are now in govt. [1985] and Parchamis?

 

 

@1978-1989:  Informally organized and locally based relations in Afghanistan

 

Saur coup.  Quickly the Khalqis generated much resentment by their attempts to discredit local leaders, and by harsh treatment of dissenters.  Early revolts in Nuristan and Hazarajat.  DE1986:222:  “The nucleus of a political organization was established in the town of Waras in Bamiyan Province.”

 

> reactions to the coup in 1978 revealed a populace ready and eager for change, as the communists (although they were not yet known to be so at that time) were well received.

>  However, the communists generated opposition by the new policies, “reforms,” that they introduced, and by their brutal attempts to put down all dissent.  The acts of opposition grew around the country.

 

2.3  On the parties, see my Orbis p 68 -71, and my MEJ “Trajectory” p. 640 [The War and Scoial Transformation: -increased contacts, -political parties, rise of autonomous commanders, persistence of local rivalries.

 

Soviet invasion in December ’79 and Jan ’80

 

The Soviet invasion generated even broader and more intense opposition

 

> early on, the acts of opposition were uncoordinated, locally instigated.

 

The Jehad

 

>  HK208:  [I]n such times the non-combative Afghans including widows were (and are) willing to support those fighting the invaders.  Thus the defence of the country and the faith is not the sole responsibility of the armed forces but of every adult Afghan capable of carrying weapons as well.  In fact, every time the country has been invaded the regular armed forces have soon isintegrated and conversely the ranks fo the irregulars have been strengthened in a spirit of jehad.”

 

The Kabul revolt of 1980

 

HK78 [The Azans, i.e. Allow Akbar — god is great — was recited in Herdar and Kenderhar intensely before it reached Kabal and in February it began to be practiced in Kabal as a form of public decent, reciting through  the night.]  There is a discussion of what Kakar call the great uprising of Kabal.  It runs for several pages

 

HK82 Kakar says, ” No group of the protesters was organized. Only the column of Chinowill seemed so.  No well known person was seen among them.  The protesters. . .  were ordinary men.”

 

HK87 “The protesters apparently lacked a plan of action, although as noted rifles were reportedly smuggled into the city;  they were not seen to be used.”. . .”While  thousands of anonymous persons, who were carried away by their concerns for their values of religion in the face of atheism, and of their values of their fatherland in the face of the visible forces of occupation, went with empty hands so far as to sacrifice of their most vaulable possession, life.” . . . “The most conspicuous feature of the opposition was the participation of the Shi’as with their Sunni brothers.”

 

HK84 . . .”The Shi’ite comnunities of Qizilbashess, and Azars were conspicuous, dominating the columns of demonstrators . . .

 

1980:  popular reactions

But as the Soviet pressure increased people sought to organize, and in the process they made use of existing structures of coalition and cooperation:  tribal, local community, and notably Islamic coalitions.

[Not everyone joined the fray on the same side, of course; some elements of the population, for their own reasons, supported the communist government.]

 

1359/1981

>HK91 ” By July 1981 about twenty groups, fronts and regional unions were active inside Afghanistan.” [referring to resistance groups]. [Islamic radicalism] these groups constitute the backbone of the resistance movement, among these some are traditional while others are a novelty in composition, ideology and platforms.  The latter are fundamentalists and revolutionary.”

 

> Charliand, G.  1982.  Report from Afghanistan.  New York:  Viking. p47:  made two generalizations about the resistance movement:  “The first is that it is an extremely popular movement that has arison spontaneously among many different kinds of people with varying motives.  The second is that in its leadership organization, coordination, and strategy, the Afghan movement is one of the weakest liberation struggles in the world today.”

 

Popular coldness to the formal parties:  the alternative revolutionary council

HK f108-112:  Meetings led to Jirga held in Peshawar in early part of 1980, lasted until May 13.  Popularly supported, althought the party leaders did not support it and showed little interest.  The Jirga passed guidelines for waging the jehad, set up a Revolutionary Council, a kind of govt in exile, called for support by wealthy Afghans, banned revenge until end of the jehad, set up penalties for violation of their agreement.

HK111:  There were thus two revolutionary councils in spring, 1980.  The one organized by the parties were largely for an “ideological Islamic republic”, the one organized by the Jirga was for a “national, Islamic and, to a degree, a democratic republic”.  The Islamic Unity council branded the Jirga “another enemy of the sacred Islamic revolution of Afghanistan” [quote is from Choueiri, p111], a statement they would have to retract because of 6the popularity of the Jirga.  For several reasons it did not succeeded:  there was some division within the council, The Islamic Unity council opposed it, Pakistan did not want a fully unified resistance organization on its own soil, and there were powerful Pakistan supporters of Hikmatyar and his party.  (see HK pp111,112).  Other attempts at unity failed for identical or related reasons.

 

The alternative national council.  How well accepted these leaders were as representatives of the Afghanistan peoples was indicated in the formation of the national council in Peshawar, to which communities all over the country sent representatives.  (see Kakar).  Public support for these representatives was strong.  It was in effect a Loya Jirga.  However, the leaders of the resistance organizations paid little attention to it, only one of them attending the assembly.  Because the outside powers did not recognize this assembly and the resistance organization leaders attacked it and used their influence against it, it eventually was unable to function.

 

The failure of the alternative national council revealed how important is the role of outside support for perpetuation of the opposition organizations.  The selection and perpetuation of these opposition organizations was effected by the support of the Pakistan government and the U. S. government, eventually also by the Saudi Arabians, some of whom were not affiliated with the government.  Crucial in this relation was the Jammat i Islami of Pakistan, a political organization with Islamist objectives that despite its surriptitious methods and its small membership exerts a powerful influence on public affairs in Pakistan.

 

 

1. 1984

Qari Taj Muhammad (Qari Baba) in Ghazni, leader of a front.  Sultan Ali Kishtmand is a Hazara, Prime Minister in this period.

 

Intolerance among the mujahedin

June, 1989:  Dr. Aziz Ludin, econ. PhD. from Germany:  represents M. M. Nabi’s party.

— Wulusmal is the ed of paper in Norway.  close relative of Ulfat and a sympathizer.  After Ulfat was killed was picked up by Pak police and ccused of being a KGB agent. … because he sympathized with Ulfat the parties threatened him.  People read his paper with great interest, educated people prefer it, it is the only independent Afghan newspaper.

 

Maruf:  Nasim Ludin was a member of Millat Party, which broke off from Afghan Millat Party very early. These are small parties, have represtatives in Peshawar, but few people seem to know how to find them.

Maruf:  series of murders of intellectuals:  Dr. Nasim Lodin; last year B. Majruh; the before than Senator Gharwaal a former member of parliament was killed in Islamabad;  and the year before that it was Azizul Rahman Ulfat.

 

Shibar during the war

 

==The Shias in Shibar are mostly (all?) with Shora; those in Foladi are mostly Harakat‑i Islami.

 

== there was a time when MGH was put in jail.  Apparently in 1978 there was an uprising in Sumbul and they took over the Alaqadaari. They held Shibar autonomouusly for 7 months but in the early 1979 (this would have been early spring?, which means the original uprising would have been in Sept, no later than Oct.) that is March? the govt came in force from Ghorband (via Shibar) and retook the place.  They put the mirs and promentn people in prison, and among them was MGH.  They kep him for about 5 months, released him because he was old, and they decided he didn’t have much power.

== Mir Ali Dad was injured in a gilkaana and later got tetanous and did.  But before that MGH was glad that Mir Ali Dad took over the miri job before him.

== Sultan Ali the man who tired to supplant him (from Birgilic?) is now in Kabul, is struggling against Sayyedi Kayan on behalf of S. Manucher.

 

Conversation with Dilawar Azimi from Pushti Mazar of Shumbul at our house, July 8, 1989

==The Mir for Pushti Mazar before MGH was, be believes, Sohbat.  Then there was MGH.  Then still in the time of Zaher Shah a man came from Kabul, Sultan Ali, who wanted to do miri.  He was in Shumbul (Shibar?) for a time, but did not succeed to become mir.  Then another man from Pushti Mazar rose up to be mir.  But the people wanted him instead of MGH. they couldn’t go to himn directly because he would be mad, so they went o Kahn Afgha in Kayan (he was acting Pir then?) and he arranged for the change.

== Recently the father of Sultan Ali has become the rep of Harakat-i Islami.  He collects $ (and I think a tax of the crops?) for Harakat i Islami and pays it to the commander of the Shibar front.  ((NB. he must be an Ismaili working for the Harakat-i Islami after the region was taken over by HrktIslmi))

 

== Mir Ahmad Jan was executed by Hafizullah Amin in the time when the govt repressed Shibar. MAJ was taken w the other leaders of Shibar, then executed.

 

== Malik Rajab from Kalu says that Mir Mir Ahmad was killed in Kabul last year by a young man from his own kinsmen.  He was a member of Khad but his reasons appear to be personal.  No one seemed to know the reason.  The young man is now in prison for that.  It would appear, then, that he, an Ismaili, was cooperating with the government.

== Mir Ahmad Jan, he said, had worked for Hafizullah Amin and when he went down MAJ disappeared ‑‑ he didn’t seem to care what happened to him, and didn’t want to say he was killed.

 

== Hazaras:  books on the Hazaras

There is a book, Gurup Survey-i Khorasan, in Persian and English.

There is a book by Ralph Bindemann who spent several years in the Hazarajat, about the political groups in the Hazarjat.  Guruphaa-i Siyasi-i Hazarajat.  Mullah Isaa Gharjistani had it in Quetta.

 

On the popular zeal for Islam and abhorrence of alien influences

HK 202:  It wAS … the Soviet invasion and the policies of the new rulers that drastically changed the attitude of the pwople … their attitude not only toward them but also toward modern education as well as local poltiical leadership underwent change.  HK202. quote from Alam, Zahir Ghazi.  nd.  The Memoirs of Jehad 1979-1985.  ms. in Pashto. p. 146 [translated in Kakar’s book on p202:  “But the Soviet interference and finaly the Soviet invasion provided powerful incentives to the mullas in their opposition to modern education.  The Soviets … decieved studetns in schools, and in the name of a revolutionary ideology spread atheism, and sense of obedience to foreigners .. and of treason to the faterhland…  The educated elements became discredited in the society, and the mullas became unrivalled urlers.”  Alam, Zahir Ghazi.  nd.  The Jehad of Afghanistan:  Observations, Views and Evaluations.  ms. in Pashto.  this xslation in HK202:  “But, advised by a great mullah, the people of our valley opposed the two projects of schools and roads.  Thus neither Khalqis nor Parchamis appeared among us.  But from among the schools of outher valleys there emerfged Khalqis and Parchamis who later, as pilots, bomarded their own people and villages, while the Russian tanks which arrive along the roads, did much the same.  the the people of our valley were immunie from such destruction.  May God bless the great Mulla.  he was so right.”

 

HK203:  “The rise of communism, the Soviet invasion, the imposition of apuppet regime, and the mass killing of the people helped the mullahs and the Islamists to lead the resistance.  In themselves these would not have been sufficiet for them to emerge as leaders as the expense of traditional leaders had the new leaders not been part of the stronger jehad organizations, which in turn were supported in weapons, logistcs, and money by outside powers”.

 

BruceW9  In the area of Charney Horvan, he ran into check points manned by Shi’ites, where they had slogans such as “Whoever does not love Iyatollah Kohmani cannot have any real love for the Mahadeem.

 

— she said they are fighting a jehad against Kafirs, not merely Soviets but Kafirs.  they see little diff between We and Sov Union

 

2/27/89:  At office of Shura-i Ittefaq i Islami:  Cmmander: Uruzgan.  Pix of Behishti and one commander on the wall.  “He said now the Muslims are beiginning to say their prayers, and say Allaho Akbar.  They are beginning only now.  the Soviets are agsint everytyhing, against learning, culture, humanity, they are against God.  And this is the end of them because God is against them.  The Soviet Union is breaking up.  It will break up inot pieces, because they are against God. [quoted Hafiz here].”  he introduced others there, one was a mullah/leader from mashhad.

 

From Jill HOffman:  There was a threat to a [Afghan] nurse in the Afghan (OB/GYN) Hospital.  Someone told her family she should not be working, that a woman should be at home,  Unislamic to be outside the home.  She was frightened, but they thought it was not an Islamist part, but was frmo the family of a suitor, who wanted her to be more accessible or who wanted her to be kept from other possible suitors she might have met at work.

 

–Ayeen:  at one time GH party got a fetwa with 60 signatures, that elections are against Islam and democracy is against Islam.

 

— M [brother of Mahmud, who came from States] was struggling over not being able to participate in the Jehad.  he was rejected because westernized.  Arabs were trying to get journalists killed; someone said eventually the Arabs would be killed by the Afghans.

 

3/12/89:  Shah Mahmud:  believes parties have power inside the country, but mainly the fundamentalist parties;

 

— S.Mahmud believes peope inside the country are now all conservative Muslims.  Unless peole helped in the war they will be distrusted.  Most of the intellectuals have not helped, so little influence

 

‑‑ Islam is something no one can gainsay, so everyone claims to be Muslim.  If Kalakani were to be alive he would put on a lungi also !.

 

==Islamic images in the shora:

Each ballot had the pictures of the party leaders as well as their names and their was a circle under each, in two of which the voter was to put a stamp which said, “Allah‑o Akbar”. (!)

 

== mullah criticism of A-A’s beard:

… they want to influence the most personal things.  The man who was supposed, under the previous plan, to become the Minister of Information recently came to him to say that people talk about his beard (he has a gotee (sp?)).  He said, Well if you first talk to King Faisal then I’ll talk to you; he is, after all, the protector of the sacred places of Islam.  The other man replied, “But Faisal is a Wahhabi.  Some people regard him as hardly a human being.”  such is the mentality of the Islamists.

 

== Ken Decker pointed out that in the last few years Peshawar has become more conservative.  He pointed out that many of the walls in Unversity Town have been raised 2 or 3 feet in the last few years.

== He also said that in a discussion with a Pushtun he pointed out that something that Pushtuns were doing was not really Islamic.  The man answered that they would follow pushtunwali before Islam.

== This brought to mind some thoughts about Afghan Islam.  It is true that Afghans are mot likely to be happy with the Ikhwan and Wahabbis, and they will likely push them out eventually.  Still, they may have to keep them, in as much as the Saudis seem important to them.  But it is also not true that the Afghans are “moderate” about Islam.  They are likely to be little concerned about Islamic society as they understand it unless it is challenged by something else.  The Soviet invasion was an example.  The Afghanistan peoples are different from the peoples among whom the radical Islamist movements developed in that despite the disruptive invasions of non‑muslim socieites ‑‑ the British in the 19th c. and the Soviets in the 20th ‑‑ the Afghanistan society has been little threatened by outside western culture.  The Afghan peoples, unlike almost any Islamic people in the world, have never been under the direct colonial control of a non‑Muslim power.  They have always said they distrusted the British, and now they despise the Soviets, because of their invasions, but they have had the satisfaction that they have won against the non‑muslim invaders.  So the Islam that is in place among the Afghans is not likely to remain as strident as it has been in the last few years of war against the Soviet Union.  If the war really subsides and the AFghan society goes back to “normal” it is conceivable that the Afghan Islamic idiom will not be strident in the Ikhwan or Wahabbi form.  However, it has not been, and is not likely to be, tolerant of religious situations that are unfamiliar.  The Afghan mullahs drove out the Ahmadias in the time of Habibullah and they have never allowed an Afghan Chrisitian community to exist.  they are not likely to be more tolerant to such outlandish views in the future.

And that is the problem, because in fact the new situation is very likely to oblige the new Afghan society to deal with the diverse views that have been masqued by the war effort.  the only “cousin rivalry” problem is not the only thing likely to continue; the struggle over how to deal with the differences over Islamist and Moderate Islamic styles is likely to be complicated by the struggle over how to deal with the existence of a Christian community protected by the Marxist government, and a Afghan Chrisitan community that has grown up among the mujahadin.  What will become of the Islmailis, who have, some of them, sided with the government for protection against the Shia majority in their regions who have been opposing them?

 

 

On the political importance of mullahs in the resistance

 

The rising influence and power of mullahs

     Mullahs before 1950s-1960s

HK204:  mullas were drawn from the poorest elements… they lived away from their own in total dependenc eon the believers for a living.  … no tribal and social standing, they were disinclined, even, opposed, to social conventions, tribal codes and natioonalism.

     Majruh, S.B.  1988.  “Past and Present Education in Afghanistan”.  In:  The Tragedy of Afghanistan.  ed by Bo Huldt.  London:  Croom Helm. p. 79:  [quoted in HK204]:  the mulla “was not invoved in local sociopolitical affairs; he did not participate in the deliberations of the counsil of village elders — his only function … was to perform the opeing and the concluding prayers for the jirga session.  While respected, he still remained the favorite target of popular jokes.”

 

 

==a mullah’s protest about women in the Shura, Peshawar

One of the precipitating events that led to the collapse of the early proposal for a government (Ahmad Shah as head, etc.) was the discussion about a Ministry for Women’s Education.  It was proposed as part of a plan for 30 ministries, two others of which were also for education (Higher ed and Min for men’s education).  In the discussion about the proposed new government organization a mullah stood up and challenged the notion of a ministry for women.  He did not feel there should be a ministry for the women to be educated.  The furor that developed in response to this brought down the whole proposal.

 

Evidence of a continued conservative Islamic consciousness

The assertion quoted above by a prominent Afghan scholar that “neither the Hazrat nor any other individual religious personage or personages enjoy paramount influence among the people” was a fair statement of the situation among the urban educated middle class.  In the 1970s Islamic authorities still enjoyed a good deal of influence among the rural and less progressive people of the country.  They were prominent in the diverse, uncoordinated opposition movement that arose and gathered strength in the wake of the Marxist coup.  Islamic authorities  ‑‑ or their relatives or close associates ‑‑ headed many of the insurgent guerrilla groups.  The most notable of these were Sebghatullah Mujaddidi, the preeminent surviving member of the Hazrat family (after M. Ism`ail Mujaddidi was executed), who heads the ???? party, and Said Ahmad Gailani, who heads the NIFA ??? party.  There were others: Mowlawi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, Mowlawi Mohammad Yunus Khalis [from Khugianay tribe, from where a number of Afghan Millat came, see HK163], and Professor (of Islamic studies) Burhanuddin Rabbani.  These leaders have become relatively well‑known in the West through the news media.  The leaders of the Shi`a resistance groups are less well known to the West.  At one time all the most prominent leaders of the Shi`a were Islamic authorities.  Sayyed `Ali Behishti was the leader of the Shuray- Ittefaq-i Enqilabi, established in Waras, and Sayyed Hasan of Khawad was the leader of a force in Ghazni.  Sayyed Khan Aga ??, the brother of the leader of the Isma`ilis, leads a force in the Hindu Kush region.  Not all these leaders represent the conservative reactionary attitudes of previous generations, however.  But their eminence still derives in part from their special claims to authority on bases familiarly known and respected among the common people of Afghanistan: namely, their descent from a holy, sacred lineage, their superior learning, their great piety and supposed unity with the devine presence.  It is still true, even the present time, that such Islamic authorities receive deference and respect from the common people, and continue to exercise influence in Afghanistan society.  Whether for progressive reform or reactionary resistence, they have been among the prominent people to rise to positions of eminence and leadership.

 

HK 204  “The almost sudden rise of the mullahs to the postion of political and military leadership at the local level at least in Logar is wiethout parallel in modern Afghn history.  Of the 29 heads (awmer), Judges (qazis), and miliatry commanders (qomandan) as noted by Zahir Ghazi Alam in the Baraki Barak district (uluswali) of the Logar province all were mullas.  Of these 19 were members of the Islamic Revolutionary Organiaation (Harakat for short) and 6 of the Naitonal Islamic Front (Jabha or Mahaz(. The rmeaining four were members of the two Islamic Parties (Hizb) and Islamic Society (Jam’iyyat).  Alam also notes th there were, in adition, a number of other mullas and akhunds (traditiona teachers, masters) in the district who were “leaders of the jehad and rulers of the people.” [quote is from Memoirs of Jehad p.148]”

HK205:  [in Logar there were] “numerous mullas and … the leader of the Harakat, Mawlawi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, who was … a mawlawi and not an Islamist, was from the Baraki Barak district of Logar around whom the numerous traditonal mullas rallied.  However, as time passed by, the mulllas were challenged by the Islamists … who wer superior to them in organization, education and weapons.”  … “in the absence of local government there was competition for power among the jehad commanders … [even] commanders of the same organization.  In this competition personal rivalry and the desire for aggrandizement played a major part .  [Also]… the sociological composition fo the Islamist and traditionalist organizations, particularly of the Harakat and Hizb (… Gulbuddin Hikmatyar) tended to put their members at variance with each other.  The conservative and tradtional mullas were at variance wiyth members of the Hizb, who were drawn from among the Dari speaking [here he means, able to speak Dari and so articulate with the wider society, as well as speak Pashto] modern educated groups …  The mullas were traditionally at odds with such elements.  Inf act the mullas were against modernization. … in their view those who believed that the eart was round were ‘infidels'”. // “Thus, the effective threat to the mullas were the Islamists…”

HK 206:  on style of leadership.  The style of leadership of the traditional mullas was authoritarian.  Apparently they settled claims and conflicts sbetween individuals and groups in accordance with the Sharii’a, while the community elders, though weakened considerably, settled cases through mirgas and social convetions.  But generally speaking in Logar the mulla=commanders ruled … ruling as they pleased.”

HK 206:  [In Logar] people “whom they thought were collaborating with the enemy of the religion.  Such people they dubbed as infidels.  Once saman was dubbed s scuh seldom was he able to rmeain alive. … In Logar alone in two years following the invasion over one hundred persons may have been executed.  The excesses in the killing were bound to create discontent and the blief thne became general that the real motivating force for the executions [p.207] was revenge and personal animosity, camouflaged under the name of jehad.”

HK 279note 16:  It was only in Logar… such killing was common throughout the land.  Mawlawi Abd al-Hay [General commander of Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami in several northern provinces] said: ‘I again reiterate that if I order that 150 Khalqis be executed, they execution is permissible even though 50 among them be non-Khalqis’.”  from Jigturan, G. R. 1980.  Bitter Facts on the War in Afhganistan.  a ms in Dari.  Peshawar. p.37-39.

 

HK210:  [mullas also suppressed ] “customs, traditions, and soical conventions [and replaced them] by injuncitons of the Islamic Shari’a. … the suppression of the tradition of singing and dancing particularly in wedding and many other similar ceremonies; the suppression of a wide range of games and entertainment and racing events … the suppression of the customs of the recitation not only of lyric but alos of epic and mystic poetry from the classic poetic literature in whic the Afghans are quite rich, and their substitution by the recitaiton of passages from the holy Quran; the confinement in homes of rural women … and more seriously the substitution of community elders, that is, those who were the embodiment of traditiona and social wisdom, by scholars of religion and Shari’a. … Never was the Afghan national culture so much under pressure from the internationalist culture of communism and the universalist culture of Islam as now.”

 

HK211:  “What actually enabled the new religious leaders to set themselves over and above the locals and to act in an authoritatrian manner was their possession of weapons.”

 

HK161:  “… in the summer of 1979 some mawlawis … of the Islamic Revolutionary organization had effected the execution of a number of men from among the Zadran tribemen fro their alleged collaboration iwht the Khalqi regime.”  Presumably these were Jaji [“Zazay”] and Mangal, as “their estrangement from the Mawlawis … of the Islamic revolutionar organization who had effected their execution .. on the grounds that they had beocme renegade, and collaborated …”p.161-162.

 

== Dr. Azizulah Lodin.  pol advisor to Mowlawi Nabi, also to Gailani and Mujeddidi.  Aslo advisor to Muj as head of the interim govt’.  Because most of the party was mullahs they were suspicious of him and they believed the problems were caused by the Western educated people  They were clean shaven — that was a sign …  So he had a hard time. …

 

— Dr. A. Ludin:  When he came out of the country he asked for a stipend as an intellectual.  the mullahs that came out fo the country are given stipends, but he never got anything.  The $ for mullahs comes from Pakistan.

 

— Problem w Nabi is his support is unsophisticated, and must corruption around him.

 

 

 

5. 1989 to 1993 Soviet withdrawal and its aftermath

 

@1989 to 93:  Formal institutional conditions

 

Involvement of outside parties or outside governments in the resistance

 

== ISI reps were in the Shora, as well as Saudis

 

== The activity of the ISI complicated the situation in Khost.  The local tribesmen had decided to attack Khost recently.  In order to make it work they needed to have a deal with the Waziris who control the trade in and out of Khost.  The tribesmen’s deal was to prepare to attack and then try to negotiate a surrender.  They thought that with the help of the Waziri traders they would be able to work out a deal and there would be little bloodshed.  The deal was that each tribe was to assess each of the tribes a certain number of mujahedin to be involved in the conflict, and each commander was to go to his party to get the materials needed for the attack.  But the ISI got wind of it and proposed to the commanders that they simply come directly to them.  This sounded good to the commanders and so they accepted the materials from them.  However, the ISI was not impressed with the proposed timing of the attack ‑‑ they wanted to push things along and get it started sooner.  So they persuaded some commanders to attack sooner than had planned.  So when they attacked the tribesmen withdrew from the whole thing.  So now there is a smaller numer of people involved, and there is little hope of negotiating a surrender without the whole support of all the tribes.  The Khost affairs is therefore dragging on.

 

Libyan involvement

Tabibi is conduit of Lybian $ to GH.  But GH has lost support because has givne orders against the sentiments of his local leaders. … in thefield a growing disaffection …

 

Maley, William.  1993.  The Reconstitution of the Afghan State.  Afghanistan Info.  No33, April.  pp8-9.

1. 8: “Dostum’s claimed autonomy is merely a symptom of a much broader pehnomenon, namely that the retreat of a state to urban strongholds during the communist period strengthened already-strong local and regional leaderships, both personal or collective, many of which are uninterested in the reconstruction of instrumentalities of the state and wish mainly to be left along by Kabul.”

 

Maley 1993.  p.8-9.:  “… the events of the last fifteen years have produced a very substantial diffusion of the means of coercion through Afghan society … Afghan society is not merely fragmented; the various fragments are armed.”

 

p.9:  “The Afghan state has no real prospect of resuming such a monopoly for the foreseeable future, and even in the long run it will be able to do so only by fostering normative attachments between state and society, rather than attachments of prucdence alone.  Islam is potenitally a socurce of generalize normative attachment to the state, but htose who claim to rule in the name of Islam run the risk of provoking widfespread cynicism if their conduct manifestly departs from widely-accepted Islamic precepts …”

 

p.9:  “While Afghanistan has little to fear from its enemies, it has much to fear from its friends.”

 

@1989-93:  Informal and local sociopolitical conditions

A transformation in the popular outlook among the common people of the country seems to have been taking place in the period after the Soviet withdrawal.  There was at first great elation that the Soviets had finally withdrawn.  However, as the tensions and eventually fighting among the organizations that made up the Afghan Interim Government heated up greater numbers of people became disgusted with the organization leaders and eventually with Islamic authorities generally.  In 1993, after the destruction of Kabul by the fighting between the several organizations, reportedly, people are openly scornful of many Islamic authorities.  [Nancy Dupree on the attitude of women.]

 

1992+  The Collapse of institutions of administration

 

 

*********************

 

 

On the rise and tranformation of Islamism

 

Discussion of Islamist agenda and background

 

HK92 “The Islamic revivalist movement is composed of the views of the three thinkers of Muslem India, Indo-Pakistan, and Egypt. They’re Abu Hassan’ali Nadawi, Abuul A’la Mawdudi (1903-79), and Said Qutb (c. 1906-66) who composed thier main works in mid-century. . .  for their actualizations, the thinkers have made the seizure of state power their main goal.”

 

me:  The Islamist Ideology.

The solutions proposed by the Shi’ite leaders in the Iranian Revolution and the Sunni leaders of the Afghanistan mujahedin resistance arose from frames of reference already in place in the Islamic world view. The Islamists, the leading figures in the recent Islamic renewal, believe that previous attempts to apply Islamic ideas to modern contexts have missed the crucial intent of Islam; some Islamists charge progressive Muslims of being, in fact, inconsistent in their understanding of Islam and half‑hearted in their application of it.  The Islamist viewpoint ‑‑ at least in its Sunni form ‑‑ has been traced back to Shah Waliullah, an eighteenth century Delhi theologian (Roy 1985), and to Ibn‑Taymiyya, the early fourteenth century jurist of Damascus, both of whom draw heavily from the ideas of Ibn‑Hanbal (Dekmejian 1985).

The central themes of the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya and Shah Waliullah manifest the thrust of the Islamist critique.  Ibn‑Taymiyya stressed the comprehensiveness of the Islamic shari’a, which for him encompassed spiritual and rational truth as well as law.  He also rejected Sufi mysticism, and called for an awakening of civic involvement among the ‘ulema (Rahman  1979:111‑115; Hodgeson 1974, vol. 2:422). Shah Waliullah taught that there should be a complementary relationship between ruler and clergy in order for a proper Islamic society to develop. He believed that hadith (the traditional information about Muhammad’s personal sayings and acts) should be a central concern of Muslim scholarly study, and he criticized Islamic scholars for laxity in their application of Islamic law (Metcalf 1982: 39‑43). What Ibn‑Taymiyya and Shah Waliullah as well as other Islamic reformers share is their call for a return to original sources and to the original spirit and intent of the Islamic revelation, especially as it applies to civil and public affairs. The Islamic reformers were also similar in that they rose to prominence in times of cultural confusion (cf. Wallace 1956); their insistence on a return to first principles was a critique of the inconsistent and half‑hearted moral commitment of their times. Rahman (1979: 111) has said that movements calling for a return to Islamic first principles seem to reawaken in “recreated formations” which “issue from time to time from the very heart of Islam. They are characterized by an indistinguishable blend of reinvigorated fundamentalism and progressivism. . . and [it is] this very character [of Islam]. . . that signifies `orthodoxy’

. . .”

Here add Ibn Taymiyya’s opposition to Saint worship; what was Shah Walliullah’s view?

 

The twentieth century Islamist movement is such a “reinvigorated blend of fundamentalism and orthodoxy.”  Its diagnosis and cure for the problems of the modern Muslim world arose at first as a social critique by a small minority of dissenters in various parts of the Muslim world.  One of the most influential of this group, at least among the Sunnis, was Moulana Abul A’la Maududi of Pakistan (1903‑1979), who pressed for a more genuinely Islamic society based on the Qur’an. It was apparently he who first among the modern Islamists insisted on the distinction between a society that faithfully lives up to the standards of Islam (for him, the only proper Islamic society) and a society that does not, which he called jahili society                                         (that is, the society of the Arabs living in ignorance before Islam). He declared the “modernizing,” secularizing societies of the Muslim world, as well as Western society, to be jahili.   Maududi’s concept of jahili society influenced Sayyed Qutb, a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, who believed it a Muslim duty to revive the Islamic world by applying Islamic rules and principles more carefully to contemporary life. The true jihad to him was the struggle to establish the reign of God’s sovereignty on earth, “to end all sin, suffering and repression” (quoted in Dekmejian 1985:91). It was from Sayyed Qutb that the Afghanistan Islamists developed their own understandings of Muslim reformatory obligation.

It is of course unnecessary to identify the most provocative Islamist thinker among the Shi’ites. Khomeini’s ideas on the depraved condition of modern Muslim society scarcely differed from those of the Sunni Islamists, but he rose on the crest of a different tradition. The Shi’ite ‘ulema to which he belonged were, unlike the Sunni ‘ulema, reluctant to grant legitimate authority to Muslim rulers merely on the ground that such rulers were better than none at all. The Shi’ite ‘ulema took upon themselves the weighty responsibility of formally critiquing the rulership and so became bound to stand apart from it. The most learned ‘ulema, known in Shi’ism as mujtaheds, had the obligation to critique the rulership and society in terms of the Islamic revelation. It was their public duty to serve as guardians of Shi’ite Islamic dogma in the absence of the Hidden Imam. As guardians of the Islamic revelation in changing circumstances, they were forced to exercise the two sides of their role ‑‑ that is, to preserve the original intent of the revelation, and also to show its relevance to contemporary issues. The Shi’ite ‘ulema, in contrast to the Sunni ‘ulema, after much argumentation, came in the fourteenth century to believe that their interpretive role sometimes necessitated the exercise of innovative judgments; new circumstances required new formulations, if the essential character of the original revelation was to be kept intact. This separate responsibility of the mujtaheds to apply received Islamic concepts to contemporary situations was formally recognized in the Persian Constitution of 1906, in which a group of mujtaheds chosen by their peers were given the right to evaluate and pass on all laws enacted by the Majlis (Parliament). This regulation was in fact never implemented, but the Iranian ‘ulema never doubted that the mujtaheds had such a right; indeed the mujtaheds felt they were obligated to offer judgments   as necessary on the social conditions of their times. Khomeini added to this notion the insistance that the ‘ulema have the obligation to become directly involved in politics (Mortimer 1982:326 ff.; Bromberger 1983). He believed the only way a true Islamic society could exist would be under the rulership of someone who knows the Islamic law and applies it justly. Indeed, only by the impartial, even unmerciful, application of Islamic laws of punishment can there be a truly Islamic society. Unlike the Sunni Islamists, who were in important respects progressives trying to find ways to make Islam relevant to the modern world, Khomeini has been a traditionalist trying to make Islam work by applying it more literally and more strictly.

The Islamists, Shi’ite and Sunni, have in any case carved out for themselves a specific ideological space in the contemporary discussion about how Islam should apply to the modern Muslim world.  They have differed with modernist progressives who liberally borrowed their social concepts from the West, for the Islamists instead regard (or so they say) the secularism implicit in Western political ideas as inimical to true Islam. The Sunni Islamists, and Khomeini among the Shi’ites, have differed from the bulk of the ‘ulema in both sects who avoided politics and legitimated Muslim rulers; indeed the Sunni Islamists have called those ‘ulema jahili and Khomeini has called them “un‑Islamic.” The Sunni Islamists have differed from “traditional” Muslims by drawing ideas and agendas and methods from the Western world, even if also attempting (or claiming) to incorporate them into an Islamic framework. Even if the ideological space taken by the Islamists appears, in the eyes of an outside observer, to lack coherence and consistency, their position is today unquestionably, in the eyes of the peoples of Iran and Afghanistan, the preeminent answer to the contemporary situation.

The Islamists are attempting to respond to modern political circumstances in terms of concepts and principles they believe are entailed in the original Islamic revelation.  This combination of modern agendas and ancient ideals has been difficult for Western observers to find the right adjectives for. The movement has been called fundamentalist, reformist, revivalist, resurgent, and revolutionary ‑‑ terms that only more or less represent its actual character.  The word used here, Islamist, derives from the term the leaders use for themselves, the islamiyya, with a meaning implicit in another term they have used for themselves, the asliyya, the “original or authentic ones,” or, perhaps, more loosely, “those who go back to first principles.”

All the descriptive terms used for the Islamists are pertinent, but to a limited extent. The Islamists are fundamentalists in calling for a return to the basic Islamic texts, the Qur’an and Hadith, and to the Islamic principles revealed therein. They are reformists in calling for a restructuring of Islamic society in terms of basic Islamic principles.  They are revivalists in seeking to find, through a consideration of first principles, a vitality and spiritual renewal that seems to have been wanting in the contemporary Muslim world.  They are revolutionaries in proposing a radical application of the ideals and principles of early Islam to modern society, and in offering a radical social critique, denouncing contemporary Muslim society as imperfectly Islamic ‑‑ even essentially non‑Islamic ‑‑ singling out for special criticism the ‘ulema, who have legitimized governments that are, in their eyes, essentially, in Sunni Islamist terms, jahili. The movement can rightfully be called resurgent, in that the Islamic moral vision has in many Muslim circles supplanted Western secularist notions as the idiom of discourse about social rights and obligations.         For all this, however, the movement is thoroughly modern and has in fact been influenced by ideas generated in the West, even if, as is the case for Khomeini, Western secular ideas serve mainly as the essential foil. But Western influence on most Islamist thinkers goes further than that, as is evinced in their use of Western terms like “party” and “revolution,” which have become central to Islamist rhetoric. Indeed, some Sunni Islamists are accused of taking their first principles actually from Western political philosophy and using the Qur’an and Hadith only as proof texts for what they want to do (Roy 1985:107).

 

Also discuss here the Shi’ite perspective on Islamism:  Use Khomaini and the Shiite author I used in Islamic politics class

 

Islamist Institutional Tools.

The Islamists in different countries have varied in their methods of implementation. In Pakistan the Islamists have been rather elitist, and so have won only limited popular support. The Afghanistan Islamists, on the other hand, have sought to enlist popular support from the beginning, developing close ties with existing traditional social networks.  They have linked up with tribes, who predominate in the south; with the kinship blocs common in the north; with the Sufi orders who are also strong in the north; and with the ‘ulema, whose influence among the common people has been in some areas crucial to the resistance movement.  The Afghanistan Islamists have also been notably successful in making political parties instruments of social and political action. Unlike the secular parties of the 1960s that were organized by middle class modernists in the cities, the political parties formed by the Afghanistan Islamists have attracted rural and urban traditionalists.  The Islamist ideology has thus been turned to very functional use, as it has provided the conceptual framework, through the social medium of the party, for the organization of resistance activities against the Afghan government and the Soviets. Even so, the Islamist parties, while bridging some traditional social barriers, still tend to be associated with the established social entities ‑‑ the ethnic groups, tribes and sects.  The Jamiat‑i Islami, for example, are mostly Sunni Tajiks and their strength is in the north; the other Sunni parties are mostly Pushtun; and the Shi’ite parties are mostly Hazara.¹¹

The Shi’ite Islamist leaders in Iran have been different from the Sunni Islamist leaders in that they are themselves ‘ulema whereas the Sunni Islamists in Afghanistan and elsewhere have on the whole been non‑’ulema. Indeed they have carefully distinguished themselves from the ‘ulema, and, in Afghanistan at least, have allied with the ‘ulema only for practical purposes.  In Iran the Shi’ite ‘ulema have themselves both inspired and organized the Islamist movement. In the uprising against the Shah the Shi’ite ‘ulema, along with the urban merchant community, were the most prominent and established institution of dissent, and were closely associated with the populace (Thaiss 1973). Even though Khomeini chided them for avoiding political activity they were essentially untainted by association with the Shah’s oppressive government ‑‑ having been excluded from it ‑‑ so when finally spurred to action, they were in a position, to lead the charge against it.

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Internal divisions

 

Most seriously manifest in the period after 1989

 

within the Sunni parties

 

Jami’at-i Islami

==  It would seem at least likely that Burhanuddin Rabbani would be very upset that his own people didn’t vote for him in the Shura.  However, Dee wonders if he isn’t in fact more of a figurehead than a real force in the party.  It is of course known that Mas’ud is not especially loyal to the party, and I have heard that the famous Herati commander refused to accept a Jamiat party card.

 

==  Conversation with Dee Smith, stringer for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

== There are rumours of disputing among the Jamiat‑i Islami party members.  One of the main poles seems to be the Ikhwanis, who are said the be mainly Sayyed Nurullah Emad and Najibullah Lafrai.  Emad is said to have a background of ruthlessness.  He was in the earlier government cabinet, is not (she thinks) in the new cabinet.  Lafra’i is said to be a “true believer”.  He was criticized for writing the stringent regulations (especially for women) proposed for the Islamic government of Afghanistan.  His response was to pull out a Qur’an and try to convince people of the real nature of the meaning of the Qur’an.  The other pole is the group of people further “left”.  Some of them are said to be old maoists.  Khalili was once a Parchami, it is said.  There was resentment against him when he spent some time in the states for a couple of years to settle his family.  Another person on the “left” is Eshaq.  Dee said she once had a conversation with him when he was tied and physically disheveled, and acted like he was fed up.  In that context he told her things he would never have said before.  He acted like he would spit about “those people” and said they don’t realize they will be pushed aside when the war is over.  They don’t realize this is a class war ‑‑ and he used other marxists terms for the situation.  She said several of the people on the “left” are said to be ex‑marxists.  Azmat has told her that many of these people are ex‑maoists.  [i.e. Settami Milli?]

 

Islami

 

Wahabis in Konar

== [from Randy] There was also another shura, of the wahabbis.  Acturally the town (Asadabad) is divided among the several parties.  this took place when the fighting was over, he surmises.  He didn’t say what parties were represented in town, but said that about half the town is wahabbi.  the other half is under the various parties of the alliance.  However, they weren’t loyal to the alliance.  In the end they told Vegeberg that they would accept his hospital there but there would have to be conditions; mainly they would not go through the alliance.  He said he would work it out with Mujaddidi.  so the hospital will go in as part of the local Konar political system.  In fact, what came through to Randy was that Konar was now an autonomous region; the Alliance had no control over it.

 

Within the Shi’a parties

 

Harakat-i Islami

== Peter [Jouvenal] decided not to go in with them.  Later went in with Mohsini’s group.  It turns out that Mohsini’s Harakat‑i Islami has a number of splinter groups in it, and this may be one of them.  Peter said that the real Mohsini group has a car, and the translator speaks perfect British English.  So there are more than one group of people calling themselves by that name, and it turns out (at least Randy is beginging to wonder) that this one is not the authentic Harakat group, but a splinter group.  As usual, the plot thickens.  The man that Randy has been interviewing and is so interested in wrote his name to be “Mudir Parsa, Representative of Foreign Affairs of Emam Musa Ebne Jafar Front of Kabul Province of Harakat‑i Islami.  His phone number is 41854.  The number for Mohsini’s party is different, and none of the other numbers I have from Razawi is the same as the official office phone number.

 

== When I asked about the FBS tension and how that affected the party relations among people in Bamian they said everyone is with Harakat‑ Islami, and that even though there was this kind of tension the war had brought them together.  At least for now things seemed better among them.  They did not deny that it could get worse after the war is over.

 

== Maruf talked about cousin rivalry.  It is seldom severe between first cousins, but is more so between 2nd and 3rd cousins, those further out.  When one does well then that is a pressure on the other to do better.  He said the intermarriage of sisters was less important than the rivalry over prestige (I”m no sure he understood my question about that).

 

3/13/89

Bruce Wannell:  Sunni Hazaras scattered among Shekh Ali; Sunni Hazara in PanjSher; KaramAli Hazaras are Sunni and were fighteing Kaynis.

 

— it was the Shekh Ali hazaras (Shiites) who disarmed the Shibar Ismailis.

 

— In first chapter, on other forms of coalition, discuss the FBS divisions, that opposing factions often have relatives in them.  They are rivals over the same tracts of land, the same women [i.e., the women cousins in the larger kindred], and “gold”, meaning loads, debt obligations.  Also, there are disputes over water, etc.

 

== In each qishlaaq there are old family divisions that affect their party affiliation.  5 familes will be Harakat Islam, 4 will be Nasr, 4 will be Shora, etc.  It will be the same in the Sunni qishlaqs too.  it is the bache‑Kaka problem.  People can go to any party they want.

 

== there are in Kalu HarakatIslami, Nasr, Shora; and the Ismailis are for whoever is the strongest; because they are weakest in the whole area (although not weakest in their own area).

 

— In first chapter, on other forms of coalition, discuss the FBS divisions, that opposing factions often have relatives in them.  They are rivals over the same tracts of land, the same women [i.e., the women cousins in the larger kindred], and “gold”, meaning loads, debt obligations.  Also, there are disputes over water, etc.

 

–Bruce:  Quarrels in valleys now vicious because of the arms:  fighting over water between Sunni/Shia, the Shia had the guns and tool over the water.  In group of 5 villages in an upper part of a valley were required to raise only Barley and allow water to run down to peopoe below.  Now over level villages have guns and now grow rice, have all the water they want; people lower down have to emigrate.

 

Taher-i Khidri, from Turughman.  In the war, avoided going to iran because of danger to himself.  Haji Nadir, who was commander of Turughman valley was Shura and fought with Nasr people.  But most of the Khidri qawm was with Nasr.  His own qawmi [with Nasr] came to him to get money to attack Haji Nadir [of Shora].  Taher refused because he felt Haji Nadir was a good man.  He therefore became fearful that people from Nasir party would kill him if he went to Iran.  So he came to Peshawar.  There were few hazaras in Peshawar then, Nasr and Sepah were not there. … Taher got into trouble because someone he interviewed said that the Nasr party was Tudeh, that is “communist”.  And he printed this statement.  for 2 months Hzb-iIslami and Nasr [who were in league at the time] wanted to kill him, believing he created the accusation.  then after 2 months Hizb-Islami and Nasr fell out with each other.  They now say he is “Sholey-i …”  Jabhad has been good to him but it is not generally good to Hazaras.  The Jabha is not one party but several.  Every commander has his own ideas, there is no one ideology.

 

== The tribes around Jalalbad and furtrher south have been often disloyal and hostile to the mujahedin.  Some people have accepted arms and $ from the govt.  There fore have been effectively milita for the govt.  some have tgricked the muahedin and misled them, sometimes  have directed them into govt ambushes.  The Khost situation is the same, only more so.  the tirbes accept $ and guns from the govt, so there are many people under arms for the govt.  this is why Hikmatyar has move to Logar.  He has given up on these tribes, and want to attack Kabul from Logar, where the people have fought the govt valiantly.  he has givenb up on the people of Jalalabad are, doesn’t believe he can work with them.

 

== The tibes in south are Durrani (Kandahar, Girish, Kashkar Gah)  they are noble, wel organized tribes.  the Ghilzai tribes are in Ghazni, Muqor, Qalat-Ghilzai.  The tribes in Paktia and Paktika are not (he says) Ghilzai.  tere are Mangal, Jaji and Amadzai, some Ghilzai.  In Nangahar the Pushtun speakers are more Persianized, esp more so in Laghman.  In Nangahar there are aslo some Ahmadzai and some Ghilzai, but most of the are different, identitifed by their province: Lahmanis, Konaris, Nuristanis.   the eastern province peoples have historically been bought off by the pwoers on either side of them.  Therefor shift sides.  (he siad the British were ensconced in Jalalbad in last century by buying off the tribes.)

 

== Fredrick has been inside several times, has been to the Hazarajat many times.  Says that there is frequent figthting among the Hazaras, often for local reasons.  They are not united much about anything.  The Mustazafin have fought the Harakat many times.  Their factions are more intense, there is more real fighting than among the Pushtuns, say (he used as an example), Konar, where there are factions, but they don’t much fight.  In the Hazarajat the factions have guns pointed at each other in the same bazar across the street from each other, and they sometimes start shooting.  Villages sometimes split and fight; valleys split and fight.

 

==Benedicte described her own experiences of mutual gift giving ‑‑ “badal” ‑‑ and the tendency to bad‑mouth people who are doing too well.  People tend after a while to begin to suspect that you know things about them, believe the gossip being circulated against them [drift away].

 

== There was fighting between Hazaras and Pushtuns in Qarabagh (south of Ghazni) because the Hazaras had taken two Arabs hostage.

 

== The Hazarajat is extremely divided, more than elsewhere.  There are often checkpoints along the way by every local village.  Each one takes a toll, and the overall toll taken of travellers can be 25% of the whole load being carried through.

 

== Conversation with Obaidullah Nawroz, brother of Haji Juma Nowroz whom I talked with the other day.  He works for the Mercy Corporation (?) International, as their agricultural field offficer in one of the areas they try to cover within Afghanistan. …

== He told me about the divisions among the various mujahedin elements in his area.  He said that in Helmand (?) there are two tribes that have been fighting each other for at least 5 years, the Achekzai and Nurzai.  Even though each of these local tribes is internally divided in party loyalties, the memebers of each tribe join together in fighting the other tribe.  There have been 2000 people killed in fighting in the last 5 years.

 

== There was anothere feud within a tribe in which there were three parties, Hizb‑Islami (GH), Mahaz and Jabha.  Hizb and one of the others joined up against the other and in that fighting 1200 were killed.  In the end the weaker group joined up with the government to get help.

 

BruceWannell4:  stories of tensions between village based resistance and the nomadic coochees, hwo side with the govt and plunder mujahedin convoys.

 

BruceW2   there are signs of dispute with a neighbor, who had started plowing fallow land without asking permission as an indictation that he may be claiming ownership.  there were ethnic and class hostilities between Shaka Pashtun and Natajek Harwarese.  the muleteres in the caravaan who were from Mira Shaw had been Harwarese, and they were accused of being government agents everytime a load fell off or a wrong turn was taken.  There were also conflicts with the Musla Hel nomads, who were also accused of siding with the government for their own gain.

 

General decay in legitimacy; rise in disillutionment.

 

— Mujaddidi has a couple of houses in the States, and “Effendi Saheb” [Gailani] has much property …  Son of M Nabi was caught trying to fly out of Islamabad with 2.5M dollars. … In Kandahar, no one knows who Mujaddidi is.

 

== The young Pir Gailani that we met at his house was central to the forming of NIFA, and his uncle then became its head.  But this man became frustrated with the party and left it; now he works for Mujeddidi.  Also, what he was saying the night that we were with him at Maruf’s house was that the plans to attack Jalalabad were all wrong headed, and would be a shame and disgrace to the jehad.  All the years of the jehad, all the shaheed in the jehad, will be waisted because of the losses in Jalalabad.  He predicted that the mujahed would sustain many losses, would plunder and kill unnecessarily, would rape the women.  All these things have been coming true.

 

== There was another meeting with Mujadedid recently and he talked about the new government and then asked how many people would support the interim government and of about 40 people only about 3 raised their hands.

 

== a commander’s rejection of the Shura in Pakistan, 1989:

At the Shura commander Allaodin from Herat came as a invitee of the Jamiat‑i Islami party, but when he got there he refused to accept the JI card.  He also in fact did not attend the Shura.  He is one of the most prominent and famous commanders, from Herat.

 

== AAS has no use for the parties.  They are only fabrications of the Pakistanis.  Inside the country they are also not Wahabbis.  They are “normal” people (i.e., moderate).

 

== The party leaders and their representatives have cars and money to dole out, but in the camps there are former members of parliament, former ministers, former governors, educated, cultured people, and they don’t have money for a bicycle (!).  The party leaders ignore these experienced and capable people because they don’t want them to horn in.  If they were really interested in the people they would work for a unified system of provisioning, but they in fact compete for clients and compete for money from the ISI.  So they toe the ISI line.  Haji noted that Samad Hamid left the Shora after only a few days, and others of his caliber as well, because they had no respect for the people leading the parties.  (Of course they could vote for no one other than one of them.)

 

> HK127:  The biggest source of concern which disillusioned the commen men was the multiplicity of the resistance organizations and their lack of unity. … jealousy of the local commanders …The flight of the traditional elders to the urban areas and abroad created a poltical vacuum…”

 

== Malik Rajab in particular genstured negatively about the parties.  He seemed to say that he had no use for them, but quietly, perhaps because other people were there.  I had the feeli

 

== The point is that they are not any more interested in fighting for the interim government.  Why fight for them, when people don’t care about them.  Jalalabad has discouraged them but the choice of leadership in the new government also discouraged them.

 

== They should at least not have Wahabbi and not Ikhwani.  These people didn’t want them.

 

== What is interesting is that there seemed no longer to be any fear of Gulbuddin.  These men did show fear of the ISI.  And they did not like Khomaeini having influence in Afghanistan.

 

== In Kandahar Mowlawi M. Nabi and Khalis came and tried to persuade them to start fighting there, but they refused, said they did not want another Jalalabad.  And also they don’t care to fight for this government.

 

== They said if Zaher Shah would come people all over would turn away from these parties.  Also the governor of Kabul is a Pushtun.  If Zaher Sha would come he would turn his gun against Najib.  Then people from both sides would accept Zaher Shah.

 

== The numbers of people in Jalalabad battle are dwindling.  They are all volunteers, he said, except the commanders who have to be there because they are paid.  But the others are not staying; coming home.

 

== Rasul Amin’s daughter said, Now the jehad is over.  There is no jehad any more because Muslims are fighting each other.

 

conversation with Henry Kamm, NYT

== There is a tremedous fear of Hikmatyar in Kabul, especially among the women.  The people fear Khad and Hikmatyar. and woman told him about this.

 

== The woman had been in Kabul in the days when the viel came off, so remembers what it was like.  Now she fears that under the muj they will have to put it back on.  She and others will fight to the death to preserve their progress.  She is not a communist, but wants the progress.

 

== Azmat:  Many of the best commanders have left in discust.  ONe of the best has left and is now living in Seattle.  … The one mentioned first left after he was given 1 mortar to a attack a govt post with; when he objected Sayyaf accused him of not being a good Muslim.  They appear to have gotten fed up with the graft among the leaders of the mujahedin.

 

== Ted says that in an interview with Abdul Haq he said that he is fed up with the CIA.  They are trying to tell him what to do.  He feels he is his own man.  They have lost credifility with his men by announcing they want to buy back stingers at a time when they are most desperately needed.  Feeling aganist the Americans is mounting; he may have to make an anti‑American statement in order to be credible with his men.

 

== Elmi:  There are three reasons why the battle in jalalabad is not going well.  One is that there was a lack of planning (this everyone affirms).  Another reason is that the Pakistanis are involved and that caused some commanders to get frustrated, and some of them defected (this is the first I have heard of this.)  Kabul has had pictures of the Panjabis caught in battle on TV, to show that Pakistan is involved in the Jalalbad battle.  Also, third, was the Wahabbis.  They were very cruel, and they went into the village of Shewa (Shewi?) and pillaged and took the women.  They have brought the women to Peshawar, people don’t know where for sure.  And when the people saw this they decided this is worse than communism and some defected.  He said a lot of people have defected to the communists recently.

 

–Bruce:  Quarrels in valleys now vicious because of the arms:  fighting over water between Sunni/Shia, the Shia had the guns and tool over the water.  In group of 5 villages in an upper part of a valley were required to raise only Barley and allow water to run down to peopoe below.  Now over level villages have guns and now grow rice, have all the water they want; people lower down have to emigrate.

 

Maruf:  In Jalalabad the muj are paid 2500 Rs/mo to fight.  They go into the country and disappear after being paid.  There is no one to fight.  There never were very many to fight in Jalalabad because the commanders claimed to have so many people fighting men, so when they were asked to contributed a certain fraction of the total to Jalalabad fight they didn’t have men.  They had been paid for having a certain number of men but didn’t have them.

 

== There was unity among the people in Bamian for the first two years.  They all rose up togheter when the Russians came in.  But gradually the unity broke down, as they sought party help.  As the parties came in they broke up into seperate party groups.

 

Dupree, Nancy Hatch.  1993.  Afghan Women View the Future.  Afghanistan Info.  No 33, April. p.14-15.

p.14:  “In the Ministry of Education … 70% of the staff is said to be women for they are the only ones with any semblance of experience in the day-to-day business of running offices; most men were too involved in the war.”

 

p.14:  “In the wake of the takeover in Kabul many atrocities were reported, including the molestation of women.  Young mujahideen who hd been taught that respectable women remained at home, simply assumed that any women showing their faces on TV or appe;aring in public were fair game.”

 

1. 14: “Unlike other refugee situations where a reported 70% of women arriving at receiving centers had been raped, incidents amogn Afghan refugee women were almost nil. Respect for women, an abiding hallmark of Afghan society, was still honoured in practice as well as in principle.  Now in February 1993, the disregard of this respect has added a disastrous dimension to the effects of the war on Afghanistan.  Afghan history is replete with tales of fierce conflicts rising form many different causes.  Never, hwoever, have women been so brutally targeted in revengeful retaliation as they are today.

 

Loss in influence of pirs

Bruce:  The strong parties among the shia have relatively little interest in the Sayyeds.  They Sayyeds were once powerful in the time when the Shura party was trong.  But the other parties came in w power based in Iran.  People expressed their separation from Iran by following anyother ayatullah: Khoyi.

 

–Bruce:  The sufi families of Panjsher have been discredited by the war.  They have been called chars eaters and they at one time collaborated w the government/Marxist/ so now have no clout.

–Bruce agreed w me that there are more people now who would deny they have a pir.

 

Nevertheless:  Evidence of veneration for pirs

 

Omar Malikian of VOA:  Told a story the people told him about Pir Gailani.  They invited him to ride with them from Kunar to Jalalabad.  He refused and said he was coming.  When they got there he was there waiting for them.  That’s the power of a “Sufi”, he said.  [NB, however, that this was said by a highly westernized reporter who clearly was representing what other people thought.  So we don’t know when, or by whom, or even if it was seriously considered.

 

— Before going into Afghan Bruce and his musician friend went to a Ziarat; it is customary to “do ziarat” before going to war.

 

Mar, 26, 1988

— Mary Hegland:  says people regarded Khomeini as the Imam.  People in her village saw his face in the moon.  She has heard of other sacred heroes facing being in the moon.

 

Bruce W1:  man complained that the land had lots God’s blessing. Wheat crop was full of black mildew.

 

Need for a leader

 

== The biggest problem is finding a leader.  Zaher Shah is nearly the symbol but the Durrani are the weakest, weaker than Ghilzais.  Durrani have become very persianized.  Some Persian speakers exp Tajiks, want to set up a government.  They have lots of land, have cultured people, and the Hazaras, Uzbeks among the Tajiks, since Mas’ud arose (Kh. doesn’t know if it’s possible.)

 

Maruf:  People don’t like the parties.  they resent them, and the party leaders know that, he says.  He said 6-9 months ago [i.e. mid 1988] some commanders wrote to Hikmatyar stating their objections to him and what he was doing.  They openly and directly critcized him.

Maruf went to Nangarhar last year [1988] and talked with all kinds of people.  he was at that time against Zaher Shah.  People resented the party leaders.  They wanted someone besides the party leaders or Najib.  That meant Zaher Shah.  He believes that if Zaher Shah comes back most people will be pleased, except Pakistan.

 

== The Doctor treated a man who is in Gulbuddin’s party.  When they were alone he told the dr. that he was in that party because all his people were in it and he had no other choice, but in fact he would very much like to see the king come back (contra Gulbuddin).

 

== They said if Zaher Shah would come people all over would turn away from these parties.  Also the governor of Kabul is a Pushtun.  If Zaher Sha would come he would turn his gun against Najib.  Then people from both sides would accept Zaher Shah.

 

Concluding remarks

 

New chapter [12?]:  Sacral society under threat

Summarize the sacral responses.

mujaddidi

Gailani:  for vested interest reasons?

Rabbani:  in early days

1. Nabi:  brought in from the outside

The Shi’ite sacral responses

sura and its errors; the other parites, supported by Iran

The Islamists: Hikmatyar, and Rabbani, Khales

 

sacral responses

ideological appropriation by the Islamists and Communists:  nb that the extreme positions took the preeminent position, first in the university under ZShah and Dawood, and then with the coup d’etat in the wider sociopolitical field.

 

The new situation:

sacral vs secular

introduce Verduin here

 

Future for Afghanistan?

military‑political appropriation by Pak, US, Saudi, and Iran

 

concluding message, the point of the preceeding:

This chapter should be about the challenge to sacral society now being experienced.  It came in the 1970s and 1980s in the form of Communism, and was enformed in the 1980s by Soviet military power.  But a new challenge may be rising in the form of an alien, and hence unpalatable, style of Islam usually called “fundamentalism”.  For in the new situation political interests, always involved in Islamic affairs and represented by Islamic idioms, was now manifestly politicized ‑‑ Islam in the coming period is running the risk of becoming solely political.  Islamic politics is overwhelmingly political; the religious dimensions of Islam that attempt to enrich the interior person are manifestly employed for selfserving interests.  Islam is becoming and evident veneer for the exercise of power.  Legitimacy ‑‑ of power, of belief, of service, of ritual, of virtually everything ‑‑ appears to be dangerously (that is for Islam) low.  That those who invoke Islam genuinely fear God may be questions by those who follow.  The decline in legitimacy is not only for the leaders  of the various sides, but also for the idioms they use to legitimate their behavior.

 

General trends and processes in the war period:

>  The globalization of rhetoric, and the modernization of technology:  NB changes in Afghan society, radio, weaponry, intensification of local hostilities; use quote from Paul Richards (from Anth Today)

>  The secularization of Islam?  decay of devotion?  secularization of the pir-murid relation.

 

residue

_________________

(The govt gave out so much money in the last 2 months that the value of Afghanis fell from 10/1 to 16/1 in one month.  This is USSR money for aid now.  It has they say offered to amt that Prince Sadruddin has said he will provide for the reconstruction. Only now.  so while Prince S. ditheres, the USSR is in fact giving out that amount to Kabul.  They have been bringing in this money since winter.  60 M. dollars.

 

Continuing relations with communists among common people

 

==Maruf:

The people here in Pakistan who have relatives working for the government in Kabul don’t want it to be known.  They are afraid of criticism and objections agains them.

== The Shinwaris make up the builk of the militia, and are involved in the gov’t in other ways.  He says their land is poor, have little water, is in the mountains, so they need money from the outside.  They have been bought off by the government.  But they are not r

 

General trends and processes in the war period:

>  The globalization of rhetoric, and the modernization of technology:  NB changes in Afghan society, radio, weaponry, intensification of local hostilities; use quote from Paul Richards (from Anth Today)

>  The secularization of Islam?  decay of devotion?  secularization of the pir-murid relation.

 

residue

_________________

(The govt gave out so much money in the last 2 months that the value of Afghanis fell from 10/1 to 16/1 in one month.  This is USSR money for aid now.  It has they say offered to amt that Prince Sadruddin has said he will provide for the reconstruction. Only now.  so while Prince S. ditheres, the USSR is in fact giving out that amount to Kabul.  They have been bringing in this money since winter.  60 M. dollars.

 

Continuing relations with communists among common people

 

==Maruf:

The people here in Pakistan who have relatives working for the government in Kabul don’t want it to be known.  They are afraid of criticism and objections agains them.

== The Shinwaris make up the builk of the militia, and are involved in the gov’t in other ways.  He says their land is poor, have little water, is in the mountains, so they need money from the outside.  They have been bought off by the government.  But they are not really communists.