Category: Anthropology

Chronology

 

== my notes, ap5,87

Several kinds of Islamin Af:

> Traditional:  pir-morid; ulama, mullah, etc.

> Government controlled, fostered:  gov’t ulama, legitimating, accrediting, support for mosques, judiciary, qazis,

> “Secular” Islami:  sep of church/state, secular, civil, Progressive, western

> Islamist:

 

 

In each period I will note the changes/patterns in the formally instituted structures of government; and the informally or locally instituted and enforced sociopolitical relations [within which the patterns of leadership and followership can be separately discussed].

 

1. 1949 to 1964: 1949-1952: The “Liberal Parliament” period

 

@1949-64: Formal institutional conditions

 

Islamism in the period between 1949 and 1973

 

     First attempts at Islamic revolution

 

HK 91?: “Islamism, or Islamic radicalism, is the story of response to society in transition from the traditional to the modern, which sets the state on a major scale on the road toward secularization, but in Afganistan the overriding concern of the Islamists was to defend Islam from the encroachment of atheism, which had begun to permeate the educated population in the late 1950’s after the country had become dependent on the Soviet Union for its schemes of modernization”

 

Balkhi

== Attempted coup by a Shiite group:  1949.  Sayyed Ismail-i Balkhi, Ibrahim (Bache-ye) Gausawar (a Hazara), Khwada Muhammad Na’im, Lt. Mir Ahmad Shah Rizwni; some other Shia leaders implicated or arrested for presumed involvement were Mir Ali Ahman Gauhar, Mir Ali Ahmad Zia, Abdul Latif Sarbaz.

 

== In prison Balkhi starts [DEdwards] Payam-i Islami [The Message of Islam] and Gausawar starts Qiyam-i Islami [The Uprising of Islam];

 

DE1986:228:  “a religiously based political culture began gradually to emerge among the Shi’i population during the 1940s and 1950s.  The first stage in this process was the establishment of the Takyah Khanahs in the city, which provided a focus for communal activities and exposed many Shii’is for the first time to their religious traditions.  In this sense, the takyah khana served as the incubator in the formation of Shi’i political ideology in Afhganistan.”  Their innaguration “provided a forum for the dramatic remembrance of the sacrifice of Husain and … laid the groundwork for the subsequent development of an ideology of Shi’i poliical activitsm”

 

@1949-64:  Informally organized and locally based social conditions

 

     The trend of progressive thought in the 1950s

Shahrani 1986: 60

… the availability of foreign scholarships, the expansion of mass media, and the availability of books and propaganda from foreign cultural missions in Kabul made the penetration of a wide range of such ideologies possible.  The emergence of Khalq and other communist parties … the movement that emerged to oppose the Communist parties was a Muslim Youth movement inspired by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and organized by several professors of the Facultry of Shari`iyat (Islamic Studies) at Kaul University, who had studied on scholarships at al‑Azhar University in Cairo during the 1950s and 1960s.  Thuys began the polititicaization of Kabul University …”

 

Shahrani 1986: 61

“Thus, the traditional political idioms of tribe, ethnicity, region, and sect were not replaced by augmented by new political ideological sympathies and loyalties.”

 

Shahrani 1986: 61

“Rural populations had successfully created their own parallel power structures at the village level to resolve local disputes with the aid of their own respected local leaders, thereby avoiding extensive and costly relations with the government whenever possible.  Consequently, during the 1960s and 1970s the nature of political conflict was no longer that of periphery versus the center, or tribe versus the state.  Instead, there were new bases for political conflicts, most concerned with the questions of the legitimacy of the government, and articulated by the newly educated youth of  Afghanistan, … manifested on two levels:  the ideological … and the generational‑class level …”

 

Early secular reform movements

 

==There was a dispute involving these people.  Faiz M. Angaar; Gul Padcha‑y Ulfat; Abdul Haadi Daa’wi; A. Rahman Mahmudi; Dr. G. M. Ghobar; S. Qaasim‑i Rishtiya; Siddiq‑i Farhang.  They began in the time of Nadir Shah.

Faiz M. Angaar) (started?): Wish Zaalmayan (“Young awakened”).  They were Pushtun fascists.  They divided into many part of which two are important:

== Afghan Millat [first paper published Ap5, 1966, LDpree1973:602] (edited by) [Papa?] Engineer Gholam Muhammad Farhaad; Hizb‑i Khalq.  A. R. Mahmudi, M. G. M. Ghobar.  These people became founders of Sholey Jawed [ed by Dr. Rahim Mahmudi; paper first published Ap4, 1968. LDupree1973:605].

 

== The orginal struggle was between Pushtun  Saalaari and anti Pushtuni Saalaari (There is not one communism)  Russian influence was not present in this.???)

 

‑‑ Sholey Jawed:  in the office of A. R. Mohmadi, Karmal was a clerk.

 

[‑‑ It was with the help of Anaita that Babrak made contact with the communists. Her husband was Dr. Kiramuddin Kakar.]

 

‑‑ Sholey‑Jawed moved toward the Chinese maoists but Karmal moved toward Russian/USSR.  (Taheri i K doesn’t think Abdul Rahman Mahmudi was a socialist).  When Sholey‑Jawed divided a part related to China.  Mahmudi still believed in God.  Faiz M. Awgaar also believed in God.  That M. believed in God was evident in his use of such terms as Walla, Billa, Tilla, etc.

 

 

 

2. 1964 to 1973: experiment in parliamentary democracy and the clash of left and right.

 

2.1 Overview:

Jawaanaan-e Musulmaan had both Sunni and Shi’a members.  There were inspired by teachings of Prof. Ghulam Muhammad Niazi, who remained publically uninvolved.

 

Communist students [??] DE:p217 “had become actively engaged in organizing students on campus a few years earlier”.

 

@1964-73: Formal institutional conditions

 

Progressive democracy groups in about 1345/1967

Hashem Maywandwal

Demokratik Mashrafi [Progressive democracy]

Musaawaat [equality, justice]

 

Radical progressives in about 1345/1967

 

Nur M. Taraki [publisher]:  Khalq

Suleiman Layeq [ed], and Mir Akbar Khaybar:  Parcham

Karmal

? Jeryaan-i Demokratik-i Khalq

 

Gholaam Muhammad Farhaad

Afghaan Millat

Split into two groups:  Afghan Millat [Shamul Huda Shams in 1989 was editor of magazine; M. Amin Wakman, author of the book, now works for VOA;  and Millat [head in 1989: Rahim Pushtunyar]; Nasim Ludin was in this party, his place was taken by his brother Wasim Ludin in 1989 when he was killed.

 

Sholey Jawed groups in about 1345/1967

Rahim Mahmudi

Akram Yaari

Enginar Eshaan

Jeryaan-i Demokratik-i Nawin

  (Sho’ley-i Jawed)

‑‑ Parcham people were from Kabul city.  Karmal was a follower of Mahmudi, joined Khalq as they both contacted the Russians.

 

‑‑ Sholey Jawed broke into several parts, of which two are important:

SAMA:  Majid‑i Kalakani was the head.

Guruy Rihayi:  they were known as Guruy‑Inqilabi.  Came from Sholey Jawad, besides SAMA.  head of Guruy Inqilabi was Dr. Haji Faiz from Kandahar.  Two yrs ago [from 1989] he was killed by Hizb‑i Islami.  He was Durrani.

‑‑ Settami‑Milli.  Persian speakers.  Uzbek from north.  In time of Nadir Kahn and Zahe Shah these people had suffered under M. Gul Muhammad, who was the Ra’is‑i Tanzim‑i Shandal [?], precurser of the Wali, only much more powerful, controlled a wider area.  Sittam‑i Milli was started by these people [??], but later than this period, but they remembered their sufferings.  Different from Sholey Jawed in 2 ways:  1.  Diff in thought.  Sholey Jawed wanted socialism, education.  Sittam‑i Milli wanted Qawm of the Tajiks and accepted Uzbeks and Hazaras.  2.  Soley Jawed. was copying China (maoist).  Sittam‑i Milli looked to Russia.  Behind these parties there were Persian ‑ Pushtun differences.  The differece also in the Islamist parties: JamI vs. HzbI.

 

1350/1972

 

     Shu’la-ye Jawed groups as of about 1350/1972;

>  HK119:  Shu’la-e-Jawid [the eternal flame]:  Maoist communists; aimed at socialism through revolutionary and violent means.  They divided into the following:  Surkha [later Rihayee], SAMA [led by Majid Kalakani, “more of a social bandit than a leader of a group of pro-Chinese leftists”, p120], Akhgar, Paikar, SAWO, Khurasan.

 

DE: 1986:219 says another similar organization established in this time [??] was Jawanan-i Mughal.

 

 

> Mahmudi — Akram Yaari

Saazmaan-i Jawaanann-i Mashriqi[??]

 

> Enginar Osmaan — Baa ‘Ays-i Bad Khushi/ Settam-i haa

 

> Daaktar Faiz (Guruh-i Enqelaabi)

 

     Groups that sprang from Sho’ley Jawed

These three subgroups unite, or at least have a common fate as:  Saazmaan-i SAMA, or Saazmaan-i Rahaayi *5

*5:  These movements, which are on the side of China and Maoist thought from 1350 on were divided into three branches, and after the coup de etat of the Russian dependants fell into many troubles.  And their efforts in the direction of establishing a communist movement ran into dead ends.  After the year 1359/1980 the sections of the remainders of these movements announced their existance by the names of the Organization of SAMA and the Organization of Rahbari, and their activities they carried on in other groups and charitable organizations.

 

HK53 The steady decline of the orginal attraction for Sittam

-e-milli may account for the change of its name to the organization of The Toilers of Afganistan or SAZA (Sazman-e-Zachmankashani Afghanistan).  For the followers of Badachi, and the commando organization of the Liberation of Afghanistan or SARFA (Sazman-e-Rehaeebakhsh’e Fedayee Afghanistan) for the followers of Bawhess

 

Progressive demoncracy as of about 1350/1972

> Hashem Maywandwaal *3  Maywanwal in 1352/1974 was arrested and murdered under the accusation of [attempting] a coup de etat.

 

Radical progressives [??] as of about 1350/1972

> Gholaam Muhammad Farhaad *4

Some people of this group continued their political activities in the form of cultural and informational [services/activities] outside of Afghanistan.

 

Communist groups as of about 1350/1972

> Taraki / Khalq

Kaarmal / Paarcham

Dastagir Panjsheri / Khalq-i Kaargar

Taher Badakhshi / Settamihaa [Ayeen:  In the north they were extremists]

 

@1964-73:  Informally organized and locally based sociopolitical conditions

 

1342/1964

Balkhi is released from prison.  DEdwards 1986:215 “Balkhi provided the focus and inspiration for the more potent political movement that was then emerging in Kabul.  He accomplished this primarily through his poetry, which was widely circulated among both Shi’is and Sunnis, particularly students …”.  DE1986:216 “Balkhi became the first figure in the modern era of Afghan history to embody personally the Islamic conception of sacrifice by refusing to compromise his beliefs … In this respect, Blkhi actualized the Karbala paradigm.  … Balkhi transformed politcal ideology and action in Afghanistan and provided a potent symbol in a society that was in the mids of fundamental structural changes.”  Balkhi started Payman-i Islami [Islamic Alliance] headed by Mir Ali Ahmad Gouhar, Shi’a “spiritual leader” from Ghorband.  Gen Mir Ahmad Shah Rizwani secretly reestablishes [DE “resurrected”] Qiyam-i Islami

 

 

1345/1967

 

Islamist groups in about 1345/1967

 

Shi’ite or merged groups in about 1345/1967

Sayyed Isma’el-i Balkhi, was in prison until 1964

Sahiqi [??]:  Qiyam-i Islami [???]

== In Iraq in 1345,46 [1966‑7] or ?1945‑6? a group started called Shabaab at Hazara (?).

 

     Sunni Islamist groups in about 1345/1967

 

Rahim Niazi

Abdul Rasul Sayyaf

Burhan ul din Rabbani

Known as Ikhwaan ul Muslemin [Muslim Brotherhood]

 

Faizani [??Sunni?]

DE217: Mawlana Faizani:  started Madrasah-yi Qur’an, which started as a sufi circle, of which he was the pir, later became a political organ.  He taught that “political progress culd come only after personal spiritual advancement.”  Dealt with problems of reconciling science with Islam.  “tried to demonstrate both how scientific knowledge is presaged in the Qur’an and how the Qur’an contains a philosophy that is coherent in the light of scientific knowledge.”  Apparently developed later:  “implicitly messianic quality of his personality and message”, for to his followers he was “considered the representative of the Mahdi himself …”  In ftnot on the page: “Faizani’s ability to transcend sectarian divisions was that he had no connection to any established sufi tariqat and claimed to have attained his own spiritual progress individually without the guidance of a pir.  His path therefore remained basically uncategorizable, and this presumably helped break down traditional divisions, including that of Sunni and Shi’i.”  DE said several people told him they believed him to be the khalifa-i mahdi akhir al-zaman [the representative of the Mahdi at the end of the age].  Held zhikr’s in his home.

 

> Other leaders active before this, as individuals, outside the Islamists:

— Sibghatullah Mujaddidi, future “amir” of the Front for National Liberation, was imprisoned in 1960.

— Pir of Tagao,

— Pir of Qalay-e Biland, Hafiz Sahib of Kapisa

— Mawlawi Fayzani in Kabul.  HK, p 271 note26:  Mawlawi Habib al-Rahman Fayzani, known as Mawlana Fayzani, was arrested in 1973, “dominated the soul and body of his numerous followers first as a school teacher and principal in Herat and later as a reformer, pir and polticial leader”.  “composed some books and traveled extensively in the country before he resided in Kabul where he opened a library and set up Madrasa-e-Quran, a seminary for the teaching of Quran, which increasingly took on an active political dimension among his followers of traditional mullas and artisans.  His teachings transcended the communal line of Sunni and Shi’a and to his followers of both sects he appeared as a messianic personality.  He played a leading role in the anti-communist agitations of the traditional mullahs in 1970.  By the time of the Da’ud coup in 1973 he had become so successful in his activitires that he was able to unite a number of secret Islamic associations under the name of the School of Monotheism (Maktab-e-Twheed) who which he was elected Amir.  Shortly after the coup he was arrested on a charge of plotting to overthrow the regime.  it was in the Khalqi rule that Fayzani along with over 100 Ikhwanis including Dr. Niazi were Executed.”  HK’s source:  D. Edwards, pp 217-220: “The Evolution of Shi’i Political Dissent in Afghanistan”, in Shi’ism and Social Protest, edited by R. I Cole and N.R. Keddie, Yale UP, 1986. [HK, p271-2].

 

1346/1968

 

DE1986:219 notes that the Islamic groups being founded in this period were only one type among many others at this time.

 

1347/1969

DEdwards1986:218:  Members of Faizani’s group and student members of Paiman-i Islami and Qiyam-i Islami worked with Jawaanaan-i Musulman in the university elections of 1969, in which they won.  “What united these groups … was the belief that they shared a common cause — the advancement of Islam — and that the furtherance of that cause outweighed watever divisions existed among them.”  [they represented ] “the emergence of new interest groups and sodalities that were partly replacing or tranforming traditional ethnic and tribal structures in Kabul society”.

 

Taher Khdri:  Musa Shafiq was very smart.  He knew the USSR would not remain quiet [in AFghanistan].  he started the Ikhwani school in Afghanistan.  A. Rahim Niazi was in the university; they both taught together. in the same faculty.

 

two stories re founding of the Islamist parties:  professors founded a secret organization in 1969, The Islamic Association. Other story by Hikmatyar:  Students founded the movement, 12, no professors; he calls it the Islamic Movement [not Jamiat].  Both were in 1969.

37. Kakar ms 92: attributes “Islamic Radicalism” to three thinkers: Abul Hassan `Ali Dadawi, Abul A’la Mawdudi (1903-79), and Sayyed Qutb c.1906-66).  “made the seizure of power their main goal.”  Sayyed Qutb: Islam is “presented to humanity a complete cure for all [humanity’s] ills” [Shepard, W.E. “Islam as a System in the Latter Writigns of Sayed Qutb” Middle East Studies vol 25, No.1, Jan, 1989, p. 37.] [for more on this see Choueirei, Y. 1990.  Islamic Fundamentalism.  Twayne Publishers [London?].  The Islamists, … “consider the state as an instrument of reform”.[HK, p 92].  Mawdudi [helped undermine the advantage of the mullahs by stating] “every Muslim who is capable and qualitied to give a sound opinion on matters of law, is entitled to interpret the law of God …” [quoted in Choueiri, p 111].  According to Mawdudi “only a mal Muslim is considered qualified tofr the post of Amir” [HK p.93].  According to S. Qutb, jehad is to “disarm the enemy so that Islam is allowed to apply its Sharia unhindered” [HK wording p94].  According to Mawdudi Islam is a”a revolutionary ideology”, and so Muslims [should] constitute an “international revolutionary party”, which has as its main aim a world-wide revolution that transcends artificial boundaries and national territories [from Choueiri, p 138].  Sayyed Qutb:  the common people cannot be trusted, are swayed by demagogues, especially by mass media.  The seizure of power is the work of the “chosen elite”:  “the summoners to God must be distinct and a community unto themselves” [quoted in Choueiri p135, cited in Kakar ms.].

The Afghan Islamists:  associated neither with the political ruling circles nor depend on the state … unlike the ulama, who had accommodate dwith the state, the Islamists held the state to be the source of all corruptions and tyrannies, so set up a goal to replace it with an Islamic order [nizam-e-Islam] [HK 97].

 

1348/1970

 

There was a mulla demonstration in this year, Faizani involved; more??

 

DE1986:218.  Shi’i and Sunni students in university began to split as it became known that the student association had ties with Jama’at-i Islami of Pakistan; the Shi’i were offended by introduction of a “foreign ideology”.  Some Shi’a disengaged from Jawanan-i Musulman; these were Farid, Akhtar Muhammad Sulaimankhel, Sayyid Isma’il Pasikh.

 

Me:  But events in the 1970s revealed that beneath the evident and enduring centralizing and secularizing structures that formed the fabric of power in the urban centers (notably Kabul) and most vitally among the educated elites the established social alignments that had so strongly affected public affairs in previous periods remained.  The events of the 1970s revealed not only that the elite-controled fabric of power in the urban centers was confronting the established configurations of power in the provincial areas, but also that the rurally based patterns of loyalty and obligation were able to transform the enlarging structure of power based at the center.  In this process the Islamic authorities and their clients participated, exerting a particular and distinctive influence on social affairs.  How much the dramatic and catclyzmic events of the late 1970s and the 1980s and 90s have affected the relations of Islamic authorities to each other and their clients is only partially known.

A series of events took place in the 1970s that revealed a growing disquiet and frustration among some of the leading Islamic authorities.  These leaders were of course expressing concerns of their own, but as the broadly presumed authorities on God’s law and moral order, they couched their concerns in terms that represented, with some effect, the distresses of the wider populations.

 

>anti-communist agitations vs communists by mullahs, Fayzani taking and leading role [see him above]

 

1349/1971

> Taher-i Khidr remembers that he was in the 12th grade when Jawaanaan-i Musulman “began” [he probably means became prominent, outspoken].  Shiites were getting books from Iran then, by Shariati, Muhandis, Mehdi Buzargan, Murtaza Mutahed.  They collected these books;presumably they were hot items.

The ruhani of the Shiites then were Alam Shu’a from Chindawul, Mir Ali Ahmad, Ismaili Balkhi, M. Yusufi Binish, Ismaili Mubaligh, a Hazara.

 

> Taher?:  There was much disputing among people then.  Jawanani Musliman were getting ideas from Egypt.  These criticized some of the Caliphs, especially Osman, said he was cruel.  They were all Hanifa.  The Ikhwan[is?] of Afghanistan said that Hanifa and Mazhab have no poiint.  They drifted away from the original idea.  People began to think this was Wahabism and secretly from the USA [??].  Other people disagreed.  Thought that USSR had intensions of taking Afghn.  His father said the day that Bulgannin came to Afghanistan he said the fatya for Afghan.

 

> me: nb. the emergence of political parties, the left manifested by the marxist parties Khaq, Parcham and Shole-Jawen, etc., and the right manifested by the Jawanan-i Musulman.

(Note that this dispute was framed by issues arising out of the discourse about development and the relations of Afghanistan with outside cultures and polities among the urban educated elite in Kabul; the Islamic authorities and their concerns attracted scarce interest among the young nation-oriented elite, even those most agressively defending Islamic culture against the communists.  {cf article by Sayyed Majruh on evolution of the society; cite it and use it somewhere})  Indeed, the young Islamists, as these people are now being called, had only scorn for the ulama and their approach to public issues.  It is this contrast, between the viewpoint and tactics of the Islamists and the those of the established Islamic authorities who are the focus of this book, that requires that this chapter be written.  Events that transpired since that time require that a particular distinction be made between the established Islamic authorities, whom I will sometimes call the “religious establishment”, and the Islamist leaders, who appeared as the opposition to the communists.

 

“Balkhi” Groups as of about 1350/1972

> Paasdaaraan-i Enqelaab-i Islaami

Mubalegh [a Hazara leader] — Fazilat [giving??] — Aaqaa-y Aalem *1

*1:  In the time of Taraki and Amin was imprisoned and thereafter disappeared.

 

> Jenraal Mir Ahmad Shah

??? — Isma’el-i Paasih

Sahifi [??] — Mir Ali Gohar

(NB: contact with Ikhwaan ul Muslemin) *2

Involved in several unsuccessful coups de etat in the time of Da’ud.

 

Islamist Groups as of about 1350/1972

> Gulbuddin — Habib ul Rahman …

(Saazmaan-i Jawaanaan-i Muslemin)

>  Burhaan ul din Rabbani —

> Sayyaf …

 

 

 

3. 1351/1973 to 1356/1978: Da’ud coup de etat and the rise of Parchamis to prominence

In the time of Da’ud:

 

@1973-78: Formal institutional conditions

 

> represented the entrance of Parchamis to power.

 

The first, led by M. Da’ud, Zaher Shah’s cousin and brother-in-law, was in 1973.  Da’ud continued to press the trend toward the secularization of the administration.  The most notable development in this regard was the adoption in 1977 of a constitution that gave even less place to Islam than the previous one.  Islam was mentioned only seven times and the Hanafi legal tradition only once.  Unlike any previous constitution it explicitly guaranteed non‑Muslims the right to worship freely.* {*Dupree 1979 (Taqiyya)}  The sentiments of the learned elite and middle class in the 1970s were expressed by one Afghan scholar:  “In comtemporary Afghanistan, neither the Hazrat nor any other individual religious personage or personages enjoy paramount influence among the people.* {*Kakar 1974 (Alberts): 19}

 

Government of Da’ud from 1352/1973 to 1357/1978 *6:  The coup de etat of the 26th of Saratan within the dynasty.

KGB *7:  The coup de etat of the 7th of Saur by the dependants of Russia.

 

Shiite progressive group

== Tanzim‑i Nasl‑i Naw‑i Hazara was started from Iraq/Iran; purpose was to awaken political sensitivity of the Hazaras.  In time of Bhutto [i.e., after 1973?] the purpose was to take back the Hazarajat.  But they were in Quetta and had no popularity within Afghanistan.  [Dr. Zia Jaghori left Jaghori and went to Chindawul Kabul and Shamali.]  They were with Sholey‑Jawed.  Bhutto could not start an organization in the Hazarajat.

 

> Hazara groups also supported by Pakistan:  Tanzim-e Nasl-e Naw-e Hazaara

> This generated Etehaadi-ye Mujahedin-e Islami-ye Afghaanistaan [??]

 

[in 1989? or 1984?  this may be from DE 1986]  Sholey-Jawid:  there are some small groups left, but they have no strength.

 

@1973-78:  Informally organized and locally based sociopolitical conditions

 

1351/1973 to 1356/1978 The more radical Islamic elements in Afghanistan society seemed to regard the accession of Da’ud to power as a threat, for some of them went underground.*  {*Male 1982: 98, 121}  The young leaders of an abortive coup attempt in 1974??? fled to Pakistan and with the help of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto began to develop anti-Da’ud activities in the name of Islam. [[check here with Rajan??]

 

>HK12  the first reaction [to the Daud coup de etat] was shown by the Islamic fundamentalists who staged an armed uprising in 1975.  The uprising . . . disillusioned Daud about his comradeship with the Communists and his policies in general.

 

HK says it is because of the support of the leading pirs/ Great mullas that a number of ulama held demonstrations for over a month in streets of Kabul vs the communists.

HK:  Prime Minister M. Hashem Maiwandwal, with about 40 senior colleages of his Social Demo part [Musawat]  were Da’ud’s first victims [HK p100].  Da’ud then wanted to destroy the Islamists, most of them fled to Pak.  Organized what they hoped would be a revolt:  On Jul 22, 1975 in Badakhshan, Laghman, Logar, Panjsher, attacked govt headquarters.  In Panjsher occupied hq for a short time; elsehwere no gains whatever.  No locals supported them, and no military groups.  Serious defeat: several were caught and tried, and some executed [HK 101], rest split up, recriminations; some established relations with “some authorities” of Pak govt., got money.  Shia and Sunni activitsts split up, distrusted ea other. [Edwards, p 222]

Islamists were weakened:  by defeat in coup attempt, by divisions among themselves, loss of credibility in eyes of their patrons the Pakistans as Da’ud sought closer ties with islamic states, including Pak, in order to distance himself from Soviet bloc.  Even after the communists came to power in Afghanistan the Islamists had no support; it was the Soviet invasion that gave them support [HK 103].

 

> DE1986:219.  Jawanan-i Musulman were vulnerable, many of them left Kabul for Pakistan.  Members of Paiman-i Islami, Qiyam-i Islami, Madrasah-yi Qur’an had not been involved in confrontations on campus, distressed by Da’ud coup, but did not leave.  These three formed an alliance called Madrasah-ye Tauhid (The School of Monotheism), with Faizani as Amir, developed plans to topple Da’ud.  Engineer Habib al-Rahman who supported Faizani and others were imprisoned for attempted plot.

 

> Note the role of Pakistan in the internal affairs of Afghan.  Such activities are common around the world, and it was not new that the neighboring power in South Asia should take an interest in activities inside Afghanistan.  The point here, however, is to note a phenomenon whose importance would grow dramatically in the 1980s, when the United States and Saudi Arabia and other states would fund the resistance activities of the opposition to the Afghan government.

 

Conversation with M. Taher‑i Khidri at his house (date?).  His father is from Turughman, although he himself has been there only a few days altogether.

== G.H. Rabbani, Khaawari, Mas’ud came to Pakistan in time of Daud.  They had ties w/ Z. Bhutto.  Bhutto had two agendas: to get Ikhwanis started to oppose Daud; and to encourage Hazaras to rise against Da’ud.  He didn’t succeed in getting the Hazaras to rise up.

 

In that time [1973??] Jamiat‑Islami (Pak) was weak.  G. Hikmatyar and Rabbani approached Jama’at‑i Pakistan.  the head of Jama’at-i Islami Pakistan was Qazi (Haji?) Hosayn Ahmad.  He received some $ from GHikm. and Rabbani, who had received $ from Bhutto.  It was the Jamiat‑i Islami P that provided the link between Zia and G.H and the Ikhwanis.  Later, when Bhutto was down, G.H. cursed him.

 

Small scale provincial insurrections of the Jawanan-i Musulman.  They had supposed they would be supported by the populace; instead were captured by the local populaces and turned over to Kabul government.  See above.

 

1354/1976

Gen Mir Ahmad Shah Rizwani organized a coup; he and the following were caught and imprisoned:  Sayyed Isma’il Pasikh, Akhtar Muhammad Sulaimankhel, and other members of Qiyam-i Islami.

 

1355/1977

By this time there was “almost complete separation” between the Shi’a and Sunni opponents of the government.  Sunnis in Peshawar; Shia based in Quetta.  Madrasah-yi Tauhid, which had included both groups split, with Sunni Pushtun members setting up in Peshawar and Shi’a group led by Asadullah Nuktadan setting up in Iran after the overthrow of the Shah.

 

 

 

 

4. 1356/1978 to 1367/1989 Khalqi coup de etat

 

 

@1978-89: Formal institutional conditions

== Sky knew Mir Ahmad Kishtmand [??] at the police academy.  He was a teacher there when Sky was there.  At one time he began talking about social change and socialism with Sky, who wondered about that, and eventually decided he was just trying to test him to see what he would say.  It was only later, when Kishtmand became the editor of a socialist newspaper, that he realized that he had been serious.  It was Kishtmand’s death that stimulated the riots that let to Daud’s putting Taraki and Amin (and others) in jail and then set in motion the “Saur Revolution.”

 

> The coup de etat of a group of young Marxists in 1978 represented an even more radically progressive orientation among the elite and educated middle class of Kabul.  Their attitude toward Islam was expressed in the new flag they introduced to represent their regime: its background was solid red, instead of the black, green and red background of the previous flag:  and the pulpit which had stood at its center for almost a half century was omitted.  Their attitude was also expressed in their treatment of the Hazrat family of Shor Bazaar, Muhammad Ibrahim Mujaddidi.  They violently attacked his residence, arrested him, and “more than 100 of his followers.”  He was executed in prison.*

 

*Newell (art on Islam ): 254‑5; Koshan 1990 [Prison Memoir]

 

The Communist coup in April, 1978, marked a major turning point in Afghn history.

>  Sultan Ali Kistmand was member of the politburo, made PM by Karmal in June, 1981.  two daughters married Russians, founder of Sitam-e-Milli was his borther in law.  He himself was Parchami, hated Khalqis, He was a “Gadee” from Qala-e-Sultan in Chardeh area; they are believed to be Ismailis.  He was known to be atheist and communist.  However he was excummunicated by his own people. HK167-8.

 

Tanzims in early formation

 

In the process of seeking arms and support from the outside the alignments already set up by the Islamists in Pakistan quickly became strategic.  The Islamist organizations — popularly called organizations [tanzims], not parties — provided the conduit between the local resistance groups inside Afghanistan and the external powers interested in embarrassing the Soviet Union in this war and, if possible, to force them to withdraw.  The resistance organizations became the conduits of support from outside powers for the resistance movements among the Afghanistan peoples.  In the process the resistance organizations hardened into political institutions that served the interests of the Islamist leaders.  The tanzims therefore became new institutions in Afghanistan society.  their importance was enforced by the policies of Paksitan.  Pakistan, that is, in particular General Zia, chose the organizations that would be the official channels of support to the Afghanistan resistance groups.  Zia chose a particular group of leaders that in his opinion were unlikely to be able to unite, lest they join into a collective power within Pakistan’s borders and disrupt Pakistanis society and politics.

 

The Islamist parties as channels of external support

Here, ISI, Pak, USCIA, etc.

 

== Maruf:  The parties are themselves intolerant of criticism.  They don’t want intellectuals to say things about what is going on.  In fact, if they do, then the parties, or the Pakistatn ISI will start rumous against them, that they are communists or maoists, or Khad, etc.  This is why the intellectuals are quiet.  They are afraid of the influence of the mujahedin parties and the Pak government.

 

Tanzims and their leaders

Certain prominent Islamic authorities were chosen to lead the organizations for the transfer of resources to the resistance groups inside Afghanistan.  Who they were:  Islamic authorities, whose Islamic bases of power contributed to their importance as political leaders:  Muj, Gailani, Muhammadi, Khales, Rabbani.  Also, the Islamists who were vital were the following:  Hikmatyar, and Masud, and Sayyaf.  The sequence of the development of parties [from interview].  These orgainzational leaders fell into two groups, one called by outside observers “moderates” the other “Islamists”.  In fact, in many ways they were all Islamist to varying degrees.

 

> HK 104:  Under presure by King of Saudi Arabia, a broad coalition, “The Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen” was formed, 4 Islamists, 3 Moderate.  Lasted until Feb, 1989 when Pak and Saudi Arabia patronage led to formation of AIG.

 

Moderat, “establishment” parties:  Sunni

HK 102.  The Islamic Movement that formed as a jehad against the Soviets; they were loosely structured organizations, not parties.  “The ulama, community elders, the intelligentsia, army officers, and former government employees formed their rank and file.  But their top leaders were either members of known religious families which had a considerable number of followers among the common people, or religious scholars.  A degree of toleration, compromise, and a democratic way of life were also features of these organizations.  They also stood for national sovereignty and independence.  They were thus basically Islamic, national and to a certian extent democratic.  They came to be known as traditionalists or moderates a distinct form Islamists.”  These orgainations were set up in 1979.

 

The following belong to Tawaafeq-e Rasmi, 1362/1984, qabuli-e rahbari-ye Zaaher Shah

 

> Jabha-ye Nejaat-e Milli-ye Islaami-ye AFghanistan (Sebghatullah Mujaddidi)

 

>  Front for National Liberation [Jabha-e Nejat-e Milli], led by S. Mujaddidi [his family headed Naqshbandi order in Afgh]; many of this family executed under Khalqis.  Known as Hazrats.

 

On Mujaddidi, see his ms. notes in “war“, and ntsmjddi.1.

 

== 7/3/89  dinner at the American club with Paul Ickx and his wife Laurence‑Lamercier and their guest Jean‑Jose Puig and R and Howie.  Most of this is from Puig

== Mujaddidi is really an Ikhawani.  Trained in same place as Rabbani and Niazi, he has same agendas.  His real difference from the “Islamists” is that he is Naqshbandi.  Also he is a large landowner.

 

> Mahaaz-e Milli Islaami-ye Afghaanistaan (Sayyed Ahmad Gailaani)

Conversation with Abdul Ghafur Maruf

== Pir Gailani’s party was founded by the young pir (Ishaq?) Gilani and his brother.  Only they asked their uncle to come and chair the party (they were of course too marginal and too young.)

 

== The Gailani party is different in being pro‑American.  The Muhammadi party is different in being tradition, establishment.

 

>  National Islamic Front [Mahaz-e Milli-ye Islami] led by Pir Sayyed Ahmad Gailani [head of Qadiriayya order in Afghan.]. [HK: the first time for a Gailani to emerge in national politics]

 

== The Gailani party is different in being pro‑American.  The Muhammadi is different in being tradition, establishment.

 

== “: Gailani’s people are more educated and therefore more able to plan and work together.

 

> Harakat-e Enqelaab-e Islaami-ye Afghaanistaan (Mowlawi Nabi Muhammadi) [NB:  he is not referred to as “Pir”]

== We talked about mullahs.  Benedicte confirmed what I have been told about the disrespect of mullahs among Pushtuns.  I raised the problem of how Mohammadi could have a party in Paktia.  She agreed that the difference was in the role of pirs.  She thought that the pirs have great influence and respect and people fear them as well as respect them because of their powers.  Also their followings were more the “maraboutic” style that Roy describes.

 

>  Revolutinary Islamic Movement [harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami], led by Mowlawi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi.  Severed as a member of parliament in the constitutional decade.  “For this as well as for his personal assault on Babrak karmal in the parliament in late 1966 he became popular particularly among hte numerous mullas in his own province, Logar”. HK 104.

 

== Maruf:  Support for Mowlai M. Nabi is from his students and he is from Logar.  he is a big mullah, so that is his base of pwoer.  But he has no real support except as a party leader.  He wasn’t all that important before the war.

 

== Karzai:  Muhammadi was once a Khalifa for Mujaddidi

 

== Dr. Aziz Lodin:  The [M. Nabi] party started in the early days when there were only 2 parties, H-I [GH] and J-I [Rabbani].  Pak goverment told them they had to form one party and they claled it Harakat-i Inqelabi-i Islami.  But GhH and R. could not allow the other to head this party, so they decided to ask an outsider to head it.  Mowlawi M. Nabi was amullah in Baluchistan.  They thought he would be harless and safe to run the party so they asked him to coome.  He came but the other two gve up non of their control fo their own party.  So in the edn there was a 3rd party.  then at that time and in those days [after 1980] this was the beggest party .. But then there was trbouble w/in the party.  The right hadn man of Mowlawi MNM was Mowlawi Nurullah Mansur.  he became dissatisfied evetually split and set up his own party.  and called it by the same name.  theyn another major Mullah Mowlawi Ma’izin split with him and starteda 3rd party by the same name.  These other 2 parties were never recognzied by Pakistan, so languished.  but these splits weakened the party.  The real problem was the MMNM had no ability to run the party.  he gave all authority to one son.  he didn’t come in, stayed at his home, left all affairs to his son. in fact sent all communications through his son.  But the 1st son became dewana.  And that caused all the problems.  Basically his son wrecked the party.  Now the other son runs the party.  And still M. MNM stays at home and depends on his S to lead. [NB the style of leadership here:  the tradition is that the top person stays at home and is solicited by others, whereas the administrative duties are done by an underling.  this is not different from the pir situation, when the pir leaves mundane things to an underling.  M. MNM is simply acting like a pir!]

 

Azizullah Ludin:  All the fundamtentlaisth parties have prisons.  Even MNM has a prison.  the guards are not supposed to fraternize with anyone else in the party and no one is allowed in the area.

 

Islamist organizations: Sunni

 

Islamist Groups as of 1357-8/1979-80

 

> Jami’at-e Islaami-ye Afghaanistaan (Burhaan ud din Rabbaani) [support from Pakistan]

— J-I has three kinds of elements in it:  Masud, whose leanings are leftist; Rabbani, in the middle; and a few Ikhwanis, the main one is Ershad, but also Lafraiyi.  but they are differen, former is Pushtun the latter is tajik.  People say to her the real difference between fundamentalist and moderate is the Pushtun-Persian split.

 

an element of Rabbani’s support is Settami Milli [perhaps those in the north, who Ayeen says were once extremists?]

 

>  Masud’s bro’s w is daughter of Rabbani

>  there are two Jamiats:  one around Rabbani, a few commanders only; and the Commanders like Masud and Isam’il and others.  They are not well connected

 

> Hezb-e Islaami-ye Afghanistan (Hekmatyaar)

== Gulb. H. is the son of a man who was the servant or attache of the former Naibul Hukumat (Viceroy”) of Badakshan, Qataghan, in the days before it was broken into two provinces.  GH was a Pushtun, but he knowns nothing of tribal life and tribal rule.  His rival, Qari M. Amin WAqad, is a Mohmand from a place where there is real tribal life.

 

== Gulbuddin has lost several commanders in the last couple of years.  They have gone over to the other side because they got fed up with him.  He also has connections with Libya.  Ghaddafi has been helping him.

 

== Gulbuddin is very cruel.  He has cases against him, knows of occaasions, has definite information, when eyes were cut out, when fingers were cut off.  He is very cruel.  AAS agrees that GH would be willing to kill, not only Mujeddidi but also Gailani ‑‑ it means nothing to him.

== But Gulbuddin has no power.  He naturally oppses the king because the king would take over when Gulbudding wants power.  He is worse than Najib or Babrak.  But the people will not accept him.

== Hikmatyar’s party is in ethnic copmosition, class and educational profile “exactly” the same as Khalq.  They are Ghilzai Pushtuns (and Pushtun chavanists?) and have strong lineage ties, and come from the same parts of the country.

== Hikmatyar’s party has essentially dissapated inside the country.  Those in his party in the north have gone over to Mujaddidi (except for those in Gulbahar (?) who now guard the governent textile factory.  Those in Ghorband have split into warring factions.l  The ones in Gulbahar who guard for the gov”t were formerly aligned with the gov’t as militia.  They were collected from among the Kharoti tribe in several parts of the eastern provinces and then palced in the N (Qunduz?) as a militia for the PDPA by hafixullah Amin.  These people were :: with the govt first, then shifted to HzbIslmi when the rest of the party began to dissipate.  They could not join another party because of their past alliances with amin so joined the govt again.  These people of course fought J.Islami.

 

GH tried to destroy the tribal structure in order to institute his party in its place, succeeded in destroying it in Kunar but not in replacing that with his party.  In Kandahar and Paktia and Nangarhar party membership is not mentioned … within the camps party membership is not mentioned.

 

== GH’s family is from the south, he is from Qunduz.  He was known as a Parchami before 1349 (1970) when he joined the Jawaanaan‑i Musulman.  For the previous 2 or 3 years he was Parchami.  (NB: Parchami, Ikhawani; Bhutto, Zia:: “he has no character”).

== Until the Shora of Feb 1989 he used to say death to America, in the Shora he was the strongest supporter of the USA.  It became known that GH would take what he could.

 

> Hezb-e Islaami-ye Afghanistan 2 (Mowlawi Khaales)

Koshan:  Khalis said that all the Hazaras should be run out of the country.

 

FRom: Metaxis:  Khalis said that Iranian Islam is irrational; Islam is not like that, he said.  Islam is very rational, he said.

 

== Khalis’s groups murder of 70+ men who had given themselves up.  This was in the area w of Torkham.  Then the government retook the area and found out about the people killed. Now talk about how prisoners are being treated by muj.

 

==Azmat: Khalis is discretited in this battle, because they were supposed to be the main fighters.  Khalis himself is from Nangarhar and most of his support is from there.  And they have not done well.  Instead Gailani’s people have done better, have born the brunt of the battle.

 

> Etehaad-e Islaami-ye Mujaahedin-e Afghaanistaan (Sayyaf)  [spin-off from Jami’at and from Hezb-e Islaami-ye Afghanistan (Hekmatyaar)]

Sayyaf was really a late comer.  He was in GH’s party group and with several other leaders was put into prison by N.Taraki.  All of them were eventually killed by the communists except Sayyaf, as he was a cousin of Amin.  When Babrak came into power the political prisoners were released and Sayyaf was among them.  When he came out of the country the 5 party alliance (at that time) was just forming.  Khalis introduced him to the alliance and he was made a member of the steering council (or whatever it was at that time).  H.A was a member of that council, and one night some of the other members came to him and suggested that when the new alliance was formed they thought Sayyaf would be a good choice to be the head of it.  He counseled against it, as Sayyaf was an unknown quantity.  He soon left to go back to the St. but he heard afterwards that Sayyaf had been elected president.  The new alliance lasted about 9 months.  But when it collapsed Sayyaf had a lot of money which he used to establish a new party.  It was Saudi money.  He has a lot of money now.  But no loyal followers.

 

> HK 104:  coalition of six Islamic organization, under name of Islamic Unity for the Liberation of Afghanistan, was set up with Abd al-Rab Rasool Sayyaf as head; he was an origianl founder of the Islamic Movement, recently released from Kabul prison and came to Peshwar.

 

Sayyaf’s name used to be Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (??).  But the Wahabbis don’t think you can be servant of the prophet so he changed his name to Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf, because Rabb is a name for God, and it’s OK to say that.

 

— Sayyaf’s influence has been to disrupt some shoras that had otherwise been working fine, united.  He has a lot of wealth in his camp at Pubi.

 

Sayyaf.  Strength of his party is in Konar and Laghman.  He is from Paghman. didn’t try to lead a movement there.  Without the help of Pakistan, Saudi A. he has no power to govern, but he has enough power to cause trouble.  (GH has power but has given up his legitimacy.)

 

== Conversation in Quetta (at New Lourdes Hotel) with Haji M. Nawroz Khan.

== He came here 11 years ago, i.e., soon after the communist coup.  Came with essentially nothing, had no place to stay and for many days had literally no place to sleep.

== early he met Sayyaf (I don’t know where), who was at that time the head of the previously abortive alliance.  Sayyaf was then trying to make one party, to bring all the Mujahedin together.  He asked Haji saheb to represent him (i.e., the alliance) in Quetta.

 

== Wahabbis involved in the resistance

Under the aegis of Sayyaf

 

May 29, 1989:  Kent Obee “only today met an Arab Wahabi who passed himself off as an Afghan refugee and has travelled all over with a refugee passport.”

 

== They should at least not have Wahabbi and not Ikhwani.  These people didn’t want them.

 

==Arabs, Wahabis in the resistance:

There are Arabs within Afghanistan who have several times tried (and sometimes succeeded) to kill foreign correspondents they have found within the country.  Donatella L. he said was almost killed by Arabs but were restrained by the Mujahedin.

 

== A man at the party was talking loudly with a foreign woman in Farsi about the situation in the country.  He said that there are very few real Wahabbis in the country.  They are Wahabi as long as the Saudis provide the money.  Ditto for Ikhwanis.  He didn’t think there were very many true believers.

 

== Dr. Hosayn Mohmand [head of OBGYN hospital]:  the Arabs are a dangerous influence in Afghanistan.  They are wahabbis and Ikhwanis.  Afghanistan Islam is not so strict.

 

== Amini, Hosaini:

one time a Wahabbi group came to them and proposed that they become Sunni.  They said it was good they were fighting the jehad but actually Shia wasn’t real Islam.  They should become Sunni, and if they would they would get a lot of money.  KThe Hazaras thought that was just laughable.

 

 

On internal party members and structure of the Sunni parties

== Homum:

it is characteristic of all the parties that the leadership and key persons in the party are related.  In fact, they are all structured in kinship groups.  Mujaddidi’s family controls his party, and Gailani’s his party.  And Mohammadi’s his.  He didn’t say anything about Khalis; I’ll bet that many of his mullahs are students, etc. and possibly are married into each other.  Jamiat has some of that, but I wonder if it is as strong as in the others.  And Hizb‑ Hikmatyar is probably not closely intermarried.  But in these cases the parties look like extensions of the family networks of prominent families in Afghanistan; and like the Islamic networks surrounding a Pir, as in the case of Gailani’s party.  So the internal structure of the parties is more like the old network patterns than is often noted.  They are mainly based on kinship relations and locality associations.  Even the Parchamis are basically kin‑based groups, as well as the Parchamis.

 

==Metaxis:

Some parties are mainly held together by tribal loyalties.  Khalis’s support is mainly in Nangarhar, where he is from himself ‑‑ and so for that reason his people are most involved in the Jalalbad battle now.  Mullah M. Nabi is from Paktia and his support is mainly from there.  Some of the parties are more ideologically based; mainly this is Hikmatyar’s party and Khalis and Jamiat and Sayyaf (!???I thought Sayyaf’s support came from the Saudis and was largely “bought” support.)

 

== Maruf:  The parties are themselves intolerant of criticism.  They don’t want intellectuals to say things about what is going on.  In fact, if they do, then the parties, or the Pakistatn ISI will start rumous against them, that they are communists or maoists, or Khad, etc.  This is why the intellectuals are quiet.  They are afraid of the influence of the mujahedin parties and the Pak government.

 

Minority parties

 

     Besides the resistance organizations officially approved by Pakistan, there were other organizations that were not official conduits of support for the Mujahedin.

 

     Minority Sunni parties

Some notable organizations not officially accepted by the Pakistani government were the following:

Waqad …; other?

 

== Qazi Muhammad Amin Wiqaad, who is the head of the party which he calls “Da’ye Ittehad‑i Islami‑ Afghanistan” (Invitation to Afghanistan Islamic Unity).  This man’s assistant is Engineer M. Amin Munsif.  (Khakmal was also present.)  Wiqaad and his assistant speak Pushtu mainly.

 

== Khakmal also said (without much clarification of how it happened) that the orginal party was Hizb‑i Islami and Qazi M. Amin Wiqaad was the head of that (verified elsewhere?), then it split and Hikmatyar was head of it.  And all the other parites split from it.

 

== These men are associated with none of the Peshawar parties, only with a man who they said was the teacher of many of the leaders, of Gulbuddin and Rabbani and Sayyaf: Mowlawi Tara Kheal, who is Sheykhul Ahdi, Asharaful Madas, Sheykhul Haddies (Hadith?), “the commander of Kabul.”

 

??== Haji Hazarat is a former merchant who has used his fortune to fight the war.  He has used his own funds.  They have lands in Shamali, but it is all destroyed now.  They can be separate because they use their own funds, and it is about gone now.  they support Mowlawi Tara Khael.

 

 

Saazmaan-e Aazaadibakhsh-e Islami (Al-Hadid).  A spin-off from Jami’at:    ??who is this??

 

     The Shi’a parties, all of which are in a sense minority parties

 

An alliance of eight Shi’ite parties, all influenced to some degree by Shi’ite leaders outside of Afghanistan.  Most of them have strong ties to Iran and several were formed late, about the time of the Geneva Accords.  One party, however, never joined this alliance.

 

Sponsored by the government of Iran:

 

== me:  The Shiite resistance organizations, all of them except Harakati Islami, were obliged by the neglect the suffered from the Paksitan government and its sponsors, the United States and Saudi Arabis, to turn to Iran.  The relations of the Afghanistan Shiites to Iran, however, were mixed, and the story of the involvement of the Iranian government in the Shiite resistance organizations inside Afghanistan reveals again the significance of the pir murid network in the formation of resistance organizations early in the war, and the the powerful effect that an outside power can have on the internal structure within the country.  The Shura organization, the coalescence of sayyeds in the formation of the new organization.  The problems with the leadership, mismanagement, and dispute with Khomeini, breakup with Iranian supporters.  The commitment of Iran to form its own organization, Nasr, and then Pasadaran, etc.  Eventually, the withdrawal of many Shiites from Iranian support.  The smaller organizations that formed.  Eventually, the Wahdat organization, united with Iranian support, but clearly independent of Iranian control.

 

== the Hazara/Shia parties mainly went to iran.  At first the Sunni parties helped in Pakistan, but not much.  Then when Iran began to help the Pakistan parties reduced even that much help.  But for the last two years Pakistan has been trying to help the Hazara/Shia more, in order to counter the influence of Iran.  But even now they get only a half a percent or one percent.

 

> Also, support for Sunni party Hizb-e Islami Afghanistan [Hikmatyar]:  DE1986:225:  Rather than backing the indigenous Shura or one of the Shi’i parties such as Harakat-i Islami Afghanistan, the Iranina government threw its support to Hizb-i Islami Afghanistan …”

 

== So the Iranians not only made a deal to get help from the Soviets but also to get munitions for their three parties ‑‑ Shora‑Ittifaq, Nasr, and Harakat‑i Islami.

 

The members of the eight party Shi’ite alliance are the following:

 

     The larger parties

 

Harakat‑i Islami (“Islamic Movement”).  Founded about 1358 (1979).  Started in Qandahar, led by Ayatollah Mohsini, affiliated with Ayatollah Khowi, who resides in Iraq.  Has drifted away from close ties with Khomeini.

 

>  Ayatullah Shaykh Asif Muhsini, head of Harakat-i-Islami (Islamic Movement).  Followed his own independent line, not Khomeni.  Strained relations with iran, and in 1980 Iran banned his party from being active in Iran.

> Harakat-i Islami-ye Afghaanistaan [some support from Pakistan], led by Ayatullah Shaikh Asaf Muhsini.  Iran’s failure to support Muhsini was “puzzling”:  DE1986:225:  [Muhsini is] “a relitious scholar of some repute, Muhsini is from Qandahar, and although he was apparently not actively engaged in politics prior to the communist revolution, [p226] he had organized a cultural group known as Subh-i Danish (Dawn of Knowledge) whose members became early and vigorous opponents of the communist regime.  nevertheless, in Agust 1980, Iran banned Muhsini’s Harakat-i Islami party from Iran and backed Hikmatyar …”  Apparently, “there was no organized group among the Shi’is that could adequately serve as an appropriate representative of their position.”  The first such party was Saazmaan-i Nasr Islami-ye Afghanistan.

 

Harakat I: Mohsini is their leader.  Khowi is helper.  Jawed is assistant to Muhsini.  S. Hasan i Faazil (is a prominent mullah), Aghay Haadi is a prominent Commander from Behsud (has wealth and land).

This party has former maoists, and former dawlati [govt] also.  Dr. Shah Jahan in Ghazni is set up against the government (positions?).  sent 2 cars to Anwar at Sanglaakh.  There was crisis among their spies in Kabul. Some one squealed and pointed out 70 of their people, were caught.  This created a crisis.  People from the party gathered in Peshawar.  Some wanted to disown (and punish?) the person who revealed the names.  Another group protected him.  Eventually there was no decision.

 

— The strongest Shiite party is Harakat Islami of Muhsini, who is close to J-I.  effective underground in Kabul.

 

== People expressed their separation from Iran by following anyother ayatullah: Khoyi.

 

== Abdul Wahid of Inst of Hazara studies in Q.:  The leader of the Harakat‑i Islami party is Sayyed Abul Qasim‑i Khoyi, who resides in Iraq, but is Iranian.  I said that he must therefore be against Khomaini, but he said no, that he just was distant, didn’t approve or disapprove of Khomaini.  he said the party that was dependent on Khomaini was the Nasr party.  The said the Pasdaran‑i … party was just a group of people that the Iranians put together, they were a few mullahs and some straggling Afghans whom they gave guns to.

 

==  Harakat seems to be loosely overganized; their commanders not always taking the same sides.

 

== There appears to be some division among the Harakat people (generally under the command of Ansari) in Kabul.

 

begun 1358 (79) in Kandahar

 

 

Saazmaan‑i Nasr (“Organization of Victory”).  Founded in 1356 or 57.  Was initially called Na’zat‑i Hosayni.  Has a central committee made up of representatives from different places.  Most notable figure is Sheykh Abdul Karim Khalili (from Qul‑i Khesh of Behsud), who is spokesman for the eight party alliance.  Other prominent leaders are: Sheykh Mir Hosayn Saadiqi (from Turughman), Azizullah Shafiz (from Behsud), Abdul Ali Mazaari (from Dara‑i Suf), Naatiqi (from Waras), Rahimi (from Khujmiri of Ghazni), Shaykh Qurbaan Irfaani (from Yak Awlang).  formed in 1356 or 55.

> Saazmaan-i Nasr-i Islami-ye Afghaanistaan.  DE1986:226: “composed primarily of young, ideolgoically committed fundamtentalists.”  These include former deputy of Ayatually Bihishti named Sadiqi, and Mazari, “who is reported to have spent time in an Iranian prison with the current president of Iran, Hujjat al-Islam Ali Khamene’i.  This party has been accused of attacking other parties [DE1986:226].  “gradually increased its influence in the [Hazarajat], in part through superior organization but largely because of the financial and logistical backing received from Iran. … accomplished in the face of opposition from the Hazara people in general and the Shura in particualr…”  “…managed to strike a decisive blow against the Shura in the summer of 10984, when it forced Ayatullah Bihishti to flee his headquarters in Waras.”  [227]: ..main opposition has come [more recently] … from another Iranian product, Sipah-i Pasdaran.”

>  Sazman-e-Nasr-e-Islami was ideologically motivated Shiites funded by Iran

== Nasr (and the Iranian parties?) entered in two ways; 1. It is common for Hazaras to go for a year to work (study?) in Iran, so when they come back they have Iranian contacts and they say good things about Iran; 2. the mullahs from there get money from Iran which they distributed

== people were happy with Iran (their success against the west?) and they supported Iran.

     Saazmaan-i Nasr

>First order leaders of this party, the Central Committee:  Shaykh Mir Hosayn Saadiqi (from Turughman), Azizullah Shafaq (Besud), Abdul Ali Mazaari (Dare Suf), Naafiqi (Waras), Hakimi (Ghazni- Khujmiri), Rahimi (Saryaabi-Ghazni), Shaykh Abdul Karim, Khalili (Behsud- Qul-i Kheysh), Shekh Qurbaan Irfaani (Yak Awlang).

>Second order leaders: in Behsud, Shora-i Wulayat, 3 people; in Ghazni, 1 imp person (a commander); in Jaghori-Qarabaagh, 1 person (This commander took 4 Arabs from a fight between Nasr and HzbIslami after HzbIslami wrecked 700 houses.  He is keeping the Arabs prisoners until the weapons are paid for.  This has disturbed HzbI. Sayyaf has gotten into it, also Saudi Arabia.  The fight took place in Qarabaagh); in Turughman, 2 people (in some places there are shoras, in others commanders; Bamian, commanders are weak, subservient to Yak Awlang or Behsud; Yak Awlang, 3 men; DehZangi ??.

>(my own comment: nb how the rural has come to dominate the “urban” of Bamian.  Bamian has historically been easily held by the government, perhaps because it was (then) on the main road.  Now it is further off, and it has been the first provincial headquarters overtaken by the opposition.  It can be viewed as a tension b/n rural and urban influences, and so far the people from neighboring areas have been able to muster the strength of opposition to dominate Bamian.))

 

> Sipah-i Pasdaaraan.  DE1986:227:  ” … was initiated in 1982 because of Iranian dissatisfaction with Nasir.”  This is “an Afghan contingent” of the semi-military organization by the same name in Iran, “using mostly Afghan personnel but operating directly under the command of the Iranians”.  Sipah-e-Pasdaran, same organiaation as the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Party.

Paasdaaraan-i Jehad-i Islami (Sepaa)

Started 1361-2, January.  Three important men: Akbari and his son from Waras; Sheykh Qurbani Muhaqiq from Turughman (he was a rival of Saadiqi of Nasr in Turughman); Zaidi from Ghazni.

Paasdaaraan‑i Jehaad‑i Islami [also called “Sapaa“] (“Guardians of Islamic Holy War”).  Founded in Iran in 1361 (January, 1982).  Three important men:  Akbari and his son (from Waras), Shaykh Qurbaani Mushaqiq (from Turughman), Zaidi (from Ghazni).

Iran supported groups by 1360/1982.  These become:  Paasdaaraan-e Jehaad-e Islaami; (they are under the influence of the administration of Iran); they receive further influences [clients? members?] from Harakat-i Islaami and Shoraay- Enqelaab-e Etefaaq-e Islaami-ye Afghaanistaan

 

     The smaller parties (most of them founded in 1358 (1979).

 

Na’zat‑i Islami Afghaanistaan (“Islamic Movement of Afghanistan”).  Leaders are from Jaaghori; most notable one is Iftikhaari, also (a representative in Peshawar) Rahimi.

Nahzat‑i Islami Afghaanistaan (“Islamic Movement of Afghanistan”); started in 1358.

> All leaders are from Jaghori: one imp leader, Iftikhaari; one rep in Peshawar, Rahimi.

 

Nerui‑yi Islam‑i Afghaanistaan (“Islamic Force of Afghanistan”).  Prominent leaders are: Sayyed Zaaher‑i Muhaqiq and his son Sayyed Hosayn Muhaqiq (from Behsud), and Hashemi (from Sang Charak in Jowzjaan).  Nairo was another [Shiite?] organiation that was considered “very successful” quoted from Haqshinas 1986, p36 on HK 273.  Haqshinas, N.  1985.  Russia’s Intrigues and Crimes in Afghanistn.  [Dari].  Cultural Committee, The Islamic Association of Afghanistan.  Tehran.  But Iran was not pleased they could get control of hazaras, the Shiites, and set up an umbrella organization, Nasr, which they supported until 1982, but gave up on it when found out they had no real control of Afghan Shiites.  so set up another party.

Neru‑i Islam‑i Afghaanistaan (“Islamic Force of Afghanistan”)

> These are Amini’s relatives.  from Behsud.  S. Zae-i Muhaqiq and his son S. Hosayni Muhaqiq; Hashem (from Sang Charak in Jowzjan Shibarghan (??Behsud?);

 

Da’wat‑i Ittehaad‑i Islami‑ye Afghaanistaan (“Invitation to the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan”).  Only strength is in Angora, Ghazni province.

 

Hizb‑i Islami‑ye Ra’d‑i Afghaanistaan (“Party of Islamic Thunder of Afghanistan”).  Leader is Qari Ahmad, also known as Qari Yakdista.

 

Jabhaa‑i Mujtahed-i Enqelaab-i Islami Afghanistan (“United Mujahedin Front”).  This is a party formed last year from four very small parties, all of which had formed in 1358 or 1359 (1978 or 1979).  These were the following:

Ruhaaniyat wa Jawaanaan‑i Afghanistan (“The Spirituality and Youth of Afghanistan”).

Islam Maktab‑i Tawhid (“Islam, School of Unity”).

Itehaad‑i Ulamaa (“Union of Islamic scholars”).

Jambesh‑i Mustazafin‑i Islami‑ye Afghanistan (“Association of the Islamic Oppressed of Afghanistan”).

     Fedaayaan-i Islam (“Zealots [??] for Islam”)

 

== The Shiite parties have formed the following united party:  now [1989] called Shoraa‑i Itilaafi‑ Musulmani‑ye Afghanistan, founded about a year ago at about the time of the Geneva accords:

Harakat‑i Islami, Saazmaan-i Nasr, Paasdaaraan-i Jehaad-i Islami (“Sepaa”):

== The groups that worked together were Harakat, and Shura and ???; later Nasr entered.

 

Shi’ite Groups as of 1357-8/1979-80

> Shoraay- Enqelaab-e Etefaaq-e Islaami-ye Afghaanistaan (“Council of the Islamic Revolutionary Alliance”)  DE1986:223:  “comprised mostly sayyids, tribal chiefs, and anumber of nationally prominent Hazaras, including some former parliamentary represeantaives, all of whom began assembling in Waras from throughout the Hazarajat in June 1979.  Of these component groups, the nonreligious elements intially dominated the council.  However, within a short period of time, leadership of the Shura was taken over by the sayyid contingent, and one of their number, Ayatullah Bihishiti, who had been educated in iraq, was chosen as the president of the council.  Bhishti’s deputy (Ayatullah Husain Nasiri) and chief military commander are also sayyids,  … [meaning Sayyid Muhammad Hasan jagran, one of the leaders of the popular uprising in Ghazni …”  DE1986:228: “The Shura, the political assembly that was set up to coordinate resistance activities in 1979, was controlled by traditional religous and secular leaders and probably had more in common with the Hazara coalition that opposed ‘Abdu al-Rahman than with any fo the political parties that emerged in the 1960s.”  DE86:229:  “From the perspective of Iran and her Afghan proxies, this may represent the last stirrings of a corrupt band of sayyids with vested interest in maintaining their authority over the illiterate Hazara peasantry.  To the majortiy of Hazaras, hwoever, the radical ideology emanating frmo Iran represents a dangerous innovation …”

 

Shoraay- Enqelaab-e Etefaaq-e Islaami-ye Afghaanistaan [some support from Pakistan; but they lost their support from Iran fairly early.]

 

== The Hazaras rose up in Saur (spring) of 58 (in the winter of 58 the Russians invaded; :: 58 is probably 1980??).  They gathered in Waras.  took Waras then took Yak Awlang.  then went to Bamian, by the end of Saur were in Bamian.  They took it and held it for about 5 days.  Leader was Sayyed Lamalam from Yak Awlang, from another family of Sayyeds near Yak Awolang, (not same as Agha RAis).  And Chaman Ali, a teacher from Yak Awlang, was his assistant.  But many were killed in Bamian.  The government bombarded them and they had poor weapons and didn’t know about what planes could do.

 

== Then many people rose up against the governemnt.

 

== The Hazaras rose up in Saur (spring) of 58 (in the winter of 58 the Russians invaded; :: 58 is probably 1980??).  They gathered in Waras.  took Waras then took Yak Awlang.  then went to Bamian, by the end of Saur were in Bamian.  They took it and held it for about 5 days.  Leader was Sayyed Lamalam from Yak Awlang, from another family of Sayyeds near Yak Awolang, (not same as Agha RAis).  And Chaman Ali, a teacher from Yak Awlang, was his assistant.  But many were killed in Bamian.  The government bombarded them and they had poor weapons and didn’t know about what planes could do.

 

== Then many people rose up against the governemnt.

 

The Shi’ite party that has fought bitterly against the Iranian based parties is:

Shoraa‑i Enqelaab‑i Itefaaq‑i Islami (“Council of the Islamic Revolutionary Alliance”).  Founded in 1357 (1978) in Waras, Bamian, Hazarajat.  [Amini said Jan,79].  Was founded by some mullahs, some arbabs, some intellectuals/teachers.  Later the mullahs took over because Iran mullahs took over there.  The people agaist Iran opposed them.  They prepared tashkilaat, in which divided the Hazarajat into 7 wulayats: each with one wali, one qazi, one shaharwaal [mayor].  It was strong then.  They announced that everyone should have a gun, every two families one rifle.  One year later, the took the rifles from the people for the “army”.  Told them they couldn’t keep books by Shariati [because he was against mullahs, was a socialist and opposed fundamentalism.]  New groups came into the Hazarajt then, in 1360 [+/-1982].  Iran asked if the Shura followed Iran.  Behisti claimed he was the leader in Afghanistan like Khomeini.  Iran sent people into Afghn to take it for Iran.  1361 [approx. 1983] they started fighting.  Two years later [1985?] the shura was very weak.  Most prominent leader: Sayyed Behishti.  (A recent attempt at rapprochement with Iran by one leader was repudiated by other members of the party.)  Book by Ralhp Bindemann in German, a 7 year study of the Hazarajat [Mullah Gharjistani had it in Quetta].

     Shoraa-i Enqelaabi-i Itefaaq-i Islami

Formed by the Arbaabs in the end of the year 1357, Jan 79.  There was a large mtg in Waras, made up of mullahs, arbaabs, intellectuals (teachers).  Later the mullahs took over because in Iran the mullahs had taken over (or, I’m not sure which: because the mullahs had taken over the Iran-based parties).  Those against Iran opposed them, as they mimed Iran.  There was a Tashkilaat (division) of territories.  Divided the Hazarajat into 7 wulayats in which there was one wali, one Qaazi, one sharwaal (mayor).  It was strong then.  Announced that everyone should have a weapon.  Every two families should have at least one rifle.  One year later they took all the rifles away from the people for the “army”; told them they couldn’t keep books by Shariati (because he was against the mullahs, and a socialist and opposed fundamentalism).  New groups came into existence in the Hazarajat then.  In 1360 Iran asked if Shora party followed Iran. Behishti claimed he was the leader in Afghanistan in the same way that Khomeini was leader of Iran.  Iran sent people into Af. to take it for Iran.  In 1361 they started fighting; two years later Shora was very weak.

 

== The Kochis in the spirng of 1979 seem to have worried about coming into the Hazarajat.  They approached S. Behishti and asked permission to go in , as they have since the 1880s, and he refused, He was of course leading the mobilizaiton of Hazarajat as part of the Shory Itelfaqi Islami.

== Dilawar himself paid a visit on S. Behishti.  He said he is incapable of leading a party, has no political awareness. is a mully only.  a pir to some people.  He is from Waras.

== Dilawar was ready to disimulate and tell him he was Shiite, but Behishti didn’t ask.

 

== Behishti has in the last 2 weeks gone over to the government(!).  This was announced by Amin Wardak who has been Behishti’s protector in the Hazarajat.  When Behishti needed help against the Nasr and Sepasdaran people he got it from Wardak, and so Wardak’s announcement comes from his most loyal defender.  It is therefore true, the Frenchmen believe.

 

== Hosaini and M. Amin Amini:  Early in the war the main party was Shura‑Ittifaq.  When they became weak some people went to Harakat‑Islami; they helped the Shura (vs Nasr?).

 

conversation with Hosaini and M. Amini.

== The Shura‑ittefaq party has made a deal with the government in Ghazni to get arms.  Hosaini’s friend was present when they signed with Kishtmand (the Hazara second in command in Kabul government) for arms.  They had to make this deal, they felt, because Khomeini had promised to give the other 8 parties about 70,000 weapons and some money to keep fighting.  These groups have been fighting with the Shora, so they had to get help somewhere and they don’t care where.  In fact, also Maadani of the office here has gone to Tehran (on same place with Rabboni) to get arms from Iran.  Of course, they lie on both ends, he said.  Evidence that Shora is actually supporting the government is that they have fired some rounds into the positions of the Mustazafin.

 

== The Shura‑Ittefaq party has been for some time getting arms from a Hazara official (general?) in Ghazni.  However, Sayed Jadran appeared on BBC radio last night to deny that they have joined the government.  Howver, the commanders in the area are unsure how Sura will behave in the planned attack on Ghazni.  They are not sure whether Shura will hang back, join them, or help the government in the battle.  This is their main worry in the attack.

 

United groups of Shi’a in 1989:

== In Iran the leadership of the 8 parties has rotated and the head of Pasdaran is now spokesman.  The former leader, from Nasr, was easier to deal with.  That could spell more trouble in Teheran for Rabani and his people in trying to bring the Iranian supported parties into the government.

 

> Another party emerges [sources unspecified]:  Jumbesh-i Muqaawamat-i Afghanistan

 

> A party supporting Hazaras with support from Pakistan:  Ittihadi-ye Mujahidin-e Islami-ye Afghanistan [ Union of islamic Mujahedin of Afghanistan] led by Abdul Husain Maqsudi [DE1986:225]

 

>  Other parties the Shiites set up:  the Party of God, some connected to Mujahedin-i-Khalq.

 

The Mustazafin Group as of 1357/1979

 

> Saazmaan-i Mujahedin-i Khalq-i Afghanistan

 

== Mustazafin:  They said the party was started by Eng. Hashemi when he was a student at the U. of Kabul (in the early years of Taraki or before?); he is from Ghazni.  They don’t have another center, no connection with Iran.

 

== The Mustazafin are not well regarded, have fought with Harakat‑i Islami.  People have distrusted them; I said I thought they were all from outside Bamian, but he said he felt sure there would be some from Bamian because otherwise the people would not let them be there.  He believed their headquarters was in France; they are really run by non‑believers, he thought.

 

== There is a Qizilbash [Mustazafin?] community in Sheshpul, have moved in from Kabul and set up shops and trying to be active in the area.  Now are serving as the rps of the Ismailis in Kalu to PS, are young, graduatesof Engineering school, not Isms but serve the PS work.  :: need to distinguish Ism peasants from the education and progressive Ismailis, many of whom are now in govt. [1985]

 

Paul Ikx:

== The mustazafin were started in Kabul University, were largely Qizilbash, were like 2 other Shia groups Sittam‑i Milli (from Badakhshan) and Sholey Jawed (Hazara)  They have changed a lot, were formerly aligned with Mujahedin‑i Khalq of Iran but now not aligned with them.  Have taken on some new qualities.  They have a large number of Hazaras now.

 

== In Bamian they have been influential even though numerically small.  It was a mustazafin commander who coordinated the attack on Bamian Markaz.  Also, he says they continue to be influential, even though weak and small.

 

== the mustazafin are accused of being maoist.  They also sound maoist to Fredrick.  They don’t want major industrial development but local industrial development.  They in other ways use the terminology of the maoists..  They also deny any connection with the Mujahedin‑i Khalq of Iran.  they believe the industry should be locally based, not large industry.

 

Re: mustazafarin:

== People say they are Khalqi, Parchami and Maoist because they are educated.  Most of them are educated, and so they were distrusted by the people for a while.

 

— Saazmaan-i Mujaahedin-i Mustazafin-i Afghanistan.  “Organization of the Oppressed Holy Warriors of Afghanistan.”  A small group, mostly Shiite, iwth a secular bias; members are from various places in Ghazni and the eastern Hazarat but working mainly in Bamian; formerly connected with the anti-Khomeini Mujahedin-i Khalq part of Iran, but now separate.  Led by a council.  Principle representative is Sayyed Hosayni of Jalrez. [this was done for MEJ]

 

Another party with a strong Shi`ite background:

Saazmaan‑i mujaahedin‑i mustazafin‑i Afghaanistaan (Organization of holy warriors for the oppressed of Afghanistan”).  A small group, mostly Shi`ite, with a secular orientation; members are from various places in Ghazni province and the eastern Hazarajat, working mainly in Bamian.  They were formerly connected with the anti‑Khomeini Mujahedin‑i Khalq party of Iran, but now separate.  Led by a council.  Principle representative in Peshawar is Sayyed Hosayni of Jalrez.

 

1360/1982

 

Mustazafin as of 1360/1982

> Saazmaan-i Mujahedin-i Khalq-i Afghanistan becomes Saazmaan-i Mujahedin-i Mustazafin-i Afghanistan

 

Remaining comments on the Shiite parties/groups

== The Shiite parties are the following.  Now called Shoraa‑i Itilaafi‑ Musulmani‑ye Afghanistan, founded about ayear ago at about the time of the Geneva accords:

–Recently, about the time of the Geneva accords, the parties affiliated with iran formed an alliance called Shoraayi-Itilaaf-i Musulmaan-i Afghanistan

 

== The Shiite parties are the following.  Now called Shoraa‑i Itilaafi‑ Musulmani‑ye Afghanistan, founded about ayear ago at about the time of the Geneva accords:

 

== In Iran the leadership of the 8 parties has rotated and the head of Pasdaran is now spokesman.  The former leader, from Nasr, was easier to deal with.  That could spell more trouble in Teheran for Rabani and his people in trying to bring the Iranian supported parties into the government.

Ismailis

 

When the communists came in they saw him [S. Kayan] as a feudal lord and wanted to destroy him.  Shi and Sunnis saw them as Kafirs.  But Sayyed i Kayan tried to keep going with both sides, the government and the mujahedin.  Several times the commanders of Harakat-i Islami attacked Kayan.  Because Sayyed i Kayan was weak and the government wanted his support they offered him arms.  Now Sayyed i Kayan gives them money to allow the mujahedin to get through and and to be accepting of each other.

 

== In Taraki’s time they imprisoned the son of Sayyed Kayan (Sayyed Mansur Nadiri, not Sayyed Manucher who was his enemy).  In jail he agreed to help and work with the government.  They killed several (5 or 6) of his family in jail.  then he agreed and was let out.  The government built mosques for them in Kabul, so the Isms were happy with the government, at least they became betaraf.

 

Dilawar Khan:, 25JUN89

The Ismailis of Shibar early in the war against the government had formed a fighting group that fought well in Bamian and some were killed against the government.  They lost some at Shahari Gholghola.  They fought in shesh Pul and at the Markaz.

— But the Kabul regime captured the sons of Sayyed-i kayan and killed a number of them.  Only the oldest, S. Naasir Naderi (Shah Saheb) and S.  Mansur (Khan Agha), these two capitulated to the government.  When htey got out S. Nasir fled and went to WEurope.  Now lives in London.  S. Mansur then took over the leadership fo the Ismailis.  His strength is in the north, Shibarghan, Doshi, Kayan.  But because he supported the government it created a problem for the Ismailis of Shibar.  He sent Khad agents to kill Nur Ahmand [leader of the Ismaili resistance group in Shibar].  also Mir Mir Ahmad was killed in Kabul by Khad agents.  The killer was from Iraq, a reltiave.  The son of MMA is still living in Iraq.  But one son was killed with him.  Then when the news was out that the Ismailis supported the government the Harakat-i Islami attacked Shibar and disarmed the Ismailis.  ten of them were killed and 1 of the Harakat-i Islami was killed.  When they came into the valley someone beat up Mir Gholam Hasan, hit him with the but of a rifle, wanted him as rish safed to tel where the guns were. // so the Ismailis suffered a lot becuase of S. Mansur’s joining of the government.  Dilawar is very much against S. Mansur.  When S. Nasir [Mansur?] Naderi went to see the Agha Khan in Paris the Agha Khan refused to see him because he had agreed to support the government.  And when Dilwar was in Karachi he saw a wakil of the Agha Khan and asked if there was amukki in Afghn he said no, that S. Mansur was not a mukki.  But the Ismailis of Afhgnaistaqn suppose that Mansur is the mukki.  In the mean time the onld rival, S. Manucher, who is a Bache Kaka to S. Mansur and who was trying to get recognized as the pir, now has lost almost everything.  s. Mansur has taken his land and his house[s].

 

The Ismaili experience was unique in the Afghanistan war, for they played, as they often have in the past, an intermediate role in public affairs, particularly in the regions where they had secure dominance.  The Shah Saheb, beaten in prison, and brother killed.  Shah Saheb fled to Europe.  Younger brother took over .  The intermediate roll the Ismailis played:  supported by the government, becoming the head of government militia in the north, but at the same time passing information to Masud, to help him in his resistance activities.  During the course of the war, therefore, Sayyed ??? has led the Ismailis and effected their relations to the government and the resistance groups.  However, there is a dispute among some of the Ismailis whether he is a properly appointed mukki [define???].

 

== Sayyed Manucher has followers in Iraq and Turughman.  One of his followers works in the office of Prince Sadruddin.

 

== there are in Kalu Harakat Islami, Nasr, Shora; and the Ismailis are for whoever is the strongest; because they are weakest in the whole area (although not weakest in their own area).

 

Conversation with Dilawar Azimi from Pushti Mazar of Shumbul at our house, July 8, 1989

==The Mir for Pushti Mazar before MGH was, be believes, Sohbat.  Then there was MGH.  Then still in the time of Zaher Shah a man came from Kabul, Sultan Ali, who wanted to do miri.  He was in Shumbul (Shibar?) for a time, but did not succeed to become mir.  Then another man from Pushti Mazar rose up to be mir.  But the people wanted him instead of MGH. they couldn’t go to himn directly because he would be mad, so they went o Kahn Afgha in Kayan (he was acting Pir then?) and he arranged for the change.

== Recently the father of Sultan Ali has become the rep of Harakat-i Islami.  He collects $ (and I think a tax of the crops?) for Harakat i Islami and pays it to the commander of the Shibar front.  ((NB. he must be an Ismaili working for the Harakat-i Islami after the region was taken over by HrktIslmi))

== S. Mansur of Turughman, who had allied himself w Sayyed Manucher, the old man who objected to the Pir of Kayyan and wanted to be his heir instead of Shah Saheb, Nasir[?] Naderi.  But eventually S. Mansur became the mukki of Turughman.  The usual situation is that there is a mukki for every jamaat Khana, and apparently S. Mansur built one in Turughman, and became mukki there.  But S. Mansur was picked up and jailed by Taraki’s governemnt, along with the sons of S.i Kayyan.  And as several of those sons were killed, so also was S. Mansur (apparently S. Manucher the rival of the PirSaheb was not picked up).  Anyway, the older sons of S i Kayyan, Shah Saheb and Khaan Agha were terrorized into capitulating to Kabul’s side and were released.

When Dilawar asked the Wakil of the Aga Khan, he said there is now no mukki in Afghanistan.  Dilawar wants to bring a group of elders to Karachi to hear this themselves, because no one will believe him if he tries to tell them.

== The people decided to support S. Mnsur of Turughman because they began to feel that S. Kayyan was not watching out for the people.  There was some disappointment with the S. Kayan )after the old man died? and therefore with his sons, who were more worldly?)  So this is how S. Mansur got the right to be mukki in Turughman.

— Prince Karim is the 49th Imam from Ali

 

— the Ismailis from Badakhshan support the resistance, but Kaynis support the government.

–Bruce Wannell:  soon after he left [in 1987?] the Ismilis got in a fight with the others and were disarmed.  Commander of Abbas from Dar-e Abbas [above Shumbul] was an Ism commander trying to organize a party to control the pass, on behalf of S. Kayan.  In a big fight the Ismailis were disarmed.  Fight occurred in Iraq.  Bruce was in shekh Ali at the time.  there wasw a major Sayyed brouth in to mediate between the Eastern Shekh Ali who were Sunni and the westerh Shekh ali who were Shii. [boy from BandiAmir said there were few Ismailis in Shekh Ali.

— Shah-iZohak is inhabited by people from PayMuri.

 

Maruf:  A friend of his in Baghlan, Amir Raoof, has accepted arms from Sayyed-i Kayan.  Sayyed it Kayan is head of all Militia forces for Kabul in norther.  Raoof has accepted arms from government, but has fought for 10 years against it.  he is head of HizbIslami forces in Baghland

Maruf:  People don’t like the parties.  they resent them, and the party leaders know that, he says.  He said 6-9 months ago [i.e. mid 1988] some commanders wrote to Hikmatyar stating their objections to him and what he was doing.  They openly and directly critcized him.

 

==Sayyed‑i Kayyan has been aligned with the opposition sides, trying to identify with the stongest side.  He was a liason with the govt on behalf of mas’ud.  but now that Najib and has become stronger has aligned with Najib and attacked Jamiat‑iIslami.

 

2/24/89.  In Juma bazar, Islamabad, antique seller from Bamian:  A lot of fighting among the Isms in Shibar 2 years ago [1985?].  They were with Najib’s govt and the Imamis.  In fight PS had moved tanks, etc. into Shibar.  hewas at that time for Najibullah.  After that the Ism’s stoppoed supporting him [Najib?]  Now the Isms have left Shibar; scattered, but most have gone to karachi.

 

Puig: Oct 12, 1985

Leader of the resistance group in Barfak and further west is Mowlawi Malang, local leader under him is Baz M.  People of Barfack and Tala [mainly Ismaili] have long been at odds, recently [1982] they got together, agreed on a cease fire.  Last time they fought on the same side was against BacheSaqwow

— Sa. Manucher, who opposed th4e PS has few followers.  Owns territory in Dahan-i Ghori.  Now cooperates with Gailani and has close ties to Mujeddidi.

 

== Sultan Ali the man who tired to supplant him (from Birgilic?) is now in Kabul, is struggling against Sayyedi Kayan on behalf of S. Manucher.

 

— Sayyed Manucher has been abandoned by nearly everyone, is near death.

 

— Isms are not wit any party, cooperate with the governemnt, receive arms from Sviets.  SM/PS has good connections w/in govt.  Many Parchamis are Ismailis … Masud gets support from PS and followers.

== Ism of Kalu have left Kalu and moved into Iraq becaus ethey can be just out of range of the guns.

== There is a Qizilbash [Mustazafin?] community in Sheshput, have moved in from Kabul and set up shops and trying to be active in the area.  Now are serving as the rps of the Ismailis in Kalu to PS, are young, graduatesof Engineering school, not Isms but serve the PS work.  :: need to distinguish Ism peasants from the education and progressiv Ismailis, many of whom are now in govt. [1985] and Parchamis?

 

 

@1978-1989:  Informally organized and locally based relations in Afghanistan

 

Saur coup.  Quickly the Khalqis generated much resentment by their attempts to discredit local leaders, and by harsh treatment of dissenters.  Early revolts in Nuristan and Hazarajat.  DE1986:222:  “The nucleus of a political organization was established in the town of Waras in Bamiyan Province.”

 

> reactions to the coup in 1978 revealed a populace ready and eager for change, as the communists (although they were not yet known to be so at that time) were well received.

>  However, the communists generated opposition by the new policies, “reforms,” that they introduced, and by their brutal attempts to put down all dissent.  The acts of opposition grew around the country.

 

2.3  On the parties, see my Orbis p 68 -71, and my MEJ “Trajectory” p. 640 [The War and Scoial Transformation: -increased contacts, -political parties, rise of autonomous commanders, persistence of local rivalries.

 

Soviet invasion in December ’79 and Jan ’80

 

The Soviet invasion generated even broader and more intense opposition

 

> early on, the acts of opposition were uncoordinated, locally instigated.

 

The Jehad

 

>  HK208:  [I]n such times the non-combative Afghans including widows were (and are) willing to support those fighting the invaders.  Thus the defence of the country and the faith is not the sole responsibility of the armed forces but of every adult Afghan capable of carrying weapons as well.  In fact, every time the country has been invaded the regular armed forces have soon isintegrated and conversely the ranks fo the irregulars have been strengthened in a spirit of jehad.”

 

The Kabul revolt of 1980

 

HK78 [The Azans, i.e. Allow Akbar — god is great — was recited in Herdar and Kenderhar intensely before it reached Kabal and in February it began to be practiced in Kabal as a form of public decent, reciting through  the night.]  There is a discussion of what Kakar call the great uprising of Kabal.  It runs for several pages

 

HK82 Kakar says, ” No group of the protesters was organized. Only the column of Chinowill seemed so.  No well known person was seen among them.  The protesters. . .  were ordinary men.”

 

HK87 “The protesters apparently lacked a plan of action, although as noted rifles were reportedly smuggled into the city;  they were not seen to be used.”. . .”While  thousands of anonymous persons, who were carried away by their concerns for their values of religion in the face of atheism, and of their values of their fatherland in the face of the visible forces of occupation, went with empty hands so far as to sacrifice of their most vaulable possession, life.” . . . “The most conspicuous feature of the opposition was the participation of the Shi’as with their Sunni brothers.”

 

HK84 . . .”The Shi’ite comnunities of Qizilbashess, and Azars were conspicuous, dominating the columns of demonstrators . . .

 

1980:  popular reactions

But as the Soviet pressure increased people sought to organize, and in the process they made use of existing structures of coalition and cooperation:  tribal, local community, and notably Islamic coalitions.

[Not everyone joined the fray on the same side, of course; some elements of the population, for their own reasons, supported the communist government.]

 

1359/1981

>HK91 ” By July 1981 about twenty groups, fronts and regional unions were active inside Afghanistan.” [referring to resistance groups]. [Islamic radicalism] these groups constitute the backbone of the resistance movement, among these some are traditional while others are a novelty in composition, ideology and platforms.  The latter are fundamentalists and revolutionary.”

 

> Charliand, G.  1982.  Report from Afghanistan.  New York:  Viking. p47:  made two generalizations about the resistance movement:  “The first is that it is an extremely popular movement that has arison spontaneously among many different kinds of people with varying motives.  The second is that in its leadership organization, coordination, and strategy, the Afghan movement is one of the weakest liberation struggles in the world today.”

 

Popular coldness to the formal parties:  the alternative revolutionary council

HK f108-112:  Meetings led to Jirga held in Peshawar in early part of 1980, lasted until May 13.  Popularly supported, althought the party leaders did not support it and showed little interest.  The Jirga passed guidelines for waging the jehad, set up a Revolutionary Council, a kind of govt in exile, called for support by wealthy Afghans, banned revenge until end of the jehad, set up penalties for violation of their agreement.

HK111:  There were thus two revolutionary councils in spring, 1980.  The one organized by the parties were largely for an “ideological Islamic republic”, the one organized by the Jirga was for a “national, Islamic and, to a degree, a democratic republic”.  The Islamic Unity council branded the Jirga “another enemy of the sacred Islamic revolution of Afghanistan” [quote is from Choueiri, p111], a statement they would have to retract because of 6the popularity of the Jirga.  For several reasons it did not succeeded:  there was some division within the council, The Islamic Unity council opposed it, Pakistan did not want a fully unified resistance organization on its own soil, and there were powerful Pakistan supporters of Hikmatyar and his party.  (see HK pp111,112).  Other attempts at unity failed for identical or related reasons.

 

The alternative national council.  How well accepted these leaders were as representatives of the Afghanistan peoples was indicated in the formation of the national council in Peshawar, to which communities all over the country sent representatives.  (see Kakar).  Public support for these representatives was strong.  It was in effect a Loya Jirga.  However, the leaders of the resistance organizations paid little attention to it, only one of them attending the assembly.  Because the outside powers did not recognize this assembly and the resistance organization leaders attacked it and used their influence against it, it eventually was unable to function.

 

The failure of the alternative national council revealed how important is the role of outside support for perpetuation of the opposition organizations.  The selection and perpetuation of these opposition organizations was effected by the support of the Pakistan government and the U. S. government, eventually also by the Saudi Arabians, some of whom were not affiliated with the government.  Crucial in this relation was the Jammat i Islami of Pakistan, a political organization with Islamist objectives that despite its surriptitious methods and its small membership exerts a powerful influence on public affairs in Pakistan.

 

 

1. 1984

Qari Taj Muhammad (Qari Baba) in Ghazni, leader of a front.  Sultan Ali Kishtmand is a Hazara, Prime Minister in this period.

 

Intolerance among the mujahedin

June, 1989:  Dr. Aziz Ludin, econ. PhD. from Germany:  represents M. M. Nabi’s party.

— Wulusmal is the ed of paper in Norway.  close relative of Ulfat and a sympathizer.  After Ulfat was killed was picked up by Pak police and ccused of being a KGB agent. … because he sympathized with Ulfat the parties threatened him.  People read his paper with great interest, educated people prefer it, it is the only independent Afghan newspaper.

 

Maruf:  Nasim Ludin was a member of Millat Party, which broke off from Afghan Millat Party very early. These are small parties, have represtatives in Peshawar, but few people seem to know how to find them.

Maruf:  series of murders of intellectuals:  Dr. Nasim Lodin; last year B. Majruh; the before than Senator Gharwaal a former member of parliament was killed in Islamabad;  and the year before that it was Azizul Rahman Ulfat.

 

Shibar during the war

 

==The Shias in Shibar are mostly (all?) with Shora; those in Foladi are mostly Harakat‑i Islami.

 

== there was a time when MGH was put in jail.  Apparently in 1978 there was an uprising in Sumbul and they took over the Alaqadaari. They held Shibar autonomouusly for 7 months but in the early 1979 (this would have been early spring?, which means the original uprising would have been in Sept, no later than Oct.) that is March? the govt came in force from Ghorband (via Shibar) and retook the place.  They put the mirs and promentn people in prison, and among them was MGH.  They kep him for about 5 months, released him because he was old, and they decided he didn’t have much power.

== Mir Ali Dad was injured in a gilkaana and later got tetanous and did.  But before that MGH was glad that Mir Ali Dad took over the miri job before him.

== Sultan Ali the man who tired to supplant him (from Birgilic?) is now in Kabul, is struggling against Sayyedi Kayan on behalf of S. Manucher.

 

Conversation with Dilawar Azimi from Pushti Mazar of Shumbul at our house, July 8, 1989

==The Mir for Pushti Mazar before MGH was, be believes, Sohbat.  Then there was MGH.  Then still in the time of Zaher Shah a man came from Kabul, Sultan Ali, who wanted to do miri.  He was in Shumbul (Shibar?) for a time, but did not succeed to become mir.  Then another man from Pushti Mazar rose up to be mir.  But the people wanted him instead of MGH. they couldn’t go to himn directly because he would be mad, so they went o Kahn Afgha in Kayan (he was acting Pir then?) and he arranged for the change.

== Recently the father of Sultan Ali has become the rep of Harakat-i Islami.  He collects $ (and I think a tax of the crops?) for Harakat i Islami and pays it to the commander of the Shibar front.  ((NB. he must be an Ismaili working for the Harakat-i Islami after the region was taken over by HrktIslmi))

 

== Mir Ahmad Jan was executed by Hafizullah Amin in the time when the govt repressed Shibar. MAJ was taken w the other leaders of Shibar, then executed.

 

== Malik Rajab from Kalu says that Mir Mir Ahmad was killed in Kabul last year by a young man from his own kinsmen.  He was a member of Khad but his reasons appear to be personal.  No one seemed to know the reason.  The young man is now in prison for that.  It would appear, then, that he, an Ismaili, was cooperating with the government.

== Mir Ahmad Jan, he said, had worked for Hafizullah Amin and when he went down MAJ disappeared ‑‑ he didn’t seem to care what happened to him, and didn’t want to say he was killed.

 

== Hazaras:  books on the Hazaras

There is a book, Gurup Survey-i Khorasan, in Persian and English.

There is a book by Ralph Bindemann who spent several years in the Hazarajat, about the political groups in the Hazarjat.  Guruphaa-i Siyasi-i Hazarajat.  Mullah Isaa Gharjistani had it in Quetta.

 

On the popular zeal for Islam and abhorrence of alien influences

HK 202:  It wAS … the Soviet invasion and the policies of the new rulers that drastically changed the attitude of the pwople … their attitude not only toward them but also toward modern education as well as local poltiical leadership underwent change.  HK202. quote from Alam, Zahir Ghazi.  nd.  The Memoirs of Jehad 1979-1985.  ms. in Pashto. p. 146 [translated in Kakar’s book on p202:  “But the Soviet interference and finaly the Soviet invasion provided powerful incentives to the mullas in their opposition to modern education.  The Soviets … decieved studetns in schools, and in the name of a revolutionary ideology spread atheism, and sense of obedience to foreigners .. and of treason to the faterhland…  The educated elements became discredited in the society, and the mullas became unrivalled urlers.”  Alam, Zahir Ghazi.  nd.  The Jehad of Afghanistan:  Observations, Views and Evaluations.  ms. in Pashto.  this xslation in HK202:  “But, advised by a great mullah, the people of our valley opposed the two projects of schools and roads.  Thus neither Khalqis nor Parchamis appeared among us.  But from among the schools of outher valleys there emerfged Khalqis and Parchamis who later, as pilots, bomarded their own people and villages, while the Russian tanks which arrive along the roads, did much the same.  the the people of our valley were immunie from such destruction.  May God bless the great Mulla.  he was so right.”

 

HK203:  “The rise of communism, the Soviet invasion, the imposition of apuppet regime, and the mass killing of the people helped the mullahs and the Islamists to lead the resistance.  In themselves these would not have been sufficiet for them to emerge as leaders as the expense of traditional leaders had the new leaders not been part of the stronger jehad organizations, which in turn were supported in weapons, logistcs, and money by outside powers”.

 

BruceW9  In the area of Charney Horvan, he ran into check points manned by Shi’ites, where they had slogans such as “Whoever does not love Iyatollah Kohmani cannot have any real love for the Mahadeem.

 

— she said they are fighting a jehad against Kafirs, not merely Soviets but Kafirs.  they see little diff between We and Sov Union

 

2/27/89:  At office of Shura-i Ittefaq i Islami:  Cmmander: Uruzgan.  Pix of Behishti and one commander on the wall.  “He said now the Muslims are beiginning to say their prayers, and say Allaho Akbar.  They are beginning only now.  the Soviets are agsint everytyhing, against learning, culture, humanity, they are against God.  And this is the end of them because God is against them.  The Soviet Union is breaking up.  It will break up inot pieces, because they are against God. [quoted Hafiz here].”  he introduced others there, one was a mullah/leader from mashhad.

 

From Jill HOffman:  There was a threat to a [Afghan] nurse in the Afghan (OB/GYN) Hospital.  Someone told her family she should not be working, that a woman should be at home,  Unislamic to be outside the home.  She was frightened, but they thought it was not an Islamist part, but was frmo the family of a suitor, who wanted her to be more accessible or who wanted her to be kept from other possible suitors she might have met at work.

 

–Ayeen:  at one time GH party got a fetwa with 60 signatures, that elections are against Islam and democracy is against Islam.

 

— M [brother of Mahmud, who came from States] was struggling over not being able to participate in the Jehad.  he was rejected because westernized.  Arabs were trying to get journalists killed; someone said eventually the Arabs would be killed by the Afghans.

 

3/12/89:  Shah Mahmud:  believes parties have power inside the country, but mainly the fundamentalist parties;

 

— S.Mahmud believes peope inside the country are now all conservative Muslims.  Unless peole helped in the war they will be distrusted.  Most of the intellectuals have not helped, so little influence

 

‑‑ Islam is something no one can gainsay, so everyone claims to be Muslim.  If Kalakani were to be alive he would put on a lungi also !.

 

==Islamic images in the shora:

Each ballot had the pictures of the party leaders as well as their names and their was a circle under each, in two of which the voter was to put a stamp which said, “Allah‑o Akbar”. (!)

 

== mullah criticism of A-A’s beard:

… they want to influence the most personal things.  The man who was supposed, under the previous plan, to become the Minister of Information recently came to him to say that people talk about his beard (he has a gotee (sp?)).  He said, Well if you first talk to King Faisal then I’ll talk to you; he is, after all, the protector of the sacred places of Islam.  The other man replied, “But Faisal is a Wahhabi.  Some people regard him as hardly a human being.”  such is the mentality of the Islamists.

 

== Ken Decker pointed out that in the last few years Peshawar has become more conservative.  He pointed out that many of the walls in Unversity Town have been raised 2 or 3 feet in the last few years.

== He also said that in a discussion with a Pushtun he pointed out that something that Pushtuns were doing was not really Islamic.  The man answered that they would follow pushtunwali before Islam.

== This brought to mind some thoughts about Afghan Islam.  It is true that Afghans are mot likely to be happy with the Ikhwan and Wahabbis, and they will likely push them out eventually.  Still, they may have to keep them, in as much as the Saudis seem important to them.  But it is also not true that the Afghans are “moderate” about Islam.  They are likely to be little concerned about Islamic society as they understand it unless it is challenged by something else.  The Soviet invasion was an example.  The Afghanistan peoples are different from the peoples among whom the radical Islamist movements developed in that despite the disruptive invasions of non‑muslim socieites ‑‑ the British in the 19th c. and the Soviets in the 20th ‑‑ the Afghanistan society has been little threatened by outside western culture.  The Afghan peoples, unlike almost any Islamic people in the world, have never been under the direct colonial control of a non‑Muslim power.  They have always said they distrusted the British, and now they despise the Soviets, because of their invasions, but they have had the satisfaction that they have won against the non‑muslim invaders.  So the Islam that is in place among the Afghans is not likely to remain as strident as it has been in the last few years of war against the Soviet Union.  If the war really subsides and the AFghan society goes back to “normal” it is conceivable that the Afghan Islamic idiom will not be strident in the Ikhwan or Wahabbi form.  However, it has not been, and is not likely to be, tolerant of religious situations that are unfamiliar.  The Afghan mullahs drove out the Ahmadias in the time of Habibullah and they have never allowed an Afghan Chrisitian community to exist.  they are not likely to be more tolerant to such outlandish views in the future.

And that is the problem, because in fact the new situation is very likely to oblige the new Afghan society to deal with the diverse views that have been masqued by the war effort.  the only “cousin rivalry” problem is not the only thing likely to continue; the struggle over how to deal with the differences over Islamist and Moderate Islamic styles is likely to be complicated by the struggle over how to deal with the existence of a Christian community protected by the Marxist government, and a Afghan Chrisitan community that has grown up among the mujahadin.  What will become of the Islmailis, who have, some of them, sided with the government for protection against the Shia majority in their regions who have been opposing them?

 

 

On the political importance of mullahs in the resistance

 

The rising influence and power of mullahs

     Mullahs before 1950s-1960s

HK204:  mullas were drawn from the poorest elements… they lived away from their own in total dependenc eon the believers for a living.  … no tribal and social standing, they were disinclined, even, opposed, to social conventions, tribal codes and natioonalism.

     Majruh, S.B.  1988.  “Past and Present Education in Afghanistan”.  In:  The Tragedy of Afghanistan.  ed by Bo Huldt.  London:  Croom Helm. p. 79:  [quoted in HK204]:  the mulla “was not invoved in local sociopolitical affairs; he did not participate in the deliberations of the counsil of village elders — his only function … was to perform the opeing and the concluding prayers for the jirga session.  While respected, he still remained the favorite target of popular jokes.”

 

 

==a mullah’s protest about women in the Shura, Peshawar

One of the precipitating events that led to the collapse of the early proposal for a government (Ahmad Shah as head, etc.) was the discussion about a Ministry for Women’s Education.  It was proposed as part of a plan for 30 ministries, two others of which were also for education (Higher ed and Min for men’s education).  In the discussion about the proposed new government organization a mullah stood up and challenged the notion of a ministry for women.  He did not feel there should be a ministry for the women to be educated.  The furor that developed in response to this brought down the whole proposal.

 

Evidence of a continued conservative Islamic consciousness

The assertion quoted above by a prominent Afghan scholar that “neither the Hazrat nor any other individual religious personage or personages enjoy paramount influence among the people” was a fair statement of the situation among the urban educated middle class.  In the 1970s Islamic authorities still enjoyed a good deal of influence among the rural and less progressive people of the country.  They were prominent in the diverse, uncoordinated opposition movement that arose and gathered strength in the wake of the Marxist coup.  Islamic authorities  ‑‑ or their relatives or close associates ‑‑ headed many of the insurgent guerrilla groups.  The most notable of these were Sebghatullah Mujaddidi, the preeminent surviving member of the Hazrat family (after M. Ism`ail Mujaddidi was executed), who heads the ???? party, and Said Ahmad Gailani, who heads the NIFA ??? party.  There were others: Mowlawi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, Mowlawi Mohammad Yunus Khalis [from Khugianay tribe, from where a number of Afghan Millat came, see HK163], and Professor (of Islamic studies) Burhanuddin Rabbani.  These leaders have become relatively well‑known in the West through the news media.  The leaders of the Shi`a resistance groups are less well known to the West.  At one time all the most prominent leaders of the Shi`a were Islamic authorities.  Sayyed `Ali Behishti was the leader of the Shuray- Ittefaq-i Enqilabi, established in Waras, and Sayyed Hasan of Khawad was the leader of a force in Ghazni.  Sayyed Khan Aga ??, the brother of the leader of the Isma`ilis, leads a force in the Hindu Kush region.  Not all these leaders represent the conservative reactionary attitudes of previous generations, however.  But their eminence still derives in part from their special claims to authority on bases familiarly known and respected among the common people of Afghanistan: namely, their descent from a holy, sacred lineage, their superior learning, their great piety and supposed unity with the devine presence.  It is still true, even the present time, that such Islamic authorities receive deference and respect from the common people, and continue to exercise influence in Afghanistan society.  Whether for progressive reform or reactionary resistence, they have been among the prominent people to rise to positions of eminence and leadership.

 

HK 204  “The almost sudden rise of the mullahs to the postion of political and military leadership at the local level at least in Logar is wiethout parallel in modern Afghn history.  Of the 29 heads (awmer), Judges (qazis), and miliatry commanders (qomandan) as noted by Zahir Ghazi Alam in the Baraki Barak district (uluswali) of the Logar province all were mullas.  Of these 19 were members of the Islamic Revolutionary Organiaation (Harakat for short) and 6 of the Naitonal Islamic Front (Jabha or Mahaz(. The rmeaining four were members of the two Islamic Parties (Hizb) and Islamic Society (Jam’iyyat).  Alam also notes th there were, in adition, a number of other mullas and akhunds (traditiona teachers, masters) in the district who were “leaders of the jehad and rulers of the people.” [quote is from Memoirs of Jehad p.148]”

HK205:  [in Logar there were] “numerous mullas and … the leader of the Harakat, Mawlawi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, who was … a mawlawi and not an Islamist, was from the Baraki Barak district of Logar around whom the numerous traditonal mullas rallied.  However, as time passed by, the mulllas were challenged by the Islamists … who wer superior to them in organization, education and weapons.”  … “in the absence of local government there was competition for power among the jehad commanders … [even] commanders of the same organization.  In this competition personal rivalry and the desire for aggrandizement played a major part .  [Also]… the sociological composition fo the Islamist and traditionalist organizations, particularly of the Harakat and Hizb (… Gulbuddin Hikmatyar) tended to put their members at variance with each other.  The conservative and tradtional mullas were at variance wiyth members of the Hizb, who were drawn from among the Dari speaking [here he means, able to speak Dari and so articulate with the wider society, as well as speak Pashto] modern educated groups …  The mullas were traditionally at odds with such elements.  Inf act the mullas were against modernization. … in their view those who believed that the eart was round were ‘infidels’”. // “Thus, the effective threat to the mullas were the Islamists…”

HK 206:  on style of leadership.  The style of leadership of the traditional mullas was authoritarian.  Apparently they settled claims and conflicts sbetween individuals and groups in accordance with the Sharii’a, while the community elders, though weakened considerably, settled cases through mirgas and social convetions.  But generally speaking in Logar the mulla=commanders ruled … ruling as they pleased.”

HK 206:  [In Logar] people “whom they thought were collaborating with the enemy of the religion.  Such people they dubbed as infidels.  Once saman was dubbed s scuh seldom was he able to rmeain alive. … In Logar alone in two years following the invasion over one hundred persons may have been executed.  The excesses in the killing were bound to create discontent and the blief thne became general that the real motivating force for the executions [p.207] was revenge and personal animosity, camouflaged under the name of jehad.”

HK 279note 16:  It was only in Logar… such killing was common throughout the land.  Mawlawi Abd al-Hay [General commander of Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami in several northern provinces] said: ‘I again reiterate that if I order that 150 Khalqis be executed, they execution is permissible even though 50 among them be non-Khalqis’.”  from Jigturan, G. R. 1980.  Bitter Facts on the War in Afhganistan.  a ms in Dari.  Peshawar. p.37-39.

 

HK210:  [mullas also suppressed ] “customs, traditions, and soical conventions [and replaced them] by injuncitons of the Islamic Shari’a. … the suppression of the tradition of singing and dancing particularly in wedding and many other similar ceremonies; the suppression of a wide range of games and entertainment and racing events … the suppression of the customs of the recitation not only of lyric but alos of epic and mystic poetry from the classic poetic literature in whic the Afghans are quite rich, and their substitution by the recitaiton of passages from the holy Quran; the confinement in homes of rural women … and more seriously the substitution of community elders, that is, those who were the embodiment of traditiona and social wisdom, by scholars of religion and Shari’a. … Never was the Afghan national culture so much under pressure from the internationalist culture of communism and the universalist culture of Islam as now.”

 

HK211:  “What actually enabled the new religious leaders to set themselves over and above the locals and to act in an authoritatrian manner was their possession of weapons.”

 

HK161:  “… in the summer of 1979 some mawlawis … of the Islamic Revolutionary organization had effected the execution of a number of men from among the Zadran tribemen fro their alleged collaboration iwht the Khalqi regime.”  Presumably these were Jaji [“Zazay”] and Mangal, as “their estrangement from the Mawlawis … of the Islamic revolutionar organization who had effected their execution .. on the grounds that they had beocme renegade, and collaborated …”p.161-162.

 

== Dr. Azizulah Lodin.  pol advisor to Mowlawi Nabi, also to Gailani and Mujeddidi.  Aslo advisor to Muj as head of the interim govt’.  Because most of the party was mullahs they were suspicious of him and they believed the problems were caused by the Western educated people  They were clean shaven — that was a sign …  So he had a hard time. …

 

— Dr. A. Ludin:  When he came out of the country he asked for a stipend as an intellectual.  the mullahs that came out fo the country are given stipends, but he never got anything.  The $ for mullahs comes from Pakistan.

 

— Problem w Nabi is his support is unsophisticated, and must corruption around him.

 

 

 

5. 1989 to 1993 Soviet withdrawal and its aftermath

 

@1989 to 93:  Formal institutional conditions

 

Involvement of outside parties or outside governments in the resistance

 

== ISI reps were in the Shora, as well as Saudis

 

== The activity of the ISI complicated the situation in Khost.  The local tribesmen had decided to attack Khost recently.  In order to make it work they needed to have a deal with the Waziris who control the trade in and out of Khost.  The tribesmen’s deal was to prepare to attack and then try to negotiate a surrender.  They thought that with the help of the Waziri traders they would be able to work out a deal and there would be little bloodshed.  The deal was that each tribe was to assess each of the tribes a certain number of mujahedin to be involved in the conflict, and each commander was to go to his party to get the materials needed for the attack.  But the ISI got wind of it and proposed to the commanders that they simply come directly to them.  This sounded good to the commanders and so they accepted the materials from them.  However, the ISI was not impressed with the proposed timing of the attack ‑‑ they wanted to push things along and get it started sooner.  So they persuaded some commanders to attack sooner than had planned.  So when they attacked the tribesmen withdrew from the whole thing.  So now there is a smaller numer of people involved, and there is little hope of negotiating a surrender without the whole support of all the tribes.  The Khost affairs is therefore dragging on.

 

Libyan involvement

Tabibi is conduit of Lybian $ to GH.  But GH has lost support because has givne orders against the sentiments of his local leaders. … in thefield a growing disaffection …

 

Maley, William.  1993.  The Reconstitution of the Afghan State.  Afghanistan Info.  No33, April.  pp8-9.

1. 8: “Dostum’s claimed autonomy is merely a symptom of a much broader pehnomenon, namely that the retreat of a state to urban strongholds during the communist period strengthened already-strong local and regional leaderships, both personal or collective, many of which are uninterested in the reconstruction of instrumentalities of the state and wish mainly to be left along by Kabul.”

 

Maley 1993.  p.8-9.:  “… the events of the last fifteen years have produced a very substantial diffusion of the means of coercion through Afghan society … Afghan society is not merely fragmented; the various fragments are armed.”

 

p.9:  “The Afghan state has no real prospect of resuming such a monopoly for the foreseeable future, and even in the long run it will be able to do so only by fostering normative attachments between state and society, rather than attachments of prucdence alone.  Islam is potenitally a socurce of generalize normative attachment to the state, but htose who claim to rule in the name of Islam run the risk of provoking widfespread cynicism if their conduct manifestly departs from widely-accepted Islamic precepts …”

 

p.9:  “While Afghanistan has little to fear from its enemies, it has much to fear from its friends.”

 

@1989-93:  Informal and local sociopolitical conditions

A transformation in the popular outlook among the common people of the country seems to have been taking place in the period after the Soviet withdrawal.  There was at first great elation that the Soviets had finally withdrawn.  However, as the tensions and eventually fighting among the organizations that made up the Afghan Interim Government heated up greater numbers of people became disgusted with the organization leaders and eventually with Islamic authorities generally.  In 1993, after the destruction of Kabul by the fighting between the several organizations, reportedly, people are openly scornful of many Islamic authorities.  [Nancy Dupree on the attitude of women.]

 

1992+  The Collapse of institutions of administration

 

 

*********************

 

 

On the rise and tranformation of Islamism

 

Discussion of Islamist agenda and background

 

HK92 “The Islamic revivalist movement is composed of the views of the three thinkers of Muslem India, Indo-Pakistan, and Egypt. They’re Abu Hassan’ali Nadawi, Abuul A’la Mawdudi (1903-79), and Said Qutb (c. 1906-66) who composed thier main works in mid-century. . .  for their actualizations, the thinkers have made the seizure of state power their main goal.”

 

me:  The Islamist Ideology.

The solutions proposed by the Shi’ite leaders in the Iranian Revolution and the Sunni leaders of the Afghanistan mujahedin resistance arose from frames of reference already in place in the Islamic world view. The Islamists, the leading figures in the recent Islamic renewal, believe that previous attempts to apply Islamic ideas to modern contexts have missed the crucial intent of Islam; some Islamists charge progressive Muslims of being, in fact, inconsistent in their understanding of Islam and half‑hearted in their application of it.  The Islamist viewpoint ‑‑ at least in its Sunni form ‑‑ has been traced back to Shah Waliullah, an eighteenth century Delhi theologian (Roy 1985), and to Ibn‑Taymiyya, the early fourteenth century jurist of Damascus, both of whom draw heavily from the ideas of Ibn‑Hanbal (Dekmejian 1985).

The central themes of the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya and Shah Waliullah manifest the thrust of the Islamist critique.  Ibn‑Taymiyya stressed the comprehensiveness of the Islamic shari’a, which for him encompassed spiritual and rational truth as well as law.  He also rejected Sufi mysticism, and called for an awakening of civic involvement among the ‘ulema (Rahman  1979:111‑115; Hodgeson 1974, vol. 2:422). Shah Waliullah taught that there should be a complementary relationship between ruler and clergy in order for a proper Islamic society to develop. He believed that hadith (the traditional information about Muhammad’s personal sayings and acts) should be a central concern of Muslim scholarly study, and he criticized Islamic scholars for laxity in their application of Islamic law (Metcalf 1982: 39‑43). What Ibn‑Taymiyya and Shah Waliullah as well as other Islamic reformers share is their call for a return to original sources and to the original spirit and intent of the Islamic revelation, especially as it applies to civil and public affairs. The Islamic reformers were also similar in that they rose to prominence in times of cultural confusion (cf. Wallace 1956); their insistence on a return to first principles was a critique of the inconsistent and half‑hearted moral commitment of their times. Rahman (1979: 111) has said that movements calling for a return to Islamic first principles seem to reawaken in “recreated formations” which “issue from time to time from the very heart of Islam. They are characterized by an indistinguishable blend of reinvigorated fundamentalism and progressivism. . . and [it is] this very character [of Islam]. . . that signifies `orthodoxy’

. . .”

Here add Ibn Taymiyya’s opposition to Saint worship; what was Shah Walliullah’s view?

 

The twentieth century Islamist movement is such a “reinvigorated blend of fundamentalism and orthodoxy.”  Its diagnosis and cure for the problems of the modern Muslim world arose at first as a social critique by a small minority of dissenters in various parts of the Muslim world.  One of the most influential of this group, at least among the Sunnis, was Moulana Abul A’la Maududi of Pakistan (1903‑1979), who pressed for a more genuinely Islamic society based on the Qur’an. It was apparently he who first among the modern Islamists insisted on the distinction between a society that faithfully lives up to the standards of Islam (for him, the only proper Islamic society) and a society that does not, which he called jahili society                                         (that is, the society of the Arabs living in ignorance before Islam). He declared the “modernizing,” secularizing societies of the Muslim world, as well as Western society, to be jahili.   Maududi’s concept of jahili society influenced Sayyed Qutb, a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, who believed it a Muslim duty to revive the Islamic world by applying Islamic rules and principles more carefully to contemporary life. The true jihad to him was the struggle to establish the reign of God’s sovereignty on earth, “to end all sin, suffering and repression” (quoted in Dekmejian 1985:91). It was from Sayyed Qutb that the Afghanistan Islamists developed their own understandings of Muslim reformatory obligation.

It is of course unnecessary to identify the most provocative Islamist thinker among the Shi’ites. Khomeini’s ideas on the depraved condition of modern Muslim society scarcely differed from those of the Sunni Islamists, but he rose on the crest of a different tradition. The Shi’ite ‘ulema to which he belonged were, unlike the Sunni ‘ulema, reluctant to grant legitimate authority to Muslim rulers merely on the ground that such rulers were better than none at all. The Shi’ite ‘ulema took upon themselves the weighty responsibility of formally critiquing the rulership and so became bound to stand apart from it. The most learned ‘ulema, known in Shi’ism as mujtaheds, had the obligation to critique the rulership and society in terms of the Islamic revelation. It was their public duty to serve as guardians of Shi’ite Islamic dogma in the absence of the Hidden Imam. As guardians of the Islamic revelation in changing circumstances, they were forced to exercise the two sides of their role ‑‑ that is, to preserve the original intent of the revelation, and also to show its relevance to contemporary issues. The Shi’ite ‘ulema, in contrast to the Sunni ‘ulema, after much argumentation, came in the fourteenth century to believe that their interpretive role sometimes necessitated the exercise of innovative judgments; new circumstances required new formulations, if the essential character of the original revelation was to be kept intact. This separate responsibility of the mujtaheds to apply received Islamic concepts to contemporary situations was formally recognized in the Persian Constitution of 1906, in which a group of mujtaheds chosen by their peers were given the right to evaluate and pass on all laws enacted by the Majlis (Parliament). This regulation was in fact never implemented, but the Iranian ‘ulema never doubted that the mujtaheds had such a right; indeed the mujtaheds felt they were obligated to offer judgments   as necessary on the social conditions of their times. Khomeini added to this notion the insistance that the ‘ulema have the obligation to become directly involved in politics (Mortimer 1982:326 ff.; Bromberger 1983). He believed the only way a true Islamic society could exist would be under the rulership of someone who knows the Islamic law and applies it justly. Indeed, only by the impartial, even unmerciful, application of Islamic laws of punishment can there be a truly Islamic society. Unlike the Sunni Islamists, who were in important respects progressives trying to find ways to make Islam relevant to the modern world, Khomeini has been a traditionalist trying to make Islam work by applying it more literally and more strictly.

The Islamists, Shi’ite and Sunni, have in any case carved out for themselves a specific ideological space in the contemporary discussion about how Islam should apply to the modern Muslim world.  They have differed with modernist progressives who liberally borrowed their social concepts from the West, for the Islamists instead regard (or so they say) the secularism implicit in Western political ideas as inimical to true Islam. The Sunni Islamists, and Khomeini among the Shi’ites, have differed from the bulk of the ‘ulema in both sects who avoided politics and legitimated Muslim rulers; indeed the Sunni Islamists have called those ‘ulema jahili and Khomeini has called them “un‑Islamic.” The Sunni Islamists have differed from “traditional” Muslims by drawing ideas and agendas and methods from the Western world, even if also attempting (or claiming) to incorporate them into an Islamic framework. Even if the ideological space taken by the Islamists appears, in the eyes of an outside observer, to lack coherence and consistency, their position is today unquestionably, in the eyes of the peoples of Iran and Afghanistan, the preeminent answer to the contemporary situation.

The Islamists are attempting to respond to modern political circumstances in terms of concepts and principles they believe are entailed in the original Islamic revelation.  This combination of modern agendas and ancient ideals has been difficult for Western observers to find the right adjectives for. The movement has been called fundamentalist, reformist, revivalist, resurgent, and revolutionary ‑‑ terms that only more or less represent its actual character.  The word used here, Islamist, derives from the term the leaders use for themselves, the islamiyya, with a meaning implicit in another term they have used for themselves, the asliyya, the “original or authentic ones,” or, perhaps, more loosely, “those who go back to first principles.”

All the descriptive terms used for the Islamists are pertinent, but to a limited extent. The Islamists are fundamentalists in calling for a return to the basic Islamic texts, the Qur’an and Hadith, and to the Islamic principles revealed therein. They are reformists in calling for a restructuring of Islamic society in terms of basic Islamic principles.  They are revivalists in seeking to find, through a consideration of first principles, a vitality and spiritual renewal that seems to have been wanting in the contemporary Muslim world.  They are revolutionaries in proposing a radical application of the ideals and principles of early Islam to modern society, and in offering a radical social critique, denouncing contemporary Muslim society as imperfectly Islamic ‑‑ even essentially non‑Islamic ‑‑ singling out for special criticism the ‘ulema, who have legitimized governments that are, in their eyes, essentially, in Sunni Islamist terms, jahili. The movement can rightfully be called resurgent, in that the Islamic moral vision has in many Muslim circles supplanted Western secularist notions as the idiom of discourse about social rights and obligations.         For all this, however, the movement is thoroughly modern and has in fact been influenced by ideas generated in the West, even if, as is the case for Khomeini, Western secular ideas serve mainly as the essential foil. But Western influence on most Islamist thinkers goes further than that, as is evinced in their use of Western terms like “party” and “revolution,” which have become central to Islamist rhetoric. Indeed, some Sunni Islamists are accused of taking their first principles actually from Western political philosophy and using the Qur’an and Hadith only as proof texts for what they want to do (Roy 1985:107).

 

Also discuss here the Shi’ite perspective on Islamism:  Use Khomaini and the Shiite author I used in Islamic politics class

 

Islamist Institutional Tools.

The Islamists in different countries have varied in their methods of implementation. In Pakistan the Islamists have been rather elitist, and so have won only limited popular support. The Afghanistan Islamists, on the other hand, have sought to enlist popular support from the beginning, developing close ties with existing traditional social networks.  They have linked up with tribes, who predominate in the south; with the kinship blocs common in the north; with the Sufi orders who are also strong in the north; and with the ‘ulema, whose influence among the common people has been in some areas crucial to the resistance movement.  The Afghanistan Islamists have also been notably successful in making political parties instruments of social and political action. Unlike the secular parties of the 1960s that were organized by middle class modernists in the cities, the political parties formed by the Afghanistan Islamists have attracted rural and urban traditionalists.  The Islamist ideology has thus been turned to very functional use, as it has provided the conceptual framework, through the social medium of the party, for the organization of resistance activities against the Afghan government and the Soviets. Even so, the Islamist parties, while bridging some traditional social barriers, still tend to be associated with the established social entities ‑‑ the ethnic groups, tribes and sects.  The Jamiat‑i Islami, for example, are mostly Sunni Tajiks and their strength is in the north; the other Sunni parties are mostly Pushtun; and the Shi’ite parties are mostly Hazara.¹¹

The Shi’ite Islamist leaders in Iran have been different from the Sunni Islamist leaders in that they are themselves ‘ulema whereas the Sunni Islamists in Afghanistan and elsewhere have on the whole been non‑’ulema. Indeed they have carefully distinguished themselves from the ‘ulema, and, in Afghanistan at least, have allied with the ‘ulema only for practical purposes.  In Iran the Shi’ite ‘ulema have themselves both inspired and organized the Islamist movement. In the uprising against the Shah the Shi’ite ‘ulema, along with the urban merchant community, were the most prominent and established institution of dissent, and were closely associated with the populace (Thaiss 1973). Even though Khomeini chided them for avoiding political activity they were essentially untainted by association with the Shah’s oppressive government ‑‑ having been excluded from it ‑‑ so when finally spurred to action, they were in a position, to lead the charge against it.

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Internal divisions

 

Most seriously manifest in the period after 1989

 

within the Sunni parties

 

Jami’at-i Islami

==  It would seem at least likely that Burhanuddin Rabbani would be very upset that his own people didn’t vote for him in the Shura.  However, Dee wonders if he isn’t in fact more of a figurehead than a real force in the party.  It is of course known that Mas’ud is not especially loyal to the party, and I have heard that the famous Herati commander refused to accept a Jamiat party card.

 

==  Conversation with Dee Smith, stringer for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

== There are rumours of disputing among the Jamiat‑i Islami party members.  One of the main poles seems to be the Ikhwanis, who are said the be mainly Sayyed Nurullah Emad and Najibullah Lafrai.  Emad is said to have a background of ruthlessness.  He was in the earlier government cabinet, is not (she thinks) in the new cabinet.  Lafra’i is said to be a “true believer”.  He was criticized for writing the stringent regulations (especially for women) proposed for the Islamic government of Afghanistan.  His response was to pull out a Qur’an and try to convince people of the real nature of the meaning of the Qur’an.  The other pole is the group of people further “left”.  Some of them are said to be old maoists.  Khalili was once a Parchami, it is said.  There was resentment against him when he spent some time in the states for a couple of years to settle his family.  Another person on the “left” is Eshaq.  Dee said she once had a conversation with him when he was tied and physically disheveled, and acted like he was fed up.  In that context he told her things he would never have said before.  He acted like he would spit about “those people” and said they don’t realize they will be pushed aside when the war is over.  They don’t realize this is a class war ‑‑ and he used other marxists terms for the situation.  She said several of the people on the “left” are said to be ex‑marxists.  Azmat has told her that many of these people are ex‑maoists.  [i.e. Settami Milli?]

 

Islami

 

Wahabis in Konar

== [from Randy] There was also another shura, of the wahabbis.  Acturally the town (Asadabad) is divided among the several parties.  this took place when the fighting was over, he surmises.  He didn’t say what parties were represented in town, but said that about half the town is wahabbi.  the other half is under the various parties of the alliance.  However, they weren’t loyal to the alliance.  In the end they told Vegeberg that they would accept his hospital there but there would have to be conditions; mainly they would not go through the alliance.  He said he would work it out with Mujaddidi.  so the hospital will go in as part of the local Konar political system.  In fact, what came through to Randy was that Konar was now an autonomous region; the Alliance had no control over it.

 

Within the Shi’a parties

 

Harakat-i Islami

== Peter [Jouvenal] decided not to go in with them.  Later went in with Mohsini’s group.  It turns out that Mohsini’s Harakat‑i Islami has a number of splinter groups in it, and this may be one of them.  Peter said that the real Mohsini group has a car, and the translator speaks perfect British English.  So there are more than one group of people calling themselves by that name, and it turns out (at least Randy is beginging to wonder) that this one is not the authentic Harakat group, but a splinter group.  As usual, the plot thickens.  The man that Randy has been interviewing and is so interested in wrote his name to be “Mudir Parsa, Representative of Foreign Affairs of Emam Musa Ebne Jafar Front of Kabul Province of Harakat‑i Islami.  His phone number is 41854.  The number for Mohsini’s party is different, and none of the other numbers I have from Razawi is the same as the official office phone number.

 

== When I asked about the FBS tension and how that affected the party relations among people in Bamian they said everyone is with Harakat‑ Islami, and that even though there was this kind of tension the war had brought them together.  At least for now things seemed better among them.  They did not deny that it could get worse after the war is over.

 

== Maruf talked about cousin rivalry.  It is seldom severe between first cousins, but is more so between 2nd and 3rd cousins, those further out.  When one does well then that is a pressure on the other to do better.  He said the intermarriage of sisters was less important than the rivalry over prestige (I”m no sure he understood my question about that).

 

3/13/89

Bruce Wannell:  Sunni Hazaras scattered among Shekh Ali; Sunni Hazara in PanjSher; KaramAli Hazaras are Sunni and were fighteing Kaynis.

 

— it was the Shekh Ali hazaras (Shiites) who disarmed the Shibar Ismailis.

 

— In first chapter, on other forms of coalition, discuss the FBS divisions, that opposing factions often have relatives in them.  They are rivals over the same tracts of land, the same women [i.e., the women cousins in the larger kindred], and “gold”, meaning loads, debt obligations.  Also, there are disputes over water, etc.

 

== In each qishlaaq there are old family divisions that affect their party affiliation.  5 familes will be Harakat Islam, 4 will be Nasr, 4 will be Shora, etc.  It will be the same in the Sunni qishlaqs too.  it is the bache‑Kaka problem.  People can go to any party they want.

 

== there are in Kalu HarakatIslami, Nasr, Shora; and the Ismailis are for whoever is the strongest; because they are weakest in the whole area (although not weakest in their own area).

 

— In first chapter, on other forms of coalition, discuss the FBS divisions, that opposing factions often have relatives in them.  They are rivals over the same tracts of land, the same women [i.e., the women cousins in the larger kindred], and “gold”, meaning loads, debt obligations.  Also, there are disputes over water, etc.

 

–Bruce:  Quarrels in valleys now vicious because of the arms:  fighting over water between Sunni/Shia, the Shia had the guns and tool over the water.  In group of 5 villages in an upper part of a valley were required to raise only Barley and allow water to run down to peopoe below.  Now over level villages have guns and now grow rice, have all the water they want; people lower down have to emigrate.

 

Taher-i Khidri, from Turughman.  In the war, avoided going to iran because of danger to himself.  Haji Nadir, who was commander of Turughman valley was Shura and fought with Nasr people.  But most of the Khidri qawm was with Nasr.  His own qawmi [with Nasr] came to him to get money to attack Haji Nadir [of Shora].  Taher refused because he felt Haji Nadir was a good man.  He therefore became fearful that people from Nasir party would kill him if he went to Iran.  So he came to Peshawar.  There were few hazaras in Peshawar then, Nasr and Sepah were not there. … Taher got into trouble because someone he interviewed said that the Nasr party was Tudeh, that is “communist”.  And he printed this statement.  for 2 months Hzb-iIslami and Nasr [who were in league at the time] wanted to kill him, believing he created the accusation.  then after 2 months Hizb-Islami and Nasr fell out with each other.  They now say he is “Sholey-i …”  Jabhad has been good to him but it is not generally good to Hazaras.  The Jabha is not one party but several.  Every commander has his own ideas, there is no one ideology.

 

== The tribes around Jalalbad and furtrher south have been often disloyal and hostile to the mujahedin.  Some people have accepted arms and $ from the govt.  There fore have been effectively milita for the govt.  some have tgricked the muahedin and misled them, sometimes  have directed them into govt ambushes.  The Khost situation is the same, only more so.  the tirbes accept $ and guns from the govt, so there are many people under arms for the govt.  this is why Hikmatyar has move to Logar.  He has given up on these tribes, and want to attack Kabul from Logar, where the people have fought the govt valiantly.  he has givenb up on the people of Jalalabad are, doesn’t believe he can work with them.

 

== The tibes in south are Durrani (Kandahar, Girish, Kashkar Gah)  they are noble, wel organized tribes.  the Ghilzai tribes are in Ghazni, Muqor, Qalat-Ghilzai.  The tribes in Paktia and Paktika are not (he says) Ghilzai.  tere are Mangal, Jaji and Amadzai, some Ghilzai.  In Nangahar the Pushtun speakers are more Persianized, esp more so in Laghman.  In Nangahar there are aslo some Ahmadzai and some Ghilzai, but most of the are different, identitifed by their province: Lahmanis, Konaris, Nuristanis.   the eastern province peoples have historically been bought off by the pwoers on either side of them.  Therefor shift sides.  (he siad the British were ensconced in Jalalbad in last century by buying off the tribes.)

 

== Fredrick has been inside several times, has been to the Hazarajat many times.  Says that there is frequent figthting among the Hazaras, often for local reasons.  They are not united much about anything.  The Mustazafin have fought the Harakat many times.  Their factions are more intense, there is more real fighting than among the Pushtuns, say (he used as an example), Konar, where there are factions, but they don’t much fight.  In the Hazarajat the factions have guns pointed at each other in the same bazar across the street from each other, and they sometimes start shooting.  Villages sometimes split and fight; valleys split and fight.

 

==Benedicte described her own experiences of mutual gift giving ‑‑ “badal” ‑‑ and the tendency to bad‑mouth people who are doing too well.  People tend after a while to begin to suspect that you know things about them, believe the gossip being circulated against them [drift away].

 

== There was fighting between Hazaras and Pushtuns in Qarabagh (south of Ghazni) because the Hazaras had taken two Arabs hostage.

 

== The Hazarajat is extremely divided, more than elsewhere.  There are often checkpoints along the way by every local village.  Each one takes a toll, and the overall toll taken of travellers can be 25% of the whole load being carried through.

 

== Conversation with Obaidullah Nawroz, brother of Haji Juma Nowroz whom I talked with the other day.  He works for the Mercy Corporation (?) International, as their agricultural field offficer in one of the areas they try to cover within Afghanistan. …

== He told me about the divisions among the various mujahedin elements in his area.  He said that in Helmand (?) there are two tribes that have been fighting each other for at least 5 years, the Achekzai and Nurzai.  Even though each of these local tribes is internally divided in party loyalties, the memebers of each tribe join together in fighting the other tribe.  There have been 2000 people killed in fighting in the last 5 years.

 

== There was anothere feud within a tribe in which there were three parties, Hizb‑Islami (GH), Mahaz and Jabha.  Hizb and one of the others joined up against the other and in that fighting 1200 were killed.  In the end the weaker group joined up with the government to get help.

 

BruceWannell4:  stories of tensions between village based resistance and the nomadic coochees, hwo side with the govt and plunder mujahedin convoys.

 

BruceW2   there are signs of dispute with a neighbor, who had started plowing fallow land without asking permission as an indictation that he may be claiming ownership.  there were ethnic and class hostilities between Shaka Pashtun and Natajek Harwarese.  the muleteres in the caravaan who were from Mira Shaw had been Harwarese, and they were accused of being government agents everytime a load fell off or a wrong turn was taken.  There were also conflicts with the Musla Hel nomads, who were also accused of siding with the government for their own gain.

 

General decay in legitimacy; rise in disillutionment.

 

— Mujaddidi has a couple of houses in the States, and “Effendi Saheb” [Gailani] has much property …  Son of M Nabi was caught trying to fly out of Islamabad with 2.5M dollars. … In Kandahar, no one knows who Mujaddidi is.

 

== The young Pir Gailani that we met at his house was central to the forming of NIFA, and his uncle then became its head.  But this man became frustrated with the party and left it; now he works for Mujeddidi.  Also, what he was saying the night that we were with him at Maruf’s house was that the plans to attack Jalalabad were all wrong headed, and would be a shame and disgrace to the jehad.  All the years of the jehad, all the shaheed in the jehad, will be waisted because of the losses in Jalalabad.  He predicted that the mujahed would sustain many losses, would plunder and kill unnecessarily, would rape the women.  All these things have been coming true.

 

== There was another meeting with Mujadedid recently and he talked about the new government and then asked how many people would support the interim government and of about 40 people only about 3 raised their hands.

 

== a commander’s rejection of the Shura in Pakistan, 1989:

At the Shura commander Allaodin from Herat came as a invitee of the Jamiat‑i Islami party, but when he got there he refused to accept the JI card.  He also in fact did not attend the Shura.  He is one of the most prominent and famous commanders, from Herat.

 

== AAS has no use for the parties.  They are only fabrications of the Pakistanis.  Inside the country they are also not Wahabbis.  They are “normal” people (i.e., moderate).

 

== The party leaders and their representatives have cars and money to dole out, but in the camps there are former members of parliament, former ministers, former governors, educated, cultured people, and they don’t have money for a bicycle (!).  The party leaders ignore these experienced and capable people because they don’t want them to horn in.  If they were really interested in the people they would work for a unified system of provisioning, but they in fact compete for clients and compete for money from the ISI.  So they toe the ISI line.  Haji noted that Samad Hamid left the Shora after only a few days, and others of his caliber as well, because they had no respect for the people leading the parties.  (Of course they could vote for no one other than one of them.)

 

> HK127:  The biggest source of concern which disillusioned the commen men was the multiplicity of the resistance organizations and their lack of unity. … jealousy of the local commanders …The flight of the traditional elders to the urban areas and abroad created a poltical vacuum…”

 

== Malik Rajab in particular genstured negatively about the parties.  He seemed to say that he had no use for them, but quietly, perhaps because other people were there.  I had the feeli

 

== The point is that they are not any more interested in fighting for the interim government.  Why fight for them, when people don’t care about them.  Jalalabad has discouraged them but the choice of leadership in the new government also discouraged them.

 

== They should at least not have Wahabbi and not Ikhwani.  These people didn’t want them.

 

== What is interesting is that there seemed no longer to be any fear of Gulbuddin.  These men did show fear of the ISI.  And they did not like Khomaeini having influence in Afghanistan.

 

== In Kandahar Mowlawi M. Nabi and Khalis came and tried to persuade them to start fighting there, but they refused, said they did not want another Jalalabad.  And also they don’t care to fight for this government.

 

== They said if Zaher Shah would come people all over would turn away from these parties.  Also the governor of Kabul is a Pushtun.  If Zaher Sha would come he would turn his gun against Najib.  Then people from both sides would accept Zaher Shah.

 

== The numbers of people in Jalalabad battle are dwindling.  They are all volunteers, he said, except the commanders who have to be there because they are paid.  But the others are not staying; coming home.

 

== Rasul Amin’s daughter said, Now the jehad is over.  There is no jehad any more because Muslims are fighting each other.

 

conversation with Henry Kamm, NYT

== There is a tremedous fear of Hikmatyar in Kabul, especially among the women.  The people fear Khad and Hikmatyar. and woman told him about this.

 

== The woman had been in Kabul in the days when the viel came off, so remembers what it was like.  Now she fears that under the muj they will have to put it back on.  She and others will fight to the death to preserve their progress.  She is not a communist, but wants the progress.

 

== Azmat:  Many of the best commanders have left in discust.  ONe of the best has left and is now living in Seattle.  … The one mentioned first left after he was given 1 mortar to a attack a govt post with; when he objected Sayyaf accused him of not being a good Muslim.  They appear to have gotten fed up with the graft among the leaders of the mujahedin.

 

== Ted says that in an interview with Abdul Haq he said that he is fed up with the CIA.  They are trying to tell him what to do.  He feels he is his own man.  They have lost credifility with his men by announcing they want to buy back stingers at a time when they are most desperately needed.  Feeling aganist the Americans is mounting; he may have to make an anti‑American statement in order to be credible with his men.

 

== Elmi:  There are three reasons why the battle in jalalabad is not going well.  One is that there was a lack of planning (this everyone affirms).  Another reason is that the Pakistanis are involved and that caused some commanders to get frustrated, and some of them defected (this is the first I have heard of this.)  Kabul has had pictures of the Panjabis caught in battle on TV, to show that Pakistan is involved in the Jalalbad battle.  Also, third, was the Wahabbis.  They were very cruel, and they went into the village of Shewa (Shewi?) and pillaged and took the women.  They have brought the women to Peshawar, people don’t know where for sure.  And when the people saw this they decided this is worse than communism and some defected.  He said a lot of people have defected to the communists recently.

 

–Bruce:  Quarrels in valleys now vicious because of the arms:  fighting over water between Sunni/Shia, the Shia had the guns and tool over the water.  In group of 5 villages in an upper part of a valley were required to raise only Barley and allow water to run down to peopoe below.  Now over level villages have guns and now grow rice, have all the water they want; people lower down have to emigrate.

 

Maruf:  In Jalalabad the muj are paid 2500 Rs/mo to fight.  They go into the country and disappear after being paid.  There is no one to fight.  There never were very many to fight in Jalalabad because the commanders claimed to have so many people fighting men, so when they were asked to contributed a certain fraction of the total to Jalalabad fight they didn’t have men.  They had been paid for having a certain number of men but didn’t have them.

 

== There was unity among the people in Bamian for the first two years.  They all rose up togheter when the Russians came in.  But gradually the unity broke down, as they sought party help.  As the parties came in they broke up into seperate party groups.

 

Dupree, Nancy Hatch.  1993.  Afghan Women View the Future.  Afghanistan Info.  No 33, April. p.14-15.

p.14:  “In the Ministry of Education … 70% of the staff is said to be women for they are the only ones with any semblance of experience in the day-to-day business of running offices; most men were too involved in the war.”

 

p.14:  “In the wake of the takeover in Kabul many atrocities were reported, including the molestation of women.  Young mujahideen who hd been taught that respectable women remained at home, simply assumed that any women showing their faces on TV or appe;aring in public were fair game.”

 

1. 14: “Unlike other refugee situations where a reported 70% of women arriving at receiving centers had been raped, incidents amogn Afghan refugee women were almost nil. Respect for women, an abiding hallmark of Afghan society, was still honoured in practice as well as in principle.  Now in February 1993, the disregard of this respect has added a disastrous dimension to the effects of the war on Afghanistan.  Afghan history is replete with tales of fierce conflicts rising form many different causes.  Never, hwoever, have women been so brutally targeted in revengeful retaliation as they are today.

 

Loss in influence of pirs

Bruce:  The strong parties among the shia have relatively little interest in the Sayyeds.  They Sayyeds were once powerful in the time when the Shura party was trong.  But the other parties came in w power based in Iran.  People expressed their separation from Iran by following anyother ayatullah: Khoyi.

 

–Bruce:  The sufi families of Panjsher have been discredited by the war.  They have been called chars eaters and they at one time collaborated w the government/Marxist/ so now have no clout.

–Bruce agreed w me that there are more people now who would deny they have a pir.

 

Nevertheless:  Evidence of veneration for pirs

 

Omar Malikian of VOA:  Told a story the people told him about Pir Gailani.  They invited him to ride with them from Kunar to Jalalabad.  He refused and said he was coming.  When they got there he was there waiting for them.  That’s the power of a “Sufi”, he said.  [NB, however, that this was said by a highly westernized reporter who clearly was representing what other people thought.  So we don’t know when, or by whom, or even if it was seriously considered.

 

— Before going into Afghan Bruce and his musician friend went to a Ziarat; it is customary to “do ziarat” before going to war.

 

Mar, 26, 1988

— Mary Hegland:  says people regarded Khomeini as the Imam.  People in her village saw his face in the moon.  She has heard of other sacred heroes facing being in the moon.

 

Bruce W1:  man complained that the land had lots God’s blessing. Wheat crop was full of black mildew.

 

Need for a leader

 

== The biggest problem is finding a leader.  Zaher Shah is nearly the symbol but the Durrani are the weakest, weaker than Ghilzais.  Durrani have become very persianized.  Some Persian speakers exp Tajiks, want to set up a government.  They have lots of land, have cultured people, and the Hazaras, Uzbeks among the Tajiks, since Mas’ud arose (Kh. doesn’t know if it’s possible.)

 

Maruf:  People don’t like the parties.  they resent them, and the party leaders know that, he says.  He said 6-9 months ago [i.e. mid 1988] some commanders wrote to Hikmatyar stating their objections to him and what he was doing.  They openly and directly critcized him.

Maruf went to Nangarhar last year [1988] and talked with all kinds of people.  he was at that time against Zaher Shah.  People resented the party leaders.  They wanted someone besides the party leaders or Najib.  That meant Zaher Shah.  He believes that if Zaher Shah comes back most people will be pleased, except Pakistan.

 

== The Doctor treated a man who is in Gulbuddin’s party.  When they were alone he told the dr. that he was in that party because all his people were in it and he had no other choice, but in fact he would very much like to see the king come back (contra Gulbuddin).

 

== They said if Zaher Shah would come people all over would turn away from these parties.  Also the governor of Kabul is a Pushtun.  If Zaher Sha would come he would turn his gun against Najib.  Then people from both sides would accept Zaher Shah.

 

Concluding remarks

 

New chapter [12?]:  Sacral society under threat

Summarize the sacral responses.

mujaddidi

Gailani:  for vested interest reasons?

Rabbani:  in early days

1. Nabi:  brought in from the outside

The Shi’ite sacral responses

sura and its errors; the other parites, supported by Iran

The Islamists: Hikmatyar, and Rabbani, Khales

 

sacral responses

ideological appropriation by the Islamists and Communists:  nb that the extreme positions took the preeminent position, first in the university under ZShah and Dawood, and then with the coup d’etat in the wider sociopolitical field.

 

The new situation:

sacral vs secular

introduce Verduin here

 

Future for Afghanistan?

military‑political appropriation by Pak, US, Saudi, and Iran

 

concluding message, the point of the preceeding:

This chapter should be about the challenge to sacral society now being experienced.  It came in the 1970s and 1980s in the form of Communism, and was enformed in the 1980s by Soviet military power.  But a new challenge may be rising in the form of an alien, and hence unpalatable, style of Islam usually called “fundamentalism”.  For in the new situation political interests, always involved in Islamic affairs and represented by Islamic idioms, was now manifestly politicized ‑‑ Islam in the coming period is running the risk of becoming solely political.  Islamic politics is overwhelmingly political; the religious dimensions of Islam that attempt to enrich the interior person are manifestly employed for selfserving interests.  Islam is becoming and evident veneer for the exercise of power.  Legitimacy ‑‑ of power, of belief, of service, of ritual, of virtually everything ‑‑ appears to be dangerously (that is for Islam) low.  That those who invoke Islam genuinely fear God may be questions by those who follow.  The decline in legitimacy is not only for the leaders  of the various sides, but also for the idioms they use to legitimate their behavior.

 

General trends and processes in the war period:

>  The globalization of rhetoric, and the modernization of technology:  NB changes in Afghan society, radio, weaponry, intensification of local hostilities; use quote from Paul Richards (from Anth Today)

>  The secularization of Islam?  decay of devotion?  secularization of the pir-murid relation.

 

residue

_________________

(The govt gave out so much money in the last 2 months that the value of Afghanis fell from 10/1 to 16/1 in one month.  This is USSR money for aid now.  It has they say offered to amt that Prince Sadruddin has said he will provide for the reconstruction. Only now.  so while Prince S. ditheres, the USSR is in fact giving out that amount to Kabul.  They have been bringing in this money since winter.  60 M. dollars.

 

Continuing relations with communists among common people

 

==Maruf:

The people here in Pakistan who have relatives working for the government in Kabul don’t want it to be known.  They are afraid of criticism and objections agains them.

== The Shinwaris make up the builk of the militia, and are involved in the gov’t in other ways.  He says their land is poor, have little water, is in the mountains, so they need money from the outside.  They have been bought off by the government.  But they are not r

 

General trends and processes in the war period:

>  The globalization of rhetoric, and the modernization of technology:  NB changes in Afghan society, radio, weaponry, intensification of local hostilities; use quote from Paul Richards (from Anth Today)

>  The secularization of Islam?  decay of devotion?  secularization of the pir-murid relation.

 

residue

_________________

(The govt gave out so much money in the last 2 months that the value of Afghanis fell from 10/1 to 16/1 in one month.  This is USSR money for aid now.  It has they say offered to amt that Prince Sadruddin has said he will provide for the reconstruction. Only now.  so while Prince S. ditheres, the USSR is in fact giving out that amount to Kabul.  They have been bringing in this money since winter.  60 M. dollars.

 

Continuing relations with communists among common people

 

==Maruf:

The people here in Pakistan who have relatives working for the government in Kabul don’t want it to be known.  They are afraid of criticism and objections agains them.

== The Shinwaris make up the builk of the militia, and are involved in the gov’t in other ways.  He says their land is poor, have little water, is in the mountains, so they need money from the outside.  They have been bought off by the government.  But they are not really communists.

WHAT FOLLOWS IS A CORRECTED VERSION OF THIS FILE, AFTER I HAVE BROUGHT INTO IT CERTAIN THINGS DONE IN CI411.  THAT HAD NOT BEEN INCLUDED HERE.  THIS IS AN ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE AND COLLATE MATERIALS IN BOTH FILES.  3/6/95 CI411.IML > bamschsm.iml

 

3/6/95

 

This will be Ismaili history file.

CI411.IML

Actually, this should be joined with material in Bamian Political History file, which is as yet not typed, to be the core of a book/ article on Bamian social history.  Bamian is a better focus, because the materials is diverse, not about mirs alone, or pirs alone.  It will then be my reply to Hans Loefler’s criticisms. 1/5/94

Bibliographic ideas/sources

 

Notes on History

Masson wrote of the district of Wardak that prior to the last century it had been “possesses by the Hazaras, who, about one hundred years since, were expelled by the Afghan.  The Hazaras would also seem to have held the country from Karabagh to Ghazni, but have been in like manner partially expelled.  Indeed, the encroachments of the Afghan tribes are still in progress.

(Masson 1844 II:224)

 

Wood  200

Of these tribes /Hazara/ the most powerful are the Deh Kundi, Dia Zingi, Deh Zingi, and Sheickh Ali.  Sometimes they are subject to Kunduz and at other times to Kabul.  They now own allegiance to the former, and annually send Murad Ali Beg /Mir of Kunduz/ a tribute in slaves.  In paying this inhuman tax, the custom is for a certain number of houses to join together, and when the value of a slaves is collected, he is furnished by them.  In years of great scarcity, such as that in which we visited this people, it is not unusual for Hazara family voluntarily to dispose of one or more children.   It is sacrifice to which they are compelled by necessity.  But generally they speak with detestation of the practice of man-stealing, and never mention the Uzbeks, who enslave them, but in terms of loathing and hatred.

 

Wood  198 (re. Hazaras encountered in Ab-i-Siah vale going up to Gulgatui “a hamlet on the southern side of Hajigak.”)

The early fall of snow this year, they had told us, destroyed the crops, and as they had been unable to pay the usual tribute to the Amir of Kabul, Dost Mohamed, they sheep had been seized.  Without the means of passing /page199/ the long dreary winter now closing in upon them, they were compelled to emigrate to the plains where the wealthy would employ them in keeping the roofs of their houses free from snow, clearing the foot paths, bringing firewood, and in the other drudgery of the household.  This is a misfortune that often overtakes th Hazara . . .

 

Gazatteer pt. II p. vi.  Population (where?) is low because of devastation by war and disease; “Persian famine” of 1872 was severe in Herat and Afghan Turkestan, and was followed by severe outbreak of cholera–1871-3 was almost depopulated.

 

Kakar 172:  The apparently quiet winter was followed by a stormy spring, when, some, if not all, the Hazaras resumed fighting.  This time the Hazaras of Koh-i-Baba area, where no garrison had been left, rose first [i.e. southern side of Koh-i-Baba].  …173…Soon, the initial success of he Hazaras in Deh Zangi in April was followed by a series of defeats in the Yakawlang to the west of Bamian by the Sipah Salar and in the Deh Zangi by General Amir Mohammad Kahn.  Perhaps the forces led by Ghulam Husayn, son of Mir Mohammad Amin of the Behsud, on the bank of the Helmand river between Deh Zangi and Behsud, where the Hazaras were routed leaving about 250 dead behind.  [They were subdued completely by September 1893.]

 

 

Problem in Bamian:  spatial patterns

Notes: Labmushak

 

The point of the case:  The broad history of group division

1. The contemporary situation

— in Shibar

— in ??Labuushak??

2. The existing marital ties and the patterns of war that show a shift in alignment of groups
3. The history of fission in ??Labuushak??

— early history of area

— the later division

— the fight

— the result and current ????

4. The point of the case resumed

 

Final Chapter

Show that within this frontier zone internal tensions between kinsmen erupts as social factions, not elsewhere possible, by desccribing its social history.

1. The early history of religious sects and factions and

history of the pirs

1. The Ramazan etc. fight
2. The resultant fragmented condition
3. The recent intra-Ismaili dispute
4. Manucher — P.S. in Kayân
5. Mausur — P.S. in Kalu-Turughman
6. Khodâdâd vs. Manucher in Kalu
7. Ramzan vs. his Ismaili community in Shibar

 

 

 

RELATIONS BETWEEN SECTS IN BAMIAN

As for the gifts themselves, it is said that to this very day that for Allah’s help in a particular crisis or as an expression of highest reverence towards a holy man, one made a gift of one’s own daughter, in additon to material assets.  The holy man collects thereby the sole right to dispose of the girl; he either married her himself or gave her to one of his supporters as a wife.

Worship and devotion towards a leader, and the other members of the Kayhan family are said to show extreme forms.  The leader is said to have had the “ius primae noctis”;  defloration gives the girl barakat;  there is said to have been mass slaughter of cattle so that the blood could clean the path for the saint, and his support could be demonstrated, and so on.

Another way of showing one’s deep reverence is unpaid labour on the landed property of the holy man, which tends to be of considerable size not least . . . [this is from Einzman p 26-7]

 

SCANDALOUS STORIES

Because a “saint’s” miracle signs are so crucial to his renown, it is widely believed that some saints use fraudulent means to project an image of miraculous generousity.  The following story is told with varying permutations by people about “saints” whose claims to sainthood they scout.

 

FRAUDULENT TECHNIQUES

The pir arranges for each of his servants the name of a type of object that may be given by his murid — a cow, a rug, etc.  Then when a man comes, intending to bring a rug to the pir, even before bringing it in, as he goes in to see the pir, the servan who has been given the name for this — for example, “carpet” — is the one who accompanies the visitor.  The pir then knows what is being brought, and he says, “Thank you for bringing the carpet,” even before being shown it.  (A Sunni man from Kabul.)

 

People say that the pir sahib of the Ismails gives names to his servants to identify what needs his murid have.  Then at certain times he sits under a cloth chanting and his sevants bring people to him.  When he brings them in and asks who it is, a certain servant says who it is and the pir sahib then knows from the servant what kind of thing they want.  And he says, “Oh yes, — is sick, or needs a male child, etc.  Tell them to come here that I may blow a blessing upon them.”  People are so surprised by his supernatural powers that they will empty their pockets to him.  (A Sunni from Kabul)

 

OUT-MYTHS vs. OTHER PIRS

He said they came to know that the other people were Ismailis when the sons of P.S. came here and stayed in the house of Mullâ Gholam Reza.  Then they knew.  He denied that they had fought over this, but said after that they wouldn’t have anything to do with them any more — won’t marry them now.  He won’t eat with them now because he thinks he will get sick from it because of this religion.  He says it is no religion at all.  They call P.S. a prophet — and what does he do?  He should change this wall to gold or something to show this.  The P.S. only collects money for himself.  He should at least have some school or some giving to Faqirs, but he only takes from his poor people and collects for himself — he says.

 

The khalifa in Turughman was Mansur and he was trying to start trouble between the sects in order to increase Ismailism.  But the pir sahib finally didn’t like it, and he changed him.  The people argued on Mansur’s behalf, and told the pir sahib they wanted only him.  The pir sahib said that he was not soliciting followers, if they wanted him, Mansur would have to go.  They took Mansur.  (Ismaili elder from Turughman.)

 

 

Mauucher expressed feeling against P.S.’s teaching to Saka.  Seemed to be leaning toward Sunni (i.e. Saka — gov’t)

P.S. family had caught three people of Mauucher’s group near Tâla o Barfak, they were from Turughman, where they were for Manucher and accused them of wanting to murder the P.S.  One of them was named Nabi and he was poisoned.  But he lived and Saka secretly sent them to Turughman.

 

Conversion

 

Manucher a months ago said that he is now Sunni.

Manucher a months ago said that he is now Sunni.Manucher a months ago said that he is now Sunni.  He told the inspector Assadullah, a colonel, that he is Sunni.  And, so the inspector is working hard for him.  He is following the commission carefully, but the commission won’t let an Ismaili be near them.

 

The Eshan of Puli Kumri gave his daughter in marriage to Manuchur.  After Manuchur and Mansur became at odds with the pir sahib.  He married her about a year ago, and now Manuchur claims to have become a Sunni.

 

People who used to follow the pir sahib, but they have become angry with him and are trying to reveal all that he has done.  They say many things against him.  They refer to certain lines in his books as evidence that he is not a Muslim.  There are some Ismailis remaining among them. (A Sunni government official)

 

In Sanglaq near Logar, there are some people who used to follow the pir sahib, but they have become angry with him and are trying to reveal all that he has done.  They say many things against him.  They refer to certain lines in his books as evidence that he is not a Muslim.  There are some Ismailis remaining among them.  (A Sunni government official)

 

Marxist young man in Bamian, emerging crisis

Sultan [urbanized young man] crticized pirs, etc. for robbing the people.  Only the ignorant really follow them [he said].  [Hashem criticized him for being too progressive.]  [He is the one who asked me if I knew the famoust Communist young man who was later killed in Kabul; I would now wonder if he was a Maoist.]  [NB doubt about pirs related to urban experience.

 

 

HISTORY OF ISMAILISM IN SHUMBUL

THE SPLIT 15 YEARS AGO — HISTORY AND CIRCUMSTANCES

 

(3-13)    An Ismaili in Khurdakâ (which is split) said the Shi`as changed from Ismaili about 15 years ago.

 

1950-1954: Fight in Shumbul

(May ’69) I remember Safar and Sardâr were shocked to see an Afghan break the fast in our house (1953 or 4), so must have kept fast then.  It was near this then (15 years ago) when Ismailism came out in the open and burnt zyârats.  Much trouble then.

??(M96 “Mullahs of those zyârats were very strong/rich.”)  Then was secretly Ismaili and P.S. was only “Sayed-i Kayân.”  When came out in open war between the sects broke apart and as yet they have not fully relocated spatially.  Some were already [Ismailis], but others didn’t know they were Ismaili.

 

Gul Nazar yesterday (June 20, 1967) said a little more on the Ismaili trouble.  He said that there are three brothers sometime back — one was his grandfather,

I think — who shared as they should.  But when they died their families fought over the inheritance.  The result was that they split up — both spatially and religiously.  The three families went to three separate sects: Shi`a, Sunni, Ismaili.  One of these families was unable to get along in Shekh Ali because the others wouldn’t tolerate a Sunni.  So his family left and went to a Sunni community.  The Shias, I think, stayed.

He said there was a serious fight in Bamyan twice, once about eight years ago (1959), once about 15 (1952).  They were between sects.

Qurban (TB patient from Shumbul) said they had trouble about 12 years ago (1955).  He said at first they were known to be Isamili, but later admitted not so.  A sayed came in to teach them — upon pressing he admitted also to gathering khums — at the initiation of Wakil Sayb.  Wakil Sayb is and was then friendly with MGH and Qurban said he was a good man.  The Mullah was from Iraq.  Apparently, the first dispute over Ismailism was there.  Then, when he came there was an argument over who was the seventh (or eighth?) Imâm.  Some argued for Ismaili, thus revealing their true identity.  Thus, this percipitated the crisis.  The Mullah came to give them trouble over this issue.

 

Khâk Gadâi

Khâk Gadâi tells me that the Ismaili were there from a long time back, but that 15 or so years ago there was a big fight over it.  The people must have then learned their true loyalty.  There was a general (umumi) fight here in the valley.  People fought in the chamand below Pusht-i Mazâr.  The people of ??Bamian?? heard about it and were coming to help the Asnâashais when the women of Asnâashars came between both sides with Quran and stopped the fight.  Then there was peace but hostility for some time.

The P.S. paid off the Hâkim of Bamian with a horse and a horse to the main man of the Sayyeds, [Tâlib ??] in Birgilich, who was a big man.

From that time Ismailis have had more freedom — been more open.  Now the king knows the P.S., so they are recognized now.  Since the fight, things got better between both sides.  At first they had nothing to do with each other, but terms got better.  They shared more and more.

Then last year at a wedding there was a big blow-up.  It was the son of Lâl M. who was marrying someone (who?) and the Ismailis — from Qalâ-y Mullah and Shakar etc. mainly claimed Lâl M. had thrown their food in the river and had not eaten it.  It was a lie (he says).  Apparently, everyone gives something to a wedding and these Ismailis [believed] their food was not used.

 

Now the Ismailis don’t have to pay for their wives, he said (Gadayi??), cause P.S. gave the order.  This is since he made his trip abroad.  Now they pay only 10 ser wheat, 5 ser rice and 2 kushlam (bara?).  Also they give the father of the woman a chapan, and the mother a chapan and shoes and a lungi.   (N.B.  This is from an Asna`ashar).  Now, he says, they are really free.

N.B.  He is single, alone.  This system for him must have some appeal

 

(5-23)    Shâ Sayyid was the other mullah who got into an argument over beards with mulla Ramagan.

 

 

[from Qorban?]

The two mirs stopped the fight between the two sects by baring their heads and (with Qurans) walking between the two sides.  They argued that they would only kill each other and then  the government would jail the offenders — so there would be a double loss.  So they never really fought, he said.

Gul Nazar said there was no single confrontation, but that each of the valleys had their own conflicts.

 

(8-79)  [MAABeg] He also admitted that until 15 years ago their identity as follwers of Aqâ khân was secret.

 

Shia Mullah preaching they should have not Pulwân Shariki with Ismailis.

 

ORIGINAL QUARREL IN IRAQ between Ramazan and other Sayyed

[N.B.  These may also have been an implied disagreement over who should receive the Khums.]

 

Mir — Schism in Iraq

Pir — Social History

(8-41)    Mir Mir Ahmad said it was in his house that Mullah Ramazan and a Sayyed of Irâq were sitting when Mir asked the Sayyed why he wore a beard and the Mullah didn’t.  The Sayyed answered gently that a beard is really of no importance, but since the Prophet had one, he felt a beard was a good thing, so he had one.  Then the Mir asked Ramazan why he didn’t.  Ramazan answered in an unusually harsh way for him.  He said he didn’t believe in that stuff and as far as he was concerned, anyone who wore a beard was the same as a Hindu.  Then the fight exploded.  The Mir Arbâb Kabir remembered this as being 12 or 10 years ago (i.e. 1955 or 1957).

The trouble spread fast all over and people were upset and up in arms all over.  An ayat [commission] was sent from Bamyan.  People gathered in Shumbul over this thing.  Mir Mir Ahmad represented Ramazan.  With him came 1200 men to Shumbul.  A lot came on behalf of the Sayyed.  They were all ready to fight, the dân of Shumbul was crammed full.  So Mir Mir Ahmad made — with difficulty — all his men go to Iljânak to wait for him.  He went back alone to Shumbul and there he and MGH and Mullah Ibrahim sat down with Hâji Wakil, Sayyed Tâlib, and ______?, and the ayat and the alagdâr.  There they had a lot of talking and arguing over this issue (and over their loyalties?) and eventually they settled it.  Paid out 6000 afs to the officials.  (To the asnâsar?, alaqadar?)  When it was quieted the men in Iljânak were sent home.  But apparently Ramazan stayed in Shumbul and taught.

The issue seemed to be over two issues, the wearing of beards and the veneration of zyârats — a point Ramazan brought up later.  It is not clear what the sequence was, but over this eventually the Ismailis burned up one zyârat (the one behind Jamili?).  Over this issue many people were split.  Brothers split over this, even between husband and wife there was sometimes trouble over this.  The ceasing to intermarry was started or completely done then, etc.  Now things are better the Mir says.

 

 

Saka: People give gifts of their children to the P.S.  The general fight

The general fight was about 20 years ago.  People were Ismailis secretly before that because they were weak.  They intermarried freely among themselves, but the Shi’ites didn’t know about this.  The Ismaili women who married Shi’ite men taught their children the Ismaili viewpoint secretly.  But then the general fight occurred in Turughman because they were discovered to be Ismailis, and some of the women went away from their husbands.  There was a lot of trouble for Ismailis in Turughman because there are only a few of them and there are many Shi’ites against them.  So, they are troubled a lot.  The Ismailis in the provinces always suffer more than in the cities because the people in the provinces can make trouble with the government for them.  They can make a complaint against them and if it’s strong enough, they can force them out.  (An Ismaili mature man from Turughman)

 

Shia-Ismaili Relations in Shibar/Shumbal

We came to know that those other people are Ismailies because one of the sons of the Ismaili pir came here and stayed in the house of mullah G–.  Then we knew.  After that we wouldn’t have anything to do with them anymore.  We don’t marry them anymore, and we don’t even eat with them now because we’re afraid we’ll get sick from it because of this religion.  In fact, it’s no religion at all.  They call the pir sahib a prophet.  And what does he do?  He should change the wall to gold or something to show this.  But he only collects money for himself.  He should at least have some school or some plan for giving to the poor, but he only takes from his poor people and collects the money for himself.  (An Imami elder in Shibar)

 

 

Xaak Gadaai tells me that the Ismailis were that a long time back, but that 15 or so years ago there was a big fight over it.  The people must have then learned their true loyalty.  There was a general (umumi) fight here in the valley.  People fought in the chamand (grass land) below  Pushti-Mazar.  The people of Bamian heard about it and were coming to help the asnâshars (Imamis) when the women of the asnâshars (the Imamis) came between both sides with Quran [on their heads] and stopped the fight.  Then there was peace, but hostility for some time.

 

The Ismaili pir paid off the governor of Bamian with a horse and a horse to the main man of sayeds of Bergelich who was a big [prominent] man.  Since that time, Ismailis have been more open.  Now the King knows the pir sahib so they are recognized.  Since the fight, things got better between both sides.  At first they had nothing to do with each other, but times got better and they shared more and more.

 

[Their beliefs about God’s blessing are very strong.  Quântori [Qurankhori??] is a secular belief. ??[[check this] ]

 

Then last year at a wedding there was a big blow-up.  It was the son of Laal Muhammad who was marrying someone (who?) and the Ismailis — from q. of mullâ and shakar etc. mainly — claimed Lâl M. had thrown their food into the river and had not eaten it.  It was a lie (he says).  Apparently, everyone gives something to a wedding and these Ismailis claimed their food wasn’t used.  (an Imami poor man in Shibar)

 

Now the Ismailis don’t have to pay for their wives, he said (Gada’i), because P.S. gave the order.  This is since he made his trip abroad.  Now they pay only 10 ser wheat, 5 ser rice and 2 kushtani (bara?

 

).  Also, they give F of the bride a chapan, and the M a chapan and shoes and a lungi [Mother?].  (NB.  This is from an asnâshar).  Now, he says, they are really free.  NB:  he is single, alone.  This system for him must have some appeal.

 

(Rise of Ismailism)

Note on the family of xudâdad in Xordagaa of Shumbull.

 

“In Xordagâ there are 10 – 12 Asnâshar houses and 8 Ismayla houses.

Note on the family of xudâdad in Xadaga of Shumbull.

“In Xardagâ there are 10 – 12 Asnâshar houses and 8 Ismayla houses.”In Xardagâ there are 10 – 12 Asnâshar houses and 8 Ismayla houses.  These are all related.  The Asnâshar changed from Ismailia about 15 years ago.

 

Mir Nasir of Kalu said [(7-19) Kalu]:

 

Maybe 30 years ago the differences between Ism. and Asnâshar became emphasized and inter-marriage stopped.

 

MGH 6. (in Clan & Sect. Dist.)

 

Re: the sects (Imamis vs. Ismailis):  “Now each side is firm.  Neither side can change.  Each year sometimes a few change from Asnâshar to Ismailia, but not otherwise.

 

Birgilic

When the Sayyeds separated themselves from the Ismailis they became separate themselves from the people of Birgilich.  After that all their work [political affairs] became separate.  (Earlier he said, “The Sayyeds had their own arbâb”, i.e., change took place during time of or before time of Mir Murad Ali).  Then the Khalifa was Mubârak Shah . . . after he killed that man.

 

How conversion is impossible.

 

Fission-Schism (Hashem 4, Quchangi)

 

If Hakim (my B) becomes asnâshar, then I (Hasham) and F. would be mad.  Others would not let him in their houses.

 

QN 42: If a man changes from one sect, he does not change from Shiite to Sunni or Sunni to Shiite.  He can become Kafer/infidel, but he cannot become any other sect.

 

MGH 174.  Schism

A person can’t change his religion — never.  The Qaazi would be unhappy — no one could ever do this — also PS and mullaa couldn’t accept it.  People would give him reproach [taana], would say you are a din-gashta.  It is not really feasible to change from one sect to another.  A person can’t really get free from his sect.  Suppose he should say something unfriendly, and wouldn’t be nice to me, or should not do maraa’at (show respect, consideration) with me, then I would really be arzuda at him, angry at him.  Then I would have to go.  If he looked bad upon me and wouldn’t allow me to come before him, then I would have to go.  Anger is an easy thing.  Can tell the servant to put someone out.  Suppose that one day you get up to find for yourself a friend.  In a whole year you couldn’t find a friend.  If you fight with everybody in one day, you can become the enemy of everyone.  It is this way.

 

Sunni > Shia in Gazetter of Kabul p 304

Kuchari (tribe of Kizilbash) — were Sunni but became Shiah upon arrival in Kabul (from Iran). [p. 304] [NB this is strange, since the Q. were originally Shia; could I have gotten the whole thing wrong, and mixed it up?]

 

My father died fairly early and his other two brothers are no longer Ismailis.  My father and father’s father were Ismailis, but the other two sons were not.  They became Shi’ite by marrying with Shi’ite women.  My father was alive and wanted to marry but not when the other married.  now they don’t have much to do with me.  But my father’s brother’s son came and asked for my daughter, but because of the difference in religion, we refused.  since the general fight in Turughman, we do not intermarry.  (An Ismaili elder from Turughman)

 

 

People become Ismailis because they see values in the pir and they choose to follow him.  They see him as a greater help than the others.  (An Ismaili elder in Shibar)

 

article

1. Ahmad (Toronto), “Conversions to Islam in the Valley of Kashmir”; Central Asiatic Journal; 23:p. 3-18 (1979)

 

malik, schism, Q. conflict

Malek Ali Yawar [an arbaab] said that some of the followings of different maleks change.  One family will shift to another and back and forth.  So his following is different somewhat from year to year.

A malek [arbaab] must be rich, must be son of a malek, he said, must have a qawm (!), (i.e., a solid following in his own qawm, I think).

A man may change maleks at a time when he has a dispute with another person in the qawm following the same malek.  When the malek takes the other side, the man may decide to go to another malek to get help.  The situation was specifically described as between brothers in a dispute.  One brother will split off and go to another malek.  As the result of these moves, though his following is localized in one area — there are some who go to another malek.  But in such cases, they are socially quite at odds with another and socially split off from the other, also the malek.

The two maleks involved are put at odds and the feelings over this split — between the maleks and between the fighting [opposing] parties can be very strong.

The importance of his father’s name as a malek contributes a lot to the strength of a malek (Ali Yawar)

 

 

Pir/schism 202

Gul Nazar yesterday (June 20 ’67) said a little more on the Ismaili trouble.  He said that there were 3 brothers some time back — one was his GF, I think — who shared as they should.  But when they died, their families fought over the inheritance.  The result was that they split up — both spatially and religiously.  The 3 families went to three separate sects — Shia, Sunni, Ismaili.  One of these families was unable to get along in Shex Ali because the others wouldn’t tolerate a Sunni, so his family left and went to Sunni community.  The Shias, I think, stayed.

 

If H & W live with his F or B’s, they don’t talk much.  In this case, women and men sit separately and talk.  If they have money a H & W may move to a place of their own, and then they talk among themselves more.

 

————————-

Situation in 1950s-1960s, muhtasib

(people said):  Because the former Khasib – Khatibs [???] were from the area they didn’t give people much trouble, but now the muhtasib (who is from another area) is doing this [same work??] and he gives the people a lot of trouble.

 

 

Here begins the Bamian political history file

MGH 46

Contemp hist, sunbul, ethnic groups

The Q of maamand were kochis in Shumbul, but were settled on the land of the Xalifa.  the land also of 300-500 houses also in Burma, a large place in the area of Day Mirak.  Then they threw them out of this area, only a few Maamad houses [were] left there.  Then Maamand went to Aybak, near Tashqurghan and near Day Mirak [Day Mirdad?].

X Kalbisha’s grandfather was himself from Sanglaaxt-i Besut.

The people of Burma asked for the king to help them also.  When the Maamands went to Aybak, the inhabitants were also Afghans of Q Maamand, so they were able to stay.

Earlier Wazir M. Gul had given land to the Maamands in both Aybak and Burma [Barimak?], but in Burma the Hazaras had revolted and fought back.  so it was necessary for all the Maamands to to to Aybak.

 

8-22

Mir Kabir-i Mir M. Nasim (Bulola)-i Mir Ghoam Ali Beg (Bulola)(he built this memaan khaana; he was mir of all Shibar)-i Mir Gorz Ali (was in Bulola, over all of Shibar)-i Osayn Baay (he was not a mir but was very rich)-i Paynda Qadam Beg (was in Bulola)-i Jumaa Baay (he was the father of all this Qawm (aashur).

Osayn Baay had 7 Sons, all but one of whom cheated and mistreated their father and did not respect his last-dying prayer … These have no offspring at all and the land is scattered to others.  Mir Gorz Ali was the only one who cared for the father.  Was Mir.

 

Mir Gorz Ali: Bulola, Jola, Shumbul, Shibar, Birgilich, Jawzaar, Iraaq.  Mir of Kalu was Mir Abbas and Mir Zafar was in this time.

Mir Gholam Ali Beg: in the time of Abdul Rahman and Habibullah.  They paid maaliya.  He was over all of Shibar from Iraaq to Sar-i Shibar.  In that time Mir Bakhtiari was Mir of Kalu.

Mir M. Nasim.  died early and the wife (d. of Bakhtiyari) went back to her home.  Arbaab Kabir was 5 when she went back to kalu and lived there for 16 years.  he came back to Bulola one year before Saqaw [1929].  His land was here.  He came when Bakhtiyari died; otherwise the FF [nb. not Bakhtiari] would not have allowed him to come back.  [because there was aproblem between the ff and Bakhtiari?].

After Mir M. Nasim, his B was the mir.  Mir Amad Ali Beg was [mir] for 8-10- 12 years.  All of shibar was under him.  He was staying in Bulola in his Brother’s house [i.e. Mir M. Nasim’s house]  (the Qalaa was made by Juma Baay.  In this time Mir Sultan Ali (Son of Baktyaari) was mir.  (In those days Paay Murid to kaalu was the area of Kaalu Mir [i.e. was locationof Sultan Ali?].

When Arbaab Kabir came to Bulola, Mir Ahmad Ali Beg went to iraq to take his land [which was] left him by his F (who had land in Iraq too) and went there.  Kabir came to Bulola.

Below Mir Ahmad Ali Beeg there were MuySafeds over ea. qaria

The FF of MAJ was over Q. aadil.  Arbaab Ali Bakhsh [was] over Q. ayaam.

Mir M. Osayn over Shunbul; and later Mir Mowladad.  He [Osayn] was awdur baaca of MGH.

All of Shibar is from one father, Baaba Darghu (except Jolaa) and Kaalu is from him too.  One S. went o Shibar (to Daaki), one S was in Kalu (f of Nasir) and one s was in Iraq (kona qalaa).

Another child was born to Darghu and he called him Shaak (the Q. of Birgalich).  Another S, Aram Sha, his descendants are gone.

In Daaki, Shex M. was the son.

Xida was in Shumbul, Iraaq, Bulola.  In Kalu was another (name?)

People of Julaa came in later, are not related to Darghu.

The Sayyeds of Birgalich came in at some time, but not related.  Are in Jawzaar (6hhs), Byaamurda (7-8 hhs), Birgilich (20hh), Shumbul (10hh), Iraq, Shikaari, a few in Kaalu (in Dasht-i Tajak).

Juma Baay (Bulola) was of Aashur-i Khida-i Baaba Darghu (Darghaan), and he came from Kandahar.

In time they first came to Shibar they were at odds with Uzbeks.  Each Qalaa had its own well.

All of Shibar [was] 100 hh; Kaalu-Paymuri 1000.

Mir Murad Ali of Birgalich; he was mir of all Shibar.  Before Mir Gurz Ali [the mir] was Ikhtiyar (of Shumbul) then Mir Muraad Ali was mir.  they he retired in favor of Mir Gh Ali Beg (of Bulola).  The change came becasue the mir Murad Ali could not do something with government, so people let him go and took Mir Gh ali Beeg.  In those days [mirs?] were very rich because each hh gave one ser roghan (1000 hhs) [rent, dues to the mir].  (In Kaalu there were 700 hhs.)  [NB the diff way they were paid then than now — in animal products]

In the time of Ikhtiyaar:  Mir Abbas was Kaalu and was over both Kaalu and Shibar, but was very cruel and they killed him.  In those days 1 rupa was worth 25 ser wheat and he levied 100,000 afs maalya [dues] on the people.

NB on a stone written, “I have two wives, one rupa is worth 12 ser wheat.”

People of Pay Muri are children of Mir Abbas.  [Mir Zafar came earlier (was in Kalu) in Daan-i gargara/yargara.  That is:  Mir Zafar [in Kalu]; then Mir Abbas [Paymurid, where his “children” still reside]; then Mir Gholam Haydar [Kalu]; then Mir Bakhtiyari [Kalu].

 

 

M-29

Slave raiding and qalaas

Ismaili houses were sep awlis.  Awli=sep house.

Qalaa is an older form, from 20 years earlier, has several houses in it.

Even earlier:  Xaana-Otaaq= sep rooms

Before the time of laki, the Turkmaan from Bukhaaraa from around the Oxus river came and stole people and sold them.  This was why qalaas were built. They had lots of large horses, tied up their victims, put them on horses, carried them toward Bukhaaraa, to Turkistaan.  In those days the King of Bukhaara was weak and could not control these people.  We didn’t know what they did for a living, but were very cruel.  Many of the tictims got back.  But many also remained there and their descendenst are Turkmen, don’t know they are Hazara.

When qalaas were built, then they couldn’t get in so easily.  Also the king became stronger in this area, so the Turkemn couldn’t come so easily.  This was in the time of Ser Ali Khaan.

 

 

8-76

An old man, Asnaashar, told me one of his ancestors, Tay M., was captured below the old Qalaa of Bulola in days when there were robbers in these parts.  They used to come horse back in scores — 200 or so.  they took Toy M. and when got up to place called Taataar and something else (near Duaab) and there he read the Shanaama so well they used him as a teacher.  Two years later let him go, gave him a horse to go on.

 

 

p 200

Gul Nazar.  May, 1967

The following are brother groups:

1. Darghaan/Darghu: This is those on the upper side of the pass, Shibar.
2. Day Kalu [day Kalaan]: these people are scattered, are in Buyaan, Sakpar, Daan-i Kajak, Qool-i Kajak, Dasht-i Xagak, beet, Kootak, Jarf, Nirx, Pawaaz, Jagalak, Durwaaz (these are all in Shekh Ali).
3. Karmali: these are in Sang Andaab and Shingiraan, Pay Kootal (a few), Sar-i Bootyaan.
4. Qaluq: these are below Daan-i Shingaraan to Duaab-i Shekh Ali, Loolinj, Cukuma, Qool-i Xool, Taxt, Sorx, Paarsaal (Surkh o Parsal).
5. Xida = Naymu: Naymaan are in Ghorbandak (next to Shibar pass), Betqool, Kharjuy, Noolangak, Xarbeetak, Oolangajaangul, Bini Sewak.

NB:  MGH says Darghan is the Fa of Khida.

 

 

—–

M81

Mir Aminuddin Ansari.  He may be a descendant of Abdulla-i Ansar, whom Mir Ghulam Hasan claims descent from.  Was born in Kandahar, went to Herat.  The ancestors of Darghan (F of Khida) were from Pusht-i Rod-i Qandahar, same as Ansaari.  They are sometimes called children of Ansaar.  In this place is a large juy — nahar-made by these people.  Is now ruid.  now when people try to researrect it, they die in large numbers, maybe someon prayed a curse on the area.  Maybe it belonged to the sons of Darghan.  All Hazaras are from Khoja Abdul-i Ansaar.

 

 

—————–

Mir hist; mir and alaqadar

8-61:  Mir hist

Naayeblukma:  the old large governships in the dayd of Haakim in Bamian

sekot= before AR, 1/3 of crops

Under AR:  maalya:  Shibar 5,000

: Kalu, 11,000

:???

Under Zaher Shah:  3 years ago [1964], Shibar 22,000

Kalu, 14,000

Shibar has 4200 men now [1967]; Kalu and Ghandak 3800 men now [population]

In time of :   The mir was:

Dost M Khan    Mir Zafar

Sher Ali Khan  Mir Akbar

 

Kalu

CONTEMPORARY SITUATIONS

Gilkârs:  2 (for Ismailis)

Ghojurak

Iljânak

1 in Joolâ (for Asnâshars)

 

SCHISM

Boy in Bulola explained that Ismailis and Asnâshars don’t speak to each other — as I observed also.  “They are very chop with us.”  This has been for 10-15-20 years.

 

(8-69) NB.  The eating patterns separating the sects keep fellowship at a minimum.  Meals in which people eat at each others’ houses became communication centers for people — but centers which have limited lines across the sects.  Relatives and ampirâ stay in each others houses when they move around for economic purposes.  Man from Kâlu working for wheat stayed at house of Mir âmad Ali Beg — because same sect.  In this way they learn about each others’ relatives and sectarian arguments, and news about the P.S., etc.

The relations with the asnâshars are not good.  If they want to borrow from them, they would send away and tell them to go to their own kind.

 

SPATIAL PATTERNS OF PIRS/??MORIDS?? IN BAMIAN

Those of us in this village see the pir of Paghman as the great pir.  In some other villages around here, people believe in the pir of Logar (a moderately well educated man in Bamian.)

 

In Ghandak,    In Ghandak, the people are Tajik, but there are no Tajiks in Shibar.  But the pir of the Tajiks is the Hazrat.  The Pushtuns have Aakhundzâda.  They are like the sayyeds.  They are godly and knowledgable. (Ismaili elder in Shibar.)

 

The pir of Ahangaran, Topchi Mulayan, and Taybuti live in Istalif.  He is an âlem.   All these places are Tajik places. (notes from conversation with Tajiks in Bamian.)

Besides the Hazaras, there are some [Ismaili] goldsmiths from the eastern province and some Hindus and some Tajiks. (notes from conversations with Ismailis.)

 

The iron workers  are Arabs but they are not Sayyed.  Usually they are only artisans.  They are Ismaili in Iraq, Shumbul, Daki, Birgilich and Sheikh Ali.  The are Imamis in Jola and Ghulam Ali. (notes on a conversation with an elder in Shibar.)

 

=== RLC checked it to here ==

PIR

SAINT EXPLOITATION

SOCIAL PROCESSES between the pir-sect network

 

(M126)    The sayeds are very near the other people, but in a separate valley.  I didn’t give the right to use this mountain to anyone else.  After Mir GH became mir he freed the people from the hand of these Sayyeds.  At first, from ancient times [they] had cows, sheep-goats, land, donkeys.  In these times, Mir Murâdali was mir.  The sayyeds were not mirs, but were rich.  They got wine and moreof the things of the people for themselves.  They took their cows, killed them, ate them.  Shânshâ the father of Shâh Ghulâm Hosain before the saqaw was hâkim.  The kâkâ of Sha Gholam Hosayn was a hâji and very rich.  He had lots of land, from the time of his father and grandfather had lots of money.  Their father was Shâdarbesh, son of Shâh-i Askar-i ??.  These people in this line had money and took sut [interest] for one 100 Afs: 50 ser wheat [for 100 afs]; in this time, one Af was one ser.

 

(M127)   These sayyeds had money, and most people didn’t have money, so they could get this amount of interest.  They didn’t have the right to do this, by religion, but cruel people can do this.  Besides loans with interest they also loaned on giraw.  They would have the owner of the land work it for a yearly amount.  If they got 10 sers toxum of land for 1000 Afs, they would soon take 500 ser of wheat yearly from them.  (This amount of land, this will do about 200 or 300 sers of wheat if it is well fertilized.)  The rest of this wheat had to come from the borrower’s other lands.   It was like this before the saqaw.  Later, then it became better, after the saqaw it became better, only 30 ser for 100 afs.  Therefore better.  This was because wheat became more valuable.  Before this time money was in hard silver.  Then after the saqaw, the notes became more plentiful and the population may have grown so the money became less valuable.  Now, in these days 1000 Afs will only bring 20 sers of wheat in interest — i.e. much cheaper.  Shân shâ died after the saqaw, 20 years later.  Sayyed âmad shâ died five or six years after saqaw.  In the time of the saqaw all the people of Shibar were for Ahmanullah but the sayyeds were for the saqaw.  Shân shâ was very wealthy before becoming hakim of Shibar.  In those days the king couldn’t come there, but only the wâli, etc.  In the days of Ahmaunullah Khan the most wealthy people were the mustaofi.  Mustaofi mumâlik was the wakil of the king, was like a PM.  He was the one with the right to appoint these people.  Shân shâ probably gave money to the Mustaofi mumalik, maybe 1000 Afs, or 2000 Afs, (was silver in those days), he had come to Kabul to get this postion.  Then the Mustaofi gave him the firman to go to Shibar as hakim.  The government paid salaries of people there.  Under the hakim are other people who are responsible for the collection of taxes.  The work of the hâkem is responsible for the collection and maintanence of order.  Even now the hâdims take a lot of bribes, and in those days got even more bribes.

 

(M128)    Even in those days,(M128)     Even in those days,, the government kept close control over records of taxes paid, etc. so point of becoming hâkem was to take bribes.  When he was hâkem he was not in the area of Shibar, he was in Yakawlang, way on the other side of bandi amir.  He was not the hâkem of Shibar.  The Hakims get their main benefit from the fights and disputes between people in their area of birgilic and became their mir.  Mir Murad ali had died, who was from lower part of birigilic, was not a sayyed.  He was not so wealthy as the sayyeds.  Because he was the mir, they couldn’t do anything.  His power as Mir was important.  Even before Mir Murad ali died, Shân Shâ became mir.  He was mir for about four or five years.  When he died his son Shâ Gholam Hosayn became mir.   When Shân Shâ became mir, then sayyed were very strong.

These sayyeds were Ismailis in time of Shâ ali askar, then in time of Shâ Darbeesh (father of Shân Shâ) they changed to Shia.  Maybe some mullah changed their minds.  Before this time they were not so close to the common people of the area.  They didn’t marry these people, and they didn’t have meemâni with the.  Shân Shâ was before the Saqaw the hâkem.  Then in time of the saqaw the Mir Murad ali was Mir, who died a year or two after the saqaw year.  In this time sayyed were saqaw.  There was a sayed named Mir Ali gawar, in charde qhorband who told them to be saqaw, because the saqaw has taken the throne and no one can take it away from him.  They were not under him but one of the daughtes of Shân Shâ was married to him, and they were related.  In Charde ghorband there are only two or three houses of Sayyeds.  These are very wealthy.  In early days these people, the Sayyeds had lots of money and power and lyâz.  The lyâz was because . . .

 

 

(Section removed here)

[new page ??]

In the time of saqaw they tried to turn people to saqawi, but these people said until they die or are killed they will not become saqawi.  He had no right to be king.  Birgilich did not suffer under the hand of the saqaw’s armies because it was quite a ways off the main road, so was untouched.  Shumbul however was hit hard because it was on the main road.

After the saqaw these sayeds were afraid to make too much trouble because they were afraid of the new king Nadir Shah.

 

[p159]

The Sayeds of Birgilic in those early days when they were powerful, could use their cows, could even take a man and use him on their own fields, they would use their donkeys in carrying loads, the people had no choice.  They oppressed them a lot.  Before the sayeds, the mir was Mir Murâd Ali.  He was from the birgilici.  The sayeds were not under him and his people were not under them.  The sayeds had their own arbâb.  He had to do with the government, and if their was any trouble between them.  When the sayeds separated themselves from the Ismailis, they made themselves separate from the people of birgilic.  But the oppression of before, they were still able to practice.  They were rich, owned a lot, they took many peoples land in giraw.  They took people’s things and the people themselves for their own work.  They made them plow, made them harvest, made them . . .  If a man borrowed money and could not pay, they would take the man’s crop when it was cut.  They had people work for them, but gave them nothing at all in pay for this.  They couldn’t get wway from the because the sayeds were very rich, and the people were very poor.  The people were also unfamiliar and (un?)known to the government, and very poor.  They couldn’t go anywhere or request anything of the government . . . ghanimat meedâsht yak câr rooz guzâreemâ shawa [ghanimat = spoil, booty.  Their mir was also weak and he couldn’t say anything.  Their khalifa was mubârak shâ, he was very zabardast person but after he killed that man, he became very weak.  And he was relieved of [his] khalifagiri.  PS very angry at him.  After Mir Murâd ali died then the sayeds became the Mirs.  Shân Shâ became mir, the father of this Shâ gholâm osayn.  They became the mir because there was no one else in their q. who could do the mirri.  The sayeds were rich, and had money–cash.  This was kind of forced on them, they hadn’t wanted it really, but had to accept them.  They couldn’t ask someone else to be Mir who was Mir somewhere else because the place was far away and the person asked could have been afraid of the sayeds . . . [160] . . . were afraid sayeds would oppress them.  Then they felt they had better be able to get along with them so they could be saved from worse oppression by them, so the people themselves chose the sayeds to be their Mirs.  In those days their miri was not official.  They were mirs unofficially.  In those days the Mir was at home and went to the araqadâri when there was work to do there.  The sayeds had lots of land, had bought a lot before.  Would buy it when a man was so poor, was forced to sell it when he had nothing, then they would buy it.  People would give land on giraw.  The land would be giraw for an indefinate period of time.  Then when the time had gone on for too long, the sayeds say qawâlee baybâd biri.  Then they would give some more money and take the land as their own.   When this is done they go to the qâzi, the alaqadâr or the hâkim can’t do this, only the qâzi.  When he has written this, he makes a moor-seal–on the document.  Once the seal of the qâzi is on it, the former owner had no right to the land.  The qâzi is in bamyan, in the wulâyat, not in alaqadâri.

 

SOCIAL HISTORY OF CONVERSION IN SHIBAR

It used to be that people would recognize a certain place as a shrine.  THey used to burn candles there.  People would burn them in their own shrine, each for himself.  Or, for example, a man had been seen, a certain faqir or a certain malang, seen there and disappeared there, never came back.  Then people in the name of this person make a ziârat.  In those times before there was much mirgandâb, shikariâ, who killed deer and then brought the horns of the deer to the ziârat.  There was also in this place a ayâti, a kona, a ruins, a gumbak, and among these there was a graveyard.  They burned lamps on the graves of a certain person at night, and they made a wall around it and called it a shrine.

After that they called it a shrine and gathered horns there.  Or in the times of now roz or in the times of Id.  People killed buzghâla, and bara, and made dalwa, and alwâ, they carried their degs with them, people gathered together, then everyone went home.  In the times of our fathers, really our grandfathers, then later people understood that they were not meaningful.  If they still this today, they would have a lot of nice horns.  They did this twice every year, once at the end of Mizân, once at the beginning of spring.  They made alwâ and dalda in the fall.  In the beginning of spring tey dilled the bara, or the buzghâla, etc.  And the people ate these things and prayed, they called this xayrât — i.e. this was a ‘godly’ place — i.e. this is a big person.  They thought this was a big person and used to call this godly, and went there and ate over his grave.  A point about these horns is that they could not be burnt, and people had no other purpose for them.  Like they do now, they didn’t do then.  So they took them to the shrine, because they are to be under foot it would not be good.  We will leave them there because our hunting could be stopped, we couldn’t kill them.  So they left the shrine.  So that there would be more good hunting, more good hunting, etc.

They used to hunt a lot.  There were a lot of horns then.  Maybe now there aren’t 1/4 of what was there.  It was a higher pile than that house.  They brought/bring the deer home and eat the meat, then bring the horns to the shrine.  Only the horns go there.  The meat they eat themselves and give to their neighbors.  They divided it.  They didn’t divide it to the shrine.  In those days they were asnâshar.

Because he would not little (listen?) to the command of God, to the command of the Pir, did something he had no right to do.  He gets very angry, that he should never come near me again.  If a man repents, go to the Pir and say that he will not do a bad thing again–ex. gamble or steal, etc.–then the P.S. won’t say anything against him.  Because of his repentance, he will accept him.

We don’t say bad things against anyone.  As much as we can.   We say that stealing is very bad.  We think gambling is very bad.  Wine is very bad.  We think these things are very bad.  We don’t fight with them, or say bad things about them.  But people see us badly.  But we don’t see anyone badly.  All men are sinners, we agree.  A people come to the Pir and repent, and say may God forgive me.  If the P.S. should sin?  No, sir.  He is the possessor of ilm (knowledge).  In so far as is hand can reach, he doesn’t sin.  For example, if he were not ripe, then he couldn’t become the Pir.  If he doesn’t know God, he can’t become Pir.  If he isn’t the possessor of ilm he cannot become the Pir.  If he weren’t near to God, he couldn’t become the Pir.  In so far as possible, he has repented from sin.  He knows God’s work better, so doesn’t know sin, doesn’t see sin, –this is not his kind of work.  It is not neccessary to repent?  Why not, he is a servant of God.  He repents before god of sin, yes.  Prince Karim Xân is a person very high.  He is the son of Imâm Jâfar, who has be descended down from him.  He is his offspring.  He is like an Imâm.  We believe or Imâm is always present.  The asnâshars say he is disappeared, is no longer with us.

 

M5  In Shumbul half are Jamâti; half asnaashari

In Jolâ all are ashnashari

Awlâd-i mir :  all ashna ashari

aashur:  half ashna ashari and half jamaati

dila:  all jamaati

kaaka:  one third asna ashari, two thirds jamaati

 

Some tajiks in Ghandak are not related; this is a large place.  2000 people beyond Bulola, Sunni [“tassenno” = sunni]

 

At first there were few Ismailis but it grew larger

In the time of Imam Jaafar-i Saadiq, one son, Ismail vs Musaa-i Kaazim.  Until this time they were all Shia.  After this time they split.  The Shia were for Musaa-i Kaazim; the Ismailia were for Ismail.

The people of Afghanistan split over this.  The people who thought the one who was biggest chose the biggest one.  There was hard feeling.

Ta’asub bud.  One side said it understood the truth, the other side the other way.

 

M6  Now each side is firm.

M6  Now each side is firm.M6  Now each side is firm.  neither side can change.

Each year sometimes a few change from ashnaashar to Ismalia but not otherwise.

The ones who change are more oshaar.  The ones who are ignorant remain Asnasshar

 

Though opposed, they are not fighting, but look badly at each other.

 

In Shumbul:  1/3 asnaashar; 2/3 Ismailia

 

HaydarBaay

5 or 6 children [see list somewhere else]

These are asnaashar qawms:

Wulaytak

Khudaqaa

Jameli

Each qawm has its land separately; h is sep; land ownership is sep.

 

Some places the q. is split between religions

q of Ghlam ali [at top of Shibar]

q of Daaki

 

If most are Ismalia, then one of these is arbaab; they give arbaab to another qawm.

 

END OF RELATIONS IN BAMIAN FILE

 

The following are from typing done by Elaine and is called Notes.rlc

The general fight was about 20 years ago.  People were Ismailis secretly before that because they were weak.  They intermarried freely among themselves, but the Shi’ites didn’t know about this.  The Ismaili women who married Shi’ite men taught their children the Ismaili viewpoint secretly.  But then the general fight occurred in Turughman because they were discovered to be Ismailis, and some of the women went away from their husbands.  There was a lot of trouble for Ismailis in Turughman because there are only a few of them and there are many Shi’ites against them.  So, they are troubled a lot.  The Ismailis in the provinces always suffer more than in the cities because the people in the provinces can make trouble with the government for them.  They can make a complaint against them and if it’s strong enough, they can force them out.  (An Ismaili mature man from Turughman)

 

My mother was Shi’ite and my father was Ismaili.  In those days people didn’t pay much attention to the difference and they didn’t care.  They married across sectarian lines freely.  There was a fight between Ismailies and Shi’ites about 10 years after the Sagaw in Turughman (i.e. +/- 1939).  Only a few houses were Ismaili then.  (An Ismaili elder from Turughman)

 

Shia-Ismaili Relations in Shibar/Shumbal

We came to know that those other people are Ismailies because one of the sons of the Ismaili pir came here and stayed in the house of mullah G–.  Then we knew.  After that we wouldn’t have anything to do with them anymore.  We don’t marry them anymore, and we don’t even eat with them now because we’re afraid we’ll get sick from it because of this religion.  In fact, it’s no religion at all.  They call the pir sahib a prophet.  And what does he do?  He should change the wall to gold or something to show this.  But he only collects money for himself.  He should at least have some school or some plan for giving to the poor, but he only takes from his poor people and collects the money for himself.  (An Imami elder in Shibar)

 

The Ismailis and the Imamis here don’t speak to each other.  The Ismailis are very silent (chap).  This has been for 15 or 20 years.

 

Note:  See on eating patterns and separation of the sects in 8-69 in Schism, fission file.

 

The relations with the Imamis aren’t good anymore.  If we want to borrow from them, they would send us away and tell us to go to our own kind.  (Ismaili elder in Shibar)

 

Now each side is firm.  Neither side can change.  Each year a few change, but from being Imami to Ismaili — not the other way.  The ones who change are more sensible; the ones who are ignorant remain Imami.  (An Ismaili elder in Shibar)

 

 

Xaak Gadaai tells me that the Ismailis were that a long time back, but that 15 or so years ago there was a big fight over it.  The people must have then learned their true loyalty.  There was a general (umumi) fight here in the valley.  People fought in the chamand (grass land) below  Pushti-Mazar.  The people of Bamian heard about it and were coming to help the asnâshars (Imamis) when the women of the asnâshars (the Imamis) came between both sides with Quran [on their heads] and stopped the fight.  Then there was peace, but hostility for some time.

 

The Ismaili pir paid off the governor of Bamian with a horse and a horse to the main man of sayeds of Bergelich who was a big [prominent] man.  Since that time, Ismailis have been more open.  Now the King knows the pir sahib so they are recognized.  Since the fight, things got better between both sides.  At first they had nothing to do with each other, but times got better and they shared more and more.

 

[Their beliefs about God’s blessing are very strong.  Quântori is a secular belief. ?? ]

 

Then last year at a wedding there was a big blow-up.  It was the son of Laal Muhammad who was marrying someone (who?) and the Ismailis — from q. of mullâ and shakar etc. mainly — claimed Lâl M. had thrown their food into the river and had not eaten it.  It was a lie (he says).  Apparently, everyone gives something to a wedding and these Ismailis claimed their food wasn’t used.  (an Imami poor man in Shibar)

 

Now the Ismailis don’t have to pay for their wives, he said (Gada’i), because P.S. gave the order.  This is since he made his trip abroad.  Now they pay only 10 ser wheat, 5 ser rice and 2 kushtani (bara?

THE FOLLOWING TEXT WAS MOVED

A.R       Mir Ghulam Haydar, Sher Ali, Beeg, Mir Bakhtiyari

 

——-

m 32 PS

[nb when there was less contact with the pir and the followers were distant the mir had more power]

In the time when argument over lang between Sher M. and his B they didn’t tell anyone about it.  The PS lived far away, in kayaan in those days and didn’t know about these things.  In those day came once/ year.  he still comes only once/ year.

 

8-78  Mir, govent, hist

MAA Beg and Arbaab Kabir said the first Alaqadaari was set up in Bulola (I think first by Amanullah [nb. no the British mention that it was an Alaqadari in 19th c, Gazatteer, Bamian].  The Saqaw sent a man whom they did not accept (some trouble w/ him at least) and the real Alaq set up finally by Naadir Khan.  This was first in Bulola.  He stayed in the memaan Khaana of Bulola.  Fought with someone (over what?) and finally he left and went to house of Mir Mowladaad for a while, moved back again to Bulola.  Wa a while in house of Sayed Taalib Shaa (Shumbul) and then back to Bulola, etc.  People didn’t want him.  Eventually place was made for him and his helpers in Shumbul.

 

————–

1. of Naayib (Jumaa Kalaantar)

Our asil is from Besud; our fathers came to Aamqul first, stayed a while.  Then cause poor water, moved to dahan-i Khaak-i Baaba (from zard Khaak); the water there was bad.  Was chamand and very swampy and lots of mosquitoes.  then went to the place of MAJ [Quchanqi].  They got a lot of land there.  We had all the land in Quchangi and throught at first land from Zard Khaak to Daaki was theirs.  There was no one there thn.  Was a big chamand where horses fed.  Then the F of Mir Gholam M. Khan (FF of MAJ) forced them out, to move up into the valley.  In that time they had land in Dahan-i Quchangi.  Then Gholam M. Khan got it from them then, either by sale or etc.  Then Qalay M. Ali.

 

————-

182 A

The Q of Ayaam is spread around, some in Iljaanak some in Quchangi.  We are q of Shumbul.  the real name is sunbul.  In early times, there were mardum-i xaarijii  sunbul.  In early times there was a house down as mouth of the sunbul near the Alaqadar, and they lived there and that daughter was named Sunbul.  It got its name from than girl.  It was very long ago, maybe 400 years ago. [Haim’s dictionary:  snbl “sombol”, Hyacinth, Nard].  But we reishsafeds heard that there a house was built and her name was sunbul, were from people of khaarij, in those days, took a place and made a house, then later our people came into here.

These were people of khaarij, like your people, for example.  And these foreignors come and see the place and say this is such a nd such a place, from looking at a book.  Cause in those days people of kaarijis came here and lived here and came and went very long ago.  But these peole from abroad came and lived here.  Then the people fo the Hazarajat came and these people left, ran, I don’t know where, but left the country.  then when the Musulmans [came] they took the land.  This is what the muy safeds said.  Don’t know very clearly, but they were from Kaarij, they were in the saraay sang …?/?

 

——

Iqbal 7084 [Quchangi]

Before the Hajigak road was built people from Kalu came over the mt to Shibar to get a car to kabul.  They were more Koband.  Shibar was on the road, so easier to get to Kabul.

 

M17  Hist PS

Shalezi wouldn’t let PS go so he asked the King.  The govt of Surkho Paarsaa asked about Khayr M.  Why he had gone with PS to give him trouble.

In the time of Ikhtyaar:  in time of laki.  GF of MGH M. Ali Sardaar: and w friends.  These were from several places.  From at pass of Hajigak, in a place called Azaarqaash.  They took the wife of the King Abdul Rahman on this road.  Took all her stuff.  They let them go.  They took the woman and raped her.  200-300 men.  There may have been 100 men with the woman.  When she got to Kabul, the King ordered the leaders of this area to be brought to Kabul and jailed them, maybe 20 men, including Ikhtiyaar.  Then he fined them with a lak of Afghanis for ea of the leaders whom he jailed.  Also took M. Ali Sardaar (GF of MGH) and jailed him.  He was not a mir but was rich.  The King took the lak off from the people — althogether took maybe 10 laks.  the men who could paid their share.  those who couldn’t ran away and stayed away until A. R. died. and Habibullah became King, who forgave them of all of it, debt, etc.  They wen to Darusuf, Qataghan, Baghlan, Khanaabad.  they were there for 2, 3 years.  [NB, thus, the event took place, say, three years before death of AR, approximately 1897]  Habibullah called all them back and forgave them.  In those days the Ismailis were few and they didn’t stay with them [who?].  Rented houses, etc. and stayed away.  In those days all the Shias and Sunnis said bad things about the Ismailias and so few.  Ghaali / Ghalaa they called thenm, as a curse.  MGH’s F was Ismaili but his GF was not.

 

————

NB Yakawlang was center of resistance to AR, is called “kohband” cause of its snow.

 

 

—–

15-57 Bamian, Mir, Hist

Ali Yaawar is son of Ali Jaan-i Mosen Beeg-i Baaba Beeg-i Ashraf Beeg-i Qalandar Beeg-i Mir Muyuu Beeg …

he said his FF (MOsen Beeg) was so powerful a mir over all the area that whe he went to Bamian to the seat of governmetn he was accompanied by 100 men.  He did not show due respect to Amaanullah when he visited here, so Amanullah took him, jailed him, where he died, and moved his family (to mazar?).  then later the family came back.  Now Ali Yaawar is malik in Fulaati, but not over so many hhs, only about 300.

—–

 

———-

Saqaw

2-27  Khan Jaan, Kaakaa of MAJ

F:  Gholam Hasan-i Ali Sher-i Afghaan Beeg-i Khja Amir … > Aadil.

Khaan Jaan was in the time of Saqaw.  The B [M. Amin/Amir?] of Amanullah was travelling in Hazarajat to get people to support him.  Khan Jan was sent with money by the PS along with several others to help Amanullah.  They carried money in fomr of hard silver sewed in belts.  in those days 1000 afs weighed 20 lbs.  he was carry 2500 Afs, so 50 lbs of money on him.  the other were also the same.  he and they were someplace on the war near Unay Pass and while there eating tea, the people stole their horses.  They ran out and would have fught over this, but were overladen with their belts which of course they carried secretly.  They dared not make too great afuss lest it be discovered they had money.  So they gave up the horses.  Then someone came who was rich and said they could get their hoses back, cause were taken by thier servants and if they would ea pay 500 afs ea they could get horses back.  There was a big discussion over this among them, young men said no, but F of MGH who was older and more experienced said now could get them back and should do it.  So they did it.  The men took their money and the other followed in hopes of getting their horses [again?].  But when the got further away they turned thir guns on them and told them to leave.  So in the end lost both the horses and the 500 afs ea.  And did not help Amanullah.

In the days that followed the PS was chased all over .  The people of DehZangi stood with the PS and Ismailis against the Saqaw.  After this they returned to their place.  After Amanullah lost, they heard 600 men of Amanullahs army were coming to Shibar to join the resistance vs the Saqaw.  Only 300 of these reached Shibar.  The others were killed or ran away.  These stood with people of Shibar 9 months of trouble.  The Saqaw’s armies came several times.  They killed leaders in Shumbul and burned houses.  The people ran away.

The people of Shekh Ali at first stood vs the Saqaw, but finally gave up, surrendered.  Then they helped the Saqaw’s armies.  They were very dangerous cause knew the area of Shibar and knew who was rich, etc.  So they led armies into the razing of the Shibar areas.  They helped dig up the wealth hidden in the ground, etc. and nothing was left to anyone.  The people of Shekh Ali were mostly Shia.  Also the shias of Shibar gave up early so the Ismailis were left along to fight the Saqaw.  The shias of Daaki and other areas also made peace with Saqawis, so they caused much trouble.

 

 

—————-

14-3

The people of Chaarikaar and Qarabaagh area are still sore about the way the king Naader Shaa treated the Saqaw.  And Sayid Amin.  Saqaw was from Qarabaagh area, and Sayyed Amin from Charikaar.  Now, there are two sons of Sayyed Amin still living in Charikaar, they are big Khaans.  There are two sons of the Saqaw in Qarabagh, one a langowner and the other dewaan.  The government doesn’t bother them.

 

 

———————

June 26, 1967

1. Osayn (owner of school, large house, from Turughman) tells me that he knew Bache Saqaw before hge became King. Aaji was a wood seller in Charikaar at the time. Saqaw was aman who came into town a lot and visited with Aaji.  There was another man Sayyed ….[Amin?] who became Saqaw’s minister of war, who at this time was operating out of Charikar while Saqaw was working in Kah Daman.  They got started as robbers by gambling.  Got into trouble by losing.  Went out and stole or robbed for their money.,  They would take, say, 50,000 afs, then pay 10,000 to Haakim and 5,000 to Kunaandaan and then walk opening around in the town — couldn’t be touched.  They wore bandeliers and carried rifles over shoulder and a pistol on the belt.  Also a dagger.  Gradually they grew in strength and power and people began to follow them.  Then when he became strong enough (says Aaji) he said lets go take the throne.  After he took the throne people were put under his control  In Ghorband they went out to subject the people. In Turughmaan they ran into the hills and stayed.  Their homes were burned etc.  Eventually they came back.  The rishsafeds finally hoisted a flag and made peace.  There was a battle in the Unai Pass area led by the Saqaw’s army and the people of Behsud (wrote names elsehwere)  They fought, this way and that, and eventually Saqaws men had to give it up because in that time Nadir Shah came toward Kabul with his army.  Thus the Saqaw had to give up the Hazarajat and go back to Kabul.  they shot the Saqaw by firing squad.

 

 

—————-

16-27

An old man 70-80 years old said with certainty that Naader Khaan (F of present King) killed Habibullah.  He and another old man, the Pushtun, told story of when Naader Shah took the throne, a famous general Gholam Nabi from Logar, who had been coming to kabul from Mazar with a force to protect Amanullah when he was abdicating, but who gave it up when they heard he ahd abdicated (from an airplane which dropped notes that said so ) — opposed Nadir’s keeping the throne, felt it belonged to Amanullah, he said, both you and I are Gholaam.  he had been offered a top generalship.  When refused, he was killed.  It was his servant’s son who killed Nadir Shah, the boy was hazara.

Because of the number of Hazaras who supported Amanullah, ep those from Besut , some of the leading ones were made cols and generals in Nadir’s army.  But when Nadir was killed, all the army wa spurged of Hazaras.  many were jailed.  (This fits Nabi’s sotry re Nadir’s promise to some people to put Amanullah back on the throne, when he didn’t this general (Nabi) ran to peshawar wa spromised safety if returned, offered rank in army, then killed.  NB Nabi is from Ghazni, looks Hazara, clams to be Sunni.

 

———

Minorsky, Vladimir.  1982.  Medieval Iran and Its Neighbors.  London:  Variorum.

Ch. II:  Some early documents in Persian (I). [orig. 1942.  J. of the Royal Asiatic Society.]

Ch III:  Some early documents in Persian (I). [orig. 1943.  J. of the Royal Asiatic Society.]

Some documents from Bamian dated c. 607/1211.

Doc A is most important.  VM 96: “characterizes the situation at Bamian under the local branc of the Shansabaanii princes of Ghor.”  Bamian was the locus of the rulership of one of three branches of the Ghor family [Ghazni and Firoz-koh being the others].  The Bamian domains included

607/1211.

Doc A is most important.  VM 96: “characterizes the situation at Bamian under the local branc of the Shansabaanii princes of Ghor.”  Bamian was the locus of the rulership of one of three branches of the Ghor family [Ghazni and Firoz-koh being the others].  The Bamian domains included Tokharistan, Badakhshan and some territories to the north of the Oxus.

Indicates that at time “infidels” still existed in the area, suggests that warfare against them was being carried on.  VM suggests that these might have been Qaraa-Khiaay tribesmen, whom he identifies as “remnants of the Liao rulers of China [who had] succeeded in founding a secdond kingdom at Blassaghun (near the Issiq-kul lake) and were victorious in their wars against the Muslim Qaraa-khaanids of Samarqand, the Seljuks of Khorasan, and the Khwaarazm-shaahs” [p.98].  At this time also “the princes were quarrelsom, disunited, and ready to invoke help from without.  Their amirs were ingriguing and exploiting the opportunities of their charges; their servants were courting thier master’s favours, gambling and oppressing the common folk.  Trade fumbled among obscure deals and only land was harnessed fast to the yoke of ancient law.”  We note that in particular the subjects of the ruler were expoloiting the peasants by monopolizing salt.

 

 

14-2  Old name for Bamian was Fanyaan, or Fanyaana (from 119 in Afghanistan, 1337 edition).

See Griesbach in Notes and Quotes, in time of A.R.  [could this be a ref to India Office Library source?  he is mentioned by Adamec, vol 1]

 

8-79

MAAB says that the government used to require much more than it does now in terms of labor and goods.  They took a lot of yuzum from Shibar to the Haakim of Bamian.  Now not so much of that.  He thinks things are better now than before.  They ask for wheat, etc.  The alaq says they pay 2 afs/naan.

 

16-10

[sayyed from valey before I reached SyaaKhaar Bulaaq in Fulaati]:  he said in the Saqaw year, the Saqaw’s men came and took all their flocks.  They themselves were in the Aylaaq when the men came.  And so they all ran away.  Others had said thir houses were burned,  but he didn’t mention it.

 

11-169

In Saal-i Saqaw Tajiks were for Saqaw and Hazaras were against him.  Tajiks were in dire trouble, nearly defeated.  Soon reinforcements came from kabul and quieted the Hazaras.

 

16-28

The Sayyeds of Fulaadi openly opposed the Saqaw.  Their houses were burend (friends from Ali yaawar’s village said), stayed on mts but one man in Ali Yaawar’s village put up the flag and stayed.  he save all the Hazaras.  When Nader Shah came he had to run for his life, but Nadir Shah knew they agreed to accept Saqaw under duress.

 

 

[Secret expansion of the Isma`ilis.]

(source??, Sayyed Anwar?:)  An early missionary to extend Isma`ilism outward from Kayan was Haydar Faqir, ??? a member of the Pir Sâheb’s family. He went to Kalu [a large populous valley that at that time was a least two days travel away from his native Kayan].  He converted some households there and went on to Shumbul, a day’s journey to the east, where he converted a few other households.  The households that converted had problems with their neighbors over this.  Families were divided, but eventually they became reconciled again, apparently without the Isma`ilis giving up their faith.

 

(An Isma`ili from Shumbul:)  People were Isma`ilis secretly because they were weak.  They intermarried freely among themselves but the Shi`as didn’t know about the Isma`ilis.  The Isma`ili women who married Shi`a taught their children secretly.

 

It was much later that the Isma`ili beliefs of these people became widely known, and it had near tragic consequences.  Here expand from file on Isma`ilism in Shumbul, etc.

 

 

 

THE FOLLOWING IS NOT ABOUT THE PIR BUT ABOUT DIVISIONS AMONG THE ISMAILIS

The sectarian fighting in Shibar in the 1950’s

(My notes from a conversation with an elderly Isma`ili man named SarKhidâd in Kalu:) The general trouble was about 20 years ago.  It was true that people were Isma`ili secretly before that because they were weak.  They intermarried freely among themselves but the Shi`a [Imamis] didn’t know about the Isma`ilis.  The Isma`ili women who married Shi`a men taught their children the Isma`ili viewpoint secretly.  When the general trouble came up some years ago, there apparently were some women who ran away from their husbands ‑‑ not in Shibar but in Turughman ‑‑ because they were discovered to be Isma`ili.  There apparently was a lot of trouble for Isma`ilis in Turughman because there are only a few of them there, in comparison with the Imamis.  So they are troubled a lot there.  The Isma`ilis in the provinces always suffer more than in the city because people in the provinces can make trouble with the government for them.  They can make complaints against them and if they are strong enough they can force them out [presumably by the high costs involved in the dispute].

Sakhidad said his mother was Imami and his father Isma`ili.  In those days they didn’t pay much attention to the difference and they didn’t care.  They married across sectarian lines freely.

 

Early dispute between Isma`ilis and Shi`as in Turughman

There was a fight between Isma`ilis and the Shi`a [Imamis] about 10 years after the Saqaw [i.e., about 1939] in Turughman.  There were 5 mirs [chiefs] there then.  Only a few houses were Isma`ili.  The Khalifa [representations of the Isma`ili pir] there was Manucher and he was trying to start trouble between the groups and the sects in order to increase Isma`ilism, but the Pir Sâheb finally was upset and changed him.  The people argued on Manucher’s behalf and told the Pir Sâheb that they wanted only him [to be their Pir].  The Pir Sâheb said that he was not soliciting followers.  If they wanted Manucher they would have to go.  They took Manucher.

 

Isma`ili ‑ Shi`a intermarriage

Sakhidad’s father died fairly early and his other 2 brothers are no longer Isma`ilis;  His father and father’s  father were Isma`ilis but his two brothers are not.  They became Shi`a through marriage with Shi`a girls.  The father was alive when one of them married, but not when the other married.  Now they don’t have much to do with Sakhidâd.  But because of their relationship one brother’s son came and asked for his daughter.  Because of religion he and his wife refused.  Now, since the public fight [in about 1952] they don’t give [them] their daughters in marriage.  He claims his son went back to Shumbul for his military registration.  His qariadâr [local representative to the government] is Mir Gholam Hasan [an Isma`ili] but the Wakil Sâheb [the representative of the Shi`a in the same area] also helps him.

 

Shi`a‑ Isma`ili sectarian disputes

In the old days Sakhidad claims the mirs were glad for the trouble between the sectarian groups because they got paid for settling them.  Usually the mirs were friendly with each other.  Mir Mowladad and Mir Khalifa (father of Mir Ahman Jan) were quite friendly.

 

More on Shi`a‑ Isma`ili sectarian disputes

(Notes on a trip to Kalu:)  For a while, until recently (that is, in the last 2 years) the Isma`ilis were free of trouble.  But before that they had trouble.  They had to be secretive about their religion.  Now also they are open, but they are having trouble.

 

 

Qorban also said the khatib has not come around for many years.  He used to examine people on the creed, the five obligations — fast, ahlms, prayers, pilgrimage, and creed.  But he could say nothing to Ismailis because they always gave the right answers.  (N.B.  this was probably before the Ismailis came out in the open.)  He said the Shias have Khalifas who collect the Shia tax.  The Sayyed from Iraq valley was a Khalifa who had come to collect khums from the Asnâashars.  It is possible that the Khalifas had not come before this time and that it was the first and the Ismailis (who were secretly paying their tithes) rebelled.  He said they had been paying the money to Wakil Sayb — 10% — before this.  Also, couldn’t recall whether  no one at all had collected the tithe before.  The mullah who collected the tithe was Shâ Sayed (of Iraq) and stayed with the house of Sayyed Qâdir (?) — of Dahan-i Wulâytak.

 

(4-60) Mulla Gh. Reza pointed out that the shias and Ismailis are on fairly good terms.  He said they are still related and marry sometimes — so things are not so bad.  Also the [sharing of the] chopân (shepherd) is not necessary for only the sect.   They may share one chopân from on village.

Note [same page]:  Lâl Muhammad denies all this.  He says there is no cooperation among the Ismailis and Shias.  Gh. Reza (Mulla) seems to be trying to smooth things over.  In his relations with Khdâdâd over the animals eating his lalma [lalmi], he was very tactful, maybe too much so.  He seemed to joke rather harshly on Khdâdâd, as if he were joking, but were [was] in fact making snide remarks (perhaps).

 

Social relations in early Bamian, +/- 19th and early 20th c.

Marital relations

(4-62)    Lâl Muhammad married a girl who was 13 — is now 30 [i.e. 17 years ago].  And in that time there was only one sect in Shumbul — went to Kotal-i-Shibar to a mulla who said nekâ there.  His mir then was the brother of Wakil Sayb.  Later he says it was Wakil Sayb.

 

Note that a number of marriages between these groups took place prior to the 15-17 years ago fight . . . of Mirzâ Ali (Ismaili) from Lâl Muhammad — his land went to his daughters who married males in ???? darya. [cf.  Shumbul, Musâferbây], also 3-14, 3-12,13.

 

Early Cultural practices, religion

IN SHIBAR

 

When Hashem was a child, he remembers eating dirt from the grave of the father of Sayed Mubarak shâ, after he died, many people went there as a zyârat [shrine].  When the kids were sick, they took dirt from the grave and fed it in spoons (like castor oil) to get them well.  They also went to the grave of Manzar Shâh which is in Khâk Mushak.  Then this all stopped because P.S. wrote against it — argued against it.  Hakim [the younger brother] did not eat this dirt.  They apparently dropped these things and Zyârats and tumâr at the same time.  They dropped Tumâr, zyârat, eating dirt of zyârat, pâl (i.e. fortune-prophecy), 14 or 15 years ago, suddenly and completely.

 

Early Pirs

Masson says [where??] that a Sayyed Shah Abbas was a Pir in Birgilich, and was pir of the Sheikh Alis.

 

Early Mirs

arbâb kabir

Mir Abbas was mir of Kâlu and Shibar, [he] was in the time of Abdul Rahman.  He was very cruel.  I don’t remember who was before him.  Then there was Gholâm Haydar, the father of Gholâm Rasul.  Mir Zafar was in Dân-i Gharghara.  Then [after him? there] was Mir Baxtiâri.

In the time of Mir Abbas all of Kâlu and Shibar were under him.  People killed him because he was very cruel.  He explained to us, and the people.  After Mir Abbas was Gholam Haydar.  He was also in Kâlu.  Also there was Mir Zafar.  After Mir Abbas was killed, Shibar and Kâlu became separate, [they] had separate Mirs.  At the time of Mir Abbas, Ikhtyâr was in Shibar.  He was liked, was mir for many, many years.  After him was Murâd Ali, who lived in Birgilic.  Then there was Mir Gurs Ali, then Mir Gholâm Ali.  Then Gholâm Mâmad, Mir Mowladâd.  He was the mir of all of Shibar.  My grandfather, Mir Gurz Ali, was mir before that.  He was in Bulola.  Irâq was under him, too.  The arbâbs in Irâq then were Mirza Faiz Ali, Arbâb Ali Mâd, and before that they had others:  Mir Zânu, Mâmad mir.  Mir Zânu was in Irâq, Mâmad Mir in Irâq was my FFF.  And Mir Abbas’s daughter had hit his hand when they went from Shibar to him.  When they were coming, she hit him and cut his finger.  Then Shibar hit Mir Abbas and killed him.  She was in the house because her foot hurt, then she saw that 1000 men from Shibar have come to us.  At first my ancestor, Mâmad Amir, was going to kill him, then the girl hit him and then the others came and killed him (Abbas).  A thousand men came against him.  He had some body guards, but not nearly as many.  The sons were killed in ??     of Irâq.  The sons ran away, hoping the people wouldn’t be so much against them, but the people didn’t let any male live from Mir Abbas.  Mir Abbas was not a descendant of Mir Zafar.

His daughters were left alive,     His daughters were left alive, and through them he has grandchildren but no sons.  They were killed in Shina of Irâq.  After that the mirs of Shibar and Kâlu were separate.  But then whoever did well, like Baxtyâri, he took Irâq, Daki, then also Birgilic, Ghandak and Jalmish, and he was mir of Kâlu.

When Mir Abbas was killed, naturally some of the people of Kâlu were angry, but they couldn’t do anything, because so many rose up against him.  Then Gholâm ayaday [Haydar?] or Mir Zafar were in Kâlu at that time.  In Shibar was Mir Gorz Ali.  Baxtyâri was in the time of Mir Gholam Ali Beg.  Then Mir Murâd Ali gave up the miri for Mir gholam ali beg, because he said he was more informed, wise.

Then when he died Mir Mowladâd became mir — i.e. when my grandfather died then Mowladâd became mir, then Mir gholâm M., then by alliance, agreement the mirs were changed [i.e. must refer to an informal concensus].  Also in the time of Mir Gholâm M., my kâkâ [Mir Ahmad Ali Beg?] was mir for one year.  They changed by itifâq — by agreement, concensus.  Then my kâkâ was not happy, because if you are going to go to Mir Gholâm M. then don’t come to me anymore — I won’t be your mir.  When people became aligned [basta] to him he tries to become mir, and [to make] the other not to be mir.  One year my father was mir, then my kâkâ, then Mir mowladâd, then Mir gholâm M. beg.  Then in the days of Mir gholâm M. beg, my Kâkâ stood up for one year, he was miri in Bulala, then went to Irâq and did miri.  Mir gholâm M. was under the hand of my grandfather [Bakhtiari?] then he took my mother.  My kâkâ [MAAB] gave her to him.  Her father wouldn’t give her to him, because he felt my kâkâ should take her [because he was the brother of her first husband, after his decease].  If you don’t take him, he told her, then you should stay at home.  But my mother wouldn’t agree to him.  Over this Baxtyâri was upset with Mir alamad ali beg.  He was still living.  The father, Arbâb Ali baxsh, came for pershraw [peyshraw? purshis {question, asking}?] to ask her to take him as husband.  At that time I was small and in Kâlu, 5 or 6.  When they married, I was 7 or 8.  After that Mir gholâm M. ran away, avoiding Mir baxtyâri.  That it was bad for his name that they didn’t marry — or she didn’t marry — according to his orders.  My uncle [MAAB] became mutafiq with him, and then he gave her to Mir gholâm M.  My kâkâ [MAAB] had the first right over her and wanted her, but she would not agree.  Then he gave her ba dista to father of MAJ [Mir Gholam M.].  If he hadn’t agreed, then they couldn’t have taken her.  The father of him [her? i.e. Arbab Ali Bakhsh] was also a help; he also took some money.  And the father took money.  Later on I fought with them, because they had sold her to them.  Maybe they took 1000 or 2000 — got it from Mir gholâm M.

When a man dies, his brother has the first right to the wife.  But she has to agree, if she doesn’t then it isn’t done.

Mir gholâm M. before he took her, he was a Mir, but didn’t have a big following.  After he took her, he got a lot of aqyat/asyat, because he had the daughter of Mir baxtyâri.  The point is that I should get a wife from some nâmdâr from a motabar person.  To get a wife from a man who moves around the country, who is informed, famous, etc.

Mir Gholâm M. had two other wives.  They were not famous people, they were from his own gawm.  They were alive when he took her.  But this woman was fâmida, could do everything, was the daughter of a nâmdâr and was jawân.  She also can read and write.

N.B. This man [Mullah Hosayn?] is xwârzâda of her. (i.e. his mother is sister of Mulla Hosayn.  Since MAJ’s mother is daughter of Mir Baxtyâri, he is xwârxâda of her.)

Then I was nâsâz with Mir Gh. Then I was nâsâz with Mir Gh. M. for some years, because he had taken my mother.  If I had been grown, and not small, he couldn’t have taken her.  Even if his place had not been far away, I wouldn’t have given her to him.  I didn’t want him.  Only my uncle gave her to him.  (my kâkâ mâkâ, i.e. others were involved — the prior right of the husband’s qawm?)  The kâkâ of Mir Ahmad Ali [Beg].  They agreed among themselves.  The wife herself did not marry (anyone in the qawm(?)), so “Come, let us give her to him”.  The uncle of this (?) came and said I am your muzdur [servant], your deeqân [farm laborer].

Then came uzur K. to house of mâdarmâd (?) — men and women.  They came heads bare, uzur K. to our house.  That you should please not fight with us.  Then we became sâz with them.  They said they will give us two daughters, so that you will be sam with us.  Don’t fight with us.  We became sam with them, but we didn’t take their daughter.  The people that were on their side were all of shibar.  These people who came sar lutch were from the Q. of âdil from quchangi.  They came to bulola, to our house.  Then they gave me a chapan and a horse.  They were going to give me two girls.  One of these was the mother of Hashem and there was another of them, child of her kâkâ.  But I said I didn’t want them, I had not râai with them.  I said, other than my own mother, I won’t take anyone else.  She was herself happy to be there.  She was herself happy to be there.  She told herself that she had left these (girls?) for me.  You should take them, but I wouldn’t take them.

Then he became very big.  Over all of shibar, to Irâq, but not ghandak.  At that time Mir baxtyâri was over ghandak.  Mir baxtyâri brought me to Kâlu because he liked me a lot.  My kâkâ [MAAB] became motafiq with them.  He wanted to take her himself but she wouldn’t.  After this, for one year Mir âmad ali beg was mir of shibar, but for only one year.  Then after that, Mir gholâm M. became Mir.  Somehow he got the people to him.  He [Mir] G.M. did fishâr.  He did something with the government.  He turned the people to himself.  There was no fight over this.  The kâkâ didn’t fight over this.

Mir mowladâd was a mir in the time of Mir âmad ali beg, but he was basta with him.  My uncle did everything, he was basta with him.  He helped my uncle.  Then after that, Mir mowladâd became (mir), then Mir gholâm M., then after that my kâkâ again.  When Mir Gholâm M. was mir, Mir moladâd did not help him, but his people were with Gh. M.  My kâkâ told him not to allow it (him? i.e. Gh. M.?), the kâkâ said he was not happy with Gh. M.  Then he beitifiqi namekad, ke mâ yak ismâyeli asteem.  And Mir mowladâd was not ismailia. (hic.  He had the hickoughs).  The sects were already known.  Mir mowladâd did not help Mir Gh. M. at all and also did not betifâqi k.  He said that this (person?) should be it.  Your father was (mir) before, before you, and he should also be it now.  But he didn’t agree, so he mutafiq girift with him (?).  Moladâd did.  Mir mowladâd was mir before, too, after my father Arbab Ali Bakhsh], and also was after my kâkâ [MAAB].  Then Gh. M. xest, and told my kâkâ to do miri again, and he didn’t — but if he had also xest, there would have been a fight, and he couldn’t have won.  Then there were two mirs.  Some people took him.  Then uwâ beitifâqi nakard.  He said beitifâq  meshem.  i.e.  We will be disunited if I also xest.  The asnaâshar are only a few — 200 – 300 households.  But they, the sayids of Birgilich, were bast on the side of Mir Gh. M.

My father, gurz ali, was Ismaila.  He was strong, so the asnâshar could not say anything.  In those days, people would say they were murid of sayid so and so, most of them said they were murid of sayid -i- kayân.  People didn’t know much about maslak in those days.  From the days of his fathers, the sayid -i-kayân was the most famous.  Others were just gadaygars, who were hungry, etc.  Also the sayids of Birgilich had their followers, too, and they later nashud (i.e. it didn’t work out for them.)  Later, they had a dispute with Mir Gh. Mâmad over who was to be Mir — was not over sect — they were for Mir mowladâd.   Some people went with Mir mowladâd, but many were for Mir Gh. M.  Those who supported Mir mowladâd were from everywhere.  From shumbul, jolâ, only a few from Birgilich, if any.  There were 100 houses in jolâ.

Mir Gh. M. died still young and vigorous.  After he died, they took one of his brothers to the Mir, then my uncle [MAAB] — the brother they took was barât ali, and my uncle was Mir âmad ali beg.  Mir Gh. M. died almost 20 years ago.  After he died, Mir mowladâd also xest, but he died, then we took MAJ.  He was our brother to us.  He also told Mir âmad ali beg that he was as a father to him.  He came and kissed his hand, and kissed his face, out of friendship.  He was a good boy to xest.

 

Bakhtiaari’s time

Kalu-at Mir Nasir

An old man talked with has said a lot about bakhtyâri I didn’t understand.

¨ Mir Bakhtyâri had a dispute over maliki over [with?] the people for two years.  It must have been serious.  In the end the other pretender was put in jail until his death.  Bakhtyâri was Ismaili secretly if he was one.  The other was asnâshar.  After this fight, Bakhtyâri visited Kayân to see P.S. and acknowledged his superiority.

¨ In those days, people couldn’t come out openly regarding their Ismaili faith.  Ismailis couldn’t survive in the army if they said they were Ismaili.  They had to go around in groups of ten or more to be safe.  They began to be more open about their Ismaili faith in the time of Nâdir shâ khân.

 

early [secret] advance of Ismailism

Pâynd Ali (of âdil), servant of Jean Selch

Said in early days of Ismaili in Shibar there were several mullas who began to teach for Ismaili.  They did it only carefully — secretly — only to people they could trust, who really were friends.  They changed ideas of a few people — 2 or three to five — and they met to discuss these things, but only secretly.  They never told about themselves.  Then 30 or 40 years ago, the P.S. openly said he was Ismaili and was for âqâ khân.  In Shumbul one of the most effective mullas was Abdul the FF of âkhund aslam.  Also FF of Mubârakshâ.  Eventually, they changed a lot of people to Ismaili in their areas.

 

early Islmailis in Shumbul

early Islmailis in Shumbul

(An elder from Shibar, MGH).  In our place now we are all Ismaili.  When my father became Ismaili the whole of Pusht-i Mazar [his village] became Ismaili.  Qalaa-i Mullah [another village] were Ismaili before Pusht-i Mazar — maybe twenty years earlier than us.  Our Khalifa was Mullah Baabay the father of Mullah Gholam.  In a few places there were a few [Ismaili] houses scattered among the other [Shi`a] houses.  In those days we troubled these people a lot — said bad things abou them … Eventually we all became Ismaili.  These early Ismailis were probably close, or well known, to the Pir Saheb.  Mullah Bâba Bây — in our childhood we called him Mullah Bâba.

 

(An elder from Shibar).  When Pusht-i Mazar [his village] became Ismaili it was 70 years ago, maybe.  The Pir Saheb was Timur Shah.  He had not visited there.  Travel was difficult then — only by horseback.  In those days few people could see the Pir Saheb, but the masjid was there [in Kayan].  The Pir Saheb’s grandfather built the masjid.  Their homeland is in Iran.  At first they came to Khawât [in Besud?], then moved to Kayân.  At first only old people knew the origin [of the pir’s family] was Iran and that they were pirs.  Then more and more people began to see that they were.  Maybe the Pir Saheb knows his family’s descent.  The Pir Saheb and the Aga Khan are both descendants of Ali, but through the main line of Ali; the Aga Khan is from bigger people than the Pir.

 

(An elder from Shibar).  Mullah Bâba [in Qala-ey Mullah].  These people had become Ismailis many years before [his vilage].  Their livelihood was better than that of many others.  It is likely that their prosperity helped induce the people of Pusht-i Mazar [his village] to become Ismailis.  The other people in Shumbul, many of them, had already become Ismailis [before Pusht-i Mazar].

 

(Sayyed Sarwar Shah of Ghojurak).  His father was Shah Gholam Hosayn-i Sayyed Mirza [of Ghojurak].  He was Khatib [therefore was also mullah for Pusht-i Mazar years ago] for the Qâzi, but was not so official; he said the nekâ [marriage cermony] and made people keep up the mosques.  He was himself Ismaili.  Everyone feared the Qâzi; he could jail them, hit them with a durra [a studded belt used for punishment].  He was the only one who could do that, not the Governor even, not the subgovernor.

 

(Gholam Rasul, brother of Mir Gholam Hasan).  In the old qalâ [fort, at the mouth of Shumbul], there was a school there.  Pusht-i Mazar had a mullah, Shah Gholaam Hosayn [the Khatib], son of Sayyed Mirza, son of Sayyed Khojaa) in Ghojurak.  His sons are there now.

 

Pattern of pirs / saints services and veneration in early Bamian

(Mullah Sidiq, a man from Shibar, and had worked in Kabul for several years).  Shah Ali Shah was a leader of the Ismailis in Jawzaar above Birgilich.  He was the father of Sayyed Mubarak Shah.  he was not the pir but did piri [pir’s work].  That is people came to him when they were in need and when sick, and he gave ta`wîz for sick children.  [Also] Shaan Shaah was a religious leader of the Asnaa`ashariya.  He did piri work.  He and Shah Ali Shah both lived to be a hundred.  He also gave ta`wîz.  Sayyed Timur Khân was brother of the the Pir Saheb and the previous Pir Saheb [of the Ismailis].  Also, the brother before him was Sayyad Gawar Khân.  He was another previous pir.

 

(From my notes).  A man told me that Sayyed Ghazanfar Shah came here about thirty years ago [c. 1937].  He is from the Sayyeds of Ghazni.  Another voluteered about the same amount of time.  One wonders if it could have been about the time  of the assassination of Nadir Shah by a Hazara from the Ghazni area.  Sayyed Ghazanfar Shah himself came here.  His Father died in Ghazni.  His father’s father died in Bamian and a large tomb to him, built by Sayyed Ghazanfar Shah, is high on a hill.  People couldn’t remember his name.

 

Current attitudes toward pirs, absence of great pirs now

(From my notes).  There was a long discussion on pirs one night with Nur Ahmad and the Qariador of the village at Kahmard.  The Qariadaar said their pir is Aakhundzâda of Qarabaagh in Kohdaman.  This is really his son now.  The old man is dead and his son is not so good as his father.  This seems to be true of most of the old pirs who were so strong and famous.  … Both Nur Ahmad and the Qariadaar agreed that the Naqib Saheb [deceased in 1947] was really a true pir.  They also agreed that the old Hazrat of Shor Bazaar was a real pir, but he is gone now too.  The real pirs are gone now; they are a thing of the past, they said.

 

(From my notes).(From my notes).  Pirs are not sending out Khalifas as they did  before.  They are collecting themselves, or their close relatives are.  For example:  Pir Saheb, Aaghany Abdullah, and the Pir from Qarabaagh.

 

Pirs in Bamian area and changes in their collection system

The Sayids of Birgilich

Shânshâ was the first pir

âmatshâ (was his brother) and successor

Sayid yâqut shâ

N.B. Hashem lungi-syâ story

now:  dârâshâ is the man in shikâri who givess tumâr

 

***************

 

From the servant of Jean Selch:

The king of Egypt and the Imam of Ismailis, mustansir-i-billâ, sent shânâsir-i-khisraw to Badakhshân to convert Ismailis.  He converted many in the area — even to as far as Bukhârâ — where there were many who became Ismailis.  Shânâsir was sayid of Ilawi.  He was pir of Badakhshân.  He lived 500+ years ago.  In this area there have been many Ismailis.  Khârukh and Dawâz, Dushanbe, Kolâb, and Bukhârâ had many who believed.

 

 

History of Shunbul Ismailism

Early Khalifa of Ismaili pir

(M82)     The father of MGH had a few animals, like now.  The father got a wife from Bulola.  He was Ismaili before the marriage, but she was not Ismaili before the marriage.  He was quite young when he became Ismaili.  When his brother became Ismaili, he became one.  The older brother was only four or five years older.  His brother at that time was arbâb.  MGH’s father was doing farming.  When the older brother was 15-18 he became Ismaili.  They all did it together.  Their father was very rich.  The Mir was Mir Mowladâd.  He was asnâshar [shi`ite], his kâkâ the arbâb was Ismaili.  The first in his qawm to become Ismaili was Hâji Sayed âhmad.  Sayed Mâhmad became the khalifagiri of Mazâri-sharif.

Eventually he gathered so much for himself that he was released by the pir.  That is, the P.S. Timur shâh khân.  These two brothers were both from Pusht-i Mazâr.  They were farmers.  They didn’t have a lot of land.  The other members of the qawm became very angry with them.  They said, even if they were killed they wouldn’t change their beliefs.  They were beaten and threatened.  Their wives were not against them.  They were also Ismaili.  Sayed Mâhmad became very rich as a khalifa.  The wife had agreed with him, whatever they did.  When they (the husbands)  became Ismaili, the wives became Ismaili, with all of the children.  Altogether it may have been 40 or 50 men in their quawm.  In those days, they were all in the one qalâ.

 

Life in early part of this century and earlier

In those days a family lived in one room with all its animals.  In one qalâ, there were ten families in it.  The houses were the following:

1. Mâmâ (kâkâ of MGH)
2. Bâba Beg (father of MGH)
3. Akbar
4. Murâd Ali
5. M. Hakim
6. 6.  M. Hosayn
7. M. Amir
8. M. Alam
9. Bozar
10. Salmân
11. Zangâl

Next to this was another qalâ.  These two qalâs were there from the beginning.  In this qalâ:

1. Khalifa Sayyed M.
2. Hâji Sayyed âhmad
3. Mirzâ Ali (who was named as one of two Mullâs in times before)
4. Rustam
5. Bargili
6. âhmad Ali
7. Sayyed Ali
8. Gholam M.
9. Metar (he was from Besud.  Married a woman there and             lived there.)

When they became Ismaili, Khalifa Sayyed M. was 40.  Sayyed âhmad was 45 — no they were younger, maybe 15 or 20 when they became Ismaili.  Khalifa Sayyed M. was a Khalifa for P.S. before he returned to Pusht-i Mazar.  It was then that there was trouble concerning them being Ismaili.  Later, the mullâs came and read books — the Khalifa and the mullâ — Mullâh Bâba, who was from Qalâ-i Mullâh.

Sayyed M. was in Mazar-i Sharif until age 15.  His father had been from Shumbul.  He had left his father when he was 7 or 8 years old and went to Mazar.  He became a student in a bakery (a nânbây) when he was about 12 years old.   He was there 2 or 3 years.  After this the P.S. made him a Khalifa.  He told him to collect the tithes from all Ismailis of Mazar.  There were only maybe 20 or 30 houses.  He was to bring money to the P.S.  There was no Khalifa before this.  Maybe before that the P.S. had sent someone else.  He was Khalifa for about 5 years.  In the sixth year, he took a wife.  He spent all the tithe money for the woman.  So P.S. released him.  The womam was from Mazâr — her lineage was from Besut.

After getting the wife, he moved to Shumbul back up to Pusht-i Mazâr.  His father was not living.  Sayyed M. maybe left because his father beat him or his father may have not gotten clothes for him.  He went alone.  Along the way, he may have done work as a donkey or camel driver.  When he returned to Pusht-i Mazâr the trouble was for a year.  (Sayyed M. came back to Shumbul because his land was there.)  The brother stood with him.  The brother was older and had become Ismaili before — I don’t know why.  Probably he was afraid and was a secret Ismaili.  When the younger brother came, they stood out [came forth] as Ismaili.  Then all the rest of the qawm was angry at them.

Then the mullâ bâbây (from Qalâ-i Mullâ) came and sat with the qawm — 2 or 3 people came and said these 2 brothers were on the right way.  They should accept them.  They read and talked to them — were with them for two days.  The trouble was for about one year.  Then in 2 or 3 days it was finished.  They were all quiet.  This was from the book.  It said this was better than Asnâshar.  Mullâ bâbây was Ismaili and all his ancestors since a long time before.  They were Ismaili for two generations back.  From a long time ago, they were Khalifa also.

The Asnâshar in those days were taking money.  They took one Afghani out of five (for tithe).  They have Mujta’id (this is now âqâ-i Ali âhmad).  In those days, they didn’t have a Mujta’id.  In those days, someone collected the money and bought a cow or sheep and killed them in front of masjid (the mosque).  The money was not forced from them.

In their group, they read the books and people cried among themselves.  The person who collects the money is a mullâ — sent by the âqâ-i Mujta’id.  In the present, this is collected at the time of the harvest.  The mullâs may be relatives of the Mujta-id or maybe just a learned person.  The Mullâ is from the place of the mujta-id.

In those days, the Mullâs of the Mujta’id got the money and carried it to the Mushta`id.  There was a masjid, that is a mosque, in each village.  Each qawm had its own masjid.  For each masjid, a family of mullâs were in charge of the masjid.  In time of harvest, the farmers paid the tithe to the family.  They collect the money and got quite a lot.  They were ususally rich.  In the early days, P.M. had no mullâ.  Among themselves they collected money, they bought a cow, killed it and ate it in the name of God.  The elders were in charge of collection.  The extra money was in the hands of the elders.  These were M. Alam and Mirzâ Ali.  They collected the money and paid for the worship ceremony.  The masjid was from a long time before.  The people together had built it and it is still there.  MGH’s grandfathers had built it.  In dispute over Ismailism, these two elders were perhaps more outspoken against Ismaili.  The Mir and Arbâb are separate from those leaders who are religious leaders.

 

They are separate because there is too much work for one man.  Hâji Sayyed âmad:  he was a Ismaili and went on the hâj.

 

 

Ismaili beliefs – pir teaching against ziarats

Ismaili beliefs – pir teaching against ziarats

We don’t believe in zyârats, don’t believe in going there to pray to get blessings.  As long as the P.S. is alive has strength [we can go to him], but after he is dead, [there is] no possible help to give us.  Why have a zyârat?  The others kiss hands of a Pir and touch their faces to his hands to get blessings.  But our P.S. won’t give his hand to anyone.  Only sometimes our people kiss hands and his sons as endearment.

 

1. said in qurân. The P.S. shows from qurân that zyârats are not right. We accept the books of 4 groups:  qurân, the New Testament of Jesus, the book of David, and the ??torât?? of Moses.  Zyârats have no value, P.S. said.  You are better than those thingss.  You have made them.

 

We destroyed the zyârats.  Before, the people who were ??mullâhs?? of these zyârats were very rich.  We destroyed them and let go the mullâhs.  We had one near our village.  I was 20-30 years old.  We then used to have 10 degs — great big ones — cooking the sheep cows we killed.   Everyone ate them at that time.  We would collect from each hh. maybe 200 [afs] at each house, then bought a cow or two sheep; then killed them at the shrine.

 

We do this as a custom.  We all gathered after eating and prayed — dawâ — (not namâz).  Prayed to the shrine that as it was great, it should implore God to forgive us of our sins.  Not pray for crops — because nature happens in crops.  Mullâh Khodâynazzar.  He had a farm.  His only job was to sweep out the shrine and the mosque, gathered the hours??, and built the deg dâns.

 

 

8-22

Mir Kabir-i Mir M. Nasim (Bulola)-i Mir Ghoam Ali Beg (Bulola)(he built this memaan khaana; he was mir of all Shibar)-i Mir Gorz Ali (was in Bulola, over all of Shibar)-i Osayn Baay (he was not a mir but was very rich)-i Paynda Qadam Beg (was in Bulola)-i Jumaa Baay (he was the father of all this Qawm (aashur).

Osayn Baay had 7 Sons, all but one of whom cheated and mistreated their father and did not respect his last-dying prayer … These have no offspring at all and the land is scattered to others.  Mir Gorz Ali was the only one who cared for the father.  Was Mir.

 

Mir Gorz Ali: Bulola, Jola, Shumbul, Shibar, Birgilich, Jawzaar, Iraaq.  Mir of Kalu was Mir Abbas and Mir Zafar was in this time.

Mir Gholam Ali Beg: in the time of Abdul Rahman and Habibullah.  They paid maaliya.  He was over all of Shibar from Iraaq to Sar-i Shibar.  In that time Mir Bakhtiari was Mir of Kalu.

Mir M. Nasim.  died early and the wife (d. of Bakhtiyari) went back to her home.  Arbaab Kabir was 5 when she went back to kalu and lived there for 16 years.  he came back to Bulola one year before Saqaw [1929].  His land was here.  He came when Bakhtiyari died; otherwise the FF [nb. not Bakhtiari] would not have allowed him to come back.  [because there was aproblem between the ff and Bakhtiari?].

After Mir M. Nasim, his B was the mir.  Mir Amad Ali Beg was [mir] for 8-10- 12 years.  All of shibar was under him.  He was staying in Bulola in his Brother’s house [i.e. Mir M. Nasim’s house]  (the Qalaa was made by Juma Baay.  In this time Mir Sultan Ali (Son of Baktyaari) was mir.  (In those days Paay Murid to kaalu was the area of Kaalu Mir [i.e. was locationof Sultan Ali?].

When Arbaab Kabir came to Bulola, Mir Ahmad Ali Beg went to iraq to take his land [which was] left him by his F (who had land in Iraq too) and went there.  Kabir came to Bulola.

Below Mir Ahmad Ali Beeg there were MuySafeds over ea. qaria

The FF of MAJ was over Q. aadil.  Arbaab Ali Bakhsh [was] over Q. ayaam.

Mir M. Osayn over Shunbul; and later Mir Mowladad.  He [Osayn] was awdur baaca of MGH.

All of Shibar is from one father, Baaba Darghu (except Jolaa) and Kaalu is from him too.  One S. went o Shibar (to Daaki), one S was in Kalu (f of Nasir) and one s was in Iraq (kona qalaa).

Another child was born to Darghu and he called him Shaak (the Q. of Birgalich).  Another S, Aram Sha, his descendants are gone.

In Daaki, Shex M. was the son.

Xida was in Shumbul, Iraaq, Bulola.  In Kalu was another (name?)

People of Julaa came in later, are not related to Darghu.

The Sayyeds of Birgalich came in at some time, but not related.  Are in Jawzaar (6hhs), Byaamurda (7-8 hhs), Birgilich (20hh), Shumbul (10hh), Iraq, Shikaari, a few in Kaalu (in Dasht-i Tajak).

Juma Baay (Bulola) was of Aashur-i Khida-i Baaba Darghu (Darghaan), and he came from Kandahar.

In time they first came to Shibar they were at odds with Uzbeks.  Each Qalaa had its own well.

All of Shibar [was] 100 hh; Kaalu-Paymuri 1000.

Mir Murad Ali of Birgalich; he was mir of all Shibar.  Before Mir Gurz Ali [the mir] was Ikhtiyar (of Shumbul) then Mir Muraad Ali was mir.  they he retired in favor of Mir Gh Ali Beg (of Bulola).  The change came becasue the mir Murad Ali could not do something with government, so people let him go and took Mir Gh ali Beeg.  In those days [mirs?] were very rich because each hh gave one ser roghan (1000 hhs) [rent, dues to the mir].  (In Kaalu there were 700 hhs.)  [NB the diff way they were paid then than now — in animal products]

In the time of Ikhtiyaar:  Mir Abbas was Kaalu and was over both Kaalu and Shibar, but was very cruel and they killed him.  In those days 1 rupa was worth 25 ser wheat and he levied 100,000 afs maalya [dues] on the people.

NB on a stone written, “I have two wives, one rupa is worth 12 ser wheat.”

People of Pay Muri are children of Mir Abbas.  [Mir Zafar came earlier (was in Kalu) in Daan-i gargara/yargara.  That is:  Mir Zafar [in Kalu]; then Mir Abbas [Paymurid, where his “children” still reside]; then Mir Gholam Haydar [Kalu]; then Mir Bakhtiyari [Kalu].

 

M-29

Slave raiding and qalaas

Ismaili houses were sep awlis.  Awli=sep house.

Qalaa is an older form, from 20 years earlier, has several houses in it.

Even earlier:  Xaana-Otaaq= sep rooms

Before the time of laki, the Turkmaan from Bukhaaraa from around the Oxus river came and stole people and sold them.  This was shy qalaas were built.  They had lots of large horses, tied up their victims, put them on hourses, carried them toward Bukhaaraa, to Turkistaan.  In those days the King of Bukhaara was weak and could not control these people.  We didn’t know what they did for a living, but were very cruel.  Many of the tictims got back.  But many also remained there and their descendenst are Turkmen, don’t know they are Hazara.

When qalaas were built, then they couldn’t get in so easily.  Also the king became stronger in this area, so the Turkemn couldn’t come so easily.  This was in the time of Ser Ali Khaan.

 

8-76

An old man, Asnaashar, told me one of his ancestors, Tay M., was captured below the old Qalaa of Bulola in days when there were robbers in these parts.  They used to come horse back in scores — 200 or so.  they took Toy M. and when got up to place called Taataar and something else (near Duaab) and there he read the Shanaama so well they used him as a teacher.  Two years later let him go, gave him a horse to go on.

 

p 200

Gul Nazar.  May, 1967

The following are brother groups:

1. Darghaan/Darghu: This is those on the upper side of the pass, Shibar.
2. Day Kalu [day Kalaan]: these people are scattered, are in Buyaan, Sakpar, Daan-i Kajak, Qool-i Kajak, Dasht-i Xagak, beet, Kootak, Jarf, Nirx, Pawaaz, Jagalak, Durwaaz (these are all in Shekh Ali).
3. Karmali: these are in Sang Andaab and Shingiraan, Pay Kootal (a few), Sar-i Bootyaan.
4. Qaluq: these are below Daan-i Shingaraan to Duaab-i Shekh Ali, Loolinj, Cukuma, Qool-i Xool, Taxt, Sorx, Paarsaal (Surkh o Parsal).
5. Xida = Naymu: Naymaan are in Ghorbandak (next to Shibar pass), Betqool, Kharjuy, Noolangak, Xarbeetak, Oolangajaangul, Bini Sewak.

NB:  MGH says Darghan is the Fa of Khida.

 

—–

M81

Mir Aminuddin Ansari.  He may be a descendant of Abdulla-i Ansar, whom Mir Ghulam Hasan claims descent from.  Was born in Kandahar, went to Herat.  The ancestors of Darghan (F of Khida) were from Pusht-i Rod-i Qandahar, same as Ansaari.  They are sometimes called children of Ansaar.  In this place is a large juy — nahar-made by these people.  Is now ruid.  now when people try to researrect it, they die in large numbers, maybe someon prayed a curse on the area.  Maybe it belonged to the sons of Darghan.  All Hazaras are from Khoja Abdul-i Ansaar.

 

—————–

Mir hist; mir and alaqadar

8-61:  Mir hist

Naayeblukma:  the old large governships in the dayd of Haakim in Bamian

sekot= before AR, 1/3 of crops

Under AR:  maalya:  Shibar 5,000

: Kalu, 11,000

:???

Under Zaher Shah:  3 years ago [1964], Shibar 22,000

Kalu, 14,000

Shibar has 4200 men now [1967]; Kalu and Ghandak 3800 men now [population]

In time of :   The mir was:

Dost M Khan    Mir Zafar

Sher Ali Khan  Mir Akbar

A.R       Mir Ghulam Haydar, Sher Ali, Beeg, Mir Bakhtiyari

 

A CHRONOLGY OF BAMIAN HISTORY:  HAZARAS, ISMAILIS, PIRS, MIRS, AMIR/MAMUR

[WHAT FOLLOWS IS THE FOLLOWING FILE WITH EMENDATIONS: BO2A.HST.TXT]

ORIGINS

 

>>  On “origins” of Hazaras, Jones, S. 1976: 50 ff.  Cites and discusses quotations from Burnes, Leech, Gray, Bacon, Aslanov.

 

ISLAMIC PERIOD

 

BAMIAN’s EARLY FORMATIVE HISTORY

>>  Jones, S.  1976: 51:  [from Bacon]:  “Before the fifteenth century in Afghanistan hazara had referred simply to a mountain tribe, . . . but by the fifteenth century the term had increasingly come to refer to specifically Mongol tribes now situated in the mountain regions.”  Aslanov (1969: 36; i.e. in Grassmuck, etc.) says Mongol invaders of 1221-23 [under Chengis] “left detachments” in the region now called Afghanistan, and later, “four sons of Chengis Khan and thereafter his grandson Mangu Khan also invaded, accompanied by thousands of men who established permanent garrisons in the conquered country.  These men mixed with the local people and gradually adopted the language of the conquered.”

 

Early Ismaili history

 

TAKEN FROM ISMERLY.HST

This will be notes on early Ismaili history, relevant to my chapter

 

Stern, S. M.  1983.  Studies in Early Ismâ`ilism.  Institute of Asian and African Studies:  The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.  Jerusalem:  Magness, and Leiden:  Brill.  pp. 189-233.

 

1. 216: “The da`wa was brought to Khurâsân by Abû `Abd Allâh al-Khâdim and the first place where it appeared was Naysâbûr (al-Maqrîzî, in his history of the Fatimids); Stern estimates this to have been at the end of the third / ninth century. He was succeeded by Abû Sa`îd al-Sha`rânî, who arrived in 307/919-20 and found converts among the military officers (Stern p. 217).  He also resided in Nishapur, was killed there sometime in the 320s A.H.  He was succeeded by al-Husayn b. `Ali al-Marwazî, who had been converted in Khurasan by the famous Isma`ili missionary Ghiyath when he for a time had fled to Khurasan from persecution in Rayy.  The center of al-Husayn’s influence was Marw al-Rûth, which included Taliqan, Maymana, Herat, Gharjistan and Ghur) (Stern 217).  He had been made a commander of Samanid forces for a short time in Sijistan in 297 and again for a time in 300 A.H.  He led a rebellion in Herat against the Samanid Amir Nasr b Ahmad in 301, but was defeated, was imprisoned, eventually released and allowed to come into the court of Nasr b. Ahmad.  On his death bed he appointed Muhammad b Ahmad al-Nasafî (also known as al-Nakhshabî) as his successor and advised him to go to Transoxania and aim at converting the officers of the Samanid court.  (Stern 219).  He became known as “one of the philosopers of Khurasan and a theologian” (Nizam al-Mulk).  Stern believes that  al-Nasafî founded Isma`ili philosophy by adopting the Islamic Neoplatonism current in his day; his philosophical works became standard statements of Isma`ili doctrine in Persia in the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries, and formed the basis of the systems taught by Abû Ya`qub al-Sijistânî and Nâsir-i Khusraw (Stern 220).  Al-Nasafî was notably successful in converting many prominent members of the court and indeed the Amir himself, Nasr b. Ahmad.  However, when Nasr’s son succeeded him to the throne the fortunes of the Isma`ilis were reversed and a number of Isma`ilis were killed, included al-Nasafî.  He was succeeded by Abu Ya`qub al-Sijistânî, who apparently survived late into the fourth century (Stern 221), and he was succeeded by Dihqân, also known as Mas`ud, the son of al-Nasafî.

——–

 

Corbin, Henry.  1975.  chapter 16:  Nâsir-i Khusrau and Iranian Ismâ`îlism.  In The Cambridge History of Iran:  Vol 4:  The Period from the Arab Invasion to the Saljuqs, ed. by R.N. Frye. pp 520 -542. 

 

520:  Ismailism began with death of Iman Ismail, son of the Imama Ja`far al-Saadiq, who died shortly before 148/765.  Ismaili history does not  extend to a past in the sense iunderstood by our own scientific history, .. rather is a hierohistory, comes from an a priori sacral image.

 

p520, unlike much of other literature of the times, which was written, even by Iranians, in Arabic, that of Nasir was written in Persian.  The Ismailis are

 

p.522   Ismailism split after the death of al-Mustansir bi’llah in 487/1094.  The period of the dominance of the Fatimids was then succeeded by a period by which the Fatimids dominated only the western Ismaili tradition, Egypt and the Yemin.   The eastern Ismaili tradition was that which followed the Nizaris.  The eastern Ismailis centered in Alamut, which was destroyed by the Mongol in 654/1256.  After that time Ismailism survived in Persia under the cover of Sufism, so that Iranian Sufism tends to assume the appearance of a crypto-Ismailism.

During that time because of crises in the Iranian plateau, many Ismailis moved to India.  After the fall of Alamut, there was a kind of renaissance of Nizari Ismailism in the 16th and 17th centuries, centered in Anjudan, which was during that time the place of residence of the Nizari Ismaili Imams.  The descendents of those who fled to India are now called Khojas and whose pre-eminent spiritual leader is His Highness Karim Agha Khan, the forty-ninth Imam.  The first Ismailis to flee into India came after the Mongol invasions of Iran and the Middle East in the 13th century.  Before the rise of the Fatimids to power in Egypt the Ismaili missionaries had created in Sind at state with its capital at Multan.  After the fall of Alamut, Ismaili literature in Persian breaks off completely until the time of Nasir-i Khusrau, who wrote mostly in Badakhshan, where his works were carefully preserved.

The agenda of the Fatimids [dates??] had been “the unification of Islam under the authority of the Imam, that is to say of the legitimate theocratic sovereign, member of the family of the Prophet” (p.524).

The works of Nasir-i Khusrau were written in Persian in the days of the Fatimid and in Badakhshan.  The Ismailis of central Asia were Nizaris, but through the influence of Nasir-i Khusrau, some of their beliefs came to resemble those of the Fatimids, who had originally commissioned Khusrau to be a missionary to Badakhshan.  Ismaili literature is divided by this author into three strati, the first being the early writings of Ismailis in the Pamir which he [who? Daya?] regards as proto-Ismaili and evinces signs of Qarmati and Khattabi ideas.  The second stratum is the works of Nasir-i Khusrau and others who imitated him, all writing in Persian, in the period after the destruction of Alamut [date??].  The third stratum was that which developed in the wake of the writings of Nasir-i Khusrau, which entailed the “coalescence of Ismaili ideas with Sufism” (p.526).  This was manifest in the writings of Mahmud Shabistari and the famous Sufi poet, Farid al-Din ‘Attar, whom the Ismailis regarded as one of themselves. (W. Ivanow. A Guide to Ismaili Literature, pp.104-105,118.)  Ismaili thought is also evident in the Persian Sufi literature, which is also Shi’i in its philosophy, as produced under the Safavids.

Ismailis maintain the notion of a magico-spiritual secret possessed only by the Imams, that is passed down to successive Imams.  Ismailis believe that this secret was passed from Imam Ja’far to his son and successor, Ismail.  The original notion of such a secret is associated with the teachings of Abu’l-Khattab, who lived in the 2nd/8th century.  The doctines of Abu’l Khattab are preserved in Umm al-kitab, a book cherished by Ismailis in the Pamir (p.526).  This book says “the Ismaili religion is that founded by the children [disciple] of Abu’l-Khattab, who sacrificed their lives for love of Ismail, the son of Ja’far Sadiq, and it will remain throughout the Cycles of Cycles” (p.527).  The book is preserved by the Ismailis of the upper Oxus as one of their earliest and most sacred books (p.528), and in many respects reflects Manichaen ideas of a pentadic plan of spiritual archtypes, a theme that appears in the writings of Nasir-i Khusrau.

Quote from author, “From the idea of the eternal Imam, as the single and identical Being manifesting itself from Cycle to Cycle in the person of the successive “Imamic personalities”, the concept of the imam is exalted to the metaphysical plane and enters the category of the divine, insofar as it is revealed.  . . . that which reveals this [annunciation], this batin, is the decipherment of the symbol in which it is formulated, whence is derived the predominance of the Silent One . . . the imam enunciating “incorporeally” the symbolic meaning, over the Prophet, the Enunciator.  Indeed, the last imam of a Cycle, the Resurrector, has the prerogative of proclaimin the Qiyamat that is to say the Resurrection which marks the end . . . of the shari’a” (p.529).

After the collapse of Alamut, Sufism provided a refuge and an alibi.

“The leaven of the Ismaili religion as the religion of personal salvation, the “religion of the Resurrection”, is subseqeuntly to be found incorporated in everything which in Iran is called ‘irfan, hikmat, tasawwuf . . ..   Perhaps [these notions] are apparent in this nostalgia for a manifestation of the divinity which allows the inner eye of the heart to behold it . . .” (p. 530).

“The concept of the eternal imam, divine anthrôpos and logos, fosters this expectation of divine anthropomorphosis and an Ismaili treatise on the tradition of Alamut contains pages of pure Sufism.

. . . the spread of this Iranian Ismailism testifies to the importance of the part played by the Persian languages . . . wherever an Ismaili community existed, the Persian language too was sanctified as a liturgial language . . .”(p.531).

Abu Mu’in Nasir b. Khusrau was born in 394/1003-4, in Qubadhiya, a town in the neighborhood of Balkh.  Ismailis of Badakhshan believed that he was a sayyid.

(p.533)  Khusrau’s missionary call was “not a matter of converting crowds, of publically proclaiming a message, but of discerning, one by one, those individuals who were suitable to receive in confidence initiation and secret instruction.”

(p.537) “. . . the local people who regard themselves as sayyids and descendants of Nasir-i Khusrau, are today fanatical Sunnis.  They believe that Nasir was a Sufi pir, a Sunni like themselves, having no connection with Ismailism.  They also apply a pious zeal to discourage the pilgrimages that the Ismailis of Badakhshan are naturally anxious to undertake.”

 

[N.B. Note that here is a shrine that the caretakers seek to discourage pilgrimage to.}

 

Nasir-i Khusrau died in approximately 465/1072, or within five years thereafter.

 

Farhad Daftary.  1990.  The Ismailis: Their History and Doctrines.  Cambridge:  CUP

 

p.444.         The Ismailis who survived the Mongols massacres after Alamut entered a new phase of their history, living outside of their traditional mountain strongholds and strictly observing taqiyya.  They were deprived of any central leadership.  Henceforth the Nizari communities were to develop on a local basis independently of one another.  Many of the Quhistani Nizaris  who survived the Mongol massacres [Daftary, p.445] migrated to Afghanistan, Sind, Panjab and other parts of the Indian subcontinent.

According to the the Nizari tradition, in the months following the fall of Alamut, the Persian Nizari community managed to hide Rukn al-Din Khurshah’s minor son,, Shams al-Din Muhammad, who had received the nass.

Safar-nama of Nizari Quhistani, whose full name was Hakim Sa’d al-Din (or Na’im al-Din) b. Shams al-Din (or Jalal al-Din) b. Muhammad Nizari Quhistani.

 

p.446  In the Safar-nama, he praises the current imam [of the Nizaris] in his poems and also speaks of the spiritual qiyama and other Ismaili ideas, resorting extensively to Sufi forms of expression.  After returning to Quhistan, Nizari served for a while longer the Kart rulers who had extended their influence throughout Afghanistan and Khurasan.

Shams al-Din Muhammad, the imam of the Nizaris Ismailis, son of Rukn al-Din Khurshah, died around 710/1310-1311 in Adharbayjan, after an imamate of almost half a century.

. . . once again a dispute over the succession to the imamate, splitting the line of the Nizari Imams and their followers into what became known as the Muhammad-Shahi and Qasim-Shahi branches.  The Muhammad-Shahi line of imams . . . was discontinued about two [p.447] centuries ago . . . The Qasim-Shahi Imams, who since the earlier decades of the last century have carried the title of Agha Khan . . . are now the sole Nizari Imams.  The split occured over a dispute to succession by the  eldest and youngest sons of Shams al-Din Muhammad.  An important work on the matter was written in Badkhshan in 926/1523 by Muhibb ‘ali Qunduzi.

———

 

1. 448 [there is some doubt about whether M Shah and Qasim Shah were in fact brothers, sons of Mu’min Shah, as Mu’min Shah may have been the elder brother of Qasim Shah, both being the sons of Shams al-Din. In any case Muhamma Shah the son of Mu’min Shah b. Shams al-Din led “a faction of the Nizari community in rivalry with his paternal uncle (or brother) Qasim Shah.”  The line of Muhammad Shahi imams was the most widely followed at first, but eventually that of the Qasim Shahis grew in strength, eventually to become the dominant line.

——————–

 

p.466  Even as late as the 15th century, the Nizari Ismaili were practicing taqiyya and utilizing the cloak of Sufism

 

p.467  Even at the beginning of the Anjudan revival, Nizarism utilizied the guise of Sufism, appearing as a Sufi order, one amongst many such orders then existing in Persia.  For this purpose, the Nizaris readily adopted the master-disciple (murshid-murid) terminology and relationship of the Sufis.  To the outsiders, the Nizari Imams appeared as Sufi murshids, shaykhs, pirs or quths; they were generally regarded, it seems, also a pious Husaynid Sayyids . . . Similarly, the followers of the imams posed as their murids, who were guided along the tariqa or path to haqiqa by a highly revered spiritual master.  With Shi’i ideas and ‘Alid loyalism then spreading in many Sufi orders and religious movements, the veneration of ‘Ali and other Husaynid Imams by the Nizaris did not cause any particular alarm . . . In the course of the Anjudan period it became customary for the Qasim-Shahi Imams to adopt Sufi names.

 

The reorganized and reinvigorated Ismaili Imam structure in Anjudan sought to (p.468–>) sought to reassert the central authority of the imams over the various outlying regions, notably India and Central Asia, which had increasingly come under the control of their local dynasties of pirs . . . The various Nizari communities in Persia . . .  as well as India, had gradually come under the authority of their local leaders, who were often referred to by the Sufi term pir . . . These pirs or chief di’is were either appointed by the imams, who accorded them extensive powers, or were selected locally by the particular Nizari community.  In most communities, the position of pir had gradually become hereditary, with the result that some dynasties of pirs had become largely independent of the imams whose precise whereabouts were often largely unknown to the bulk of their followers.  The hereditary pirs had become particularly autonomous in the areas farthest removed from the residence of the imams; notably Afghanistan, Badakhshan and other localities in Central Asia, as well as the Indian subcontinent.  . . . the local pirs in charge of these communities had acquired financial independence as well . . . It was for these reasons that the imams of the Anjudan period directed a good part of their revived efforts towards undermining the position of the local pirs, with the objective of replacing them by their own loyal appointees.

 

p.469          . . . copies of the Persian version of the Pandiyat [the Pandiyat-i jawanmardi, the sermons of Mustansir bi’llah II] are still preserved in the Nizari manuscript collections of Badakhshan . . . the Nizaris are referred to in the Pandiiyat by Sufi terms such as ahl-i haqq and ahl-i haqiqat, the people of the truth, whilst the imam himself is designated as “pir, murshid and qutb“.  It is explained in that book, however, “that the haqiqa [that is, the secret] essentially consists of recognizing the current imam.  The Pandiyat contiuously stress the duty of the faithful to recognize and obey the current imam, emphasizing that no sacrifice is great enough for making the didar journey to see the imam.  An equal stress is placed on the obligation of the true believer to pay his religious dues, notably the tithe (Persian, dah-yik) . . . of his annual income, to the imam of the time.  These admonitions are evident in the writings of a key leader who wrote in the middle the 10th/16th century.  This imam, following in the footsteps of his father, invited the Muhammad-Shahi Nizaris of Badakhshan and Afghanistan to transfer their allegiance to the true line of the imams, viz., the Qasim-Shahi Imams.

 

NB the rest of this appears in red-lined sections of the copied materials from this book

 

Daya, Mehmood N.  1980.  On the Ismailis in Greater Badakhshan:  Historical Growth and Current Status.  ms. [acknowledge him for this ms.]

 

p1:  Ismailism is well known as the Ismaili tariqa.

p2:  He describes the periods of Ismaili development:

> dawr al-satr, the period of concealment, which eventually led to the creation of the Fatimid Empire in Egypt in 297/909.

> At the death of Caliph Imam al-Mustansir (d. 1094 A.D.) there was the great split between the Musalian branch and Nizari branch.

> Nizari Ismailism “went through” the Alamut period, when they became known as the Assassins;

> Anjuman period or secrecy, [a period of florescence for Ismailism, when the Imams secured their power over local pirs]

> Emergence of the Aga Khan Mahlatti, and thereafter the Indian period of the Imams, eventuating in H. H. Prince Aga Khan IV, the 49th in line beginning with Ali b. Abu Talib.

 

p3 ff.  history of Badakhshan Ismailis will be divided into 4 periods:

>  early period:  The Umm Al-Kitab, “venerated by the Ismailis of the Pamir as one of their sacred books”, originated in this period, is “proto-Ismaili”, reflects ideas among Qarmati and Khattabi adherents at this time.  Umm al-Kitab [“the most secret book of the Central Asian Ismailis” Daftari p25].  This reflects a dissident version of Ismailism.  The Qarmatis were a revolutionary, messianic movement of Ismailis that began in the 3rd/9th century; the Khattabis believed in the divintiy of the imams and also held that al-Sadiq’s spirit had passed to Abu’l Khittab, while some of them maintained that after the latter’s death this spirit had devlved to Muhammad b Ismaili, who later came to be regarded as the wawaited Mahdi by the buk of the early Ismailis; Fatimid Ismailis regarded him as a heritic and repudiated his followers [Daftari 99].  In fact, the Umm al-Kitab “states that the Ismaili religion (madhhab) is that founded by the childen …[disciples] of Abul’l Khattab, who gave their lives for love of Ismail, the son of Ja`far al-Sâdiq, and it will continue through the cycle of cycles” [Daftari 100].  The book contains doctrines of the Shi`i Ghulât, is a syncretic work reflecting influence of diverse non-Islamic religious traditions … such as Valentinion Gnosticism and Manichaeism” [Daftari 110].  Written in the 2nd/8th c. [Corbin] or 5th/11th c [Ivanow], the final redaction of the ms. available being from the 6th/12th c. [Madelung].  The ms. suggests that Muhammad was God, and appeared in five different bodies — M. Ali, Fatima, al-Hasan, al-Husayn; also Muhammad had been Adam, Nuh, Ibrahim, Musa and Isa.

>  period of Nasir-i Khusraw. [Abu Mu`in Nasir b. Khusraw b. Harith al-Qubadiyani].  B. in Qubadiyan, a district of Balkh in 394/1004 [Daftari 215]; visited the Fatimid Caliph Imam al-Mustansir (r. 427-1035 to 487/1094), which was the ‘golden age” of Fatimid rule in Egypt.  He was made a da’i and was given the rank of hujjat; preached Ismailism in Mazandaran with little success, moved to Balkh, with similar results; the ulama there regarded him as a heretic, and in addition “the Seljuqs were systematically persecuting Shi`a of all persuasions, but particularly the Isma`iliya” [Dupree 1976: 10].  He eventually fled persecution to Yamgan in Badakhshan, where he continued to preach and wrote some of the most cherished poetry in the Persian language.  He died in circa 465/1072 to 471/1078.  His tomb is a popular locus of pilgrimage, both by Ismailis and Sunnis, especially Sufis, as his teachings became widely infused into Sufi thought [Dupree 1976].  It was mainly after his death that his writings influenced the populations of Badakhshan to accept Ismailism.  His tomb in Yamgan is now called Hazrat Sayyid; that of his brother nearby is also frequented.  Dupree says that both shrines are currently cared for by Sayyids claiming “true” Arab descent from Bokhara.  “They were reluctant to talk about any isma`iliya connection, and claimed to be Hanafi Sunni.   … [they also] claimed relation to Nasir-i Khushraw through the female line.” [Dupree 1976: 11].  An Ismaili young man said that “both the shrines of Kishm and hazrat Sayyid were related to the Isma`iliya sect.  he also informed [them] that his group believed that Nasir-i Khusrau was buried, not at Hazrat Sayyid, but in Darwaz, to which [he] had walked through a tunnel after his supposed rock tomb at yamgan had sealed itself.”  [Dupree 1976: 13].  nb there is more I did not get yet.

 

From the servant of Jean Selch:

The king of Egypt and the Imam of Ismailis, mustansir-i-billâ, sent shâ nâsir-i-khisraw to Badakhshân to convert Ismailis.  He converted many in the area — even to as far as Bukhârâ — where there were many who became Ismailis.  Shânâsir was sayid of Ilawi.  He was pir of Badakhshân.  He lived 500+ years ago.  In this area there have been many Ismailis.  Khârukh and Dawâz, Dushanbe, Kolâb, and Bukhârâ had many who believed.

 

>  the first revival.  Begins in the 13th c and ends with the end of the Safawid rule in Persian and the coming of the Qajar rulers; this coincides with the appearance of Aga Khan I.  Corbin refers to this period as the “coalescence of Ismaili ideas with Sufism” [Daya p6], as the Ismailis during this period formally embraced the doctrine of ta’wîl [symbolic, i.e., esoteric, interpretation]; began to be associated with the Nasafi Sufi order; and began to regard Farid al-Din Attar [d. 627/1230] as one of themselves.  Actually, the early part of this period was not a “revival” so much as a collapse, as the Ismailis after the fall of Alamut were dispersed and began to conceal their true convictions [practicing taqiyya = dissimulation].  In their dispersion many flet into Afghanistan as well as into the subcontinent.  Living under strict secrecy they took on the appearance of adherents to the Sufi tariqas.  [During this time the Imams remained hidden, as Ismaili Imams had typically been.  They had lived in the period after Alamut in AZerbayjan, then after some other moves eventually settled in Anjudan, near Sultanabad [now Aragh] Persia.  Ismaili Nizaris adopted a “Mystic terminology” [Daya 8]; Hakim Nizari Birjindi Kohistani [d. 720/1320] a Nizari Ismaili poet, was a friend of such famous sufi poets of the time as Hazrat Mehmood Shabistari, Shaikh Solahuddin Sirazi and Sheikh Saadi, whom the Ismailis came to regard as secret members of their religion.  Hamid Algar [1969].  The Revolt of Agha Khan Mahlatti and the Transference of the Ismaili Imamate to India.  Studia Islamica, XXIX: 55-81; p. 57] says that during this period proselization was limited in Persia but “by way of compensation intensified in Central Asia, and still more in north-west India” [p. 57].  This was also the period when the Imams gained greater control over the outlying communities [see Stern, Daftari] and “a constant stream of pilgrims, bringing tribute and seeking blessing,” were undertaking the “perilous journey” to the residence of the Imams in Anjudan [Daya 10]; these pilgrims were looted by “Bakhtiyari raiders and rapacious officials” [Daya 10].  In the latter part of this period the Imams moved to Kahak and thence to Shahr-i Babak in southeastern Iran.  This was a move aimed at accommodating the needs of pilgrims from India, whose importance was growing.  The move also marked the emergence of the Ismailis “from concealment and obscurity to participation in political life” [Daya 10].  The murder of the Imam Shah Khalilullah in 1815 in Yazd marked the emergence of the new period [Daya 11].  During this period, that is during the 14th, 15th, and 16th centuries, Badakhshan was visited by several Ismaili missionaries [Daya 12 ff.].

>  the times of Aga Khan Mahlatti [Aga Khan I] and the Aga Khan III of Bombay.  Imam Hasan Ali Shah became the new Imam and was awarded the district of Mahallat by the Qajar sovereign, Fath Ali Shah Qajar, “to compensate for the brutal murder of his father” [Daya 11].  The award included a title, Aga Khan, a one of the Qajar ruler’s daughters.  Later the Aga Khan was given the governorship of Kirman.  His domains eventually beseiged, however, by the succeeding ruler, Faridun Mirza, (during which time he received tribute from a delegation of Ismailis from Badakhshan (Algar ????: p 66) [cited in Daya 11, 20], and he was eventually imprisoned.  The Aga Khan, however, made several attempts to regain control of Kirman, and was eventually forced to flee.  He moved first to Qandahar [where he found Ismailis?] and eventually to Bombay and died there in 1881.  [It is possible that Qandahar here meant the regions of Q., and in fact referred to Ismailis in rural areas who protected him?].  During the time of Aga Khan I the only reference to an Ismaili leader visiting Badakhshan was by Pir Shahbud Din Shah al-Husayni (d. Dec. 1884).

 

In the present time [c. 1980, Daya 15] Daya says there are 200,000 Ismailis in Afghanistan; 80,00 of whom live in Kabul city, where there are four Jama’at Khanas.  Of the total 80,000 are “Sheikh Ali Hazaras who live in the Bamian, Baghlan and Parwan provinces” [Daya 15] and “practice a high amount of secrecy and as such their exact number is impossible to calculate.  The rest … live in the Pamir mountains ….  There are at least three Jamaat Khanas in these townships.” [Daya 15-6].

 

Dupree, Louis.  1976.  Saint Cults in Afghanistan.  South Asia Series vol XX No. 1 (Afghanistan).  American Universities Field Staff.

 

p3.  The da`i (missionaries) of the Isma`ilia preached an esoteric version of the Koran which the orthodox Sunni though to be heretical.  … God has no attributes, and is above and beyond all conceptions; byt, but His will, He has manifested Himself in the form of …[seek a better source]. …. Seven cycles of Prophets and Imams have existed … Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, Mohammad,the Prophet, and finally ismai`il and Muhammad 9His son).  The Imams who accompanied each Prophet were:  Seth, Sem, Ishmael, Aaron, Simon peter (or John the Baptist …) and Ali.  The Nizar, … diefy `Ali and believe in a Trinity consisting of `Ali, Mohammad, and Solomon.”

…. “As part of taqiya [dissimulation], Isma`iliya often perform Sunni rituals and claim to be Sunni in Sunni-dominated areas.” [p3]

[p 4]  In 1896, Amir Abdur Rahman (1880-1901) implemented policies which rapidly brought most urban brotheroods under the control fo the state.  he appointed the members of the brotherhoods to various grades in an established hierarch, and paid them government salaries. … However, disputes often arose when brotherhoods split and could not agree upon shich group should maintain control of the shrine. …. At theshrin of Sah Maqsud, for example, …two sections of the local brotherhood agreed that each would operate the shrine on alternate weeks to collect donations from pilgrims …

 

======

END OF ISEARLY.HIST NOTES

—————

 

BABUR’S TIME [16^TH C.] AND FOLLOWING

 

Hazaras and Hazarajat

 

Hazarajat in Babur’s time [16th c.]

>>  Babur in 1504 noted that “Hazaras a Nikudari tribes were living in the western mts of Afghanistan, some of whom spoke Mogholi.  Some groups wintered in the Ghorband are, plundering other tribes, and Babur himself took part in an action against the Sultan Mas’udi Hazaras between Takht Pass and the Sanglakh mountians, occaioned by thier refusal to pay government tributes.  In addition, he noted considerable numbers of Sultan Mas’udi tribesmen living in Kabul.”  Jones, S.  1976: 49.

 

>>  Jones, S.  1976: 53.  Schurmann (1962) and Ferdinand (1964) conclude “that the Hazaras are the descendants of various admixtures of ethnic groupings, from one side an autochthonous agricultural, mainly Tajik populace of the central Afghan uplands, and from the other side nomads of Turco-Mongolian and Turco-Mongolian-Iranian stock. … [T]his nomadic populations migrated regularly and over a long period of the summer season to the mountain districts of the Hazarajat.  By the sixteenth century [[i.e., 1500+] they had begun to settle in these summer encampments and to subject themselves to the Tajik population. … [and] gave their Shi`ite religion to the Tajiks.”

 

>>  Jones, S.  1976: 54:  to Ferdinand a Hazara Khan of Dai Zangi said that “Hazaras were originally nomads from Kandahar”.

 

Jones, Sara.  1976.  The Implications of Ethnic Division in Afghanistan, with Particular Reference to the Hazara Mongols.  Bachelor of Letters Thesis, Institute of Social Anthropology.  Oxford University.

 

Schurmann, H.F.  The Mongols of Afghanistan.  Mouton & Co, 1962.

 

(p. 77)  We know that the medieval countries of Bâmiyân and Ghûr were populated by Iranian peoples.  Futhermore, the subtribal name Tadjik still occurs among both Taimannîs and Hazâras, indicating the presence of a submerged Tadjik or Tadjikoid population.   Today, however, the aboriginal Iranian population has been [p.78] into the now dominant Aimâqs and Hazâras.

 

Schurmann, H.F.  The Mongols of Afghanistan.  Mouton & Co, 1962.

 

(p.115)  The term Hazâra, of course, means a unit of a thousand.  There is no question but that it is the Persian word designating a unit of 1000 soldiers, a fundamental tribal-military unit in Mongol society (ming-ghan in Mongolian, ming in Turkic).  Although in the 13th century the term hazârá was still used in its original sense, by the middle of the 14th century it was used to designate nomadic or semi-nomadic tribal groups, particularly those nomadizing in the gärmsîr of South-Central Persia and Southern Afghanistan.  Some of the Hazâra groups . . . of the 14th century are definately Mongol, like the Nikûdärîs.  Others are Afghans, and some, perhaps like the Jurmâ’îs, may be of mixed Mongolo-Afghan origin.  Bâbur mentions several types of Hazâras.  The major Hazâras he mentions are the mountain population west of Kâbul.  These are [p.116] undoubtably the ancestors of the present-day Hazârajât Hazâras.  . . . These Sultân Mas’ûd Hazâras, as he stated subsequently, nomdized in the Ghaznî region.  Thus one can say that by the early 16th century, there were already two principal Hazâra groups in the region south of the Hindu Kush: the nomad Hazâras of the Ghaznî-Qandahâr plains region, and the mountain Hazâras of the Gharjistân region.  . . . The Hazâra nomad elements probably disappeared once and for all with the rise of Afghan nomad political power (Ghilzais, Durrânîs, Muhammadzais) in the 17th and 18th centuries.

There is every reason to believe that the nomadic Hazâras mentioned by Bâbur were at least partially Mongol.  Since he distinguishes them from the Afghans, they could not have been Afghan.  However, one need not rely on speculation, for Abu l-Fazl in the late 16th [p.117] century expresses the idea that the Hazâras are of Mongol origin.

 

“. . . The Hazâras are of the army of Caghatai.  Mängü Khân sent [them] tothe assistance of Hülâgü Khân.  He designated his son Nikûdâr-oghlân [to go along] with that group to this region.  From Ghaznîn to Qandahâr, and from Maidân to Balkh, [the whole region] is under their control. More than 100,000 households and [of which] a third part [is] horsemen.  They have horses, sheep, and goats.  Each troop has been seized by cupidity, and they have thus become [divided] into bands and bands.  They play a two-faced game, and show the amity of the wolf.”

 

It is clear that Abu l-Fazl considers the Hazâras to be one of the principal nomadic elements in Eastern and Southern Afghanistan . . . .  Their power extended from Qandahâr as far north as Balkh.  Not only were they descended from Mongols, but their language too was most likely Mongol, for Abu l-Fazl lists Mongolian as the second language (after Turkî and before Fârsi) of the Särkârî of Kabûl.  Not all the Hazâras, however, were nomads.  Bâbur mentions them (along with the Nikûdärîs further west) as the principal mountain population of the Hindu Kush region west of Kabûl.  Abu l-Fazl also mentions some tribal groups in the process of settling down, among whom must have been Hazâras . . .  It seems that the settlement process which led to the formation of the modern Hazârajât Hazâras was going on in Abu l-Fazl’s day.

 

Schurmann, H.F.  The Mongols of Afghanistan.  Mouton & Co, 1962.

 

(p.17)  Dr. Elizabeth Bacon’s characterization of these people as “Hazara Mongols” is misleading.  As I shall argue subsequently, it is my opinion that the Hazâras represent a mixed population made up of an Iranian substratum with a heavy Mongolian overlay.  . . . Ultimately, the Mongol ethnic element in the Hazâras is probably closely linked with that of the ancestors of the Monghôls.  However, such a link cannot be asserted directly on the basis of existing cultural similarities, but largely through historical inference.   Bâbur, in his description of Kâbul Province, states: “In the western mountains there are Hazâras and Nikudärîs.  Among the Hazâras and Nikûdärîs, some speak Mongolian.”

 

Schurmann, H.F.  The Mongols of Afghanistan.  Mouton & Co, 1962.

 

(p.18)  From the descriptions of Bâbur and Abu l-Fazl a number of things is clear.  By the 16th century, there were two distinct ethnic groups living in the mountainous regions west of Kâbul: Hazâras and Nikûdärîs.  The Mongolian language was spoken to some extent among both groups.  The Hazâras were probably the same as the present Hazârajât Hazâras.  The Nikûdärîs, I believe, were the ancestors of the present Moghôls of Afghanistan.

 

Schurmann, H.F.  The Mongols of Afghanistan.  Mouton & Co, 1962.

 

(p.21)  The Nikûdärîs were a nomadic group, at least partially of Mongol origin, which entered the Ghôrât sometime between the end of the 14th century and the beginning of the 16th century, probably as the result of disruption of the their nomadic cycle through the conquests of Tamerlane.  The Nikûdärîs, as well as other similar groups, arose in the middle of the 13th century as dissident (i.e. anti-Il-khanid) Mongol nomadic elements which established a new nomadic [p.22] cycle in Central and Southern Persia.  Though largely Mongol in composition and Mongolian-speaking, they most likely represented a mixture of diverse tribal elements.

. . . Caghatai id rulers were said to have controlled both the Ghôrât and Gharjistân during the early part of the 14th century.  However, there is [sic] a number of reasons for assuming that the Mongols did not settle permanently in the Ghôrât then.  . . . These Ghûrîs formed the basic Iranian population of the Ghôrât.  However, during the Timurid period, they were severely defeated when Herat was reduced.  Thereafter, they are rarely mentioned in the sources.  Bâbur, who enumerates most of the principle ethnic elements in Afghanistan, makes no mention of Ghûrîs.  However, Bâbur mentions that Zû n-Nûn Arghûn was given “Ghûr and the Nikûdärîs” by the ruler of Herat, Sultân Hussain Mîrzâ.   The implication is clearly that by Bâbur’s time, the Nikûdärîs had become the principal ethnic element in the Ghôrât.  . . . I should like to suggest that up to Tamerlane’s time, Iranian Ghûrîs remained the [p.23] principal ethnic element in the Ghôrât.  Thereafter, an incursion of non-Iranian peoples took place.

We know that during the Timurid period large numbers of Central Asiatic peoples entered Khurâsân.  Much of the present racial mixture in both Persian and Afghan Khurâsân dates from that time.  However, it is highly unlikely that any of these people spoke Mongolian.  The ethnic grops allied with Tamerlane were for the most part Turkic-speaking.  There is a tradition that the “Hazâras” are the descendants of ethnic groups which came to the Herât region with Shâh Rûkh, son of Tamerlane.

 

Schurmann, H.F.  The Mongols of Afghanistan.  Mouton & Co, 1962.

 

(p.25)  . . . it seems more likely that the entrance of the Mongols into the Ghôrât and of the Mongol element of the Hazâras into the present Hazârajât must be related in some way.

Direct linguistic connections between Hazâras and Moghôls are difficult to establish.  The Mongol vocabulary of the Hazâras shows characteristics which are foreign to those of Mogghôlî.

. . . it is hard to find Mongolian words which occur in both tongues.  However, the Persian dialect which the two groups also shows considerable differences.  This may be due to the fact that the Hazâras have spoken Persian as their common tongue for a much longer period than the Moghôls.  The Moghôls show signs of having adopted Persian as their common tongue . . . in the recent past.  . . . The total absence of spoken Mongolian among the Hazâras shows that Persian became their common [p.26] language at a much earlier date, probably at the time of the ethnogenesis of the present-day Hazâras.

 

Schurmann, H.F.  The Mongols of Afghanistan.  Mouton & Co, 1962.

 

(p.26)  Essentially, I believe that the Hindu Kush Hazâras represent a composite group consisting of an Iranian or proto-Tadjik sub-stratum with a heavy Mongol overlay.  There is considerable ethnographic evidence to support a hypothesis.  [He uses nomadic practice and forms of tense as cultural criteria for distinguishing several kinds of Hazâras and other non-Hazâras, such as the Moghôls, which is of course not discussed.]

 

Schurmann, H.F.  The Mongols of Afghanistan.  Mouton & Co, 1962.

 

(p.27)  By Bâbur’s time the Hazârajât Hazâras already existed as a distinct people.  However, at that time there still existed nomadic groups in Southern Afghanistan known as Hazâras.  In fact, Bâbur labels the Hazâras and the Afghans as the principal nomadic elements in Southern Afghanistan.  In the 14th century, the term Hazâra was used in the general sense of nomad, particularly one of Mongol origin.  Nikûdärîs, Naurûzîs, Jurmâ-îs, and even Afghans were all apparently generically called Hazâras in the Ta-rîkh-i Guzîdá.  Between the time of Tamerlane and Bâbur, some of these nomadic elements had drifted eastward.  The Nikûdärîs . . .entered the Ghôeât.  Some may have entered the Hazârajât as well.  . . . Apparently sometime between the reigns of Tamerlane and Bâbur, some of these nomadic groups moved up the Hilmand both into the Ghôrât and the Hazârajât.  By Bâbur’s time, they had already formed into separate ethnic groups inhabiting the mountains west of Kâbul.  The nomadic Hazâras who remained in the desert have apparently disappeared.  Either they were Afghanized, or they also filtered into the mountain regions, but at a later date.

This incursion of nomadic Mongolian or partially Mongolian elements seems to have occurred sometime in the 15th century.

 

Schurmann, H.F.  The Mongols of Afghanistan.  Mouton & Co, 1962.

 

(p.28)  We know more about the Ghôrât during the time of the Ghûrid Dynasty than we do in subsequent centuries.  Disunity seems to have prevailed for the most part.  Abû l-Fazl states that the region form “Ghaznîn to Qandahâr, and from Maidân to Balkh” was in the hands of the Hazâras, but adds that they were divided among themselves and constantly at war with each other.  The scene then was probably little different from that which Elphinstone described at the beginning of the 1??th century.  Yet one event makes one think that at one time some sort of political unification must have existed: the Shiization of the Hazâras.  This event is probably related to the spread of Shiism among the masses of Persia during the early part of teh Safawid Dynasty, i.e., in the 16th and 17th centuries.

 

Schurmann, H.F.  The Mongols of Afghanistan.  Mouton & Co, 1962.

 

(p.29)  However, as there is no evidence for a spread of popular Shiism into the lands east of Persia prior to the Safawid Dynasty, [He’s wrong here.  There are a number of radical movements associated with Shiism; he is thinking about a certain brand of Shiism but the Shiism movements were much earlier than this one] it seems most likely that Shiism was adopted by the ruling elements in the Hazârajât and forced onto the mass of the population.  It is possible that this event may have taken place at a time when a large segment of the Hazârajât was briefly unified and in alliance with Safawid Persia, perhaps in the time of Shâh Abbâs I.

 

Schurmann, H.F.  The Mongols of Afghanistan.  Mouton & Co, 1962.

 

(p.31)  . . . in the Hazârajât, on the other hand, is that the Mongols who invaded the region ultimately adopted the culture forms of the pre-existing population, most likely an Iranian group very similar to the Mountain Tadjiks.  However, a new social situation arose, one induced by the fact of conquest.  The invaders became a ruling element whose power was hereditarily constituted.  They seem to have built great fortresses (qal’ás) for defensive concentration.  Common descent groups were strong, and sib consciousness pronounced.  But there is little evidence, except for certain vestigial element in kinship terminology, for sib exogamy.  The groups married among themselves . . . .  Thus, where exonomic forms of the Hazâra way of life seem largely Tadjik, the social forms show marked differences.  . . . [Among the Hazâra] severe climatic conditions put an end to large-scale pastoralism.  Horses were apparently still kept in large numbers, but these did not require removal to yaylâqs as in the case of large sheep or goat herds.  The conversion to Shiism most likely created a strong bond between the rulers and the ruled, for both became religious heretics in the eyes of their overwhemingly Sunnî neighbors.

 

END OF QUOTES FROM: Schurmann, H.F.  The Mongols of Afghanistan.

 

Hazarajat in 18^th– early 19th century

 

Hazaras and Hazarajat

Masson wrote of the district of Wardak that prior to the last century it had been “possessed by the Hazaras, who, about one hundred years since, were expelled by the Afghan.  The Hazaras would also seem to have held the country from Karabagh to Ghazni, but have been in like manner partially expelled.  Indeed, the encroachments of the Afghan tribes are still in progress.

(Masson 1844 II:224)

Early Pirs

 

Masson says [448] that a Sayyed Shah Abbas was a Pir in Birgilich, and was pir of the Sheikh Alis.

 

Wood  200

Of these tribes /Hazara/ the most powerful are the Deh Kundi, Dai Zingi, Deh Zingi, and Sheikh Ali.  Sometimes they are subject to Kunduz and at other times to Kabul.  They now own allegiance to the former, and annually send Murad Ali Beg [Mir of Kunduz] a tribute in slaves.  In paying this inhuman tax, the custom is for a certain number of houses to join together, and when the value of a slaves is collected, he is furnished by them.  In years of great scarcity, such as that in which we visited this people, it is not unusual for Hazara family voluntarily to dispose of one or more children.   It is sacrifice to which they are compelled by necessity.  But generally they speak with detestation of the practice of man-stealing, and never mention the Uzbeks, who enslave them, but in terms of loathing and hatred.

 

Wood  198 (re. Hazaras encountered in Ab-i-Siah vale going up to Gulgatui “a hamlet on the southern side of Hajigak.”)

The early fall of snow this year, they had told us, destroyed the crops, and as they had been unable to pay the usual tribute to the Amir of Kabul, Dost Mohamed, they sheep had been seized.  Without the means of passing /page199/ the long dreary winter now closing in upon them, they were compelled to emigrate to the plains where the wealthy would employ them in keeping the roofs of their houses free from snow, clearing the foot paths, bringing firewood, and in the other drudgery of the household.  This is a misfortune that often overtakes th Hazara . . .

 

Hazarjat in first half of 19th century

 

>>  Jones, S. 1976: 55:  Ferdinand believes “tribal feudalism ruled”, with a basis in the lineage system.  Elphinstone [in early 19th c] describes the tribal divisions, the Deh Zangee, Dah Kundi, Jaghori, and Polada being the largest:  A “Sultan” had absolute power over the tribe, to administer justice, impose fines and executions.  “who have good castles, fine clothes and servants adorned with gold and silver” (1842: 211).  Ferrier similarly describes the eastern Hazaras [whom he knew as the “Posh [Pusht] Koh” as divided into several “tribes” each led by a chief.  Burnes describes the chiefs in the central areas [of the Hazarajat, which included populations as far east as Ghorband] had chiefs known as “mirs” and towards Turkestan as “begs”.  Schurmann (1962: 122) believed the desegnations referred less to lineages as to areas/ localities.

 

>>  dig out my “Petrified Minds” draft and cut up and match with the discussions in Jones:

 

>>  DEB / AMANDA:  copy Jones pp 56 – 65

 

1856. 1: copy quote from Ferrier 1856. [and find the original and get the exact page number]

 

They will never be able to do more than describe with precision the state in which they find it, on account of the multiplicity of political changes, followed by the displacement of whole tribes, the turning of rivers and the destruction of towns near the ruins of which others will rise in an incredibly short space of time . . . How is it possible to establish any system for the future student or traveller where everything is perpetually changing or even to relate distinctly what has happened?

J.P.Ferrier, Caravan Journeys and Wanderings in Persia, Afghanistan, Turkestan and Beluchistan, 1856: p. 1

 

>>  discussions of racial composition in hazarajat and Bamian are in:

Schurmann, F.  1962.  The Mongols of Afghanistan.  p 112.

Jones, S.  1976.  [thesis]:  p19-21.

Ferdinand, K.  1964 [Acta Orientalia 28: 184 ff.] his review of Schurmann

Centlivres, Pierre.  ?? anything published?  see his other arts.

 

>>  on 19th c Bamian:  see Lal [1934]; Masson [1842].  They say the pop in Bamian was mainly Imami.  [Jones, S.  1976: 26]

 

Charles Masson,  Journal … [from about 1832]

 

Masson:  p.295:  Besud [Bìsùd]:  “mâllìa, or tribute, is extracted from them by the authorities of Kâbal.  This fluctuates in actual receipt, but the registered amount is 40,000 rupees.  Some twenty or twenty-five years since the superior chief of [Besud] was the Wali Beg, of Kârzâr.  He was treacherously slain by an inferior chief, the Vakíl Sifúlah, at Síáh Sang (black rock), a spot in the valley leading from Kâbal to the vale of the Helmand.  Mír Walí Beg had twelve sons, the elder of whom, Mír Máhmúd Shah, became Mír of Bísút.  The younger of these sons, Mír Yezdânbaksh, assembled troops, defeated and took prisoner the Vakíl Sifúlah, whom he slew at the same spot (Síáh Sang) where his brother had been sacrificed.  Mír Yezdânbaksh next directed his arms against his eldest brother, Mír Máhamúd Shah, whom he compelled to fly to Kâbal.  He now assumed the mírship, but his claim was contested by an intermediate brother, Mír Abbás.  The fortune of Mír Yezdânbaksh prevailed, and Mír Abbás suffered defeat; but the former, … unwilling to proceed to extremities with a brother, and anxious to secure to his interests as a ???? soldier, tendered a reconciliation, which Mír Abbás accepted, and for some time resided with his brother.”

 

 

Masson: p. 296:  “Mìr Yazdan Bakhsh, the acknowledged lord of Bísút, turned his attention to the affairs of his province, and by humiliation of the several petty chiefs, established a more decisive authority than any former mír had enjoyed.  Inexorable to the haughty, and such as opposed his plans, he was equally careful of the interests of the subject, and his name was venerated among the Hazáras.  The high road between Kâbal and Bamíân led through his territory, and had hitherto been a theatre for forays and depredations:  forays from the independent Hazáras of Shékh Alí, and depredations from the inhabitants of Bísút.  By the energetic measures of Mír Yezdânbaksh order was restored; the road became safe; the Hazáras of Shékh Alí dared not make their appearance, and the people of Bísút became as eager to show civility as they had been before to offend, while the single traveller passed as securely as if in company with a host.  To kâfilas the chief was particularly attentive, and merchants were diligent in spreading his praises and renown.  It was evident that a chief of superior ability had arisen among the Hazáras and he became an object of much attention both to the Shías and government of Kâbal;  the former congratulating themselves in having a potent ally in case of need, the latter apprehensive of  his views and of the effects of a consolidated authority in the Hazárajât.”

 

Masson: p 297:  “They have exceedingly multiplied, and become affluent, and, decidedly, are the most powerful and influential body in the city of Kâbal, of which they occupy one half, and exclusively the quarter called Chándol, which is fortified.  They occupy also many castles in the vicinity of the city.  An inextinguishable rancour is known to exist between the two leading sects of Máhomedanism, the Shía and the Súní, which, however for a while dormant, or concealed by consent of both, is ever ready to burst forth upon the most trivial occcasion…”

 

Masson: p 298:  “The Shias of Kâbal, aware of their constant exposure to conflict, and of the possibility of defeat, have endeavoured to provide for such a calamity by securing for themselves an asylum.  They have, therefore, turned their eyes upon Bísút, where the most wealthy of them have purchased castles and lands, and have, in fact, become joint proprietors of the soil with the Hazáras.  Prior to the sway of Mír Yezdânbaksh they possessed a paramount superiority in Bísút, arising not from power of force but from that of the influence which they possessed over the mírs, divided in councils and feeble in talents, and who were glad to avail themselves of their mediation and support in their domestic quarrels and transactions with the Afghân authorities.  Mír Yezdânbaksh, early made it apparent that he would allow no rival or controlling influence in Bísút, and even confiscated some estates of such Kâbal Shías who had favoured his opponents; and it became manifest to the remaider that to enjoy thier properties they must submit to conciliate the favour of the new chief.   . . . the daily increasing power of the Bisut mir was an universal subject of triumph and exaltation.”

[Were the shias of Kabul Qizilbash?]

 

Masson: p. 299:  There was a prepossession among the Shias of Kabul in favour of Dost Mahomed Khan, on account of his mother being a Kazzilbash [Qizilbash].  No doubt they principally contributed to his accession to power; and on attaining it he was assiduous in attention to them.

 

NB:  The events that follow took place in 1830-32.

 

Masson:  p300:  But Dost Mahomed Khan was uneasy: …

DEB, THIS PAGE AND THOSE THAT FOLLOW, DOWN TO P 315 CAN BE PHOTOCOPIED. 

 

Note to myself:  Note that in this period Mir Yazdanbakhsh was moving with his men — several hundreds at a time — all over Bamian, from Shibar to Bandi-Amir and in Saighan he took his men to challenge the mir of the area, Muhammad Ali Beg, who was an avowed enemy, and was frustrated that he and his men would not come out and fight.  He at one time possessed Bamian valley and thus caused anxiety among the Afghans.  Eventually he would be tricked into accepting hospitality that would cause his death, as Haji Khan had been seeking it all along, by trickery and promises of safety, etc.  The death of Yazdanbakhsh marked the end of the grand confederacy that intimidated everyone in the Hazarajat.  There were several notable shrines, ziarats, to which people visited.  BandiAmir was visted by Mir Yazdanbakhsh and his men; Birgilich was location of a Sayyed whose power was being challenged by the Sheikh Ali Hazaras because he was urging a raprochment with the Afghans; there were numerous less famous shrines mentioned by Masson, one in Jalrez area, one in Bamian, which was famous.  The point is that there were several notable Sayyeds, pirs; and a heirarchy of mirs, Mir Yazdanbakhsh being the most powerful, who subdued those who refused to give tribute and respect.  His home qal’â was in Kâzâr [sp?], where he had built an especially large qal’â.  He had “mirzâda” living in the area, descendants of his brother who lived nearby.

 

Bamian and Hazarajat before the Hazara Afghan War. 

 

Gazatteer pt. II p. vi.  Population (where?) is low because of devastation by war and disease; “Persian famine” of 1872 was severe in Herat and Afghan Turkestan, and was followed by severe outbreak of cholera–1871-3 was almost depopulated.

 

1880s, war against AR

Kakar 172:  The apparently quiet winter was followed by a stormy spring, when, some, if not all, the Hazaras resumed fighting.  This time the Hazaras of Koh-i-Baba area, where no garrison had been left, rose first [i.e. southern side of Koh-i-Baba].  …173…Soon, the initial success of he Hazaras in Deh Zangi in April was followed by a series of defeats in the Yakawlang to the west of Bamian by the Sipah Salar and in the Deh Zangi by General Amir Mohammad Kahn.  Perhaps the forces led by Ghulam Husayn, son of Mir Mohammad Amin of the Behsud, on the bank of the Helmand river between Deh Zangi and Behsud, where the Hazaras were routed leaving about 250 dead behind.  [They were subdued completely by September 1893.]

 

========================

 

M-29

Slave raiding and qalaas

Ismaili houses were sep awlis.  Awli=sep house.

Qalaa is an older form, from 20 years earlier, has several houses in it.

Even earlier:  Xaana-Otaaq= sep rooms

            Before the time of laki [i.e. before A.R assessed a penalty tax] , the Turkmaan from Bukhaaraa from around the Oxus river came and stole people and sold them.  This was why qalaas were built. They had lots of large horses, tied up their victims, put them on horses, carried them toward Bukhaaraa, to Turkistaan.  In those days the King of Bukhaara was weak and could not control these people.  We didn’t know what they did for a living, but were very cruel.  Many of the tictims got back.  But many also remained there and their descendenst are Turkmen, don’t know they are Hazara.

            When qalaas were built, then they couldn’t get in so easily.  Also the king became stronger in this area, so the Turkemn couldn’t come so easily.  This was in the time of Ser Ali Khaan.

 

8-76

An old man, Asnaashar, told me one of his ancestors, Tay M., was captured below the old Qalaa of Bulola in days when there were robbers in these parts.  They used to come horse back in scores — 200 or so.  they took Toy M. and when got up to place called Taataar and something else (near Duaab) and there he read the Shanaama so well they used him as a teacher.  Two years later let him go, gave him a horse to go on.

 

 

===========================

Gazatteer of Afghanistan: Part IV — Kabul. 4th edition, 1910.

 

(p.40)  [Concerning Shahidan and Shibartu] Mir Ata Beg is the headman of these two valleys.  The revenue is said to be 4,000 Kabuli rupees (all payable in cash?), of which Mir Ata Beg gets 15 tomans (300 Kabuli rupees) and 7 Kabuli kharwars of grain, etc.

 

PIR

 

Gazatteer of Afghanistan: Part IV — Kabul. 4th edition, 1910.

 

(p.40)  The Tajiks occupy the valley of Bamian proper, and the Saiyads are in close proximity.  The whole of the rest of Bamian is peopled by Hazâras.  . . . Jan Muhammad Khan, of Barikab near Ghazni, was Hakim of Bamian in 1885-86.

 

Gazatteer of Afghanistan: Part IV — Kabul. 4th edition, 1910.

 

(p.40)  Mulla Gadai and Mauladad Sultan were the heads of the Shahgum Beg Takanas of Karghanatu in 1885.  The revenue of Karghanatu is said to be 25 tomans (500 Kabuli rupees) in cash, and 30 (600 Kabuli rupees) in kind. [I presume that this information is based upon research or materials collected in 1885.]

 

Gazatteer of Afghanistan: Part IV — Kabul. 4th edition, 1910.

 

(p.41)  There are no troops in Bamian except 100 khasdadars; but according to Dafadar Shamshuddin Khan, who passed through in 1886, the Amir had ordered quarters for 12,000 men to be built (?) [There are now (1906) a battery of artillery and two companies of infantry quartered at Kala Sarkari, in addition to 300 khasadars.]  The roads from Bamian to Kabul have lately been greatly improved by Amir Abdur Rahman.

 

Gazatteer of Afghanistan: Part IV — Kabul. 4th edition, 1910.

 

(p.51)  The eastern end of the Bamian district is occupied by a tribe of Hazaras who originally lived in Besud, but about a hundred years ago [1810?] crossed the watershed and established themselves in their present location.  To the compiler [of this source] they spoke of themselves as Khatai, but Peacocke, who saw more of them, invariably calls them Darghan.  As a matter of fact, they are the Darghan branch of the Khatai tribe.  The Khatai Hazâras are one of the main or original divisions of the Hazâras, and the bulk of them, who are also called Babali, are adjacent to, or partly in, the Kandabar districts of Tirin and Dehrawat . . ..

The country of the Darghan or Khatai Hazaras principally consists of the large glens of Kalu, Irak, and Bulola, which lead up respectively to the Hajigak, Irak, and Shibar passes.  The two former lead to Kharzar in Besud and the main road from Kabul to Bamian now passes over the Hajigak although up to the end of 1886 it was by the Irak.  Both these roads are closed in winter, and the Shibar is then alone used.  Running east from the Shibar is the Dara Shaikh Ali, and north of the watershed of the Bulola glens is Jalmish, also inhabited by Shaikh Alis, so the Darghan Hazaras are to some extent interposed between two of the principal locations of that tribe.

 

Gazatteer of Afghanistan: Part IV — Kabul. 4th edition, 1910.

 

(p.42)  Kalbi Husain is chief of the whole [meaning Khatai or Darghan Hazaras of the Bamian district], and in the time of Sher Ali was responsible for the entire revenue of the sub-district.  But since Abdul Rahman became Amir, he has been deprived of authority over all but a small portion of his people.  He appears in fact to have only lower Kalu: Ghulam Haidar Khan has upper Kalu, while a majority of the whole tribe living in Bulola, Irak, etc., are under Sayad Baksh Khan.

 

Gazatteer of Afghanistan: Part IV — Kabul. 4th edition, 1910.

 

(p.54)

Bamian district, Khatai or Darghan Hazaras tribe, that is in Kalu, Irak, or Bulola and all east of the Bamian valley, are headed by Mir Kalbi Husain.

 

Polada tribe in Polada is headed by Mir Baba Beg, “but was in prison in Kabul in 1885-86.”

 

The mir of Shahidan is Mir Ata Beg.  He was head of both Shahidan and Shibartu in 1885-86.]

 

(p.55)  There were “Shadmarda Shaikh Alis in Jalmish.”

 

[These notes appear to have come from Maitlan and Talbot who visited Bamian in 1885]

 

[What is interesting is that the British have a lot to say about the tribes and about groups that they recognize as ethnic groups, but nothing to say about saints, that is, sayyads, who are of particular importance as central social figures.]

 

Gazatteer of Afghanistan: Part IV — Kabul. 4th edition, 1910.

 

(p.213)  The inhabitants of Jalmish and the Dahan-i-Jalmish are Shaikh Ali Hazaras of the Sad Marda section.  The main number of them live up the Dahan-i-Jalmish.  In 1886 they numbered over 1,000 families, though quite half as many more had recently emigrated on account of the locusts.

 

Gazatteer of Afghanistan: Part IV — Kabul. 4th edition, 1910.

(p.219)  The Dara Shumbal is an open roomy valley about 700 yards wide; its bed is level and well-cultivated and studded with villages.  It contains in all 11 villages, with 7 watermills and 270 families of Darghan Hazaras.

 

Gazatteer of Afghanistan: Part IV — Kabul. 4th edition, 1910.

 

(p.469)  The Shaikh Alis of Doshi, Khinjan, etc., also appear to have been given to plundering, and we noticed when passing through those districts in 1886 that [p.470] the name appeared to be as it were prescribed [do they mean proscribed?], all the Hazaras we met declining to allow they were Shaikh Alis, and calling themselves Khinjanis.  Since Abdur Rahman Khan’s accession, the Shaikh Alis, like other troublesome tribes, have been reduced to complete submission and made to pay revenue.

. . . It was the inaccessibility of their settlements on the Surkhab and the strength of their fastnesses in the glens of the Hindu Kush which enabled them for so long to carry on their evil practices.  Lately, that is during Ishak Khan’s rebellion of 1888, the Shaikh Alis made some sort of a rising.  It appears that Dilawar Khan, the Chief of Doab, declared for the Sardar, and induced the Shaikh Alis in his district to turn out.  The Amir on his way to Turkistan took the Surkhab route, and Dilawar Khan who had been taken prisoner, or surrendered himself, was put to death at Dasht-i-Safed.   Nothing was done to the Shaikh Alis, who had become quiet enough, but the Amir significantly remarked that he would deal with them when he returned.

 

Gazatteer of Afghanistan: Part IV — Kabul. 4th edition, 1910.

 

(p.472)  The people of the Dara Turkoman were originally Turkomans, refugees from their own country, but have long been settled in their present location.  They are so much intermarried and mixed with the Hazaras as to be themselves Hazaras to all intents and purposes.  And this was the case so far back as the time of Babar, who attacked and plundered the Turkoman Hazaras after crossing the Shibar pass on his winter march from Herat to Kabul (1506-07).

 

Gazatteer of Afghanistan: Part IV — Kabul. 4th edition, 1910.

 

(p.473)  From the Shibar Kotal westwards the country is occupied by the Darghan, or Khatai, Hazaras, who cover all the eastern part of Bamian, and will be found described under the head of “Bamian proper.”  These Darghan Hazaras extend up the Birgilich and other glens to the north watershed of the Dara Bulola, but beyond the watershed of the Shaikh Alis re-commence, and in particular occupy the Jalmish glen which runs west-northwest to the defiles of the Bamian stream locally known as the Aodara.

Jalmish itself is in the Aodara.   . . . above and below Dahan-i-Jalmish the Aodara is an impassable gorge, and without inhabitants as [p.474] far down as Baghak, where there are Tajiks.  . . . The people of Doab are Tatars, who are not exactly Hazaras, but closely akin.

. . . Four or five miles below Doab-i-Mekhzari the road on the left bank of the river (now become the Surkhab) crosses a couple of spurs by the Karimak Kotal.  Here Shaikh Alis re-commence and continue down the river to Doshi.  They also inhabit all the affluent glens on both sides.  But the Doab district ceases at Shutar Jangal . . .

 

Gazatteer of Afghanistan: Part IV — Kabul. 4th edition, 1910.

 

(p.475)  As before mentioned, it was these Shaikh Alis of the Surkhab who formerly plundered travellers on the Kara Kotal, and rendered the Bamian kafila route unsafe.  The Doab district in 1886 was under Dilawar Khan, the Tatar Chief of Doab-i-Shah Pasand.  He was put to death in 1889 for participating in Sardar Ishak Khan’s rebellion.  Ashraf Khan appears to have been local head of the Shaikh Alis, responsible to Dilawar Khan.  . . . the Shaikh Alis have been partially disarmed [as of 1889] . . .

According to Peacocke, the Shaikh Alis of the Surkhab are all Shiahs.  They are in fact followers of Aga Khan of Bombay, whose representative Saiyid Jafar, formerly resided among them; but he was imprisoned by Amir Abdur Rahman shortly after his accession, and sent to Mazar-i-Sharif, where is is said to have been still in confinement in 1886.

It is not known what revenue is paid by the Shaikh Alis of the Surkhab.  In the time of the Dilawar Khan, Chief of Doab, the revenue of his district was remitted–that is to say, he levied what he pleased for his own benefit, but it was less than the usual Government demand.

 

Gazatteer of Afghanistan: Part IV — Kabul. 4th edition, 1910.

 

(p.482)  “Shibar” is Uzbaki for mud, and “tu” is the possessive.

 

=========

People become Ismailis because they see values in the pir and they choose to follow him.  They see him as a greater help than the others.  (An Ismaili elder in Shibar)

 

============

 

[Time frame:  recent, 1960s]

 

HISTORY OF ISMAILISM IN SHUMBUL

THE SPLIT 15 YEARS AGO — HISTORY AND CIRCUMSTANCES

 

(3-13) An Ismaili in Khurdakâ (which is split) said the Shi`as changed from Ismaili about 15 years ago.

 

1950-1954: Fight in Shumbul

(May ’69)       I remember Safar and Sardâr were shocked to see an Afghan break the fast in our house (1953 or 4), so must have kept fast then.  It was near this then (15 years ago) when Ismailism came out in the open and burnt zyârats.  Much trouble then. 

??(M96 “Mullahs of those zyârats were very strong/rich.”)  Then was secretly Ismaili and P.S. was only “Sayed-i Kayân.”  When came out in open war between the sects broke apart and as yet they have not fully relocated spatially.  Some were already [Ismailis], but others didn’t know they were Ismaili.

 

Gul Nazar yesterday (June 20, 1967) said a little more on the Ismaili trouble.  He said that there are three brothers sometime back — one was his grandfather,

I think — who shared as they should.  But when they died their families fought over the inheritance.  The result was that they split up — both spatially and religiously.  The three families went to three separate sects: Shi`a, Sunni, Ismaili.  One of these families was unable to get along in Shekh Ali because the others wouldn’t tolerate a Sunni.  So his family left and went to a Sunni community.  The Shias, I think, stayed.

            He said there was a serious fight in Bamyan twice, once about eight years ago (1959), once about 15 (1952).  They were between sects.

            Qurban (TB patient from Shumbul) said they had trouble about 12 years ago (1955).  He said at first they were known to be Isamili, but later admitted not so.  A sayed came in to teach them — upon pressing he admitted also to gathering khums — at the initiation of Wakil Sayb.  Wakil Sayb is and was then friendly with MGH and Qurban said he was a good man.  The Mullah was from Iraq.  Apparently, the first dispute over Ismailism was there.  Then, when he came there was an argument over who was the seventh (or eighth?) Imâm.  Some argued for Ismaili, thus revealing their true identity.  Thus, this percipitated the crisis.  The Mullah came to give them trouble over this issue. 

 

Khâk Gadâi

            Khâk Gadâi tells me that the Ismaili were there from a long time back, but that 15 or so years ago there was a big fight over it.  The people must have then learned their true loyalty.  There was a general (umumi) fight here in the valley.  People fought in the chamand below Pusht-i Mazâr.  The people of ??Bamian?? heard about it and were coming to help the Asnâashais when the women of Asnâashars came between both sides with Quran and stopped the fight.  Then there was peace but hostility for some time. 

            The P.S. paid off the Hâkim of Bamian with a horse and a horse to the main man of the Sayyeds, [Tâlib ??] in Birgilich, who was a big man.

            From that time Ismailis have had more freedom — been more open.  Now the king knows the P.S., so they are recognized now.  Since the fight, things got better between both sides.  At first they had nothing to do with each other, but terms got better.  They shared more and more. 

            Then last year at a wedding there was a big blow-up.  It was the son of Lâl M. who was marrying someone (who?) and the Ismailis — from Qalâ-y Mullah and Shakar etc. mainly claimed Lâl M. had thrown their food in the river and had not eaten it.  It was a lie (he says).  Apparently, everyone gives something to a wedding and these Ismailis [believed] their food was not used. 

 

            Now the Ismailis don’t have to pay for their wives, he said (Gadayi??), cause P.S. gave the order.  This is since he made his trip abroad.  Now they pay only 10 ser wheat, 5 ser rice and 2 kushlam (bara?).  Also they give the father of the woman a chapan, and the mother a chapan and shoes and a lungi.   (N.B.  This is from an Asna`ashar).  Now, he says, they are really free. 

N.B.  He is single, alone.  This system for him must have some appeal

 

(5-23)  Shâ Sayyid was the other mullah who got into an argument over beards with mulla Ramagan. 

 

 

[from Qorban?]

            The two mirs stopped the fight between the two sects by baring their heads and (with Qurans) walking between the two sides.  They argued that they would only kill each other and then  the government would jail the offenders — so there would be a double loss.  So they never really fought, he said.

            Gul Nazar said there was no single confrontation, but that each of the valleys had their own conflicts.

 

(8-79)  [MAABeg] He also admitted that until 15 years ago their identity as follwers of Aqâ khân was secret.

 

            Shia Mullah preaching they should have not Pulwân Shariki with Ismailis.

 

ORIGINAL QUARREL IN IRAQ between Ramazan and other Sayyed

[N.B.  These may also have been an implied disagreement over who should receive the Khums.]

 

After the Hazara /Afghan war, between 1880s – 1910

 

— Schism in Iraq

Pir — Social History

(8-41)  Mir Mir Ahmad said it was in his house that Mullah Ramazan and a Sayyed of Irâq were sitting when Mir asked the Sayyed why he wore a beard and the Mullah didn’t.  The Sayyed answered gently that a beard is really of no importance, but since the Prophet had one, he felt a beard was a good thing, so he had one.  Then the Mir asked Ramazan why he didn’t.  Ramazan answered in an unusually harsh way for him.  He said he didn’t believe in that stuff and as far as he was concerned, anyone who wore a beard was the same as a Hindu.  Then the fight exploded.  The Mir Arbâb Kabir remembered this as being 12 or 10 years ago (i.e. 1955 or 1957). 

            The trouble spread fast all over and people were upset and up in arms all over.  An ayat [commission] was sent from Bamyan.  People gathered in Shumbul over this thing.  Mir Mir Ahmad represented Ramazan.  With him came 1200 men to Shumbul.  A lot came on behalf of the Sayyed.  They were all ready to fight, the dân of Shumbul was crammed full.  So Mir Mir Ahmad made — with difficulty — all his men go to Iljânak to wait for him.  He went back alone to Shumbul and there he and MGH and Mullah Ibrahim sat down with Hâji Wakil, Sayyed Tâlib, and ______?, and the ayat and the alagdâr.  There they had a lot of talking and arguing over this issue (and over their loyalties?) and eventually they settled it.  Paid out 6000 afs to the officials.  (To the asnâsar?, alaqadar?)  When it was quieted the men in Iljânak were sent home.  But apparently Ramazan stayed in Shumbul and taught.

            The issue seemed to be over two issues, the wearing of beards and the veneration of zyârats — a point Ramazan brought up later.  It is not clear what the sequence was, but over this eventually the Ismailis burned up one zyârat (the one behind Jamili?).  Over this issue many people were split.  Brothers split over this, even between husband and wife there was sometimes trouble over this.  The ceasing to intermarry was started or completely done then, etc.  Now things are better the Mir says. 

 

 

 [NOTES ON PIRS, FROM INFORMANTS]

            As for the gifts themselves, it is said that to this very day that for Allah’s help in a particular crisis or as an expression of highest reverence towards a holy man, one made a gift of one’s own daughter, in additon to material assets.  The holy man collects thereby the sole right to dispose of the girl; he either married her himself or gave her to one of his supporters as a wife. 

            Worship and devotion towards a leader, and the other members of the Kayhan family are said to show extreme forms.  The leader is said to have had the “ius primae noctis”;  defloration gives the girl barakat;  there is said to have been mass slaughter of cattle so that the blood could clean the path for the saint, and his support could be demonstrated, and so on.

            Another way of showing one’s deep reverence is unpaid labour on the landed property of the holy man, which tends to be of considerable size not least . . . [this is from Einzman p 26-7]

 

SCANDALOUS STORIES

            Because a “saint’s” miracle signs are so crucial to his renown, it is widely believed that some saints use fraudulent means to project an image of miraculous generousity.  The following story is told with varying permutations by people about “saints” whose claims to sainthood they scout.

 

FRAUDULENT TECHNIQUES

            The pir arranges for each of his servants the name of a type of object that may be given by his murid — a cow, a rug, etc.  Then when a man comes, intending to bring a rug to the pir, even before bringing it in, as he goes in to see the pir, the servan who has been given the name for this — for example, “carpet” — is the one who accompanies the visitor.  The pir then knows what is being brought, and he says, “Thank you for bringing the carpet,” even before being shown it.  (A Sunni man from Kabul.)

 

            People say that the pir sahib of the Ismailis gives names to his servants to identify what needs his murid have.  Then at certain times he sits under a cloth chanting and his sevants bring people to him.  When he brings them in and asks who it is, a certain servant says who it is and the pir sahib then knows from the servant what kind of thing they want.  And he says, “Oh yes, — is sick, or needs a male child, etc.  Tell them to come here that I may blow a blessing upon them.”  People are so surprised by his supernatural powers that they will empty their pockets to him.  (A Sunni from Kabul)

 

OUT-MYTHS vs. OTHER PIRS

            He said they came to know that the other people were Ismailis when the sons of P.S. came here and stayed in the house of Mullâ Gholam Reza.  Then they knew.  He denied that they had fought over this, but said after that they wouldn’t have anything to do with them any more — won’t marry them now.  He won’t eat with them now because he thinks he will get sick from it because of this religion.  He says it is no religion at all.  They call P.S. a prophet — and what does he do?  He should change this wall to gold or something to show this.  The P.S. only collects money for himself.  He should at least have some school or some giving to Faqirs, but he only takes from his poor people and collects for himself — he says.

 

The khalifa in Turughman was Mansur and he was trying to start trouble between the sects in order to increase Ismailism.  But the pir sahib finally didn’t like it, and he changed him.  The people argued on Mansur’s behalf, and told the pir sahib they wanted only him.  The pir sahib said that he was not soliciting followers, if they wanted him, Mansur would have to go.  They took Mansur.  (Ismaili elder from Turughman.)

 

 

            Mauucher expressed feeling against P.S.’s teaching to Saka.  Seemed to be leaning toward Sunni (i.e. Saka — gov’t)

            P.S. family had caught three people of Mauucher’s group near Tâla o Barfak, they were from Turughman, where they were for Manucher and accused them of wanting to murder the P.S.  One of them was named Nabi and he was poisoned.  But he lived and Saka secretly sent them to Turughman.

 

Conversion

 

Manucher a months ago said that he is now Sunni.

Manucher a months ago said that he is now Sunni.Manucher a months ago said that he is now Sunni.  He told the inspector Assadullah, a colonel, that he is Sunni.  And, so the inspector is working hard for him.  He is following the commission carefully, but the commission won’t let an Ismaili be near them.

 

The Eshan of Puli Kumri gave his daughter in marriage to Manuchur.  After Manuchur and Mansur became at odds with the pir sahib.  He married her about a year ago, and now Manuchur claims to have become a Sunni.

 

People who used to follow the pir sahib, but they have become angry with him and are trying to reveal all that he has done.  They say many things against him.  They refer to certain lines in his books as evidence that he is not a Muslim.  There are some Ismailis remaining among them. (A Sunni government official)

 

In Sanglaq near Logar, there are some people who used to follow the pir sahib, but they have become angry with him and are trying to reveal all that he has done.  They say many things against him.  They refer to certain lines in his books as evidence that he is not a Muslim.  There are some Ismailis remaining among them.  (A Sunni government official)

 

Marxist young man in Bamian, emerging crisis

Sultan [urbanized young man] crticized pirs, etc. for robbing the people.  Only the ignorant really follow them [he said].  [Hashem criticized him for being too progressive.]  [He is the one who asked me if I knew the famoust Communist young man who was later killed in Kabul; I would now wonder if he was a Maoist.]  [NB doubt about pirs related to urban experience.

 

===============

Saka: People give gifts of their children to the P.S.  The general fight

The general fight was about 20 years ago.  People were Ismailis secretly before that because they were weak.  They intermarried freely among themselves, but the Shi’ites didn’t know about this.  The Ismaili women who married Shi’ite men taught their children the Ismaili viewpoint secretly.  But then the general fight occurred in Turughman because they were discovered to be Ismailis, and some of the women went away from their husbands.  There was a lot of trouble for Ismailis in Turughman because there are only a few of them and there are many Shi’ites against them.  So, they are troubled a lot.  The Ismailis in the provinces always suffer more than in the cities because the people in the provinces can make trouble with the government for them.  They can make a complaint against them and if it’s strong enough, they can force them out.  (An Ismaili mature man from Turughman)

 

Shia-Ismaili Relations in Shibar/Shumbal

We came to know that those other people are Ismailies because one of the sons of the Ismaili pir came here and stayed in the house of mullah G–.  Then we knew.  After that we wouldn’t have anything to do with them anymore.  We don’t marry them anymore, and we don’t even eat with them now because we’re afraid we’ll get sick from it because of this religion.  In fact, it’s no religion at all.  They call the pir sahib a prophet.  And what does he do?  He should change the wall to gold or something to show this.  But he only collects money for himself.  He should at least have some school or some plan for giving to the poor, but he only takes from his poor people and collects the money for himself.  (An Imami elder in Shibar)

 

 

Xaak Gadaai tells me that the Ismailis were that a long time back, but that 15 or so years ago there was a big fight over it.  The people must have then learned their true loyalty.  There was a general (umumi) fight here in the valley.  People fought in the chamand (grass land) below  Pushti-Mazar.  The people of Bamian heard about it and were coming to help the asnâshars (Imamis) when the women of the asnâshars (the Imamis) came between both sides with Quran [on their heads] and stopped the fight.  Then there was peace, but hostility for some time.

 

The Ismaili pir paid off the governor of Bamian with a horse and a horse to the main man of sayeds of Bergelich who was a big [prominent] man.  Since that time, Ismailis have been more open.  Now the King knows the pir sahib so they are recognized.  Since the fight, things got better between both sides.  At first they had nothing to do with each other, but times got better and they shared more and more. 

 

[Their beliefs about God’s blessing are very strong.  Quântori [Qurankhori??] is a secular belief. ??[[check this] ]

 

Then last year at a wedding there was a big blow-up.  It was the son of Laal Muhammad who was marrying someone (who?) and the Ismailis — from q. of mullâ and shakar etc. mainly — claimed Lâl M. had thrown their food into the river and had not eaten it.  It was a lie (he says).  Apparently, everyone gives something to a wedding and these Ismailis claimed their food wasn’t used.  (an Imami poor man in Shibar)

 

Now the Ismailis don’t have to pay for their wives, he said (Gada’i), because P.S. gave the order.  This is since he made his trip abroad.  Now they pay only 10 ser wheat, 5 ser rice and 2 kushtani (bara? 

 

).  Also, they give F of the bride a chapan, and the M a chapan and shoes and a lungi [Mother?].  (NB.  This is from an asnâshar).  Now, he says, they are really free.  NB:  he is single, alone.  This system for him must have some appeal.

 

(Rise of Ismailism)

Note on the family of xudâdad in Xordagaa of Shumbull.

 

“In Xordagâ there are 10 – 12 Asnâshar houses and 8 Ismayla houses.

Note on the family of xudâdad in Xadaga of Shumbull.

“In Xardagâ there are 10 – 12 Asnâshar houses and 8 Ismayla houses.”In Xardagâ there are 10 – 12 Asnâshar houses and 8 Ismayla houses.  These are all related.  The Asnâshar changed from Ismailia about 15 years ago. 

 

Mir Nasir of Kalu said [(7-19) Kalu]:

 

Maybe 30 years ago the differences between Ism. and Asnâshar became emphasized and inter-marriage stopped.

 

MGH 6. (in Clan & Sect. Dist.)

 

Re: the sects (Imamis vs. Ismailis):  “Now each side is firm.  Neither side can change.  Each year sometimes a few change from Asnâshar to Ismailia, but not otherwise.

 

Birgilic

When the Sayyeds separated themselves from the Ismailis they became separate themselves from the people of Birgilich.  After that all their work [political affairs] became separate.  (Earlier he said, “The Sayyeds had their own arbâb”, i.e., change took place during time of or before time of Mir Murad Ali).  Then the Khalifa was Mubârak Shah . . . after he killed that man.

 

Pir/schism 202

Gul Nazar yesterday (June 20 ’67) said a little more on the Ismaili trouble.  He said that there were 3 brothers some time back — one was his GF, I think — who shared as they should.  But when they died, their families fought over the inheritance.  The result was that they split up — both spatially and religiously.  The 3 families went to three separate sects — Shia, Sunni, Ismaili.  One of these families was unable to get along in Shex Ali because the others wouldn’t tolerate a Sunni, so his family left and went to Sunni community.  The Shias, I think, stayed.

 

How conversion is impossible.

 

Fission-Schism (Hashem 4, Quchangi)

 

If Hakim (my B) becomes asnâshar, then I (Hasham) and F. would be mad.  Others would not let him in their houses.

 

QN 42: If a man changes from one sect, he does not change from Shiite to Sunni or Sunni to Shiite.  He can become Kafer/infidel, but he cannot become any other sect.

 

MGH 174.  Schism

A person can’t change his religion — never.  The Qaazi would be unhappy — no one could ever do this — also PS and mullaa couldn’t accept it.  People would give him reproach [taana], would say you are a din-gashta.  It is not really feasible to change from one sect to another.  A person can’t really get free from his sect.  Suppose he should say something unfriendly, and wouldn’t be nice to me, or should not do maraa’at (show respect, consideration) with me, then I would really be arzuda at him, angry at him.  Then I would have to go.  If he looked bad upon me and wouldn’t allow me to come before him, then I would have to go.  Anger is an easy thing.  Can tell the servant to put someone out.  Suppose that one day you get up to find for yourself a friend.  In a whole year you couldn’t find a friend.  If you fight with everybody in one day, you can become the enemy of everyone.  It is this way.

 

Sunni > Shia in Gazetter of Kabul p 304

Kuchari (tribe of Kizilbash) — were Sunni but became Shiah upon arrival in Kabul (from Iran). [p. 304] [NB this is strange, since the Q. were

Gazatteer of Afghanistan: Part IV — Kabul

 

 

 

 

KALU SUB-DISTRICT

(p.39)  Mir Kalbi Husain, Mirdad Khatai, is chief of the whole clan, and originally the entire revenue of the sub-district was paid through him.  Since the accession of Amir Abdur Rahman, however, Irak and Shibar (or Bulola), with Birgilich and Jolah, have been removed from his jurisdiction, and now pay their revenue direct to the Hakim of Bamian.

 

My father died fairly early and his other two brothers are no longer Ismailis.  My father and father’s father were Ismailis, but the other two sons were not.  They became Shi’ite by marrying with Shi’ite women.  My father was alive and wanted to marry but not when the other married.  now they don’t have much to do with me.  But my father’s brother’s son came and asked for my daughter, but because of the difference in religion, we refused.  since the general fight in Turughman, we do not intermarry.  (An Ismaili elder from Turughman)

 

======

article

1. Ahmad (Toronto), “Conversions to Islam in the Valley of Kashmir”; Central Asiatic Journal; 23:p. 3-18 (1979)

==========

malik, schism, Q. conflict

            Malek Ali Yawar [an arbaab] said that some of the followings of different maleks change.  One family will shift to another and back and forth.  So his following is different somewhat from year to year.

            A malek [arbaab] must be rich, must be son of a malek, he said, must have a qawm (!), (i.e., a solid following in his own qawm, I think).

            A man may change maleks at a time when he has a dispute with another person in the qawm following the same malek.  When the malek takes the other side, the man may decide to go to another malek to get help.  The situation was specifically described as between brothers in a dispute.  One brother will split off and go to another malek.  As the result of these moves, though his following is localized in one area — there are some who go to another malek.  But in such cases, they are socially quite at odds with another and socially split off from the other, also the malek.

            The two maleks involved are put at odds and the feelings over this split — between the maleks and between the fighting [opposing] parties can be very strong.

            The importance of his father’s name as a malek contributes a lot to the strength of a malek (Ali Yawar)

 

If H & W live with his F or B’s, they don’t talk much.  In this case, women and men sit separately and talk.  If they have money a H & W may move to a place of their own, and then they talk among themselves more.

 

————————-

Situation in 1950s-1960s, muhtasib

(people said):  Because the former Khasib – Khatibs [???] were from the area they didn’t give people much trouble, but now the muhtasib (who is from another area) is doing this [same work??] and he gives the people a lot of trouble.

 ==================

Here begins the Bamian political history file

MGH 46

Contemp hist, sunbul, ethnic groups

The Q of maamand were kochis in Shumbul, but were settled on the land of the Xalifa.  the land also of 300-500 houses also in Burma, a large place in the area of Day Mirak.  Then they threw them out of this area, only a few Maamad houses [were] left there.  Then Maamand went to Aybak, near Tashqurghan and near Day Mirak [Day Mirdad?].

X Kalbisha’s grandfather was himself from Sanglaaxt-i Besut.

The people of Burma asked for the king to help them also.  When the Maamands went to Aybak, the inhabitants were also Afghans of Q Maamand, so they were able to stay.

Earlier Wazir M. Gul had given land to the Maamands in both Aybak and Burma [Barimak?], but in Burma the Hazaras had revolted and fought back.  so it was necessary for all the Maamands to to to Aybak.

 

[Arbab Kabir?]

8-22

            Mir Kabir-i Mir M. Nasim (Bulola)-i Mir Ghoam Ali Beg (Bulola)(he built this memaan khaana; he was mir of all Shibar)-i Mir Gorz Ali (was in Bulola, over all of Shibar)-i Osayn Baay (he was not a mir but was very rich)-i Paynda Qadam Beg (was in Bulola)-i Jumaa Baay (he was the father of all this Qawm (aashur).

            Osayn Baay had 7 Sons, all but one of whom cheated and mistreated their father and did not respect his last-dying prayer … These have no offspring at all and the land is scattered to others.  Mir Gorz Ali was the only one who cared for the father.  Was Mir.

 

            Mir Gorz Ali: Bulola, Jola, Shumbul, Shibar, Birgilich, Jawzaar, Iraaq.  Mir of Kalu was Mir Abbas and Mir Zafar was in this time.

Mir Gholam Ali Beg: in the time of Abdul Rahman and Habibullah.  They paid maaliya.  He was over all of Shibar from Iraaq to Sar-i Shibar.  In that time Mir Bakhtiari was Mir of Kalu.

            Mir M. Nasim.  died early and the wife (d. of Bakhtiyari) went back to her home.  Arbaab Kabir was 5 when she went back to kalu and lived there for 16 years.  he came back to Bulola one year before Saqaw [1929].  His land was here.  He came when Bakhtiyari died; otherwise the FF [nb. not Bakhtiari] would not have allowed him to come back.  [because there was aproblem between the ff and Bakhtiari?].

            After Mir M. Nasim, his B was the mir.  Mir Amad Ali Beg was [mir] for 8-10- 12 years.  All of shibar was under him.  He was staying in Bulola in his Brother’s house [i.e. Mir M. Nasim’s house]  (the Qalaa was made by Juma Baay.  In this time Mir Sultan Ali (Son of Baktyaari) was mir.  (In those days Paay Murid to kaalu was the area of Kaalu Mir [i.e. was locationof Sultan Ali?].

            When Arbaab Kabir came to Bulola, Mir Ahmad Ali Beg went to iraq to take his land [which was] left him by his F (who had land in Iraq too) and went there.  Kabir came to Bulola.

            Below Mir Ahmad Ali Beeg there were MuySafeds over ea. qaria

The FF of MAJ was over Q. aadil.  Arbaab Ali Bakhsh [was] over Q. ayaam.

Mir M. Osayn over Shunbul; and later Mir Mowladad.  He [Osayn] was awdur baaca of MGH.

            All of Shibar is from one father, Baaba Darghu (except Jolaa) and Kaalu is from him too.  One S. went o Shibar (to Daaki), one S was in Kalu (f of Nasir) and one s was in Iraq (kona qalaa).

            Another child was born to Darghu and he called him Shaak (the Q. of Birgalich).  Another S, Aram Sha, his descendants are gone.

In Daaki, Shex M. was the son.

            Xida was in Shumbul, Iraaq, Bulola.  In Kalu was another (name?)

People of Julaa came in later, are not related to Darghu.

            The Sayyeds of Birgalich came in at some time, but not related.  Are in Jawzaar (6hhs), Byaamurda (7-8 hhs), Birgilich (20hh), Shumbul (10hh), Iraq, Shikaari, a few in Kaalu (in Dasht-i Tajak).

            Juma Baay (Bulola) was of Aashur-i Khida-i Baaba Darghu (Darghaan), and he came from Kandahar.

            In time they first came to Shibar they were at odds with Uzbeks.  Each Qalaa had its own well.

            All of Shibar [was] 100 hh; Kaalu-Paymuri 1000.

            Mir Murad Ali of Birgalich; he was mir of all Shibar.  Before Mir Gurz Ali [the mir] was Ikhtiyar (of Shumbul) then Mir Muraad Ali was mir.  they he retired in favor of Mir Gh Ali Beg (of Bulola).  The change came becasue the mir Murad Ali could not do something with government, so people let him go and took Mir Gh ali Beeg.  In those days [mirs?] were very rich because each hh gave one ser roghan (1000 hhs) [rent, dues to the mir].  (In Kaalu there were 700 hhs.)  [NB the diff way they were paid then than now — in animal products]

            In the time of Ikhtiyaar:  Mir Abbas was Kaalu and was over both Kaalu and Shibar, but was very cruel and they killed him.  In those days 1 rupa was worth 25 ser wheat and he levied 100,000 afs maalya [dues] on the people.

            NB on a stone written, “I have two wives, one rupa is worth 12 ser wheat.”

            People of Pay Muri are children of Mir Abbas.  [Mir Zafar came earlier (was in Kalu) in Daan-i gargara/yargara.  That is:  Mir Zafar [in Kalu]; then Mir Abbas [Paymurid, where his “children” still reside]; then Mir Gholam Haydar [Kalu]; then Mir Bakhtiyari [Kalu].

 

 ———–

 

[Arbab Kabir?]

8-22

            Mir Kabir-i Mir M. Nasim (Bulola)-i Mir Ghoam Ali Beg (Bulola)(he built this memaan khaana; he was mir of all Shibar)-i Mir Gorz Ali (was in Bulola, over all of Shibar)-i Osayn Baay (he was not a mir but was very rich)-i Paynda Qadam Beg (was in Bulola)-i Jumaa Baay (he was the father of all this Qawm (aashur).

            Osayn Baay had 7 Sons, all but one of whom cheated and mistreated their father and did not respect his last-dying prayer … These have no offspring at all and the land is scattered to others.  Mir Gorz Ali was the only one who cared for the father.  Was Mir.

 

            Mir Gorz Ali: Bulola, Jola, Shumbul, Shibar, Birgilich, Jawzaar, Iraaq.  Mir of Kalu was Mir Abbas and Mir Zafar was in this time.

Mir Gholam Ali Beg: in the time of Abdul Rahman and Habibullah.  They paid maaliya.  He was over all of Shibar from Iraaq to Sar-i Shibar.  In that time Mir Bakhtiari was Mir of Kalu.

            Mir M. Nasim.  died early and the wife (d. of Bakhtiyari) went back to her home.  Arbaab Kabir was 5 when she went back to kalu and lived there for 16 years.  he came back to Bulola one year before Saqaw [1929].  His land was here.  He came when Bakhtiyari died; otherwise the FF [nb. not Bakhtiari] would not have allowed him to come back.  [because there was aproblem between the ff and Bakhtiari?].

            After Mir M. Nasim, his B was the mir.  Mir Amad Ali Beg was [mir] for 8-10- 12 years.  All of shibar was under him.  He was staying in Bulola in his Brother’s house [i.e. Mir M. Nasim’s house]  (the Qalaa was made by Juma Baay.  In this time Mir Sultan Ali (Son of Baktyaari) was mir.  (In those days Paay Murid to kaalu was the area of Kaalu Mir [i.e. was locationof Sultan Ali?].

            When Arbaab Kabir came to Bulola, Mir Ahmad Ali Beg went to iraq to take his land [which was] left him by his F (who had land in Iraq too) and went there.  Kabir came to Bulola.

            Below Mir Ahmad Ali Beeg there were MuySafeds over ea. qaria

The FF of MAJ was over Q. aadil.  Arbaab Ali Bakhsh [was] over Q. ayaam.

Mir M. Osayn over Shunbul; and later Mir Mowladad.  He [Osayn] was awdur baaca of MGH.

            All of Shibar is from one father, Baaba Darghu (except Jolaa) and Kaalu is from him too.  One S. went o Shibar (to Daaki), one S was in Kalu (f of Nasir) and one s was in Iraq (kona qalaa).

            Another child was born to Darghu and he called him Shaak (the Q. of Birgalich).  Another S, Aram Sha, his descendants are gone.

In Daaki, Shex M. was the son.

            Xida was in Shumbul, Iraaq, Bulola.  In Kalu was another (name?)

People of Julaa came in later, are not related to Darghu.

            The Sayyeds of Birgalich came in at some time, but not related.  Are in Jawzaar (6hhs), Byaamurda (7-8 hhs), Birgilich (20hh), Shumbul (10hh), Iraq, Shikaari, a few in Kaalu (in Dasht-i Tajak).

            Juma Baay (Bulola) was of Aashur-i Khida-i Baaba Darghu (Darghaan), and he came from Kandahar.

            In time they first came to Shibar they were at odds with Uzbeks.  Each Qalaa had its own well.

            All of Shibar [was] 100 hh; Kaalu-Paymuri 1000.

            Mir Murad Ali of Birgalich; he was mir of all Shibar.  Before Mir Gurz Ali [the mir] was Ikhtiyar (of Shumbul) then Mir Muraad Ali was mir.  they he retired in favor of Mir Gh Ali Beg (of Bulola).  The change came becasue the mir Murad Ali could not do something with government, so people let him go and took Mir Gh ali Beeg.  In those days [mirs?] were very rich because each hh gave one ser roghan (1000 hhs) [rent, dues to the mir].  (In Kaalu there were 700 hhs.)  [NB the diff way they were paid then than now — in animal products]

            In the time of Ikhtiyaar:  Mir Abbas was Kaalu and was over both Kaalu and Shibar, but was very cruel and they killed him.  In those days 1 rupa was worth 25 ser wheat and he levied 100,000 afs maalya [dues] on the people.

            NB on a stone written, “I have two wives, one rupa is worth 12 ser wheat.”

            People of Pay Muri are children of Mir Abbas.  [Mir Zafar came earlier (was in Kalu) in Daan-i gargara/yargara.  That is:  Mir Zafar [in Kalu]; then Mir Abbas [Paymurid, where his “children” still reside]; then Mir Gholam Haydar [Kalu]; then Mir Bakhtiyari [Kalu].

—-

M-29

Slave raiding and qalaas

Ismaili houses were sep awlis.  Awli=sep house.

Qalaa is an older form, from 20 years earlier, has several houses in it.

Even earlier:  Xaana-Otaaq= sep rooms

            Before the time of laki, the Turkmaan from Bukhaaraa from around the Oxus river came and stole people and sold them.  This was shy qalaas were built.  They had lots of large horses, tied up their victims, put them on hourses, carried them toward Bukhaaraa, to Turkistaan.  In those days the King of Bukhaara was weak and could not control these people.  We didn’t know what they did for a living, but were very cruel.  Many of the tictims got back.  But many also remained there and their descendenst are Turkmen, don’t know they are Hazara.

            When qalaas were built, then they couldn’t get in so easily.  Also the king became stronger in this area, so the Turkemn couldn’t come so easily.  This was in the time of Ser Ali Khaan.

8-76

An old man, Asnaashar, told me one of his ancestors, Tay M., was captured below the old Qalaa of Bulola in days when there were robbers in these parts.  They used to come horse back in scores — 200 or so.  they took Toy M. and when got up to place called Taataar and something else (near Duaab) and there he read the Shanaama so well they used him as a teacher.  Two years later let him go, gave him a horse to go on.

p 200

Gul Nazar.  May, 1967

The following are brother groups:

1. Darghaan/Darghu: This is those on the upper side of the pass, Shibar.
2. Day Kalu [day Kalaan]: these people are scattered, are in Buyaan, Sakpar, Daan-i Kajak, Qool-i Kajak, Dasht-i Xagak, beet, Kootak, Jarf, Nirx, Pawaaz, Jagalak, Durwaaz (these are all in Shekh Ali).
3. Karmali: these are in Sang Andaab and Shingiraan, Pay Kootal (a few), Sar-i Bootyaan.
4. Qaluq: these are below Daan-i Shingaraan to Duaab-i Shekh Ali, Loolinj, Cukuma, Qool-i Xool, Taxt, Sorx, Paarsaal (Surkh o Parsal).
5. Xida = Naymu: Naymaan are in Ghorbandak (next to Shibar pass), Betqool, Kharjuy, Noolangak, Xarbeetak, Oolangajaangul, Bini Sewak.

NB:  MGH says Darghan is the Fa of Khida.

—–

M81

Mir Aminuddin Ansari.  He may be a descendant of Abdulla-i Ansar, whom Mir Ghulam Hasan claims descent from.  Was born in Kandahar, went to Herat.  The ancestors of Darghan (F of Khida) were from Pusht-i Rod-i Qandahar, same as Ansaari.  They are sometimes called children of Ansaar.  In this place is a large juy — nahar-made by these people.  Is now ruid.  now when people try to researrect it, they die in large numbers, maybe someon prayed a curse on the area.  Maybe it belonged to the sons of Darghan.  All Hazaras are from Khoja Abdul-i Ansaar.

———————————————

Mir hist; mir and alaqadar

8-61:  Mir hist

Naayeblukma:  the old large governships in the dayd of Haakim in Bamian

sekot= before AR, 1/3 of crops

Under AR:  maalya:  Shibar 5,000

                        : Kalu, 11,000

                        :???

Under Zaher Shah:  3 years ago [1964], Shibar 22,000

                                                Kalu, 14,000

Shibar has 4200 men now [1967]; Kalu and Ghandak 3800 men now [population]

In time of :     The mir was:

Dost M Khan Mir Zafar

Sher Ali Khan           Mir Akbar

A.R                 Mir Ghulam Haydar, Sher Ali, Beeg, Mir Bakhtiyari

 

p 200

Gul Nazar.  May, 1967

The following are brother groups:

1. Darghaan/Darghu: This is those on the upper side of the pass, Shibar.
2. Day Kalu [day Kalaan]: these people are scattered, are in Buyaan, Sakpar, Daan-i Kajak, Qool-i Kajak, Dasht-i Xagak, beet, Kootak, Jarf, Nirx, Pawaaz, Jagalak, Durwaaz (these are all in Shekh Ali).
3. Karmali: these are in Sang Andaab and Shingiraan, Pay Kootal (a few), Sar-i Bootyaan.
4. Qaluq: these are below Daan-i Shingaraan to Duaab-i Shekh Ali, Loolinj, Cukuma, Qool-i Xool, Taxt, Sorx, Paarsaal (Surkh o Parsal).
5. Xida = Naymu: Naymaan are in Ghorbandak (next to Shibar pass), Betqool, Kharjuy, Noolangak, Xarbeetak, Oolangajaangul, Bini Sewak.

NB:  MGH says Darghan is the Fa of Khida.

 

—–

M81

Mir Aminuddin Ansari.  He may be a descendant of Abdulla-i Ansar, whom Mir Ghulam Hasan claims descent from.  Was born in Kandahar, went to Herat.  The ancestors of Darghan (F of Khida) were from Pusht-i Rod-i Qandahar, same as Ansaari.  They are sometimes called children of Ansaar.  In this place is a large juy — nahar-made by these people.  Is now ruid.  now when people try to researrect it, they die in large numbers, maybe someon prayed a curse on the area.  Maybe it belonged to the sons of Darghan.  All Hazaras are from Khoja Abdul-i Ansaar.

 

—————–

Mir hist; mir and alaqadar

8-61:  Mir hist

Naayeblukma:  the old large governships in the dayd of Haakim in Bamian

sekot= before AR, 1/3 of crops

Under AR:  maalya:  Shibar 5,000

                        : Kalu, 11,000

                        :???

Under Zaher Shah:  3 years ago [1964], Shibar 22,000

                                                Kalu, 14,000

Shibar has 4200 men now [1967]; Kalu and Ghandak 3800 men now [population]

In time of :     The mir was:

Dost M Khan Mir Zafar

Sher Ali Khan           Mir Akbar

 

 Kalu

CONTEMPORARY SITUATIONS

Gilkârs:  2 (for Ismailis)

                                    Ghojurak

                                    Iljânak

            1 in Joolâ (for Asnâshars)

 

SCHISM

            Boy in Bulola explained that Ismailis and Asnâshars don’t speak to each other — as I observed also.  “They are very chop with us.”  This has been for 10-15-20 years.

 

(8-69) NB.  The eating patterns separating the sects keep fellowship at a minimum.  Meals in which people eat at each others’ houses became communication centers for people — but centers which have limited lines across the sects.  Relatives and ampirâ stay in each others houses when they move around for economic purposes.  Man from Kâlu working for wheat stayed at house of Mir âmad Ali Beg — because same sect.  In this way they learn about each others’ relatives and sectarian arguments, and news about the P.S., etc. 

            The relations with the asnâshars are not good.  If they want to borrow from them, they would send away and tell them to go to their own kind.

 

SPATIAL PATTERNS OF PIRS/??MORIDS?? IN BAMIAN

            Those of us in this village see the pir of Paghman as the great pir.  In some other villages around here, people believe in the pir of Logar (a moderately well educated man in Bamian.)

           

            In Ghandak,  In Ghandak, the people are Tajik, but there are no Tajiks in Shibar.  But the pir of the Tajiks is the Hazrat.  The Pushtuns have Aakhundzâda.  They are like the sayyeds.  They are godly and knowledgable. (Ismaili elder in Shibar.)

           

            The pir of Ahangaran, Topchi Mulayan, and Taybuti live in Istalif.  He is an âlem.   All these places are Tajik places. (notes from conversation with Tajiks in Bamian.)

                                                                                                                        Besides the Hazaras, there are some [Ismaili] goldsmiths from the eastern province and some Hindus and some Tajiks. (notes from conversations with Ismailis.)

           

            The iron workers  are Arabs but they are not Sayyed.  Usually they are only artisans.  They are Ismaili in Iraq, Shumbul, Daki, Birgilich and Sheikh Ali.  The are Imamis in Jola and Ghulam Ali. (notes on a conversation with an elder in Shibar.)

 

=== RLC checked it to here ==

 

Early 1900s

Ismaili advance in Bamian / Shibar in 19th / 20th c

See also: /projects/pir2/s4birth

{{/Projects/pir/excerpt [down to “five years later”]

Sayyed Nadir was born in a turbulent time.  The second Anglo-Afghan war had occurred only ten years before his birth and at its end in 1879 the Amir of Kabul, Yaqub Khan, had signed a humiliating treaty with the British.  Within four months the British envoy in Kabul had been assassinated and British troops invaded again.  In Kabul they demolished the historic citadel where the assassination had taken place, and accepted the Yaqub’s resignation.  As they withdrew the new Amir, Abdul Rahman, to acceeded to power in July of 1880.  His capital was in ruins and the countryside had dissolved into dozens of autonomous feudalities.  The new Amir soon was engaged over a series of risings in the eastern provinces, the most serious in 1886-1887 when the Ghilzais rebelled under the headship of a famous religious leader known as Mullah Mushk-i Alam.  Scarcely had that revolt been put down when the Shenwaris and Safays rose; the Shinwaris would not be finally subdued until 1892.  But there were distractions all through this period in the east-central region of Afghanistan where Sayyed Nadir was to be born.  In three successive years, 1881, 1882, and 1883, the Amir had to send military excursions into the Sheikh Ali territories — which extended between the Turkman valley to as far north as Doshi and may have included Kayan (Maitland n.d.: 380 ff.)  {Kakar mistakenly places the Sheikh Alis “north-west of Bamian”.} — because their depredations of traffic interrupted communications into Afghan Turkistan (Kakar 1971: 162 ff.).  The arrival of troops into the area would have been a major event for the peoples of  the Sayyed’s neighborhood.  A more disruptive event in the territory of Sayyed Nadir’s birth would have taken place in the year of the Sayyed’s birth:  the war between the Amir and his cousin Sardar Muhammad Ishaq Khan.  The Amirs army had in fact staged their move to the north from Sayghan, less than fifty miles from Kayan, and moved into Kahmard on their way to Ghaznigak where they defeated the rebellious army of Afghan Turkistan.  Ghaznigak was scarcely 90 miles north of Kayan and the Amir’s army would have marched near there, perhaps through Doshi, Tala and Barfak nearby.  Moreover, because the Sheikh Ali Hazaras of the region had failed to support him in the struggle against Ishaq Khan the Amir two years later removed thousands of Sheikh Alis out of the area and carried them off to Herat (Kakar 1971: 163).  That was not the end of trouble in the east-central region, however, because within a year the Hazarajat rose against the Amir.  In the bloody Hazara war against the Amir in 1891-1893 most of the fighting would have taken place at some distance from Kayan but the neighborhood would certainly have been affected by the displacement of thousands of Hazaras and the devestations the region that the Amir’s armies left behind (Mousavi 1999???).  Even then the Sheikh Alis of the region were not completely subdued because after the death of the Amir in 1901 they “renewed their old practice of plundering caravans on the Kabul-Turkistan road which ran through their country” (Kakar 1971: 162).  Such would be the incorageability of the Hazara peoples among whom would be many followers of Sayyed Nadir when he was named pir of the Ismailis five years later. }}

Bakhtiaari’s time

Pirs in Bamian area and changes in their collection system

Kalu-at Mir Nasir

An old man talked with has said a lot about Bakhtyâri I didn’t understand.

¨ Mir Bakhtyâri had a dispute over maliki over [with?] the people for two years.  It must have been serious.  In the end the other pretender was put in jail until his death.  Bakhtyâri was Ismaili secretly if he was one.  The other was asnâshar.  After this fight, Bakhtyâri visited Kayân to see P.S. and acknowledged his superiority.

¨ In those days, people couldn’t come out openly regarding their Ismaili faith.  Ismailis couldn’t survive in the army if they said they were Ismaili.  They had to go around in groups of ten or more to be safe.  They began to be more open about their Ismaili faith in the time of Nâdir shâ khân.

 

early [secret] advance of Ismailism

 

Pâynd Ali (of âdil), servant of Jean Selch

Said in early days of Ismaili in Shibar there were several mullas who began to teach for Ismailism.  They did it only carefully — secretly — only to people they could trust, who really were friends.  They changed ideas of a few people — 2 or three to five — and they met to discuss these things, but only secretly.  They never told about themselves.  Then 30 or 40 years ago [since 1968, i.e., 1928-1938], the P.S. [this would have been Pir Nadir Shah] openly said he was Ismaili and was for âqâ khân.  In Shumbul one of the most effective mullas was Abdul the FF of âkhund aslam.  Also FF of Mubârakshâ.  Eventually, they changed a lot of people to Ismaili in their areas.

 

early Islmailis in Shumbul

 

[MGH?]  At first there were few Ismailis but it grew larger

In the time of Imam Jaafar-i Saadiq, one son, Ismail vs Musaa-i Kaazim.  Until this time they were all Shia.  After this time they split.  The Shia were for Musaa-i Kaazim; the Ismailia were for Ismail.

The people of Afghanistan split over this.  The people who thought the one who was biggest chose the biggest one.  There was hard feeling.  Ta’asub bud.  One side said it understood the truth, the other side the other way.

 

M6  Now each side is firm.  Neither side can change.

Each year sometimes a few change from ashnaashar to Ismalia but not otherwise.

The ones who change are more oshaar.  The ones who are ignorant remain Asna`ashar

 

Though opposed, they are not fighting, but look badly at each other.

 

(An elder from Shibar, MGH).  In our place now we are all Ismaili.  When my father became Ismaili the whole of Pusht-i Mazar [his village] became Ismaili.  Qalaa-i Mullah [another village] were Ismaili before Pusht-i Mazar — maybe twenty years earlier than us.  Our Khalifa was Mullah Baabay the father of Mullah Gholam.  In a few places there were a few [Ismaili] houses scattered among the other [Shi`a] houses.  In those days we troubled these people a lot — said bad things abou them … Eventually we all became Ismaili.  These early Ismailis were probably close, or well known, to the Pir Saheb.  Mullah Bâba Bây — in our childhood we called him Mullah Bâba.

 

(An elder from Shibar).  When Pusht-i Mazar [his village] became Ismaili it was 70 years ago, maybe.  The Pir Saheb was Timur Shah.  He had not visited there.  Travel was difficult then — only by horseback.  In those days few people could see the Pir Saheb, but the masjid was there [in Kayan].  The Pir Saheb’s grandfather built the masjid.  Their homeland is in Iran.  At first they came to Khawât [Khawār? in Besud?], then moved to Kayân.  At first only old people knew the origin [of the pir’s family] was Iran and that they were pirs.  Then more and more people began to see that they were.  Maybe the Pir Saheb knows his family’s descent.  The Pir Saheb and the Aga Khan are both descendants of Ali, but through the main line of Ali; the Aga Khan is from bigger people than the Pir.

 

(An elder from Shibar).  Mullah Bâba [in Qala-ey Mullah].  These people had become Ismailis many years before [his village].  Their livelihood was better than that of many others.  It is likely that their prosperity helped induce the people of Pusht-i Mazar [his village] to become Ismailis.  The other people in Shumbul, many of them, had already become Ismailis [before Pusht-i Mazar].

 

(Sayyed Sarwar Shah of Ghojurak).  His father was Shah Gholam Hosayn-i Sayyed Mirza [of Ghojurak].  He was Khatib [therefore was also mullah for Pusht-i Mazar years ago] for the Qâzi, but was not so official; he said the nekâ [marriage cermony] and made people keep up the mosques.  He was himself Ismaili.  Everyone feared the Qâzi; he could jail them, hit them with a durra [a studded belt used for punishment].  He was the only one who could do that, not the Governor even, not the subgovernor.

 

(Gholam Rasul, brother of Mir Gholam Hasan).  In the old qalâ [fort, at the mouth of Shumbul], there was a school there.  Pusht-i Mazar had a mullah, Shah Gholaam Hosayn [the Khatib], son of Sayyed Mirza, son of Sayyed Khojaa) in Ghojurak.  His sons are there now.

 

Pattern of pirs / saints services and veneration in early Bamian

(Mullah Sidiq, a man from Shibar, and had worked in Kabul for several years).  Shah Ali Shah was a leader of the Ismailis in Jawzaar above Birgilich.  He was the father of Sayyed Mubarak Shah.  He was not the pir but did piri [pir’s work].  That is people came to him when they were in need and when sick, and he gave ta`wîz for sick children.  [Also] Shaan Shaah was a religious leader of the Asnaa`ashariya.  He did piri work.  He and Shah Ali Shah both lived to be a hundred.  He also gave ta`wîz.  Sayyed Timur Khân was brother of the the Pir Saheb and the previous Pir Saheb [of the Ismailis].  Also, the brother before him was Sayyad Gawar Khân.  He was another previous pir.

 

(From my notes [in the Markaz?]).  A man told me that Sayyed Ghazanfar Shah came here about thirty years ago [c. 1937].  He is from the Sayyeds of Ghazni.  Another volunteered about the same amount of time.  One wonders if it could have been about the time of the assassination of Nadir Shah by a Hazara from the Ghazni area.  Sayyed Ghazanfar Shah himself came here.  His Father died in Ghazni.  His father’s father died in Bamian and a large tomb to him, built by Sayyed Ghazanfar Shah, is high on a hill.  People couldn’t remember his name.

 

 

Mirs in Shibar / Kalu from early this century

arbâb kabir

                    Mir Abbas was mir of Kâlu and Shibar, [he] was in the time of Abdul Rahman.  He was very cruel.  I don’t remember who was before him.  Then there was Gholâm Haydar, the father of Gholâm Rasul.  Mir Zafar was in Dân-i Gharghara.  Then [after him? there] was Mir Baxtiâri.

In the time of Mir Abbas all of Kâlu and Shibar were under him.  People killed him because he was very cruel.  He explained to us, and the people.  After Mir Abbas was Gholam Haydar.  He was also in Kâlu.  Also there was Mir Zafar.  After Mir Abbas was killed, Shibar and Kâlu became separate, [they] had separate Mirs.  At the time of Mir Abbas, Ikhtyâr was in Shibar.  He was liked, was mir for many, many years.  After him was Murâd Ali, who lived in Birgilic.  Then there was Mir Gurs Ali, then Mir Gholâm Ali.  Then Gholâm Mâmad, Mir Mowladâd.  He was the mir of all of Shibar.  My grandfather, Mir Gurz Ali, was mir before that.  He was in Bulola.  Irâq was under him, too.  The arbâbs in Irâq then were Mirza Faiz Ali, Arbâb Ali Mâd, and before that they had others:  Mir Zânu, Mâmad mir.  Mir Zânu was in Irâq, Mâmad Mir in Irâq was my FFF.  And Mir Abbas’s daughter had hit his hand when they went from Shibar to him [? when Mir Abbas and daughter came from Shibar to Maamad Mir?].  When they were coming, she hit him and cut his finger.  Then Shibar hit Mir Abbas and killed him.  She was in the house because her foot hurt, then she saw that 1000 men from Shibar have come to us.  At first my ancestor, Mâmad Amir, was going to kill him, then the girl hit him and then the others came and killed him (Abbas).  A thousand men came against him.  He had some body guards, but not nearly as many.  The sons were killed in Shina of Irâq.  The sons ran away, hoping the people wouldn’t be so much against them, but the people didn’t let any male live from Mir Abbas.  Mir Abbas was not a descendant [ascendant?] of Mir Zafar.

His daughters were left alive, and through them he has grandchildren but no sons.  They were killed in Shina of Irâq.  After that the mirs of Shibar and Kâlu were separate.  But then whoever did well, like Baxtyâri, he took Irâq, Daki, then also Birgilic, Ghandak and Jalmish, and he was mir of Kâlu.

When Mir Abbas was killed, naturally some of the people of Kâlu were angry, but they couldn’t do anything, because so many rose up against him.  Then Gholâm ayaday [Haydar?] or Mir Zafar were in Kâlu at that time.  In Shibar was Mir Gorz Ali.  Baxtyâri was in the time of Mir Gholam Ali Beg.  Then Mir Murâd Ali gave up the miri for Mir Gholam Ali Beg, because he said he was more informed, wise.

Then when he [Mir Gholam Ali Beg?] died Mir Mowladâd became mir — i.e. when my grandfather died then Mowladâd became mir, then Mir Gholâm M., then by alliance, agreement the mirs [they?] were changed [i.e. must refer to an informal concensus].  Also in the time of Mir Gholâm M., my kâkâ [Mir Ahmad Ali Beg?] was mir for one year.  They changed by itifâq — by agreement, concensus.  Then my kâkâ was not happy, because if you are going to go to Mir Gholâm M., if you are going to go to Mir gholâm M. then don’t come to me anymore — I won’t be your mir.  When people became aligned [basta] to him he tries to become mir, and [to make] the other not to be mir.  One year my father was mir, then my kâkâ, then Mir mowladâd, then Mir gholâm M. beg.  Then in the days of Mir Gholâm M. Beg, my Kâkâ [MAAB] stood up for one year, he was miri in Bulola, then went to Irâq and did miri.

Mir Gholâm M. was under the hand of my grandfather [Bakhtiari?] then he took my mother.  My kâkâ [MAAB] gave her to him.  Her father wouldn’t give her to him, because he felt my kâkâ should take her [because he was the brother of her first husband, after his decease].  If you don’t take him, he told her, then you should stay at home.  But my mother wouldn’t agree to him.  Over this Baxtyâri was upset with Mir Aamad Ali Beg.  He was still living.  The father, Arbâb Ali Baxsh, came for pershraw [peyshraw? purshis {question, asking}?] to ask her to take him as husband.  At that time I was small and in Kâlu, 5 or 6.  When they married, I was 7 or 8 [he was about 45 in 1968; 38 years earlier would have been 1930].  After that Mir Gholâm M. ran away, avoiding Mir Baxtyâri.  That it was bad for his name that they didn’t marry — or she didn’t marry — according to his orders.  My uncle [MAAB] became mutafiq with him, and then he gave her to Mir Gholâm M.  My kâkâ [MAAB] had the first right over her and wanted her, but she would not agree.  Then he gave her ba dista to father of MAJ [Mir Gholam M.].  If he hadn’t agreed, then they couldn’t have taken her.  The father of him [her? i.e. Arbab Ali Bakhsh] was also a help; he also took some money.  And the father took money.  Later on I fought with them, because they had sold her to them.  Maybe they took 1000 or 2000 — got it from Mir Gholâm M.

When a man dies, his brother has the first right to the wife.  But she has to agree, if she doesn’t then it isn’t done.

                    Mir Gholâm M. before he took her, he was a Mir, but didn’t have a big following.  After he took her, he got a lot of aqyat/asyat [raayat], because he had the daughter of Mir Baxtyâri.  The point is that I should get a wife from some nâmdâr from a motabar person.  To get a wife from a man who moves around the country, who is informed, famous, etc.

                    Mir Gholâm M. had two other wives.  They were not famous people, they were from his own gawm.  They were alive when he took her.  But this woman [daughter of Bakhtiari] was fâmida, could do everything, was the daughter of a nâmdâr and was jawân.  She also can read and write.

N.B. This man [Mullah Hosayn?] is xwârzâda of her. (i.e. his mother is sister of Mulla Hosayn [NO, MH is son of the sister of this woman, who is dau of Bakhtiari].  Since MAJ’s mother is daughter of Mir Baxtyâri, he is xwârxânda of her.)

Then I was nâsâz with Mir Gh. M. for some years, because he had taken my mother [i.e., she had been married to his father who had died].  If I had been grown, and not small, he couldn’t have taken her.  Even if his place had not been far away, I wouldn’t have given her to him.  I didn’t want him.  Only my uncle gave her to him.  (my kâkâ mâkâ, i.e. others were involved — the prior right of the husband’s qawm?)  The kâkâ of Mir Ahmad Ali [Beg].  They agreed among themselves.  The wife herself did not marry (anyone in the qawm(?)), so “Come, let us give her to him”.  The uncle of this (?) came and said I am your muzdur [servant], your deeqân [farm laborer].

Then [they, who? Mir Gh M?] came uzur K. to house of mâdarmâd (?) — men and women.  They came heads bare, uzur K. to our house.  That you should please not fight with us.  Then we became sâz with them.  They said they will give us two daughters, so that you will be sam with us.  Don’t fight with us.  We became sam with them, but we didn’t take their daughter.  The people that were on their side were all of shibar.  These people who came sar lutch were from the Q. of âdil from Quchangi.  They came to Bulola, to our house.  Then they gave me a chapan and a horse.  They were going to give me two girls.  One of these was the mother of Hashem and there was another of them, child of her kâkâ.  But I said I didn’t want them, I had not râai with them.  I said, other than my own mother, I won’t take anyone else.  She was herself happy to be there.  She was herself happy to be there.  She told herself that she had left these (girls?) for me.  You should take them, but I wouldn’t take them.

Then he became very big.  Over all of Shibar, to Irâq, but not Ghandak.  At that time Mir Baxtyâri was over Ghandak.  Mir Baxtyâri brought me to Kâlu because he liked me a lot.  My kâkâ [MAAB] became motafiq with them.  He wanted to take her himself but she wouldn’t.  After this, for one year Mir Āmad Ali beg was mir of Shibar, but for only one year.  Then after that, Mir Gholâm M. became Mir.  Somehow he got the people to him.  He [Mir] He G.M. did fishâr.  He did something with the government.  He turned the people to himself.  There was no fight over this.  The kâkâ didn’t fight over this.

                    Mir Mowladâd was a mir in the time of Mir Āmad Ali beg, but he was basta with him.  My uncle did everything, he was basta with him.  He helped my uncle.  Then after that, Mir Mowladâd became (mir), then Mir Gholâm M., then after that my kâkâ again.  When Mir Gholâm M. was mir, Mir Moladâd did not help him, but his people were with Gh. M.  My kâkâ told him not to allow it (him? i.e. Gh. M.?), the kâkâ said he was not happy with Gh. M.  Then he beitifiqi namekad, ke mâ yak ismâyeli asteem.  And Mir Mowladâd was not ismailia [this is the Mir Mowladad who was in Shumbul?]. (hic.  He had the hicoughs).  The sects were already known.  Mir Mowladâd did not help Mir Gh. M. at all and also did not betifâqi k.  He said that this (person?) should be it.  Your father was (mir) before, before you, and he should also be it now.  But he didn’t agree, so he mutafiq girift with him (?).  Moladâd did.  Mir Mowladâd was mir before, too, after my father Arbab Ali Bakhsh], and also was after my kâkâ [MAAB].  Then Gh. M. xest, and told my kâkâ to do miri again, and he didn’t — but if he had also xest, there would have been a fight, and he couldn’t have won.  Then there were two mirs.  Some people took him.  Then uwâ beitifâqi nakard.  He said beitifâq meshem.  i.e.  We will be disunited if I also xest.  The asnaâshar are only a few — 200 – 300 households.  But they, the sayids of Birgilich, were bast on the side of Mir Gh. M.

My father, Gurz Ali, was Ismaila.  He was strong, so the asnâshar could not say anything.  In those days, people would say they were murid of sayid so and so, most of them said they were murid of sayid -i- kayân.  People didn’t know much about maslak in those days.  From the days of his fathers, the sayid -i-kayân was the most famous.  Others were just gadaygars, who were hungry, etc.  Also the sayids of Birgilich had their followers, too, and they later nashud (i.e. it didn’t work out for them.)  Later, they had a dispute with Mir Gh. Mâmad over who was to be Mir — was not over sect — they were for Mir Mowladâd.   Some people went with Mir Mowladâd, but many were for Mir Gh. M.  Those who supported Mir Mowladâd were from everywhere.  From Shumbul, Jolâ, only a few from Birgilich, if any.  There were 100 houses in Jolâ.

                    Mir Gh. M. died still young and vigorous.  After he died, they took one of his brothers to the Mir, then my uncle [MAAB] — the brother they took was Barât Ali, and my uncle was Mir âmad ali beg.  Mir Gh. M. died almost 20 years ago [from 1968 that would have been ~1948].  After he died, Mir Mowladâd also xest, but he died, then we took MAJ.  He was our brother to us.  He also told Mir âmad ali beg that he was as a father to him.  He came and kissed his hand, and kissed his face, out of friendship.  He was a good boy to xest.

 

Hazarjat in Saqqaw time

>>  During time of Saqqaw the pop of Tagaw allied w Saqqaw while the Hazaras opposed him.

 

[new page ??]

In the time of saqaw they tried to turn people to saqawi, but these people said until they die or are killed they will not become saqawi.  He had no right to be king.  Birgilich did not suffer under the hand of the saqaw’s armies because it was quite a ways off the main road, so was untouched.  Shumbul however was hit hard because it was on the main road.

After the saqaw these sayyeds were afraid to make too much trouble because they were afraid of the new king Nadir Shah.

 

Wedding incident in about the late 1930s

                    pp 133b – 150 of original field notes.

Marriage Conflict in Shibar Sheykh Ali

The members of a descent group have in the past strongly exercised their right to control the flow of young women given in marriage to outsiders.  Sentiment in the qawm against the marriage of a girl to someone in a distant qawm can become strong enough to prevent the marriage.  The following account (from a recorded conversation) of an attempt by the girl’s qawm to refuse her to a strong man of a distant region took place about forty years ago [1968-40=1928].  It is included to illustrate the former manner of inter-qawm articulation and the unwillingness to marry girls very far out.  Obviously in this case the relations between these two qawm communities were not close.  Note that the sizes of the functioning qawm groups seem to have been considerably larger than at present.

When I got this wife, before that there was a man named Gh. Resa from Sex Ali [he?] was her father.  He died.  Then there was a man named Mirza Osayn who married the widow.  There were four daughters of Gh. Reza by this woman.  There was a man in Sheykh Ali named M.O. who had married a widow, the mother of four daughters.  This M.O. said to me that he would give one of them to me, but he said, “Give me 1000 afghanis.”  He promised his first daughter, whom I had already seen.  When I brought the 1000 afghanis, I asked for her according to our agreement, but he didn’t agree to give her right then…  Then twenty days later, when I went again to ask about the marriage, the man asked for 10,000 afghanis for the bride price.  So in ten or twelve days I obtained the money, and took it to him.  Then the man made a promise, that on a certain day I and my people should come.  “Send your gifts and we will have the marriage.”

The gifts and food were to be sent a few days in advance of the wedding feast.  So I put 10 ser of flour on a donkey, and 10 ser of rice on another donkey, along with two ser of rowghaan (clarified butter) and five sheep and 40 meters of cloth and sent them to him.  Then we went a few days later to the agreed-upon marriage feast.  The distance was great, so I didn’t take a lot of men, only forty.  When we were coming M.O. with all the Mirs of the Sheykh Ali came to us on horses.  We were on horses too, and they came to a place and stopped us on the road.  Then M.O. asked us “Where are you going?”  Then he said, “Go back to your house, there will be no marriage now.”  Then I said, “I can’t go back now, I have brought my qawm and my people.  If I go back now, I will be embarrassed.”  I had with me Mir Awdur and Sayyed Tabar, and they took the biggest man of Sheykh Ali aside and sat with him…  Then they offered him a fine turban and a chapan [a kind of coat or mantle] to persuade M.O. to go through with the marriage.  Then this man went with them to the house of M.O. and all went there with them.  This was the month of Ramazaan [the month of fast], and on the way these men with me had not eaten at all.  When we got there M.O. told us that there was no food there; it had all been eaten.  Then I bought two sheep from someone else in Sheykh Ali, and I bought rowghaan and rice and flour, etc., and then we took this to him but he still didn’t give this to our people.  They were left hungry all night.  But M.O. did bring a mullah and he performed the marriage ceremony.  During the night M.O. fed ten of the elders from his own valley in two separate rooms, but the others of us were left hungry.  That night at 2 a.m. he told me and our people that we must leave now.  “And if the people of Sheykh Ali know that you take the girl you will not be able to have her” — that is, we should take her secretly.  So we took her that night, and went home.  Our men had been away for two days and nights without eating any food.

The next day early in the morning the people of Sheykh Ali came to M.O., maybe 100 men, and said they would not allow him to give this girl to the people of Darghaan.  When he told them that the girl had already been taken away they all were much distressed, but they went away to their own homes.

The idea of these people was that a woman should not go out of their valley.  They were angry at me that I wanted to take away that girl.  They said, “Are there no men in Sheykh Ali that we should give the girl to him?  We are people of Sheykh Ali and he is from the people of Darghu [Darghaan].  She should stay here among us, she should not go out.  We have plenty of men for our women.”  They felt she should go to a member of their own qawm.  She should marry relatives, not another person.  The relatives have the right to her.  They thought, “It is not good that our qawm should not build a household, while another qawm does so with one of our women.”

 

[The following is a summary of mine of the above]

The Mir before the present w. had another wife, who had two d’s. who have now married.  When I got this wife, before that there was a man named Gh. Resa from Sex Ali [he?] was her father.  He died.  Then there was a man named Mirza Osayn who married the widow.  There were four daughters of Gh. Reza by this woman.  When they grew up one of them this Mirza Osayn said to Mir Sayb that he would give one of them to him.  He promised to give one of them, but said give me 1000 afs.  He promised the first daughter, whom the Mir had seen.  Then the Mir had already asked for her.  When he had agreed, Mir went to do the shirini, also asked some men to come with him, then went second time, 1000 afs gave him.  Then he said now you should give her, according to your agreement.  Then he took the money, but he didn’t agree to give her right then.  Then about 20 days later he asked Mir to give him 2 caws and one xar to use in the harvest of his crops, then he kept them didn’t give them back.  Then another 20 days later, when the Mir went to again to do the marriage, the man asked for another 10,000 afs.  Then in 10-12 days he found the money, and took it to him.  Then the man made a promise, that on a certain day you and your people should come, send your gifts and then we will have marriage.  The gifts and food are sent 2 to 4 days in advance of the wedding feasting.  Then Mir put 10 ser of flour on the donkey and 10 ser of rice on another donkey, and 2 ser rooghan and 5 sheep, and 10 suits of cloth (= 40 meters of cloth).  Then they went a few days later to the agreed upon marriage feast.  The distance was great so I didn’t take a lot of men–took only 40 men with me.

 

When we were coming then, Mirza Hosayn, with all the Mirs of the Shex Ali came to us on horses, we were on horses too, and they came to a place and stopped the road, and then asked us Mirza Hosayn asked us, where are you going.  Then said go back to your house.  There will be no marriage now.  Mir then said I can’t go back now, I have brought my Q. and my people if I go back now, I will be embarrassed.  Then I had with me the other Mir Gh. Asan, and Sayed Taalib Shaa; then they took the biggest man of Shex Ali aside and sat together, this man was Firqa Isaa Khaan.  Then they offered him a lungi, chapan to get Mirza Hosayn to go through with the marriage.  Then this man went with them to house of Mirza Gh. Osain.  Then all went together to his house.  This was mo. of Razaman.  On the way these men now with Mir. had not eaten at all on way.  When they got there, then the Mirza Gh. H. said to them that there was not food there, it had all been eaten.  Then the Mir bought 2 sheep from someone else in Shex Ali.  Then also bought rooghan and rice, and flour, etc.  Then they took this and he still didn’t give it to the Mir’s people.  They were still hungry.  They were left hungry all night.  Then Mirza Gh. Hosayn brought a mullah, Mullaa Faqir to do the nikaa to join the marriage.  He read the xudbe-nekaa. ra basta kad.  During this night he fed his own people from Shex Ali, 10 of the elders from own valley in two separate rooms.  The others were left hungry.  That night we gave this rich man the lungi and chapan. and to three other elders we gave three lungis.  Then that night at 2 a.m. he told Mir and his people that they must leave now.  And if the people of Shex Ali knew that you have taken the girl, you would not be able to have her; i.e., take her secretly.  Then that night took her.  Then for two days and nights these men returned to their homes not having eaten.  They arrived about 2 or 3 in afternoon.  Then the next day early in morning the people of Shex Ali came to Mirza Gh. Hosayn–maybe 100 men–and said they would not allow him to give this girl to the people of Darghaan–i.e., to upper people of Shirbar.  Then when he told them the girl was taken they all expressed great disappointment.

Then they dispersed.  Then at his house Mir held a big party at his house 2 or 3 nights.  Had musicians and lots of food 150 or 200 people came.

 

The only point of Mirza Gh. Hosayn was that he should take the money and lie his way out of it.  He is now in Kabul.  After 4 or 5 years there were these 2 daughters.  Then she died.  One year after her death, then this Irza came and said he thought the Mir had killed her.  If I had had time I would have taken blood from you because of this.

 

This Mirza Hosayn had a d. and s. by this marriage.  He caused a lot of trouble for his own people in Shex Ali.  He was went to the alaqadaar and claimed someone had stolen this or that, then took money from this man to leave this alone.  Did this several times, then finally people of Shex Ali areeza kad that this man had given us enough trouble.  He was put in jail.  Was there in Charikaar for 1 year.  Then somehow got out although he was to come to Kabul for two more.  Now is secretly living in Kabul, has paid a man to try to spring him out of his jail sentence.

 

The people of Shex Ali are also Ismailis, but this man who had the daughters didn’t really pay any attention to sect.  But the idea of these people was that a woman should not go out of our valley.  They were angry at me that I wanted to take away that girl.  They said are there no men in Shex Ali that we would give the girl to him?  We are people of Shex Ali and he is from people of Darghaan.  She should stay here among us, should not go out, we have plenty of men for our women.  Feel she should go to a member of same qawm.  Not that the expenses should go out, but the members of same q. will also pay same amount.  Mainly interested in the girls staying here, not going elsewhere.  Should not be to another qawm.  Should be to relatives, not to another person.  The relatives have the rights to her.  Should be to relatives, like the purdah — to be unveiled outside the q. is not so good.  It is not good that our qawm should not build a household, while another one does with one of our women.

 

Social relations in 1930s 1940s

SAINT EXPLOITATION

in the pir-sect network in the +/- 1940s -1950s.  Sayyeds of Birgilich.

(M126)      The sayeds [of Birgilich??] are very near the other people, but in a separate valley.  I didn’t give the right to use this mountain to anyone else.  After Mir GH became mir he freed the people from the hand of these Sayyeds.  At first, from ancient times [they] had cows, sheep-goats, land, donkeys.  In these times, Mir Murâdali was mir.  The sayyeds were not mirs, but were rich.  They got wine and moreof the things of the people for themselves.  They took their cows, killed them, ate them.  Shânshâ the father of Shâh Ghulâm Hosain before the saqaw was hâkim.  The kâkâ of Sha Gholam Hosayn was a hâji and very rich.  He had lots of land, from the time of his father and grandfather had lots of money.  Their father was Shâdarbesh, son of Shâh-i Askar-i ??.  These people in this line had money and took sut [interest] for one 100 Afs: 50 ser wheat [for 100 afs]; in this time, one Af was one ser.

 

(M127)   These sayyeds had money, and most people didn’t have money, so they could get this amount of interest.  They didn’t have the right to do this, by religion, but cruel people can do this.  Besides loans with interest they also loaned on giraw.  They would have the owner of the land work it for a yearly amount.  If they got 10 sers toxum of land for 1000 Afs, they would soon take 500 ser of wheat yearly from them.  (This amount of land, this will do about 200 or 300 sers of wheat if it is well fertilized.)  The rest of this wheat had to come from the borrower’s other lands.   It was like this before the saqaw.  Later, then it became better, after the saqaw it became better, only 30 ser for 100 afs.  Therefore better.  This was because wheat became more valuable.  Before this time money was in hard silver.  Then after the saqaw, the notes became more plentiful and the population may have grown so the money became less valuable.  Now, in these days 1000 Afs will only bring 20 sers of wheat in interest — i.e. much cheaper.  Shân shâ died after the saqaw, 20 years later.  Sayyed âmad shâ died five or six years after saqaw.  In the time of the saqaw all the people of Shibar were for Ahmanullah but the sayyeds were for the saqaw.  Shân shâ was very wealthy before becoming hakim of Shibar.  In those days the king couldn’t come there, but only the wâli, etc.  In the days of Ahmaunullah Khan the most wealthy people were the mustaofi.  Mustaofi mumâlik was the wakil of the king, was like a PM.  He was the one with the right to appoint these people.  Shân shâ probably gave money to the Mustaofi mumalik, maybe 1000 Afs, or 2000 Afs, (was silver in those days), he had come to Kabul to get this postion.  Then the Mustaofi gave him the firman to go to Shibar as hakim.  The government paid salaries of people there.  Under the hakim are other people who are responsible for the collection of taxes.  The work of the hâkem is responsible for the collection and maintanence of order.  Even now the hâdims take a lot of bribes, and in those days got even more bribes.

 

(M128)            Even in those days,, the government kept close control over records of taxes paid, etc. so point of becoming hâkem was to take bribes.  When he was hâkem he was not in the area of Shibar, he was in Yakawlang, way on the other side of bandi amir.  He was not the hâkem of Shibar.  The Hakims get their main benefit from the fights and disputes between people in their area of birgilic and became their mir.  Mir Murad ali had died, who was from lower part of birigilic, was not a sayyed.  He was not so wealthy as the sayyeds.  Because he was the mir, they couldn’t do anything.  His power as Mir was important.  Even before Mir Murad ali died, Shân Shâ became mir.  He was mir for about four or five years.  When he died his son Shâ Gholam Hosayn became mir.   When Shân Shâ became mir, then sayyed were very strong.

These sayyeds were Ismailis in time of Shâ Ali Askar, then in time of Shâ Darbeesh (father of Shân Shâ) they changed to Shia.  Maybe some mullah changed their minds.  Before this time they were not so close to the common people of the area.  They didn’t marry these people, and they didn’t have meemâni with the.  Shân Shâ was before the Saqaw the hâkem.  Then in time of the saqaw the Mir Murad ali was Mir, who died a year or two after the saqaw year.  In this time sayyed were saqaw.  There was a sayed named Mir Ali gawar, in charde qhorband who told them to be saqaw, because the saqaw has taken the throne and no one can take it away from him.  They were not under him but one of the daughtes of Shân Shâ was married to him, and they were related.  In Charde ghorband there are only two or three houses of Sayyeds.  These are very wealthy.  In early days these people, the Sayyeds had lots of money and power and lyâz.  The lyâz was because . . .

 

(Section removed here)

 

[p159]

The Sayeds of Birgilic in those early days when they were powerful, could use their cows, could even take a man and use him on their own fields, they would use their donkeys in carrying loads, the people had no choice.  They oppressed them a lot.  Before the sayeds, the mir was Mir Murâd Ali.  He was from the Birgilici.  The sayyeds were not under him and his people were not under them.  The sayeds had their own arbâb.  He had to do with the government, and if their was any trouble between them.  When the sayeds separated themselves from the Ismailis, they made themselves separate from the people of birgilic.  But the oppression of before, they were still able to practice.  They were rich, owned a lot, they took many peoples land in giraw.  They took people’s things and the people themselves for their own work.  They made them plow, made them harvest, made them . . .  If a man borrowed money and could not pay, they would take the man’s crop when it was cut.  They had people work for them, but gave them nothing at all in pay for this.  They couldn’t get away from them because the sayeds were very rich, and the people were very poor.  The people were also unfamiliar and (un?)known to the government, and very poor.  They couldn’t go anywhere or request anything of the government . . . ghanimat meedâsht yak câr rooz guzâreemâ shawa [ghanimat = spoil, booty].  Their mir was also weak and he couldn’t say anything.  Their khalifa was Mubârak shâ, he was very zabardast person but after he killed that man, he became very weak.  And he was relieved of [his] khalifagiri.  PS very angry at him.  After Mir Murâd Ali died then the sayeds became the Mirs.  Shân Shâ became mir, the father of this Shâ Gholâm Hosayn.  They became the mir because there was no one else in their qawm who could do the mirri.  The sayeds were rich, and had money — cash.  This was kind of forced on them, they hadn’t wanted it really, but had to accept them.  They couldn’t ask someone else to be Mir who was Mir somewhere else because the place was far away and the person asked could have been afraid of the sayeds . . . [160] . . . were afraid sayeds would oppress them.  Then they felt they had better be able to get along with them so they could be saved from worse oppression by them, so the people themselves chose the sayeds to be their Mirs.  In those days their miri was not official.  They were mirs unofficially.  In those days the Mir was at home and went to the araqadâri when there was work to do there.  The sayeds had lots of land, had bought a lot before.  Would buy it when a man was so poor, was forced to sell it when he had nothing, then they would buy it.  People would give land on giraw.  The land would be giraw for an indefinate period of time.  Then when the time had gone on for too long, the sayeds say qawâlee baybâd biri [beti?].  Then they would give some more money and take the land as their own.   When this is done they go to the qâzi, the alaqadâr or the hâkim can’t do this, only the qâzi.  When he has written this, he makes a moor-seal–on the document.  Once the seal of the qâzi is on it, the former owner had no right to the land.  The qâzi is in bamyan, in the wulâyat, not in alaqadâri.

 

SOCIAL HISTORY OF CONVERSION IN SHIBAR

(162)  After the sayyeds became Mir, then they were able to freely oppress the people.  One or two years after the Saqaw they became mir — Shaan Shah was mir — then he died and Ali Shaa became their arbaab.  He was this for 4 or 5 years, then when he died Laal Shah his brother was it, who was the son of Ahmad Shah, then he became thier mir, then Mir Gh Hosayn became their mir.  Laal Shaa was the son of brother of Shaan Shaa.  Until the time of Shaa Gholam Hosayn the people were under the Sayyeds.  At first I was on good terms with Shah Gholam Hosayn.  But after they turned back the donkeys and fought then Shah Gholam Hosayn said of these peole that they had taken his cow, stolen it, and after they had hit arbaab Ali Jam and after they had made areza and when it has become rasmi we argued over this for a long time, maybe for one year or two years.  Every week we went five or six days to Bamyan, came back then went to the alaqadari then back to Bamian.  We spent two years like this. When this never worked then this Jaan M Khan said it wen to Bamian “I will ask you a question then you write that these cows were eaten by a wolf.  They are not theirs, then I will let you go.  then they did it, then he let them go, finished it.  The Birgilichis and Sayyeds were both finished.  And after that I became their mir.  After that wherever we went this Mir Gholam Hosayn fought with me.  We fought a lot.  “Why didn’t you like me?  You took these people away from me.  They were mine.”  He was completely finished from miri and arbaab, everything.  Then the Sayyeds came to Haji Gholam Hasan because they are also Asnaa`ashar.  This Shah Gholam Hosayn was nothing, not a mir, not an arbaab for some time, then two years later the people of Jalmish, who are Tajiks, made him mir.  Sometimes he is there, sometimes not.  He is still angry with me, still fights.  He has been their mir now for 6 years maybe.

(163)  In the days when the sayyeds were their arbaabs the people had been going up there to gather bushes before, but this was with much difficulty.  The shepherds and ther servants, they didn’t give them permission but they came anyway and sort of stole it.  They couldn’t have taken it barmalaa [openly].  They wanted to take these bushes withoug being noticed but then they were noticed and were turned back.  It was also their intention to have an argument so they could get free from the Sayyeds.  Before this they took it at night, etc.  But this time they took it during the day.  Before this these people were very aajiz, very uninformed, unfamiliar, later when they had become knowledgeable and wise then other people became on their side, like the people of Shibar, Shumbul, etc.  Then they knew these people were for them, so they went and took the bushes “so that we should be free from them anymore”.  Also thought [that] MGH could help them.  This Haaji Gholam Hasan was a help to the Sayyeds and I with the people of Shibar helped the people.  MAJ and I and several others, we went to Bamian for this areza.  We payed maybe 60,000 Afs at first.  This was very important to all of us, a struggle between the sects because of they could get away with this, they could have extended their oppression over all the people. So we helped them. We gave a lot of money in bribes for them.  The Sayyeds also paid a lot of money.  They became very ajiz [poor?] from all of this; they paid out a lot.  If there were a 100 houses then, whatever the expense, they assessed it over all the 100 houses. Everyone was angry over this.  All [164] of these Sayyeds were angry, very angry at the Sayyeds because they were very cruel over these people of Birgilic.  These people couldn’t do anything because the Sayyeds were far from other people.  They couldn’t have oppressed them [if they had been more accessible?] although in some places they were ablet to extend their trouble to some others.

Before they went up the hill to take the bushes they didn’t let me know of it.  But they had decided it among themselves.  This 100 houses had decided to do this.  “So that we can be free of these Sayyeds.”  On the side of the Sayyeds all the Shias joined.  All the Ismailis were for the poeple of Birgilich.  We have about 1000 or 1500 housholds and they have about 700 so we were stronger.  But before this all the people of the Shias were stronger than we were, than our people.  In those days the father of MAJ was mir of this Shibar over the Q. of Daaki, Aadil and Ayaam.  He was not mir in other places.  In other places the mir of Shumbul or Iraaq where the people were Ismaili he was not the mir.  He was over these three Q and the Q of Gholamali.  He was over the people of his own Q who were Ismailis.  At the time of this fight I was Mir, MAJ, and the other Mir, Mir Ahmad [MMA] of lower Eraq.  He was mir for some time but became at odds with Qumandaan of Bamian.  He was here in Kabul last [the previous?] year; this year [had ] returned to his own Q and become mir again.  He had fought with his own qawm so his “amqawm” went to the qumadaan and asked an arz — they didn’t come to MGH — went to Wali and Qumandaan of Bamian.  At that time Ansaari was the Wali.  He was very good with our people.  he gave the peole no trouble.  He did their work, their requests.  Then Mir Ahmad said he would do no more miri and came to Kabul, stayed here for two years and this year went back.  The people had become unhappy with him so let him go.  His Q members said you oppress us too much.  He said he never did this kind of thing, never oppressed them.  You are not right to complain to me.   So among themselves they were unhappy, so they went and did arz and the Wali truly came on their side and settled the dispute.  He [MMA] was angry with his Q members so came to Kabul.

[another note]:  They [Sayyeds of Birgilich] were so cruel that a man working in the filed with his team of oxen and chapar [thorn thresher] they would take these away from him as he was in the field, by force.  They would take the cows and do their own work with them.

They Sayyed’s fathers were Ismaili, then later they became Shia.  Their grandfather had been a Khalifa of the Ismailis. {??}

 

Marital relations among the sects

 

(4-62)         Lâl Muhammad married a girl who was 13 — is now 30 [i.e. 17 years ago, from 1967].  And in that time there was only one sect in Shumbul — went to Kotal-i-Shibar to a mulla who said nekâ there.  His mir then was the brother of Wakil Sayb.  Later he says it was Wakil Sayb.

 

Note that a number of marriages between these groups took place prior to the 15-17 years ago fight . . . of Mirzâ Ali (Ismaili) from Lâl Muhammad — his land went to his daughters who married males in ???? darya. [cf.  Shumbul, Musâferbây], also 3-14, 3-12,13.

 

My mother was Shi’ite and my father was Ismaili.  In those days people didn’t pay much attention to the difference and they didn’t care.  They married across sectarian lines freely.  There was a fight between Ismailies and Shi’ites about 10 years after the Sagaw in Turughman (i.e. +/- 1939).  Only a few houses were Ismaili then.  (An Ismaili elder from Turughman)

 

Cultural practices in Shibar in +/- 1910s – 1920s [when mgh was young]

(4-60)  SHUMBUL [shrine]

Mulla Gh.

It used to be that people would recognize a certain place as a shrine.  THey used to burn candles there.  People would burn them in their own shrine, each for himself.  Or, for example, a man had been seen, a certain faqir or a certain malang, seen there and disappeared there, never came back.  Then people in the name of this person make a ziârat.  In those times before there was much mirgandâb, shikariâ, who killed deer and then brought the horns of the deer to the ziârat.  There was also in this place a ayâti, a kona, a ruins, a gumbak, and among these there was a graveyard.  They burned lamps on the graves of a certain person at night, and they made a wall around it and called it a shrine.

After that they called it a shrine and gathered horns there.  Or in the times of now roz or in the times of Id.  People killed buzghâla, and bara, and made dalwa, and alwâ, they carried their degs with them, people gathered together, then everyone went home.  In the times of our fathers, really our grandfathers, then later people understood that they were not meaningful.  If they still this today, they would have a lot of nice horns.  They did this twice every year, once at the end of Mizân, once at the beginning of spring.  They made alwâ and dalda in the fall.  In the beginning of spring tey dilled the bara, or the buzghâla, etc.  And the people ate these things and prayed, they called this xayrât — i.e. this was a ‘godly’ place — i.e. this is a big person.  They thought this was a big person and used to call this godly, and went there and ate over his grave.  A point about these horns is that they could not be burnt, and people had no other purpose for them.  Like they do now, they didn’t do then.  So they took them to the shrine, because they are to be under foot it would not be good.  We will leave them there because our hunting could be stopped, we couldn’t kill them.  So they left the shrine.  So that there would be more good hunting, more good hunting, etc.

They used to hunt a lot.  There were a lot of horns then.  Maybe now there aren’t 1/4 of what was there.  It was a higher pile than that house.  They brought/bring the deer home and eat the meat, then bring the horns to the shrine.  Only the horns go there.  The meat they eat themselves and give to their neighbors.  They divided it.  They didn’t divide it to the shrine.  In those days they were asnâshar.

            Because he would not little (listen?) to the command of God, to the command of the Pir, did something he had no right to do.  He gets very angry, that he should never come near me again.  If a man repents, go to the Pir and say that he will not do a bad thing again–ex. gamble or steal, etc.–then the P.S. won’t say anything against him.  Because of his repentance, he will accept him. 

            We don’t say bad things against anyone.  As much as we can.   We say that stealing is very bad.  We think gambling is very bad.  Wine is very bad.  We think these things are very bad.  We don’t fight with them, or say bad things about them.  But people see us badly.  But we don’t see anyone badly.  All men are sinners, we agree.  A people come to the Pir and repent, and say may God forgive me.  If the P.S. should sin?  No, sir.  He is the possessor of ilm (knowledge).  In so far as is hand can reach, he doesn’t sin.  For example, if he were not ripe, then he couldn’t become the Pir.  If he doesn’t know God, he can’t become Pir.  If he isn’t the possessor of ilm he cannot become the Pir.  If he weren’t near to God, he couldn’t become the Pir.  In so far as possible, he has repented from sin.  He knows God’s work better, so doesn’t know sin, doesn’t see sin, –this is not his kind of work.  It is not neccessary to repent?  Why not, he is a servant of God.  He repents before god of sin, yes.  Prince Karim Xân is a person very high.  He is the son of Imâm Jâfar, who has be descended down from him.  He is his offspring.  He is like an Imâm.  We believe or Imâm is always present.  The asnâshars say he is disappeared, is no longer with us.

 

M5  In Shumbul half are Jamâti; half asnaashari

In Jolâ all are ashnashari

Awlâd-i mir :  all ashna ashari

aashur:  half ashna ashari and half jamaati

dila:  all jamaati

kaaka:  one third asna ashari, two thirds jamaati

 

Some tajiks in Ghandak are not related; this is a large place.  2000 people beyond Bulola, Sunni [“tassenno” = sunni]

 

At first there were few Ismailis but it grew larger

            In the time of Imam Jaafar-i Saadiq, one son, Ismail vs Musaa-i Kaazim.  Until this time they were all Shia.  After this time they split.  The Shia were for Musaa-i Kaazim; the Ismailia were for Ismail. 

            The people of Afghanistan split over this.  The people who thought the one who was biggest chose the biggest one.  There was hard feeling.

Ta’asub bud.  One side said it understood the truth, the other side the other way.

 

M6  Now each side is firm.

M6  Now each side is firm.M6  Now each side is firm.  neither side can change.

Each year sometimes a few change from ashnaashar to Ismalia but not otherwise.

The ones who change are more oshaar.  The ones who are ignorant remain Asnasshar

 

Though opposed, they are not fighting, but look badly at each other.

 

In Shumbul:  1/3 asnaashar; 2/3 Ismailia

 

HaydarBaay

            5 or 6 children [see list somewhere else]

These are asnaashar qawms:

            Wulaytak

            Khudaqaa

            Jameli

Each qawm has its land separately; h is sep; land ownership is sep.

 

Some places the q. is split between religions

            q of Ghlam ali [at top of Shibar]

            q of Daaki

 

If most are Ismalia, then one of these is arbaab; they give arbaab to another qawm.

 

END OF RELATIONS IN BAMIAN FILE

 

The following are from typing done by Elaine and is called Notes.rlc

The general fight was about 20 years ago.  People were Ismailis secretly before that because they were weak.  They intermarried freely among themselves, but the Shi’ites didn’t know about this.  The Ismaili women who married Shi’ite men taught their children the Ismaili viewpoint secretly.  But then the general fight occurred in Turughman because they were discovered to be Ismailis, and some of the women went away from their husbands.  There was a lot of trouble for Ismailis in Turughman because there are only a few of them and there are many Shi’ites against them.  So, they are troubled a lot.  The Ismailis in the provinces always suffer more than in the cities because the people in the provinces can make trouble with the government for them.  They can make a complaint against them and if it’s strong enough, they can force them out.  (An Ismaili mature man from Turughman)

 

My mother was Shi’ite and my father was Ismaili.  In those days people didn’t pay much attention to the difference and they didn’t care.  They married across sectarian lines freely.  There was a fight between Ismailies and Shi’ites about 10 years after the Sagaw in Turughman (i.e. +/- 1939).  Only a few houses were Ismaili then.  (An Ismaili elder from Turughman)

 

Shia-Ismaili Relations in Shibar/Shumbal

We came to know that those other people are Ismailies because one of the sons of the Ismaili pir came here and stayed in the house of mullah G–.  Then we knew.  After that we wouldn’t have anything to do with them anymore.  We don’t marry them anymore, and we don’t even eat with them now because we’re afraid we’ll get sick from it because of this religion.  In fact, it’s no religion at all.  They call the pir sahib a prophet.  And what does he do?  He should change the wall to gold or something to show this.  But he only collects money for himself.  He should at least have some school or some plan for giving to the poor, but he only takes from his poor people and collects the money for himself.  (An Imami elder in Shibar)

 

The Ismailis and the Imamis here don’t speak to each other.  The Ismailis are very silent (chap).  This has been for 15 or 20 years.

 

Note:  See on eating patterns and separation of the sects in 8-69 in Schism, fission file.

 

The relations with the Imamis aren’t good anymore.  If we want to borrow from them, they would send us away and tell us to go to our own kind.  (Ismaili elder in Shibar)

 

Now each side is firm.  Neither side can change.  Each year a few change, but from being Imami to Ismaili — not the other way.  The ones who change are more sensible; the ones who are ignorant remain Imami.  (An Ismaili elder in Shibar)

 

 

Xaak Gadaai tells me that the Ismailis were that a long time back, but that 15 or so years ago there was a big fight over it.  The people must have then learned their true loyalty.  There was a general (umumi) fight here in the valley.  People fought in the chamand (grass land) below  Pushti-Mazar.  The people of Bamian heard about it and were coming to help the asnâshars (Imamis) when the women of the asnâshars (the Imamis) came between both sides with Quran [on their heads] and stopped the fight.  Then there was peace, but hostility for some time.

 

The Ismaili pir paid off the governor of Bamian with a horse and a horse to the main man of sayeds of Bergelich who was a big [prominent] man.  Since that time, Ismailis have been more open.  Now the King knows the pir sahib so they are recognized.  Since the fight, things got better between both sides.  At first they had nothing to do with each other, but times got better and they shared more and more. 

 

[Their beliefs about God’s blessing are very strong.  Quântori is a secular belief. ?? ]

 

Then last year at a wedding there was a big blow-up.  It was the son of Laal Muhammad who was marrying someone (who?) and the Ismailis — from q. of mullâ and shakar etc. mainly — claimed Lâl M. had thrown their food into the river and had not eaten it.  It was a lie (he says).  Apparently, everyone gives something to a wedding and these Ismailis claimed their food wasn’t used.  (an Imami poor man in Shibar)

 

Now the Ismailis don’t have to pay for their wives, he said (Gada’i), because P.S. gave the order.  This is since he made his trip abroad.  Now they pay only 10 ser wheat, 5 ser rice and 2 kushtani (bara?

THE FOLLOWING TEXT WAS MOVED

A.R                 Mir Ghulam Haydar, Sher Ali, Beeg, Mir Bakhtiyari

——-

m 32 PS

[nb when there was less contact with the pir and the followers were distant the mir had more power]

In the time when argument over lang between Sher M. and his B they didn’t tell anyone about it.  The PS lived far away, in kayaan in those days and didn’t know about these things.  In those day came once/ year.  he still comes only once/ year.

 

8-78  Mir, govent, hist

MAA Beg and Arbaab Kabir said the first Alaqadaari was set up in Bulola (I think first by Amanullah [nb. no the British mention that it was an Alaqadari in 19th c, Gazatteer, Bamian].  The Saqaw sent a man whom they did not accept (some trouble w/ him at least) and the real Alaq set up finally by Naadir Khan.  This was first in Bulola.  He stayed in the memaan Khaana of Bulola.  Fought with someone (over what?) and finally he left and went to house of Mir Mowladaad for a while, moved back again to Bulola.  Wa a while in house of Sayed Taalib Shaa (Shumbul) and then back to Bulola, etc.  People didn’t want him.  Eventually place was made for him and his helpers in Shumbul.

 ————–

1. of Naayib (Jumaa Kalaantar)

Our asil is from Besud; our fathers came to Aamqul first, stayed a while.  Then cause poor water, moved to dahan-i Khaak-i Baaba (from zard Khaak); the water there was bad.  Was chamand and very swampy and lots of mosquitoes.  then went to the place of MAJ [Quchanqi].  They got a lot of land there.  We had all the land in Quchangi and throught at first land from Zard Khaak to Daaki was theirs.  There was no one there thn.  Was a big chamand where horses fed.  Then the F of Mir Gholam M. Khan (FF of MAJ) forced them out, to move up into the valley.  In that time they had land in Dahan-i Quchangi.  Then Gholam M. Khan got it from them then, either by sale or etc.  Then Qalay M. Ali.

————-

182 A

The Q of Ayaam is spread around, some in Iljaanak some in Quchangi.  We are q of Shumbul.  the real name is sunbul.  In early times, there were mardum-i xaarijii  sunbul.  In early times there was a house down as mouth of the sunbul near the Alaqadar, and they lived there and that daughter was named Sunbul.  It got its name from than girl.  It was very long ago, maybe 400 years ago. [Haim’s dictionary:  snbl “sombol”, Hyacinth, Nard].  But we reishsafeds heard that there a house was built and her name was sunbul, were from people of khaarij, in those days, took a place and made a house, then later our people came into here.

            These were people of khaarij, like your people, for example.  And these foreignors come and see the place and say this is such a nd such a place, from looking at a book.  Cause in those days people of kaarijis came here and lived here and came and went very long ago.  But these peole from abroad came and lived here.  Then the people fo the Hazarajat came and these people left, ran, I don’t know where, but left the country.  then when the Musulmans [came] they took the land.  This is what the muy safeds said.  Don’t know very clearly, but they were from Kaarij, they were in the saraay sang …?/?

 

——

Iqbal 7084 [Quchangi]

Before the Hajigak road was built people from Kalu came over the mt to Shibar to get a car to kabul.  They were more Koband.  Shibar was on the road, so easier to get to Kabul.

 

M17    Hist PS

            Shalezi wouldn’t let PS go so he asked the King.  The govt of Surkho Paarsaa asked about Khayr M.  Why he had gone with PS to give him trouble.

            In the time of Ikhtyaar:  in time of laki.  GF of MGH M. Ali Sardaar: and w friends.  These were from several places.  From at pass of Hajigak, in a place called Azaarqaash.  They took the wife of the King Abdul Rahman on this road.  Took all her stuff.  They let them go.  They took the woman and raped her.  200-300 men.  There may have been 100 men with the woman.  When she got to Kabul, the King ordered the leaders of this area to be brought to Kabul and jailed them, maybe 20 men, including Ikhtiyaar.  Then he fined them with a lak of Afghanis for ea of the leaders whom he jailed.  Also took M. Ali Sardaar (GF of MGH) and jailed him.  He was not a mir but was rich.  The King took the lak off from the people — althogether took maybe 10 laks.  the men who could paid their share.  those who couldn’t ran away and stayed away until A. R. died. and Habibullah became King, who forgave them of all of it, debt, etc.  They wen to Darusuf, Qataghan, Baghlan, Khanaabad.  they were there for 2, 3 years.  [NB, thus, the event took place, say, three years before death of AR, approximately 1897]  Habibullah called all them back and forgave them.  In those days the Ismailis were few and they didn’t stay with them [who?].  Rented houses, etc. and stayed away.  In those days all the Shias and Sunnis said bad things about the Ismailias and so few.  Ghaali / Ghalaa they called thenm, as a curse.  MGH’s F was Ismaili but his GF was not.

 

————

NB Yakawlang was center of resistance to AR, is called “kohband” cause of its snow.

 

 

—–

15-57 Bamian, Mir, Hist

Ali Yaawar is son of Ali Jaan-i Mosen Beeg-i Baaba Beeg-i Ashraf Beeg-i Qalandar Beeg-i Mir Muyuu Beeg …

he said his FF (MOsen Beeg) was so powerful a mir over all the area that whe he went to Bamian to the seat of governmetn he was accompanied by 100 men.  He did not show due respect to Amaanullah when he visited here, so Amanullah took him, jailed him, where he died, and moved his family (to mazar?).  then later the family came back.  Now Ali Yaawar is malik in Fulaati, but not over so many hhs, only about 300.

—–

 

———-

Saqaw

2-27  Khan Jaan, Kaakaa of MAJ

F:  Gholam Hasan-i Ali Sher-i Afghaan Beeg-i Khja Amir … > Aadil.

Khaan Jaan was in the time of Saqaw.  The B [M. Amin/Amir?] of Amanullah was travelling in Hazarajat to get people to support him.  Khan Jan was sent with money by the PS along with several others to help Amanullah.  They carried money in fomr of hard silver sewed in belts.  in those days 1000 afs weighed 20 lbs.  he was carry 2500 Afs, so 50 lbs of money on him.  the other were also the same.  he and they were someplace on the war near Unay Pass and while there eating tea, the people stole their horses.  They ran out and would have fught over this, but were overladen with their belts which of course they carried secretly.  They dared not make too great afuss lest it be discovered they had money.  So they gave up the horses.  Then someone came who was rich and said they could get their hoses back, cause were taken by thier servants and if they would ea pay 500 afs ea they could get horses back.  There was a big discussion over this among them, young men said no, but F of MGH who was older and more experienced said now could get them back and should do it.  So they did it.  The men took their money and the other followed in hopes of getting their horses [again?].  But when the got further away they turned thir guns on them and told them to leave.  So in the end lost both the horses and the 500 afs ea.  And did not help Amanullah. 

            In the days that followed the PS was chased all over .  The people of DehZangi stood with the PS and Ismailis against the Saqaw.  After this they returned to their place.  After Amanullah lost, they heard 600 men of Amanullahs army were coming to Shibar to join the resistance vs the Saqaw.  Only 300 of these reached Shibar.  The others were killed or ran away.  These stood with people of Shibar 9 months of trouble.  The Saqaw’s armies came several times.  They killed leaders in Shumbul and burned houses.  The people ran away. 

            The people of Shekh Ali at first stood vs the Saqaw, but finally gave up, surrendered.  Then they helped the Saqaw’s armies.  They were very dangerous cause knew the area of Shibar and knew who was rich, etc.  So they led armies into the razing of the Shibar areas.  They helped dig up the wealth hidden in the ground, etc. and nothing was left to anyone.  The people of Shekh Ali were mostly Shia.  Also the shias of Shibar gave up early so the Ismailis were left along to fight the Saqaw.  The shias of Daaki and other areas also made peace with Saqawis, so they caused much trouble.

 

 

—————-

14-3

The people of Chaarikaar and Qarabaagh area are still sore about the way the king Naader Shaa treated the Saqaw.  And Sayid Amin.  Saqaw was from Qarabaagh area, and Sayyed Amin from Charikaar.  Now, there are two sons of Sayyed Amin still living in Charikaar, they are big Khaans.  There are two sons of the Saqaw in Qarabagh, one a langowner and the other dewaan.  The government doesn’t bother them.

 

 

———————

June 26, 1967

1. Osayn (owner of school, large house, from Turughman) tells me that he knew Bache Saqaw before hge became King. Aaji was a wood seller in Charikaar at the time. Saqaw was aman who came into town a lot and visited with Aaji.  There was another man Sayyed ….[Amin?] who became Saqaw’s minister of war, who at this time was operating out of Charikar while Saqaw was working in Kah Daman.  They got started as robbers by gambling.  Got into trouble by losing.  Went out and stole or robbed for their money.,  They would take, say, 50,000 afs, then pay 10,000 to Haakim and 5,000 to Kunaandaan and then walk opening around in the town — couldn’t be touched.  They wore bandeliers and carried rifles over shoulder and a pistol on the belt.  Also a dagger.  Gradually they grew in strength and power and people began to follow them.  Then when he became strong enough (says Aaji) he said lets go take the throne.  After he took the throne people were put under his control  In Ghorband they went out to subject the people. In Turughmaan they ran into the hills and stayed.  Their homes were burned etc.  Eventually they came back.  The rishsafeds finally hoisted a flag and made peace.  There was a battle in the Unai Pass area led by the Saqaw’s army and the people of Behsud (wrote names elsehwere)  They fought, this way and that, and eventually Saqaws men had to give it up because in that time Nadir Shah came toward Kabul with his army.  Thus the Saqaw had to give up the Hazarajat and go back to Kabul.  they shot the Saqaw by firing squad.

 

 

—————-

16-27 

An old man 70-80 years old said with certainty that Naader Khaan (F of present King) killed Habibullah.  He and another old man, the Pushtun, told story of when Naader Shah took the throne, a famous general Gholam Nabi from Logar, who had been coming to kabul from Mazar with a force to protect Amanullah when he was abdicating, but who gave it up when they heard he ahd abdicated (from an airplane which dropped notes that said so ) — opposed Nadir’s keeping the throne, felt it belonged to Amanullah, he said, both you and I are Gholaam.  he had been offered a top generalship.  When refused, he was killed.  It was his servant’s son who killed Nadir Shah, the boy was hazara.

            Because of the number of Hazaras who supported Amanullah, ep those from Besut , some of the leading ones were made cols and generals in Nadir’s army.  But when Nadir was killed, all the army wa spurged of Hazaras.  many were jailed.  (This fits Nabi’s sotry re Nadir’s promise to some people to put Amanullah back on the throne, when he didn’t this general (Nabi) ran to peshawar wa spromised safety if returned, offered rank in army, then killed.  NB Nabi is from Ghazni, looks Hazara, clams to be Sunni.

 

———

Minorsky, Vladimir.  1982.  Medieval Iran and Its Neighbors.  London:  Variorum. 

Ch. II:  Some early documents in Persian (I). [orig. 1942.  J. of the Royal Asiatic Society.]

Ch III:  Some early documents in Persian (I). [orig. 1943.  J. of the Royal Asiatic Society.]

Some documents from Bamian dated c. 607/1211. 

            Doc A is most important.  VM 96: “characterizes the situation at Bamian under the local branc of the Shansabaanii princes of Ghor.”  Bamian was the locus of the rulership of one of three branches of the Ghor family [Ghazni and Firoz-koh being the others].  The Bamian domains included Tokharistan, Badakhshan and some territories to the north of the Oxus.

            Indicates that at time “infidels” still existed in the area, suggests that warfare against them was being carried on.  VM suggests that these might have been Qaraa-Khiaay tribesmen, whom he identifies as “remnants of the Liao rulers of China [who had] succeeded in founding a secdond kingdom at Blassaghun (near the Issiq-kul lake) and were victorious in their wars against the Muslim Qaraa-khaanids of Samarqand, the Seljuks of Khorasan, and the Khwaarazm-shaahs” [p.98].  At this time also “the princes were quarrelsom, disunited, and ready to invoke help from without.  Their amirs were ingriguing and exploiting the opportunities of their charges; their servants were courting thier master’s favours, gambling and oppressing the common folk.  Trade fumbled among obscure deals and only land was harnessed fast to the yoke of ancient law.”  We note that in particular the subjects of the ruler were expoloiting the peasants by monopolizing salt.

 

 

14-2  Old name for Bamian was Fanyaan, or Fanyaana (from 119 in Afghanistan, 1337 edition).

See Griesbach in Notes and Quotes, in time of A.R.  [could this be a ref to India Office Library source?  he is mentioned by Adamec, vol 1]

 

8-79

MAAB says that the government used to require much more than it does now in terms of labor and goods.  They took a lot of yuzum from Shibar to the Haakim of Bamian.  Now not so much of that.  He thinks things are better now than before.  They ask for wheat, etc.  The alaq says they pay 2 afs/naan.

 

16-10

[sayyed from valey before I reached SyaaKhaar Bulaaq in Fulaati]:  he said in the Saqaw year, the Saqaw’s men came and took all their flocks.  They themselves were in the Aylaaq when the men came.  And so they all ran away.  Others had said thir houses were burned,  but he didn’t mention it.

 

11-169

In Saal-i Saqaw Tajiks were for Saqaw and Hazaras were against him.  Tajiks were in dire trouble, nearly defeated.  Soon reinforcements came from kabul and quieted the Hazaras.

 

16-28

The Sayyeds of Fulaadi openly opposed the Saqaw.  Their houses were burend (friends from Ali yaawar’s village said), stayed on mts but one man in Ali Yaawar’s village put up the flag and stayed.  he save all the Hazaras.  When Nader Shah came he had to run for his life, but Nadir Shah knew they agreed to accept Saqaw under duress.

 

 

[Secret expansion of the Isma`ilis.]

(source??, Sayyed Anwar?:)  An early missionary to extend Isma`ilism outward from Kayan was Haydar Faqir, ??? a member of the Pir Sâheb’s family. He went to Kalu [a large populous valley that at that time was a least two days travel away from his native Kayan].  He converted some households there and went on to Shumbul, a day’s journey to the east, where he converted a few other households.  The households that converted had problems with their neighbors over this.  Families were divided, but eventually they became reconciled again, apparently without the Isma`ilis giving up their faith.

 

(An Isma`ili from Shumbul:)  People were Isma`ilis secretly because they were weak.  They intermarried freely among themselves but the Shi`as didn’t know about the Isma`ilis.  The Isma`ili women who married Shi`a taught their children secretly.

 

It was much later that the Isma`ili beliefs of these people became widely known, and it had near tragic consequences.  Here expand from file on Isma`ilism in Shumbul, etc.

 

 

 

THE FOLLOWING IS NOT ABOUT THE PIR BUT ABOUT DIVISIONS AMONG THE ISMAILIS

            The sectarian fighting in Shibar in the 1950’s

(My notes from a conversation with an elderly Isma`ili man named SarKhidâd in Kalu:) The general trouble was about 20 years ago.  It was true that people were Isma`ili secretly before that because they were weak.  They intermarried freely among themselves but the Shi`a [Imamis] didn’t know about the Isma`ilis.  The Isma`ili women who married Shi`a men taught their children the Isma`ili viewpoint secretly.  When the general trouble came up some years ago, there apparently were some women who ran away from their husbands ‑‑ not in Shibar but in Turughman ‑‑ because they were discovered to be Isma`ili.  There apparently was a lot of trouble for Isma`ilis in Turughman because there are only a few of them there, in comparison with the Imamis.  So they are troubled a lot there.  The Isma`ilis in the provinces always suffer more than in the city because people in the provinces can make trouble with the government for them.  They can make complaints against them and if they are strong enough they can force them out [presumably by the high costs involved in the dispute].

            Sakhidad said his mother was Imami and his father Isma`ili.  In those days they didn’t pay much attention to the difference and they didn’t care.  They married across sectarian lines freely. 

 

            Early dispute between Isma`ilis and Shi`as in Turughman

There was a fight between Isma`ilis and the Shi`a [Imamis] about 10 years after the Saqaw [i.e., about 1939] in Turughman.  There were 5 mirs [chiefs] there then.  Only a few houses were Isma`ili.  The Khalifa [representations of the Isma`ili pir] there was Manucher and he was trying to start trouble between the groups and the sects in order to increase Isma`ilism, but the Pir Sâheb finally was upset and changed him.  The people argued on Manucher’s behalf and told the Pir Sâheb that they wanted only him [to be their Pir].  The Pir Sâheb said that he was not soliciting followers.  If they wanted Manucher they would have to go.  They took Manucher.

 

            Isma`ili ‑ Shi`a intermarriage

Sakhidad’s father died fairly early and his other 2 brothers are no longer Isma`ilis;  His father and father’s  father were Isma`ilis but his two brothers are not.  They became Shi`a through marriage with Shi`a girls.  The father was alive when one of them married, but not when the other married.  Now they don’t have much to do with Sakhidâd.  But because of their relationship one brother’s son came and asked for his daughter.  Because of religion he and his wife refused.  Now, since the public fight [in about 1952] they don’t give [them] their daughters in marriage.  He claims his son went back to Shumbul for his military registration.  His qariadâr [local representative to the government] is Mir Gholam Hasan [an Isma`ili] but the Wakil Sâheb [the representative of the Shi`a in the same area] also helps him.

 

            Shi`a‑ Isma`ili sectarian disputes

In the old days Sakhidad claims the mirs were glad for the trouble between the sectarian groups because they got paid for settling them.  Usually the mirs were friendly with each other.  Mir Mowladad and Mir Khalifa (father of Mir Ahman Jan) were quite friendly.

 

            More on Shi`a‑ Isma`ili sectarian disputes

(Notes on a trip to Kalu:)  For a while, until recently (that is, in the last 2 years) the Isma`ilis were free of trouble.  But before that they had trouble.  They had to be secretive about their religion.  Now also they are open, but they are having trouble.

 

 

            Qorban also said the khatib has not come around for many years.  He used to examine people on the creed, the five obligations — fast, ahlms, prayers, pilgrimage, and creed.  But he could say nothing to Ismailis because they always gave the right answers.  (N.B.  this was probably before the Ismailis came out in the open.)  He said the Shias have Khalifas who collect the Shia tax.  The Sayyed from Iraq valley was a Khalifa who had come to collect khums from the Asnâashars.  It is possible that the Khalifas had not come before this time and that it was the first and the Ismailis (who were secretly paying their tithes) rebelled.  He said they had been paying the money to Wakil Sayb — 10% — before this.  Also, couldn’t recall whether  no one at all had collected the tithe before.  The mullah who collected the tithe was Shâ Sayed (of Iraq) and stayed with the house of Sayyed Qâdir (?) — of Dahan-i Wulâytak.

 

            (4-60) Mulla Gh. Reza pointed out that the shias and Ismailis are on fairly good terms.  He said they are still related and marry sometimes — so things are not so bad.  Also the [sharing of the] chopân (shepherd) is not necessary for only the sect.   They may share one chopân from on village.

            Note [same page]:  Lâl Muhammad denies all this.  He says there is no cooperation among the Ismailis and Shias.  Gh. Reza (Mulla) seems to be trying to smooth things over.  In his relations with Khdâdâd over the animals eating his lalma [lalmi], he was very tactful, maybe too much so.  He seemed to joke rather harshly on Khdâdâd, as if he were joking, but were [was] in fact making snide remarks (perhaps). 

 

Social relations in early Bamian, +/- 19th and early 20th c.

Marital relations

(4-62)  Lâl Muhammad married a girl who was 13 — is now 30 [i.e. 17 years ago].  And in that time there was only one sect in Shumbul — went to Kotal-i-Shibar to a mulla who said nekâ there.  His mir then was the brother of Wakil Sayb.  Later he says it was Wakil Sayb.

 

Note that a number of marriages between these groups took place prior to the 15-17 years ago fight . . . of Mirzâ Ali (Ismaili) from Lâl Muhammad — his land went to his daughters who married males in ???? darya. [cf.  Shumbul, Musâferbây], also 3-14, 3-12,13.

 

Early Cultural practices, religion

            IN SHIBAR

 

 

                    cultural practice in 1940s +/-:  Shibar

When Hashem was a child, he remembers eating dirt from the grave of the father of Sayed Mubarak shâ, after he died, many people went there as a zyârat [shrine].  When the kids were sick, they took dirt from the grave and fed it in spoons (like castor oil) to get them well.  They also went to the grave of Manzar Shâh which is in Khâk Mushak.  Then this all stopped because P.S. wrote against it — argued against it.  Hakim [the younger brother] did not eat this dirt.  They apparently dropped these things and Zyârats and tumâr at the same time.  They dropped Tumâr, zyârat, eating dirt of zyârat, pâl (i.e. fortune-prophecy), 14 or 15 years ago, suddenly and completely.

 

Early Pirs

Masson says [where??] that a Sayyed Shah Abbas was a Pir in Birgilich, and was pir of the Sheikh Alis.

 

Early Mirs

arbâb kabir

Mir Abbas was mir of Kâlu and Shibar, [he] was in the time of Abdul Rahman.  He was very cruel.  I don’t remember who was before him.  Then there was Gholâm Haydar, the father of Gholâm Rasul.  Mir Zafar was in Dân-i Gharghara.  Then [after him? there] was Mir Baxtiâri. 

            In the time of Mir Abbas all of Kâlu and Shibar were under him.  People killed him because he was very cruel.  He explained to us, and the people.  After Mir Abbas was Gholam Haydar.  He was also in Kâlu.  Also there was Mir Zafar.  After Mir Abbas was killed, Shibar and Kâlu became separate, [they] had separate Mirs.  At the time of Mir Abbas, Ikhtyâr was in Shibar.  He was liked, was mir for many, many years.  After him was Murâd Ali, who lived in Birgilic.  Then there was Mir Gurs Ali, then Mir Gholâm Ali.  Then Gholâm Mâmad, Mir Mowladâd.  He was the mir of all of Shibar.  My grandfather, Mir Gurz Ali, was mir before that.  He was in Bulola.  Irâq was under him, too.  The arbâbs in Irâq then were Mirza Faiz Ali, Arbâb Ali Mâd, and before that they had others:  Mir Zânu, Mâmad mir.  Mir Zânu was in Irâq, Mâmad Mir in Irâq was my FFF.  And Mir Abbas’s daughter had hit his hand when they went from Shibar to him.  When they were coming, she hit him and cut his finger.  Then Shibar hit Mir Abbas and killed him.  She was in the house because her foot hurt, then she saw that 1000 men from Shibar have come to us.  At first my ancestor, Mâmad Amir, was going to kill him, then the girl hit him and then the others came and killed him (Abbas).  A thousand men came against him.  He had some body guards, but not nearly as many.  The sons were killed in ??     of Irâq.  The sons ran away, hoping the people wouldn’t be so much against them, but the people didn’t let any male live from Mir Abbas.  Mir Abbas was not a descendant of Mir Zafar.

            His daughters were left alive,          His daughters were left alive, and through them he has grandchildren but no sons.  They were killed in Shina of Irâq.  After that the mirs of Shibar and Kâlu were separate.  But then whoever did well, like Baxtyâri, he took Irâq, Daki, then also Birgilic, Ghandak and Jalmish, and he was mir of Kâlu.

            When Mir Abbas was killed, naturally some of the people of Kâlu were angry, but they couldn’t do anything, because so many rose up against him.  Then Gholâm ayaday [Haydar?] or Mir Zafar were in Kâlu at that time.  In Shibar was Mir Gorz Ali.  Baxtyâri was in the time of Mir Gholam Ali Beg.  Then Mir Murâd Ali gave up the miri for Mir gholam ali beg, because he said he was more informed, wise. 

            Then when he died Mir Mowladâd became mir — i.e. when my grandfather died then Mowladâd became mir, then Mir gholâm M., then by alliance, agreement the mirs were changed [i.e. must refer to an informal concensus].  Also in the time of Mir Gholâm M., my kâkâ [Mir Ahmad Ali Beg?] was mir for one year.  They changed by itifâq — by agreement, concensus.  Then my kâkâ was not happy, because if you are going to go to Mir Gholâm M. then don’t come to me anymore — I won’t be your mir.  When people became aligned [basta] to him he tries to become mir, and [to make] the other not to be mir.  One year my father was mir, then my kâkâ, then Mir mowladâd, then Mir gholâm M. beg.  Then in the days of Mir gholâm M. beg, my Kâkâ stood up for one year, he was miri in Bulala, then went to Irâq and did miri.  Mir gholâm M. was under the hand of my grandfather [Bakhtiari?] then he took my mother.  My kâkâ [MAAB] gave her to him.  Her father wouldn’t give her to him, because he felt my kâkâ should take her [because he was the brother of her first husband, after his decease].  If you don’t take him, he told her, then you should stay at home.  But my mother wouldn’t agree to him.  Over this Baxtyâri was upset with Mir alamad ali beg.  He was still living.  The father, Arbâb Ali baxsh, came for pershraw [peyshraw? purshis {question, asking}?] to ask her to take him as husband.  At that time I was small and in Kâlu, 5 or 6.  When they married, I was 7 or 8.  After that Mir gholâm M. ran away, avoiding Mir baxtyâri.  That it was bad for his name that they didn’t marry — or she didn’t marry — according to his orders.  My uncle [MAAB] became mutafiq with him, and then he gave her to Mir gholâm M.  My kâkâ [MAAB] had the first right over her and wanted her, but she would not agree.  Then he gave her ba dista to father of MAJ [Mir Gholam M.].  If he hadn’t agreed, then they couldn’t have taken her.  The father of him [her? i.e. Arbab Ali Bakhsh] was also a help; he also took some money.  And the father took money.  Later on I fought with them, because they had sold her to them.  Maybe they took 1000 or 2000 — got it from Mir gholâm M.

            When a man dies, his brother has the first right to the wife.  But she has to agree, if she doesn’t then it isn’t done. 

Mir gholâm M. before he took her, he was a Mir, but didn’t have a big following.  After he took her, he got a lot of aqyat/asyat, because he had the daughter of Mir baxtyâri.  The point is that I should get a wife from some nâmdâr from a motabar person.  To get a wife from a man who moves around the country, who is informed, famous, etc. 

Mir Gholâm M. had two other wives.  They were not famous people, they were from his own gawm.  They were alive when he took her.  But this woman was fâmida, could do everything, was the daughter of a nâmdâr and was jawân.  She also can read and write.

            N.B. This man [Mullah Hosayn?] is xwârzâda of her. (i.e. his mother is sister of Mulla Hosayn.  Since MAJ’s mother is daughter of Mir Baxtyâri, he is xwârxâda of her.)

            Then I was nâsâz with Mir Gh.        Then I was nâsâz with Mir Gh. M. for some years, because he had taken my mother.  If I had been grown, and not small, he couldn’t have taken her.  Even if his place had not been far away, I wouldn’t have given her to him.  I didn’t want him.  Only my uncle gave her to him.  (my kâkâ mâkâ, i.e. others were involved — the prior right of the husband’s qawm?)  The kâkâ of Mir Ahmad Ali [Beg].  They agreed among themselves.  The wife herself did not marry (anyone in the qawm(?)), so “Come, let us give her to him”.  The uncle of this (?) came and said I am your muzdur [servant], your deeqân [farm laborer].

            Then came uzur K. to house of mâdarmâd (?) — men and women.  They came heads bare, uzur K. to our house.  That you should please not fight with us.  Then we became sâz with them.  They said they will give us two daughters, so that you will be sam with us.  Don’t fight with us.  We became sam with them, but we didn’t take their daughter.  The people that were on their side were all of shibar.  These people who came sar lutch were from the Q. of âdil from quchangi.  They came to bulola, to our house.  Then they gave me a chapan and a horse.  They were going to give me two girls.  One of these was the mother of Hashem and there was another of them, child of her kâkâ.  But I said I didn’t want them, I had not râai with them.  I said, other than my own mother, I won’t take anyone else.  She was herself happy to be there.  She was herself happy to be there.  She told herself that she had left these (girls?) for me.  You should take them, but I wouldn’t take them. 

            Then he became very big.  Over all of shibar, to Irâq, but not ghandak.  At that time Mir baxtyâri was over ghandak.  Mir baxtyâri brought me to Kâlu because he liked me a lot.  My kâkâ [MAAB] became motafiq with them.  He wanted to take her himself but she wouldn’t.  After this, for one year Mir âmad ali beg was mir of shibar, but for only one year.  Then after that, Mir gholâm M. became Mir.  Somehow he got the people to him.  He [Mir] G.M. did fishâr.  He did something with the government.  He turned the people to himself.  There was no fight over this.  The kâkâ didn’t fight over this.

Mir mowladâd was a mir in the time of Mir âmad ali beg, but he was basta with him.  My uncle did everything, he was basta with him.  He helped my uncle.  Then after that, Mir mowladâd became (mir), then Mir gholâm M., then after that my kâkâ again.  When Mir Gholâm M. was mir, Mir moladâd did not help him, but his people were with Gh. M.  My kâkâ told him not to allow it (him? i.e. Gh. M.?), the kâkâ said he was not happy with Gh. M.  Then he beitifiqi namekad, ke mâ yak ismâyeli asteem.  And Mir mowladâd was not ismailia. (hic.  He had the hickoughs).  The sects were already known.  Mir mowladâd did not help Mir Gh. M. at all and also did not betifâqi k.  He said that this (person?) should be it.  Your father was (mir) before, before you, and he should also be it now.  But he didn’t agree, so he mutafiq girift with him (?).  Moladâd did.  Mir mowladâd was mir before, too, after my father Arbab Ali Bakhsh], and also was after my kâkâ [MAAB].  Then Gh. M. xest, and told my kâkâ to do miri again, and he didn’t — but if he had also xest, there would have been a fight, and he couldn’t have won.  Then there were two mirs.  Some people took him.  Then uwâ beitifâqi nakard.  He said beitifâq  meshem.  i.e.  We will be disunited if I also xest.  The asnaâshar are only a few — 200 – 300 households.  But they, the sayids of Birgilich, were bast on the side of Mir Gh. M. 

            My father, gurz ali, was Ismaila.  He was strong, so the asnâshar could not say anything.  In those days, people would say they were murid of sayid so and so, most of them said they were murid of sayid -i- kayân.  People didn’t know much about maslak in those days.  From the days of his fathers, the sayid -i-kayân was the most famous.  Others were just gadaygars, who were hungry, etc.  Also the sayids of Birgilich had their followers, too, and they later nashud (i.e. it didn’t work out for them.)  Later, they had a dispute with Mir Gh. Mâmad over who was to be Mir — was not over sect — they were for Mir mowladâd.   Some people went with Mir mowladâd, but many were for Mir Gh. M.  Those who supported Mir mowladâd were from everywhere.  From shumbul, jolâ, only a few from Birgilich, if any.  There were 100 houses in jolâ.

Mir Gh. M. died still young and vigorous.  After he died, they took one of his brothers to the Mir, then my uncle [MAAB] — the brother they took was barât ali, and my uncle was Mir âmad ali beg.  Mir Gh. M. died almost 20 years ago.  After he died, Mir mowladâd also xest, but he died, then we took MAJ.  He was our brother to us.  He also told Mir âmad ali beg that he was as a father to him.  He came and kissed his hand, and kissed his face, out of friendship.  He was a good boy to xest.

 

Bakhtiaari’s time

            Kalu-at Mir Nasir

            An old man talked with has said a lot about bakhtyâri I didn’t understand. 

            ¨ Mir Bakhtyâri had a dispute over maliki over [with?] the people for two years.  It must have been serious.  In the end the other pretender was put in jail until his death.  Bakhtyâri was Ismaili secretly if he was one.  The other was asnâshar.  After this fight, Bakhtyâri visited Kayân to see P.S. and acknowledged his superiority. 

            ¨ In those days, people couldn’t come out openly regarding their Ismaili faith.  Ismailis couldn’t survive in the army if they said they were Ismaili.  They had to go around in groups of ten or more to be safe.  They began to be more open about their Ismaili faith in the time of Nâdir shâ khân.

 

early [secret] advance of Ismailism

Pâynd Ali (of âdil), servant of Jean Selch

            Said in early days of Ismaili in Shibar there were several mullas who began to teach for Ismaili.  They did it only carefully — secretly — only to people they could trust, who really were friends.  They changed ideas of a few people — 2 or three to five — and they met to discuss these things, but only secretly.  They never told about themselves.  Then 30 or 40 years ago, the P.S. openly said he was Ismaili and was for âqâ khân.  In Shumbul one of the most effective mullas was Abdul the FF of âkhund aslam.  Also FF of Mubârakshâ.  Eventually, they changed a lot of people to Ismaili in their areas.

 

early Islmailis in Shumbul

early Islmailis in Shumbul

(An elder from Shibar, MGH).  In our place now we are all Ismaili.  When my father became Ismaili the whole of Pusht-i Mazar [his village] became Ismaili.  Qalaa-i Mullah [another village] were Ismaili before Pusht-i Mazar — maybe twenty years earlier than us.  Our Khalifa was Mullah Baabay the father of Mullah Gholam.  In a few places there were a few [Ismaili] houses scattered among the other [Shi`a] houses.  In those days we troubled these people a lot — said bad things abou them … Eventually we all became Ismaili.  These early Ismailis were probably close, or well known, to the Pir Saheb.  Mullah Bâba Bây — in our childhood we called him Mullah Bâba.

 

(An elder from Shibar).  When Pusht-i Mazar [his village] became Ismaili it was 70 years ago, maybe.  The Pir Saheb was Timur Shah.  He had not visited there.  Travel was difficult then — only by horseback.  In those days few people could see the Pir Saheb, but the masjid was there [in Kayan].  The Pir Saheb’s grandfather built the masjid.  Their homeland is in Iran.  At first they came to Khawât [in Besud?], then moved to Kayân.  At first only old people knew the origin [of the pir’s family] was Iran and that they were pirs.  Then more and more people began to see that they were.  Maybe the Pir Saheb knows his family’s descent.  The Pir Saheb and the Aga Khan are both descendants of Ali, but through the main line of Ali; the Aga Khan is from bigger people than the Pir.

 

(An elder from Shibar).  Mullah Bâba [in Qala-ey Mullah].  These people had become Ismailis many years before [his vilage].  Their livelihood was better than that of many others.  It is likely that their prosperity helped induce the people of Pusht-i Mazar [his village] to become Ismailis.  The other people in Shumbul, many of them, had already become Ismailis [before Pusht-i Mazar]. 

 

(Sayyed Sarwar Shah of Ghojurak).  His father was Shah Gholam Hosayn-i Sayyed Mirza [of Ghojurak].  He was Khatib [therefore was also mullah for Pusht-i Mazar years ago] for the Qâzi, but was not so official; he said the nekâ [marriage cermony] and made people keep up the mosques.  He was himself Ismaili.  Everyone feared the Qâzi; he could jail them, hit them with a durra [a studded belt used for punishment].  He was the only one who could do that, not the Governor even, not the subgovernor.

 

(Gholam Rasul, brother of Mir Gholam Hasan).  In the old qalâ [fort, at the mouth of Shumbul], there was a school there.  Pusht-i Mazar had a mullah, Shah Gholaam Hosayn [the Khatib], son of Sayyed Mirza, son of Sayyed Khojaa) in Ghojurak.  His sons are there now.

 

Pattern of pirs / saints services and veneration in early Bamian

(Mullah Sidiq, a man from Shibar, and had worked in Kabul for several years).  Shah Ali Shah was a leader of the Ismailis in Jawzaar above Birgilich.  He was the father of Sayyed Mubarak Shah.  he was not the pir but did piri [pir’s work].  That is people came to him when they were in need and when sick, and he gave ta`wîz for sick children.  [Also] Shaan Shaah was a religious leader of the Asnaa`ashariya.  He did piri work.  He and Shah Ali Shah both lived to be a hundred.  He also gave ta`wîz.  Sayyed Timur Khân was brother of the the Pir Saheb and the previous Pir Saheb [of the Ismailis].  Also, the brother before him was Sayyad Gawar Khân.  He was another previous pir.

 

(From my notes).  A man told me that Sayyed Ghazanfar Shah came here about thirty years ago [c. 1937].  He is from the Sayyeds of Ghazni.  Another voluteered about the same amount of time.  One wonders if it could have been about the time  of the assassination of Nadir Shah by a Hazara from the Ghazni area.  Sayyed Ghazanfar Shah himself came here.  His Father died in Ghazni.  His father’s father died in Bamian and a large tomb to him, built by Sayyed Ghazanfar Shah, is high on a hill.  People couldn’t remember his name. 

 

Current attitudes toward pirs, absence of great pirs now

(From my notes).  There was a long discussion on pirs one night with Nur Ahmad and the Qariador of the village at Kahmard.  The Qariadaar said their pir is Aakhundzâda of Qarabaagh in Kohdaman.  This is really his son now.  The old man is dead and his son is not so good as his father.  This seems to be true of most of the old pirs who were so strong and famous.  … Both Nur Ahmad and the Qariadaar agreed that the Naqib Saheb [deceased in 1947] was really a true pir.  They also agreed that the old Hazrat of Shor Bazaar was a real pir, but he is gone now too.  The real pirs are gone now; they are a thing of the past, they said.

 

(From my notes).(From my notes).  Pirs are not sending out Khalifas as they did  before.  They are collecting themselves, or their close relatives are.  For example:  Pir Saheb, Aaghany Abdullah, and the Pir from Qarabaagh.

 

Pirs in Bamian area and changes in their collection system

The Sayids of Birgilich

            Shânshâ was the first pir

            âmatshâ (was his brother) and successor

            Sayid yâqut shâ

            N.B. Hashem lungi-syâ story

            now:  dârâshâ is the man in shikâri who givess tumâr

 

***************

 

From the servant of Jean Selch:

            The king of Egypt and the Imam of Ismailis, mustansir-i-billâ, sent shânâsir-i-khisraw to Badakhshân to convert Ismailis.  He converted many in the area — even to as far as Bukhârâ — where there were many who became Ismailis.  Shânâsir was sayid of Ilawi.  He was pir of Badakhshân.  He lived 500+ years ago.  In this area there have been many Ismailis.  Khârukh and Dawâz, Dushanbe, Kolâb, and Bukhârâ had many who believed.

 

 

Hazarajat in mid-twentieth century:  ethnic composition

 

Schurmann, H.F.  The Mongols of Afghanistan.  Mouton & Co, 1962.

 

(pp. 76-77)  Although they [Tajiks] closely resemble the Hazâras, many of whom inhabit the same region, they differ from them in a number of respects.   For example, all the semi-nomadic Tadjiks we questioned indicated they were Sunnites, whereas most of the Hazâras in this region are either Shi’ite or Isma’ilite.  Unlike the Bâmiyân Tadjiks who are completely sedentary, these semi-nomadic Tadjiks of the Därá-i Sikârî have a tent culutre.  Were it not for their Persian speech, one would immediately assume them to be Turks.

 

Schurmann, H.F.  The Mongols of Afghanistan.  Mouton & Co, 1962.

 

(p.84)  The informants stated that of these villages Fûlâdî, south of Bâmiyân and entirely populated by Hazâras, was the largest with 1000 households, and Fâtmästî was the smallest with 15 households.  The informants stated that, according to government statistics, there are about 7000 households in the Bâmiyân region.

 

 

****NOTE:  Reread article on Bamian, III. Modern Town and District, by Planhol, from the Encyclopedia of Iran.

 

Bamian and Shibar in 1960s

1960s:  spatial patterns in Bamian: 

Those of us in this village see the pir of Paghman as the great pir.  In some other villages around here, people believe in the pir of Logar (a moderately well educated man in Bamian.)

In Ghandak, the people are Tajik, but there are no Tajiks in Shibar.  But the pir of the Tajiks is the Hazrat.  The Pushtuns have Aakhundzâda.  They are like the sayyeds.  They are godly and knowledgable. (Ismaili elder in Shibar.)

The pir of Ahangaran, Topchi Mulayan, and Taybuti lives in Istalif.  He is an âlem.   All these places are Tajik places. (notes from conversation with Tajiks in Bamian.)

Besides the Hazaras, there are some [Ismaili] goldsmiths from the eastern province and some Hindus and some Tajiks. (notes from conversations with Ismailis.)

 

                    Ethnic categories and sectarian identities in Bamian

The Ismailis and the Imamis here don’t speak to each other.  The Ismailis are very silent (chap).  This has been for 15 or 20 years.

 

Note:  See on eating patterns and separation of the sects in 8-69 in Schism, fission file.

 

The relations with the Imamis aren’t good anymore.  If we want to borrow from them, they would send us away and tell us to go to our own kind.  (Ismaili elder in Shibar)

 

Now each side is firm.  Neither side can change.  Each year a few change, but from being Imami to Ismaili — not the other way.  The ones who change are more sensible; the ones who are ignorant remain Imami.  (An Ismaili elder in Shibar)

 

M5  In Shumbul half are Jamâti; half asnaashari

In Jolâ all are ashnashari

Awlâd-i mir :  all ashna ashari

aashur:  half ashna ashari and half jamaati

dila:  all jamaati

kaaka:  one third asna ashari, two thirds jamaati

 

Some Tajiks in Ghandak are not related; this is a large place.  2000 people beyond Bulola, Sunni [“tassenno” = sunni]

 

In Shumbul:  1/3 asnaashar; 2/3 Ismailia

 

Haydar Baay

5 or 6 children [see list somewhere else]

These are asnaashar qawms:

Wulaytak

Khudaqaa

Jameli

Each qawm has its land separately; h is sep; land ownership is sep.

 

Some places the q. is split between religions

q of Ghlam ali [at top of Shibar]

q of Daaki

 

If most are Ismailia, then one of these is arbaab; they give arbaab to another qawm.

 

The iron smiths are Arabs but they are not Sayyed.  Usually they are only artisans.  They are Ismaili in Iraq, Shumbul, Daki, Birgilich and Sheikh Ali.  They are Imamis in Jola and Ghulam Ali. (notes on a conversation with an elder in Shibar.)

 

Gilkârs:  2 (for Ismailis)

Ghojurak

Iljânak

1 in Joolâ (for Asnâshars)

                    Lack of communication between sects

Boy in Bulola explained that Ismailis and Asnâshars don’t speak to each other — as I observed also.  “They are very chop with us.”  This has been for 10-15-20 years.

 

(8-69) NB.  The eating patterns separating the sects keep fellowship at a minimum.  Meals in which people eat at each others’ houses became communication centers for people — but centers which have limited lines across the sects.  Relatives and ampirâ stay in each others houses when they move around for economic purposes.  Man from Kâlu working for wheat stayed at house of Mir âmad Ali Beg — because same sect.  In this way they learn about each others’ relatives and sectarian arguments, and news about the P.S., etc.

The relations [of Ismailis] with the asnâshars are not good.  If they want to borrow from them, they would send away and tell them to go to their own kind.

(4-60) Mulla Gh.

Reza pointed out that the shias and Ismailis are on fairly good terms.  He said they are still related and marry sometimes — so things are not so bad.  Also the [sharing of the] chopân (shepherd) is not necessary for only the sect.   They may share one chopân from on village.

Note [4-60]: Lâl Muhammad denies all this.  He says there is no cooperation among the Ismailis and Shias.  Gh. Reza (Mulla) seems to be trying to smooth things over.  In his relations with Khdâdâd over the animals eating his lalma [lalmi], he was very tactful, maybe too much so.  He seemed to joke rather harshly on Khdâdâd, as if he were joking, but were [was] in fact making snide remarks (perhaps).

 

History of Shunbul Ismailism

                    Early Khalifa of Ismaili pir

(M82)         The father of MGH had a few animals, like now.  The father got a wife from Bulola.  He was Ismaili before the marriage, but she was not Ismaili before the marriage.  He was quite young when he became Ismaili.  When his brother became Ismaili, he became one.  The older brother was only four or five years older.  His brother at that time was arbâb.  MGH’s father was doing farming.  When the older brother was 15-18 he became Ismaili.  They all did it together.  Their father was very rich.  The Mir was Mir Mowladâd.  He was asnâshar [shi`ite], his kâkâ the arbâb was Ismaili.  The first in his qawm to become Ismaili was Hâji Sayed âhmad.  Sayed Mâhmad became the khalifagiri of Mazâri-sharif.

Eventually he gathered so much for himself that he was released by the pir.  That is, the P.S. Timur shâh khân.  These two brothers were both from Pusht-i Mazâr.  They were farmers.  They didn’t have a lot of land.  The other members of the qawm became very angry with them.  They said, even if they were killed they wouldn’t change their beliefs.  They were beaten and threatened.  Their wives were not against them.  They were also Ismaili.  Sayed Mâhmad became very rich as a khalifa.  The wife had agreed with him, whatever they did.  When they (the husbands)  became Ismaili, the wives became Ismaili, with all of the children.  Altogether it may have been 40 or 50 men in their quawm.  In those days, they were all in the one qalâ.

 

Life in early part of this century and earlier

In those days a family lived in one room with all its animals.  In one qalâ, there were ten families in it.  The houses were the following:

1. Mâmâ (kâkâ of MGH)
2. Bâba Beg (father of MGH)
3. Akbar
4. Murâd Ali
5. M. Hakim
6. M. Hosayn
7. M. Amir
8. M. Alam
9. Bozar
10. Salmân
11. Zangâl

Next to this was another qalâ.  These two qalâs were there from the beginning.  In this qalâ:

1. Khalifa Sayyed M.
2. Hâji Sayyed âhmad
3. Mirzâ Ali (who was named as one of two Mullâs in times before)
4. Rustam
5. Bargili
6. âhmad Ali
7. Sayyed Ali
8. Gholam M.
9. Metar (he was from Besud.  Married a woman there and lived there.)

When they became Ismaili, Khalifa Sayyed M. was 40.  Sayyed âhmad was 45 — no they were younger, maybe 15 or 20 when they became Ismaili.  Khalifa Sayyed M. was a Khalifa for P.S. before he returned to Pusht-i Mazar.  It was then that there was trouble concerning them being Ismaili.  Later, the mullâs came and read books — the Khalifa and the mullâ — Mullâh Bâba, who was from Qalâ-i Mullâh.

Sayyed M. was in Mazar-i Sharif until age 15.  His father had been from Shumbul.  He had left his father when he was 7 or 8 years old and went to Mazar.  He became a student in a bakery (a nânbây) when he was about 12 years old.   He was there 2 or 3 years.  After this the P.S. made him a Khalifa.  He told him to collect the tithes from all Ismailis of Mazar.  There were only maybe 20 or 30 houses.  He was to bring money to the P.S.  There was no Khalifa before this.  Maybe before that the P.S. had sent someone else.  He was Khalifa for about 5 years.  In the sixth year, he took a wife.  He spent all the tithe money for the woman.  So P.S. released him.  The womam was from Mazâr — her lineage was from Besut.

After getting the wife, he moved to Shumbul back up to Pusht-i Mazâr.  His father was not living.  Sayyed M. maybe left because his father beat him or his father may have not gotten clothes for him.  He went alone.  Along the way, he may have done work as a donkey or camel driver.  When he returned to Pusht-i Mazâr the trouble was for a year.  (Sayyed M. came back to Shumbul because his land was there.)  The brother stood with him.  The brother was older and had become Ismaili before — I don’t know why.  Probably he was afraid and was a secret Ismaili.  When the younger brother came, they stood out [came forth] as Ismaili.  Then all the rest of the qawm was angry at them.

Then the mullâ bâbây (from Qalâ-i Mullâ) came and sat with the qawm — 2 or 3 people came and said these 2 brothers were on the right way.  They should accept them.  They read and talked to them — were with them for two days.  The trouble was for about one year.  Then in 2 or 3 days it was finished.  They were all quiet.  This was from the book.  It said this was better than Asnâshar.  Mullâ bâbây was Ismaili and all his ancestors since a long time before.  They were Ismaili for two generations back.  From a long time ago, they were Khalifa also.

The Asnâshar in those days were taking money.  They took one Afghani out of five (for tithe).  They have Mujta’id (this is now âqâ-i Ali âhmad).  In those days, they didn’t have a Mujta’id.  In those days, someone collected the money and bought a cow or sheep and killed them in front of masjid (the mosque).  The money was not forced from them.

In their group, they read the books and people cried among themselves.  The person who collects the money is a mullâ — sent by the âqâ-i Mujta’id.  In the present, this is collected at the time of the harvest.  The mullâs may be relatives of the Mujta-id or maybe just a learned person.  The Mullâ is from the place of the mujta-id.

In those days, the Mullâs of the Mujta’id got the money and carried it to the Mushta`id.  There was a masjid, that is a mosque, in each village.  Each qawm had its own masjid.  For each masjid, a family of mullâs were in charge of the masjid.  In time of harvest, the farmers paid the tithe to the family.  They collect the money and got quite a lot.  They were ususally rich.  In the early days, P.M. had no mullâ.  Among themselves they collected money, they bought a cow, killed it and ate it in the name of God.  The elders were in charge of collection.  The extra money was in the hands of the elders.  These were M. Alam and Mirzâ Ali.  They collected the money and paid for the worship ceremony.  The masjid was from a long time before.  The people together had built it and it is still there.  MGH’s grandfathers had built it.  In dispute over Ismailism, these two elders were perhaps more outspoken against Ismaili.  The Mir and Arbâb are separate from those leaders who are religious leaders.

 

They are separate because there is too much work for one man.  Hâji Sayyed âmad:  he was a Ismaili and went on the hâj.

 

Ismaili beliefs – pir teaching against ziarats

Shia Story–Fission

We don’t believe in zyârats, don’t believe in going there to pray to get blessings.  As long as the P.S. is alive has strength [we can go to him], but after he is dead, [there is] no possible help to give us.  Why have a zyârat?  The others kiss hands of a Pir and touch their faces to his hands to get blessings.  But our P.S. won’t give his hand to anyone.  Only sometimes our people kiss hands and his sons as endearment.

 

1. said in qurân. The P.S. shows from qurân that zyârats are not right. We accept the books of 4 groups:  qurân, the New Testament of Jesus, the book of David, and the ??torât?? of Moses.  Zyârats have no value, P.S. said.  You are better than those thingss.  You have made them.

 

We destroyed the zyârats.  Before, the people who were ??mullâhs?? of these zyârats were very rich.  We destroyed them and let go the mullâhs.  We had one near our village.  I was 20-30 years old.  We then used to have 10 degs — great big ones — cooking the sheep cows we killed.   Everyone ate them at that time.  We would collect from each hh. maybe 200 [afs] at each house, then bought a cow or two sheep; then killed them at the shrine.

 

We do this as a custom.  We all gathered after eating and prayed — dawâ — (not namâz).  Prayed to the shrine that as it was great, it should implore God to forgive us of our sins.  Not pray for crops — because nature happens in crops.  Mullâh Khodâynazzar.  He had a farm.  His only job was to sweep out the shrine and the mosque, gathered the horns, and built the deg dâns.

 

 

 

 

 

=================

Problem in Bamian:  spatial patterns

Notes: Labmushak

 

The point of the case:  The broad history of group division

1. The contemporary situation

            — in Shibar

            — in ??Labuushak??

2. The existing marital ties and the patterns of war that show a shift in alignment of groups
3. The history of fission in ??Labuushak??

            — early history of area

            — the later division

            — the fight

            — the result and current ????

4. The point of the case resumed

 

Final Chapter

Show that within this frontier zone internal tensions between kinsmen erupts as social factions, not elsewhere possible, by desccribing its social history.

1. The early history of religious sects and factions and

               history of the pirs

1. The Ramazan etc. fight
2. The resultant fragmented condition
3. The recent intra-Ismaili dispute
4. Manucher — P.S. in Kayân
5. Mausur — P.S. in Kalu-Turughman
6. Khodâdâd vs. Manucher in Kalu
7. Ramzan vs. his Ismaili community in Shibar

 

 

Ðwolf civilization paper:

“[W]e need to invent new ways of thinking about the heterogeniety and transformative nature of human arrangements, and to do so scientifically and humanistically at the same time.”  Wolf Inventing Society AE [1988] 15[4]: 753.

1.  Problem in the discipline: a contradiction in behavior of anthropologists

Á  ÁThe term culture area entails some inherent contradictions.
Nevertheless, modern sociocultural anthropologists assume the existance of broad cultural regions, even if they scarcely ever define them.

In this paper I examine a certain contradiction, or at least an ambiguity, in the way certain anthropologists treat the problem of

do:  They teach courses on what might be called “civilizational areas” such as “Latin America” or “Subsaharan Africa”, and list their research interest in terms of culture areas, but as a whole they tend to avoid formulations of what a culture area is.  Admittedly, the problem is trivial in some parts of the world, where broad culture areas — civilizational areas — are easily glossed in geographic terms.  In Subsaharan Africa and Australia, for instance, the outlines of geography arguably correspond to broad configurations of culture.  But some commonly recognized civilizational areas get little help from geography:  notably, the Middle East and Southeast Asia.  With respect to these areas scholars have struggled to develop adequate formulations of the senses in which the regions can be distinguishable culturally.  Wolters [????] has proposed, for instance, that what distinguishes Southeast Asia is its diversity — and thus turns a analytical problem into a virtue.  Emmerson [1984] argues that Southeast Asia was distinguished essentially for military reasons; its particular configurations of cutlure, diverse as they are, had little to do with its identity as a “culture area.”  Definitions of the “Middle East” have fared little better.  The bases on which scholars have defined the Middle as a culture area have been diverse, and of course, depending on the criteria, different geographic territories have been included in the term.*

*Fernea-Fernea, Watson, Bates-Rassam, Cressey, Patai, L.Sweet, Gulick, Coon, El-Zein.

Á ÁMy particular target in this brief essay is the definition of the Middle Eastern culture area in two widely used textbooks, each defining the area differently and so including a different territory; also each, in my opinion, leavs some important issues unexamined.  Dale Eickleman, in his justly appreciated anthropological essay on the Middle East, seems to have given upany attempt to justify his area in cultural terms:  In the first edition [1981] he identified the Middle East merely as a list of nation-states; in the second edition [1989] as “the region stretching from Rabat to Tehran …” [p. 31].  He did also say, however, in refering to common usages of the term, that “When certain features of the linguistic, religious, political and historical complexities of the region are emphasized, the term [Middle East] is often extended to encompass Afghanistan, Pakistan, and, at least in the recent historical past, those states of Soviet Central Asia which are heavily influenced by Islam” [p. 4].  Without explaining the criteria for this common usage he suggested that the bases for the recognition of the Middle East are somehow linguistic, religious [apparently Islamic], political, and historical.  My problem is not with Eickleman’s Middle Eastern area as such; I only think that a definition in terms of a list of nations leave many questions unanswered.  It suggests that criteria exist, although unstated, for examining Eickleman’s particular configuration of nations as a culture or civilizational area.  I hope here to advance our understanding of the criteria for defining an area such as Eickleman’s Middle East which he, apparently intuitively, believes is a single culture area.
 X  sense that there is some kind of cultural continuity to the area.
Á ÁThe other textbook on the Middle East whose definition of the area interests me is by Dan Bates and Amal Rassam, ÃÃPeoples and Cultures of the Middle EastÄÄ.  Their focus is on a considerably smaller zone within Eickleman’s area, which they call the “Central Middle East.” They justify this region as a culture area in terms of the factors that made for its “coherence” — which they say is evident in its political history, its long©established routes of trade and communications, its “high level of cultural integration” — and it modern strategic importance (1983: xi).  My problem with their Central Middle East is its seeming arbitrariness.  Are the Arab states of their “Central Middle East” — Egypt, Jordan, Iraq ??? — more closely integrated with Turkey, which they include, than with the Arabic speaking countries of the Maghrib, which they exclude?
Á ÁThe issue is a broader question:  Is there a way to define a civilizational area more precisely?  How do we decide on what should be included in a culture area?
Á ÁMy agenda in this paper is to emphasize the need for a clearer formulation of what is meant by a broad culture area — a “civilizational area” — and to suggest some ways to think about the construct.  In this project I borrow liberally from the ideas of Eric Wolf.

2.  Some notions on the concept of culture area or civilizational area.

Á ÁI have left some conceptual loose ends in this discussion so far that need to be tightened up.
ŒÁ ÁFor one thing, there seems to be no particular consensus on the terms to use for broad civilizational areas of the sort that Eickleman and Bates and Rassam are examining.  The term most generally in use is “culture area,” although other terms have been used.  Kroeber, who employed the term as an analytical category, used other terms such as “ethnic province”, or “civilization” as a gloss for culture area.  [Kroeber 1920: 151 [[California Culture Provinces.  U. of Cal Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology, vol 17, No 2: 151-169]].  The term “culture area” has lost its saliency among contemprary sociocultural anthropologists:  The term, after all, was originally developed as a basis for classifying assemblages of artifacts in museum displays, and in any case it implies a discrete, culturally homogeneous territory that few of us find useful anymore.
ÃÃ
 X Âmodern sociocultural anthropologists have generally eschewed this sense of the term, because they are interested less in artifacts than in the frames of meaning that inform the social worlds within which such artifacts are used. Other words like “civlization” or “civilizational area” have been avoided by many anthropologists, whose cultural frame of references has been the local society.
ÄÄ
I will speak of “civilizational area” in order to avoid confusion with concepts of narrower scale.
Á ÁSuch a usage presumes that patterned cultural systems are discernible on many levels, from specific locally situated sets of belief and custom to, in a wider “civilizational” sense, sets of relations in which there are certain family resemblances of belief and custom.  A civilization, to follow Hodgson’s definition, is “any wider grouping of cultures … [that] share consciously in interdependent cumulative traditions….”  (Hodgson 1974: I, 33)  He assumed “a certain integrality” to such civilizations, notably, for him, the Islamic world which was the object of his research (1974 I, 32)
Á ÁThe problem, of course, is that the diacritica of cultural entities so expansive as civilizations are never easily identified.  Indeed, as one observer said of Europe, a region generally considered somehow a cultural unit, that its “major characterisitcs of commonality” are only identifiable “at a distance”; “close at hand” it is the “differences in time and space” that are most evident.  Kroeber [????,Wolf’s review]: 450] once pointed out that the more history that is known about an area the more difficult it is to develop a satisfactory culture area classification.  Hodgeson confessed that “the reason for distinguishing a `civilization’ cannot be a single universal one…; it must almost be special to each case…. . Each civilization defines its own scope” (1974: I, 33).

Á ÁNevertheless, anthropologists and historians presume that broader sociocultural entities exist, manifest in common usages like Latin America or “the Subcontinent” [or “South Asia”], or “the Far East.”  Some of these terms imply the cultural contentby which they are defined ©© for example, “ÃÃLatinÄÄ America” or “the ÃÃIslamicÄÄ world.”Ó  ÓÓ   Ó Other terms that strictly denote geographic regions, such as “Europe”, “the Far East ” or “India,” are sometimes used as glosses for civilizational areas.  For example when Marc Bloc (1961: xix) said that “Europe was a creation of the Middle Ages,” he use the term “Europe” in a cultural sense.  A unit of territory our generation takes for granted as a geographic entity was, he said, effectively constituted by a certain culture, or at least a certain constellation of cultures.  Europe, he said, was a “civilization” that “rose and flowered, until in the end it covered the face of the earth, among those that dwelt between the Tyrrhenian, the Adriatic, the Elbe, and the Atlantic Ocean.” Fernand Braudel’s statement that “the Mediterranean is an urban region” (1972 [1949]: I, 278) made that sea a cultural world. Bloc’s European “civilization” and Braudel’s “urban region” were in these usages geographically situated culture areas. Civilizations, said Braudel in another work, are “ways of ordering space” (1984 [1979]: 65). They are also, in a similar sense, ways of ordering time, for they emerge and recede through time, marking historical periods. The Europe that Bloc referred to “began” before the dawn of feudalism (1961: I, xix), and Braudel’s “urban” Mediterranean belonged to the sixtennth century (1972: I, 277©278). The spatial and temporal ordering of civilzations is reflected in a few of our terms for geographic regions. Today the “Near East,” for example, suggests an area and a culture distinguished from the “Middle East,” not, as formerly, by its closeness to Europe, but by its historical period; for the Near East in current usage denotes the Fertile Crescent in Ancient times, or sometimes, the Ottoman territories in Medieval times; “Middle East,” variously defined, is, in contrast, a modern cultural region.
Á ÁWe have said, then, that civilizational areas are territories whose identity is marked by a somewhat distiguishable culture whose boundaries, such as they are, shift over time.  However useful it is to express this process in these terms such a formulation masks the fact that the recognition of a cultural entity such as a “civilization” is itself an analytical act.  That civilizations are commonly presumed to exist is as much a part of the “reality” of civilizations as their internal cultural features.  The recognition of civilizations in their historical and spatial contexts is a construction of social reality imposed upon geography and history. The culture and civilizations we choose to identify become distinct to us for reasons important to us. The Mediterranean did not become for Braudel a discernible, examinable social entity until he began to ask how its social and cultural dynamics affected the sixteenth century empire of Phillip II, when the Spanish empire was led to direct its power upon the Atlantic (1966 [1944] I, 19, 20). The boundaries of Braudel’s object ©© Mediterranean society and culture at the height of Spanish imperial power ©© were in part set in a spatial and temporal context by his question. Cultural entities, indistinct and approximae as the always are, take form in somerelation to the questions being asked and the perspectives being taken.
Á ÁIt is hardly a major consession, therefore, to acknowledge that in fact, the spatial and temporal configurations of civilizations as they have been generally understood have been shaped by the perspectives of the EuroAmericans and are therefore reflective of EuroAmerican conceptions of vital strategic and economic issues associated with these regions. In the nineteenth century India, for instance, whatever internal cultural integrity it may have had, was from the European viewpoint, the locus of a cluster of British interests ©© political, economic, and, for the missionaries, religious.  The Eurocentric term “Middle East” came into use because of European geopoltiical interests.  As used today the term reflects the World War II experience, when it was placed under a unified Allied command (Eickleman 1989:3).  Likewise, Southeast Asia was first recognized as a region when it was placed under Lord Mountbatten’s World War II command, and it is still recognized in such post©war political instituitions as the South East Asia Treaty Orginization; and indeed the precise boundaries of Southeast Asia have shifted back and forth in recent decades in respect to political developments (Emmerson, 1984).
Á ÁThis may be added the footnote on funding:  for the impirical?? existence of the culture areas now commonly recognized is further cemented in popular consensus by the commitment of the major funding agencies to the “reality” of such culture areas.  One wonders what flexibility there is in the current system to ajust to the emerging world system in which the geopolitical interests are realigning.

Á ÁLet us make one more assertion about civilizations, or “civiliational areas”:  in so far as they exist they are the property of only certain individuals within the region; civilizations are cultural entities carried by, reproduced by, only certain persons in this wide field of social relations.  Different social elements carry different cultural elements, different traditions.  The “little” traditions are carried and reproduced by individuals whose contacts and training are limited; the “great” traditions are carried and reproduced by people who have enjoyed a wider experience, through education or travel — literati, priests, sometimes artists or other valued specialists, people who are usually based in cities and associated with cultural centers such as temples, courts of adjudication, or bureacracies.  It is the great traditions that provide the common ground of discourse through which “civilizations” are said to be bound together.  Even when populations over a wide area are politically divided, some of them — the carriers of the “great” traditions — share a common world of similar ideas, values, and customs, so that what is taught, preached, written about, or otherwise promulgated by specialists of the great tradition has strong threats of commonality.
 X ÂEmbodied in “sacred books” or “classics”, sanctified by a cult, expressed in monuments, sculputure, painting, andarchitecture, served by the arts and sciences, the Great Tradition becomes the core culture of an indigenous civilization and a source, constantly examined, for defining its moral, legal, aesthetic and other cultural norms. … [It] is a vehicle and standard for those who share it to identify with one another as members of a common civilization.  (Redfield and Singer 1954: 63)
In so far as a civilization may have a “consciousness” it is manifested in the shared culture that the great tradition provides.  A great tradition is both “a condition for and a consequence of the functional integration of city and country and of the different spheres of society” (Singer 1972:7).

??Á Áthe orientations of people whose contacts and relations extend over a wide area can become the integrative orientation of a civilization, a broad frame of reference, a complex set of related idioms of social interaction that serve the interests of states and leaders over a wide area.  The “great traditions” are not merely deep historically; they are connected widely, over a relatively broad swath of territory.  The connections between societies separated by different rulerships and scattered over wide areas are transmitted by specialists — literati, priests, artisans — most of whom live in cities and are associated with cultural centers such as schools, or mosques, or courts of adjudication, or bureacracies.  “Cities and their communications, communications and their cities, have imposed a unified human construction on geographical space,” said Braudel (1972: I, 277).  Because the specialists of great traditions in the urban centers share a common world of symbolic forms — language, rules of etiquette, social statuses, tools, artistic designs, architectural styles, and the like — they can culturally integrate regions that are otherwise politically separated, as Buddhist monks integrated Central Asia in the ??? centuries (Lattimore ???) and as the seekers of hadith and mystical knowledge have integrated the peoples of the Islamic world.  Through the movement of individuals, manuscripts and other creations of men, the populations over a wide area — or at least certain elements the populations — are tied together.  Through individual specialists who share a common idiom of communication, a common set of techniques and skills, and through them similar ideas, values, and customs, are taught, preached, written about, or otherwise promulgated over a great span of territory.
??
Á ÁBut besides presuming the existence of a great tradition that provides the strands linking certain elements of a region it is useful to think of other traditions, some of them more broadly connected than others, multiple traditions, only some of which connect societies in broad webs of shared intersubjectivity.  Multiple networks of social interaction, only partially interlinked with each other, foster the reproduction of multiple traditions.  Different classes, ethnic groups, and religious groups, perpetuate different traditions; as members of different social blocs may not closely interact, theirorientations on life can persist alongside each other with little affect on each other.  The orientations of people whose social world is relatively isolated can persist through time with varying affects on the wider field of human beings in the area.  Accommodation between different adjacent traditions occurs “over a cultural gap of greater or lesser distance and not over an unbridgable divide; and … the ‘traditions’ are not global, general, and unified but varied and contextualized” (Antoun 1989: 43).

3.  Some layered views of the culture history of “the Middle East” that suggest
Á ÁPropose that we layer the historical information available to us on the wider region of the mE, and organize its history in terms that seem to reflect …  NB this is a deliberate contstruction, an attempt to order in such a way as to suggest some useful collectivities of the cultural elements that need to be examined together.
Á ÁWhat is strking about Eickleman’s Middle East is its reselmblance to the geographic configuration of the Islamic empire during the period of the High Caliphate in about the ninth century.  In tha time of cultural climax Islam held sway over the territory from Spain and the Maghrib to the Indus River and in Central Asia as far north as the ???? desert [ie. beyon Bukhara and Samarqand.  In was in the period of the High Caliphs that Islamic cultrue flourished.  Baghdad and many other cities of the Islamic orbit became magnets for the specialists of belle lettres, arts, architecture, and and sciences of the many peoples that were now a part of the Islamic community.  Greeek, Persian, Hindustani, Buddhist, Jewish, Christian, Mithraist, Zoroastrian, Mazdaist etc ideas were absorbed into a metropolitain culture to become the discourse of the Islamic community /// 😕  That configuration of culture that congealed in that period stamped Islamic world with idioms of learned and public discourse that would thereafterwards give Islamicate society a certain characteristic form.  Notions about authority, public rights and status, the proper proceedures of argumentation, the premises of sublimity and ultimate significance w — these and other things were woven into a fabric that was considered essentially Islamic.
Á ÁThis culture took form, as already noted in the great cities of the Abbasid Islamic empire:  Fez and Cairo in North Africa; Damascus and Baghdad in the Firtile Crescent; Nishapur and Bukhara in Khorasan.  The limits of the empire in, say, 900, were scarcely secure, as the boundaries would change, but the culture that took form in the urban societies of the Islamic empire presided over by the Ummayyads and Abbasids would be a characteristic foundational culture that would be carried on to further Islamic lands in subsequent generations and on which those societies would build their own particular expressions of Islamic culture.  This Arabic language world would be the essential feature of the Islamicate society that would be spread far beyond the limits of the empire in the 9th century.
Á ÁEickleman’s Middle East roughly reflects a widely felt notion that the discernible homeland of the Islamic world is not merely its Arabian cradle but the wider geographic context of its youthful florescence, which was the period when under the oversight of a vaunted Caliphate situated in Damascus and Baghdad in the eighth and ninth centuries reached a climax that could be called “Arabic Islamicate culture.”  Eickleman’s Middle East is in fact a cultural entity, one that was melded out of a configuration of elements, disparate in origin, that congealed as an Arabic cultural florescence under the aegis of an Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs.Œ—
Formative society in High Caliphal Period

Islam of Imperial elites vs of the religious elites vs the rural [and relatively unislamized] populations
–Á ÁRural populations
–Á ÁImperial elites:  courts
 X Â-Á ÁIslam was an idiom of legitmation and sanction for the imperial office; the caliphate patronized Islamic art and architecture, sponsored the study of philosophy, science and literature.  The architecture drew inspiration from the Sasanid and Achaemenid palaces in the pre-Islamic era.  Ummayad caliph held audiences “dressed in crown and royal robes, seated on a throne, and veiled from the rest of his audience by a curtain” (Lapidus 1988: 83)
 X Â-Á Á”vice regent of God on earth.  Caliphal magical powers upheld the order of the cosmos, providing for the rain and the harvests, keeping all persons in their places … He was the symbol of civilization; agriculture, cities, arts, and learnign depended on his blessings” (Lapidus 1988: 88); “the court poets address[ed] the Caliph as ÃÃkhalifat allahÄÄ (the deputy of God)” (Lapidus 1988: 85).  The `Abbasid caliphs, seeking to capture the eschatological vision of the populace that put them in power, took titles enshrouded with notions of saviorhood:  al-Mansur (“the victorious”), al-Mahdi (the “guided one”, “messiah”) (Lapidus 1988: 87).

–Â X Âcorrection on comments about the Umayyads:  some of them fled to Spain and set up dynasty there.

–Á ÁUrban Islamic elites. Ulama, etc.
 X Â-Á Ádominated by Arab populations; in cities:  middle class.  Main leadership:  ulama, ÃÃqurra’ÄÄ, sufi ascetics; sources of counsel.  loosely affiliated; diverse views, disputes.
 X ÂVariants:
 X Â- Sunni scripturalists.  [struggle with al-Ma’mun (r.813-33) over mu’tazili doctrine that Q was created, not of divine essence].  Ahmad b. Hanbal
 X Â- Sufis:  two variants: Khurasani [tawakkul, resignation to God’s will expressed through volutary poverty and renunciation of work; ignored obedience to Quranic commands and conformity to the law; stressed intoxication with God; ÃÃshathÄÄ, theopathic utterances; al Hallaj; claimed greater authority than ulama or Caliph]; Baghdadi [ascetism and renunciation of worldly things combined with the cultirvation of practical virtues such as patience, trust, gratitude, and love of God; believed in observance of the quran and conformity with Muslim law; more closely integrated with ordinary Muslim religious practice and belief;Á Ámystic was considered a healer, a magician, a worker of miracles, and a pillar of the universe
 X Â- Shi’ism:  hadith of Ali; popular resistance [vs Umayyads,vs Abbasids]; Ismailism [L: p. 131]; numerous heretical /radical movements; often little clear doctrinal content.

–Â X ÂHow this [High Caliphal] period seems to structure a certain level of Islamic society.  Some of the points of view on history and culture:  L-S, in the minds of people; Geertz; Wolf, “civilization” simply reconstituting itself out of previous elements.  The rough limits of the empire in 945; how it resembles Eickleman’s “Middle East”:  it is the range of the Arabic dominated world
——–
Á ÁOf course, this configuration of elements did not continue in this form for long, for the empire of the Abbasid Caliphate was in fact on the verge of collapse by the end of the ninth century.  The ÃÃecumeneÄÄ that we recognize as a cultural entity, and that Eickleman implicitly captures in his “Middle East”, was already being reshaped by new political developments.  Through a series of political vicissitudes the Islamic world would enlarge and at the same time take on new cultural features.  A new cultural configuration would take form and a new kind of society, an extension on some of the premises of the Arabic islamicate cutlure would develop other relations between people and resources.  A new ecumene would emerge, or rather, in a sense the established Islamic world would segment into two two sub-ecumenes.  In the west by the 10th century the Ismaili Fatimids had come to dominate Egypt and the Mediterranean coasts of North Africa, claiming, even, to be the rightful caliphs in contradistinction with the Abbasids who despite their weaking political grip were nevertheless still the titular heads of most of the land east of the Mediterranean.
Á ÁThe period from mid-tenth century when the first formal cracks of the Abbasid empire appear in the east, to the time of the Mongol invasions in the 13th century a new configuration of alignments took form.  That new pattern was in place by early in the 11th century when the Samanids, Ghaznavids, Qarakhanids and Seljuqs rose to prominence in the eastern Islamic territories.  In the west the Fatimids and other Arabic speaking regimes perpetuated the Arabic Islamicate tradition, which in the east these new regimes presided over the formation some new elements in Islamicate culture; the Ghaznawids and their successors the Ghorids pushed their particular expressions of Islamicate culture into the Indo-Gangetic plain all the way to the Bay of Bengal.  The geographic scope of the Islamic world now has escaped the zone of Islam’s florescent youth; we are no long talking about a culture whose geographic limits correspond to Eickleman’s Middle East; it looks more like the region previously — that is, especially before wWi — called “the Near and Middle East”, by which was meant the whole scope of the Islamic world to at least as far as the limits of India, although not necessarily excluding the important Islamic regions beyond, that is, in the Malaysian peninsula and Indonesia.  The Middle East of the earlier period included the region of the Indus and eastward where Muslims in the period from the 11 century to the 13 century were a dominant minority.  ŒÁ ÁThis culture was marked by the following cultural features:
The new Islamic society that was formed under these new administrations:
 X ÂÃÃPersian languageÄÄ:  Dari [Sassanid language]; Samanid uses of Dari; Firdowsi [poetry as idiom of political expression, sans-Arabic]; translation from Arabic into Persian.  Ghazni:  Modern Persian, enriched with Arabic
 X ÂÃÃRise of Turkish empiresÄÄ:  Turks vs Persian [never perfect distinction]; Turkish ghulams in Islamic lands [Baghdad, in Bukhara]; Turkish tribes in Cent Asia.
 X  X ÂÃÃSamanids vs QarakhanidsÄÄ: Alptigin fled to Nishapur, Ghazni; Qarakhanids over Samanids
 X  X ÂÃÃGhaznavidsÄÄ:  court patronage; learned authorities; raiding in India > Lahore; the internal ethnic composition:  Turks, Persians, Ulama – 3 languages.
 X  X ÂÃÃQarakhanidsÄÄ:  fostered Turkish
 X  X ÂÃÃSeljuqs:ÄÄ princely lineage from Ghuzz Turkish tribe; spread w; courts, painting, literature; flattery of rulers by learned.
 X  X ÂÃÃGhaznawids, Ghorids, Delhi SultanatesÄÄ [took over in 1206]:  culture, paintings
 X ÂÃÃDevelopment of society dominated by the cachet of Islam:ÄÄ before this, Islam was rel of dominant.  Under Samanids: ulama; threat of Ismailis; Hanafi vs Shafa`i disputes.  Invasion of Qarakhanids, ulama complicity; later Qarakhanid dep on ulama for governance > bureacratic class; prominence of public prayers; central use of ulama in decaying social order; for first time ulama were allowed into administrative prominence.  Cities became agregates of credal communities lead by relig leaders; Ulama married into prominent families.  Mosques, shrines in architecture; lexicon; public rituals; more ordinary Muslims.  The cachet of Islamic loyalty, as legitimacy.  Caliphs endored Sunni orthodoxy.  The threat of Fatimids in 10th c.  Sultanate, as endorsed by caliph.  Islamic permeated the learning of the elite classes.
 X ÂÃÃDevelopment of ecumenical [trans-national] communities of religion affiliationÄÄÃÃ.ÄÄ.  ÃÃArabic literaray communityÄÄ.  scholars.  ÃÃHadith seekersÄÄ.  extensive travel. scholarly networks.  ÃÃthe Shi`aÄÄ.  Sayyeds/Alids tolerated.  Ismailis despised.  Shi`a begin public curing of Mu`awiya; stress loyalty to family of Ali [vs doctrine].  Miracles of the saints/imams.  ÃÃSunni schoolsÄÄ.  Hanafis, Hanbalis, Shafa`is.  Introduction of madrasas under Seljuqs.  ÃÃFactional groupsÄÄ.  [asabiyya, futuwwa, ayyars].  Karramis [sufi and orthodox].  ÃÃSufisÄÄ.  alternative Islamic ideas, theosophy; sufi orders, political services.

Á ÁThe effect of the rise of Turko-Persian Islam — which would be especially strengthened by the Mongol and Timurid invasions — was to divide the Islamicate world into two sub-ecumenes, the zone of division falling around the drainage of Mesopotamea.  To the west of that area Arabic Islamicate culture continued.  To the east of it the Turko-Persian version of Islamicate cultureprevailed.  The Mongol invasions of the 13th century and the Timurid invasion of the 14th century strengthened this division, as they introduced more Turkic and Mongol-Turkic elements into the eastern Islamic world, which would affect the nature of the Islamic world that would arise, especially after 1500 in the eastern Islamic lands.

Á ÁThis culture, this eastern sub-ecumene of the Islamic world, would yet again be transformed by the shock of the Mongol and Timurid invasions of the 13th and 14th centuries.  the impact of these invasions, devastating as they were would contribute to the formations of new social configurations, none of them to abrogate the configurations of previous ecuminical configurations but to give to them a new charateristic form.  Sufi orders as means of social order, etc.  In a sense the Turko-Persian Islamicate society that had already taken form in the eastern Islamic lands was prodded into a new and specialized climactic form, for beginning in the 16th century a new body of Islamic empires came to dominate most of the Islamic world, the Ottomans in the west, the Safavids in Iran, and the Mughals in India.  In all of these dynasties the Sufi orders which orginally taken form in loose worship circles in the Arabic Islamicate period and had formed into stylized orders of worship in the Turko-Persian Islamicate period now provided circles of social and political organization and central idioms of legitimacy of the ruling elites.  The sufi orders had become important social means of order in the period when “society lost order “. ….  Now, by the 16tyh century and 17 century, sufism provided central idioms of legitimacy for the administration of effective control over the Islamic world.
Á ÁThe Safavids are most well known for their claims to devine inspiration and …  of the had formed in the
Á ÁSufi notions of the infusion of authority and related notions of karaamat that came through direct experience of God and through designation through sacred lines of descent were coopted by the rulers of all three of the gunpowder empires.  The Safavids most notably.  Their relation to their devoted followers was especially problematic, depending on whther the Safavid ruler need to claim his rights as the locus jof divine power to be venerated by his sufi devotees or whehter on the basis of his control of a increasingly rationalized state bureaucracy.  Less well known is the similar claims of Ottoman rulers who claimed to be not only sultans of the Ottoman empire but also caliphs of the whole Islamic community, made use of similar concepts of authority.  Moghal rulers in India similarly made use of notions of sacred descent and to direct access to God in order to foster the loyalty and devotion of their fighting forces.
Á ÁThe point is that on top of the configuration of cultural elemenst that congealed in High Caliphal times as the Arabic Islamicate culture and the Turko-Persian Islamicate culture of the pre-Mongol period there developed another pattern of cultural relations, an extension and elaboration on the previous Turko-Persian culture, that was manifest in the climactic cultural forms of the gunpowder empires of the 16th, 17th and18th centuries.  The particular cultural emphases of the Safavids, however, added a new element to the situation, for even though the three empires — and with them was a fourth, though considerably less prosperous and powerful rulership, the Uzbek Shaybanids of Central Asia — were similar in their Turko-Persian Islamicate heritage, the Safavid cultivation of Shi’ism as the state religion wrought a separation between the Sunni elements of the Turko-Persian world, cutting off the Ottomans of the west from the Shaybanids of Central Asia and the Mughals of India.  From then on, until after the arival of European infleucnes from the coastlands, the eastern and western versions of Tuko-Persian Sunnism would develop separately.  The result was that as Turko-Persian Islamicate society spread westward under the Ottomans to engulf most of North Africa in the west and as a certain variant of Turko-Persian Islamicate culture — though admittedly distict on its own — spread further into Southeast Asia the whole ecumene was subdividing again into a Western Islamic world under the Ottomans, a Shi’ite Islamic world under the Safavids of Iran, and an eastern Sunni Islamic world in the eastern realms of Islam from Central Asia to the islands of Southeast Asia.
Á ÁThe dominanat empire of the Islamic world for much ofthe period after 1500 to present has been, of course, the Ottoman, whose particular blend of TurkoPersian and Arabic cultural elements gave a particular shape to the region that Bates and Rassam have called the “Central Middle East”.  One is struck by the resemblance of their Central Middle East with the heartland of the Ottomans in the period from the 16th century to its collapse in the 1920s.  The Islamic culture that took form in the period from about 1000 to the time of the European encroachments in the 18th and 19th centuries is sometimes called the “medieval” period.  The term itself suggests the importance of the sociocultural patterns that were laid upon the Arabic Islamicate world of the period of High Caliphal cultural florescence.
Á ÁIn the modern period nation-states took form all across the Islamic world, often in conscious emulation of the nation-states of Europe.  In many places local elites found it useful to structure their interests in terms of nation-states that could interact with other similar political entities on the world scene and so solicify their positions of eminence and expand their influence.  These new sociopolitical institutions refigured the existing institutions where necessary to bring them into conformity to the interests of local state entities.  And in this process Islamic instutions — the customs associated with islamic worship and the specialists in Islamic law and theology and the sufi leadership — would be enlisted where possible to bring into existance the new sociopolitical entities in the interest of fostering local and regional control on the flow of trade and the exercise of power.  The Islamic ‘reformers” sought to make use of Islamic images to justify the existence of the new nation-states over which they sought to preside.  The renewal of Islamic institutions became the expressed concern of the new modern Islamic nation-states.  In this context local languageswere emphasized; not only Arabic and Persian and Turkish, where they were the popular idioms, but also Pushtu, Uzbeki, Urdu, and Indonesian became idioms of public discourse, as the use of the local languages served the interests of the dominant voices of the new leadership.  Leaders called for a renewed Islamic devotion as the basis of a reaction to the Western cultural hegomoney aagainst which they had alined themselves.  So Nation-states emerged, with precisely defined “national” boundaries and with representatives from the local elites who concerned themselves with international issues, representing the new Islamic nation states in the halls of the international representative bodies.  The result has been the gradual further dismemberment of the Islamic world.  What may at one time have been spoken of as a region of Arabic Islamicate culture despite diverse political divisions, or at another time as a Turko-Persian Islamicate sub-ecumene of the Islamicate world now must be spoken of as locally oriented nation-states.  The various attempts to formulate local interests in terms of a common Arab culture, or as a common Turkish culture or as a common Islamic culture [so-called ‘Pan-Islamism’] gave way to regionalized mini-empires, each with a diversity of ethnic populations within its domains, each ruled by an elite that is in some sense homogenous, usually in terms of sect but also often in terms of ethnic identity.  So laid upon the cultural configurations that formerly defined broad ecumemes or sub-ecumenes now is another pattern of cultural r3elations associated with the appearance and presumably fixed and enduring modern nation-states.
Á ÁI have said “laid upon” deliberately.  A crucial assumption in this discussion has been that the various cultural periods, when certain configurations of cultural elements took form and became diagnostic of the scope of certain geographically situated ecumenes, actually overlay one another.  For these are literate citivilizations, whose particular constellations are expressed in written form, the particular issues of public discourse being preserved in tracts and books and epigrams, in prayers and incantations that eventually in some form are not only preserved through oral indoctrination but also enshrined in writing.  New cultural periods are literally “laid upon” the former ones, as the writings and sayings and recitations and epigrams of the new generation are useually — and in these cases have certainly been — been shaped so as to rephrase or reinterpret or correct and refigure the understandings and doctrines of the previous cultural configurations.  In whatever sense we can speak of certain formative cultural periods, when certain configurations of culter were established and codified as a particular style of culture we can speak of successif periods as reactions to and refigurings of previous formulations previous understandings and relations.

hip invoked Islam a resurgent and modified IslamReformist” Islamic leaders , as well as the languages already established along side of or in place of the Turkish, Persian, and Arabicthat had already been established as the languageslanguages of political expression,

Á ÁIt is noticable that Eickleman and Bates and Rassam neglect the place of the nationalist elites in the nation-states within thier Middle Eastern “area”. ???  E. was correct to shift from a definition of his ME on the basis of a list of nations to a one on the basis of a broad territory between two great cities.  For he seems to have had little interest in the specific effects of the polities or internal problems of the nations of the ME as nations, the specific problems of the n-states.  He also had essentially no interest in the wider geopolitical issues, the issues that govern the course of public discussion about public issues among the administrative elites of these nations.

Á ÁMy proposal then is that several configurations of culture can be distinguished, one one of them conforming to the the cultural configuration that E called the ME — which is the Arabic Islamicate culture that harded into a kind of climatic configuration in the High Caliphal period.  Upon this configuration was laid other configurations that “climaxed” in succeeding periods:  The TP Islamicate culture, which then became a crucial basis of the empires of the eastern Islamicate world before the 13th c, but then was further carried over a much wider part of the Islamic world in successive centuries, notably under the influence of the gunpoweder empires.  In these two climactic periods, the geographic scoke of the Islamic world was different.  The TP culture beore the Mongol and Timurid invasions of the 13th and 14th centuries included the zone from the Medi to Bengal; in the gunpowder empire periods this culture was under the Ottomans carried further Ea. etc.  Upon these cultural layers were the Reformist movements that foster the emergence of nation-states on the image of Europe polities et.c

Á ÁThis exercise has a special interest to me because in our times the Islamic world, like the rest of the world, seems to be undergoing not only a major cultural refiguration but also confronting a major reshaping of geopolitical alignments.  New geopoltiical issues seem to be driving the world polities

Á ÁSince we have seemed critical of the works of E and B-A, it is fitting to conclude with some recognition of their achievements.  We acknowldge that we may usefully examine any set of relations in any part of the world; we don’t have to believe in the existence of a “Middle East” as a cultural entity, as an examinable ecumene.  I have suggested, however, that at least for the ME there is use in examine the layers of cultural ecumenes that have existed in this part of the world, with varying shapes and varying extents at different periods, as a series of layers that can be usefully sorted out as different clusters or constellations of sultural elements.  The ways we consdier the ME, however it is constituted, can thus be recognized as cultural entities.  One problem is that the cultural configurations that make the ME in one sense is compromsed or complicated by themany other senses in which its cultural elements relate to the cultural elements of other areas.  My contention is, howeve,rt that at base the ME that is examine by E and B-R is a certain distillation is essentially an Islamic society as it existed in a certain historcial period, overlaid with the influence of other periods when the ecume of the society was aprt had not only different cultural configurations by a different spatial configuration.  Quote Wolf here.
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Periods in the history of Islamic political culture [cf chart of chronlogy]:  1.  Early Islam up through 4th caliph; 2.  High Caliphal period; 3.  Rise of Persianate Islam [Samanids, Ghaznawids, Seljuqs, Ghorids]; 4.  Mongol and Timurid disruptions and renewals; 5.  Gun-powder empires; 6. Confrontation with the West and decline; 7. Secular states; 8.  Contemporary period, radical reactions.

The periods, culturally defined:
–Á Á*Periods 1 and 2:  Arabic dominated

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–Á ÁPeriod 4.  Mongol-Timurid period:
Á ÁÁ ÁEcumenes:  Arabic; Turko-Persian
 X  X Âorganized sufi orders;
–Á Á*Period 5.  Gun-powder empires
 X  X ÂEcumenes:  Arabic/North African; Turko-Persian [Ottoman; Safavid; Central Asian/South Asian]
–Â X ÂÂ X ÂÁ€ ÁPeriod 6.  Early contact with Europe and weakening of empires
Á ÁÁ ÁLocal and fractional alginments
–Á Á*Period 7.  Twentieth Century Period:  Secular
 X  X ÂRise of nation-states, with national educational and bureacratic institutions, growing sense of international relations, international arenas of contact and influence; Pan-Arabism; Pan-Turkism; Pan-Islamism
–Á ÁPeriod 8.  Contemporary period:  Rise of radical reactions

xxxx

ÃÃ2.  I got into this in thinking about the relation of Afghanistan to its wider geographic context and its Islamic history.
ÄÄ
Á ÁThe problem caused me no concern until I began to be interested in the cultural antecedents of modern Afghanistan, especially to know the Islamic culture that was in place at the dawn of the modern society of Afghanistan, as that configuration of social alignments and orientations provided the context for the development of contemporary Afghanistan political relations.  The interest in cultural anticedents obliged me to consider the relation of the peoples in Afghanistan to the peoples in neighboring areas.  That is, the peoples in the region ÃÃnowÄÄ calledAfghanistan, for in fact that nation did not exist as a discernible political entity until the early modern period, beginning no earlier than the time of Ahmad Shah of Kandahar; and even then the region we call Afghanistan was not entirely under his control while other parts of South Asia were.  The modern nation of Afghanistan as we know it now, in its current geographic shape, was finalized at the end of the last century.
Á ÁThat is to say, the peoples of Afghanistan, until the borders of a nation-state were drawn [by the European state, the British, in the image of a European nation-state] about a century ago the peoples of the region belonged ÃÃculturallyÄÄ to a much wider area.  They participated in the wide flow of ideas and goods that drew the peoples of a wide region together in some kind of informal, culturally constituted social world.  Of course that network extended, in the abstract, around the globe.  But in the region of Central Asia there was a relatively dense flow of ideas and commerce which for generations gave the region — defined somewhat variously — a distinguishable history and a recognizable cultural tradition of its own.

Indeed Bosworth (1984:2 “The Coming of Islam to Afghanistan,” in Islam in Asia Westview) argues that the eastern lands of Iran, known as Khurasan, and the Mountains to the south, have long been a distinguishable region, for geopolitical and economic reasons:
 X Â
 X ”[C]ontrary to first appearances, Afghanistan is a well-defined geographical and cultural region, and not just a buffer-zone between the Indian, Iranian and Central Asian worlds”.  “[T]owns like Bamiyan, Kapisa .. and Kabul, have frequently been the centre of empires, dominanting lands both north and south of the Hindu Kush, and sometimes comprehending Bactria and Transoxiana and the plains of northern India; in pre-Islamic times these included the empires of the Sakas, the Kushans and the Hephtalites.”

Also, he notes that the other route around the Hindu Kush, on the west, from Herat to Sistan to the “lower Indus”, has been the route of major conquerors.

Á ÁBut the cultural world to which the peoples of this region (the “Afghanistan” that Bosworth considers regionally distinguishable) belonged, that is, the sea in which there was a relatively dense flow of ideas and commerce — this cultural world varied in scale and scope over time.  What can be considered a “core area” was the region known from pre-Islamic times as Khorasan, “the place where the sun rises.”  ÃÃÄÄ

ÃÃ2.1Â X ÂAfghn as a regional entity in pre-modern times did not clearly exist:  Khorasan, Sistan, Ghandhara …? etc.

2.2Â X ÂIn fact, at different times the culture that was the anticeedent of contemporary Afghn Islamic culture was at different times prevalent over varying territories:
ŒÂ X  X ÂIn 11 c. was Central Asian/ Khorasanian

 X  X ÂIn 13th c. was all over the Western Asian/South Asian world

 X  X ÂAnd continued to be widespread although changing much due to Mongol and Timurid invasions and due to local cultures that shaped the Islamic TurkPersian culture differently.

2.3Â X ÂIn fact, if we were developing courses on the various “civilizational worlds” in different periods of Islamic history we would have done it differently at different times.

3.  The problem of defining culture area:

3.1Á ÁWhy it has fallen out of use among sociocultural anthropologists:
-Á ÁWhat it originally meant and why the term was invented
-Á Áfocus on local cultures,
-Á Áobvious problems with broader formulations:  Kroeber’s problems with definition of civilization

but this term was developed as a basis for classifying assemblages of artifacts in museum displays

3.2 Problems of defining culture area of the Middle East:

 X ÂEickleman’s dilemma:  The fiction that we are still studying “local cultures”.

 X ÂÁ ÁThe difficulties have therefore deterred some specialists in cultural regions from seriously attempting to define the sense in which they can be considered at all integrally related. Eickleman (1981), for instance, in his seminal essay on the Middle east, made no effort ot identify the cultural grounds for identifying such a region, and in fact only presented it a s list of nations.  He defines it in the second edition (1989) simply as “the region stretching from Rabat to Tehran…” [p. 3].  On the next page he acknowledges that “When certain features of the linguistic, religious, political and historical complexities of the region are emphasized, the term is often extended to encompass Afghanistan, Pakistan, and, at least in the recent historical past, those state of Soviet Central Asia which are heavily influenced by Islam.” He does not indicate what those features are, but acknowledges that “The epicenter of the total Muslim population lies between Iran and Pakistan, …” * ŒÂ X Â*Nowhere in his book does mention the ??? million Muslims in India, even though he frequently cites W. Cantwell Smith’s excellent examination of modern Islam, which has a strongly South Asian Islamic orientation.)
 X ÂAnother version of the problem in Middle Eastern studies:  the difficulty of anthropologists in dealing with Islam vs ‘islams’

3.3 The difficulty as it bears on definition of other culture areas;

 X Âthe absence of a concern for the problem in parts of the world where geography helps:  Sub-saharan Africa, America, Australia, India

 X Âbut in certain areas the necessity to address the problem of culture [or civilizational] area has appeared because geography does not help, notably southeast Asia and the Middle East.

3.4 In fact, there was a general tendency of anthropologists not to grapple with the definitional problems of culture area

3.5 The contradiction for anthropologists:  their bread and butter courses are often “area” courses, “peoples and cultures of XX” courses.  NB the way anthropologists list their interests.

 X ÂThe definition of culture areas has been confused because of the necessary conjuction of culture and locality in the term.  The early useage of the term culture area has never seemed particularly useful to social anthropologists, the term having been invented to organize displays of artifacts in museum displays.  (Kroeber 1939 on cultural and natural areas) Nevertheless, social anthropologists have commonly betrayed their interest in the spatial contexct of culture, as they commonly give courses in such presumed civilizational regions as “Latin American”, the “Middle East”, “South Asia”, , etc.

3.6 Point: to stress the need for clearer thinking about the broader sociocultural entities that are loosely taken for granted in our work, and to make a couple of modest proposals aimed to generate a more precise discussion about the discussion of culture area.

4.  Attempts to define the problem more clearly

Á Ácommon usage of area terms
culture areas culturally defined.

My own problems of defining it.

[culture as social relations and social processes]
Œ3.  Culture as social relations and social processes

3.1 The Social organization of tradition
Á ÁThe agencies through which the orientations and cultural systems of a society are perpetuated are of course people.  Traditions are socially organized.  That is, they are cultivated and transmitted by individuals in interaction.  Thus, the transmission of tradition is affected by such social institutions as marriage, trade, friendship, religious affiliation, and political allegiance (Redfield 1956a: 49 ff.).  The “organic linkage” between the cities of India is effected by “networks of direct relationship structurally and by a common culture and communications network” (Cohn 1971: 155).  “A society, like a mind,” said Marc Bloc (1961: I, 59), “is woven of perpetual interaction.” Á Á”Neither thought nor feeling”, say Geertz (1968: 18) is … a self©contained stream of subjectiveity, but each is inescapably dependent upon the utilization by indivividuals of socially available [19] “systems of significance,” cultural constructs embodied in language, custom, art, and technolgy ©© that is to say, symbols. … [R]eligion is a social institution, worship is a social activity, and faith a social force.”

E. 1989: 258: When first applied, the Great Traditon/Little Tradition contrast had the effect of rekindling an interst in how popular understandings of religion … were related to more literary ones of placing these understandings in the wider context of complex societies. It also meant paying attention to discerning the carriers of particular religious interpretations and practices ©© persons influential in thier own society or marginal to it, so that links between religions, authority, and influence could be explored. Nonetheless, in many anthropolgocial monographs the concept subsequently meant little beyond juxtaposing statements of ‘essential” Islamic pricnciples as eleaborated in statandard scholarly texts and by educated Muslims with inventories of local religious practices.”

POLITIES WITHIN ECUMENES
Á ÁBesides the idioms that integrate civilizations through the informal informal contacts between specialists in different places and even in different political domains there are also the idioms that express and reinforce the influence and power of rulers.  The boundaries of polity and civilization do not coincide.
Á ÁIn fact, there are other strands of power and influence that draw societies in wider spans of terrritory together into relationship.  Wolf (1982), in attempting to explain the dominance and impact of capitalism upon the peoples of the world after the fifteenth century, argued that human social affairs are controlled by “modes of production,” i.e., the “historically occuring set[s] of social relations whrough which labor is deployed to wrtest energy from nature by means of tools, skills,organization, and knowledge” (1982: 75).  For Wolf the course of history and the structure of social life are controlled by the social mechanisms for mobilizing labor and developing technologies and resources.  Cultures are for him not organized or patterned; they are not “integrated totalities in which each part contributes to the maintenance of an organized, autonomous and enduring whole.  They are [instead] only cultural sets of practices and ideas, … [which are] assembled, dismantled, and reassembled, conveying in v arious accents the divergent parths of groups and classes.  These paths … grow out of the deployment of labor, mobilized to engage the world of nature.  The manner of that mobilization sets the terms of history” (1982: 390-1).  In these terms the divergent societies of the world have become connected through multiple strands of influence that mobilize labor and organize certan productive activities.  The wider world is integrated through the exercise of power.  Rulers make use of specialists of all sorts — teachers, clerics, artists, and of course their own bureacrats — to secure their control over their domains and generally to legitimate their hold on power.  In the kind of society we will examine in this book the ruler and those loyal specialists who serve his interest exert a coercive influence on the symbols that represent his claims and serve to link his domains into a sytem that serves his interests.  In polities the specialists employed by rulers are pressed into service because they are means of exercizing the “symbolic capital” through which domination is actualized, reproduced, and furthered; they are the idioms through which a certain representation of reality is projected in the interests of those who dominate (Bourdieu 1977: 165).
Á Á
MULTIPLE SCALES OF CULTURAL AFFILIATION
Á ÁWe have distinguished, that is, the variation in scale characteristic of cultural orientations.  Orientations, cultural systems, vary in scale, from those that are the intersubjective medium of social concourse in a tightly integrated local community, to the wider mediums of affairs perpetuated among societies connected essentially through their subjection to a common ruler, to the intersubjective mediums shared by the informally connected communities of a wide region.  In civilizations diverse societies are integrated through the specialists who by their wide associations with each other can reproduce in key sectors of their societies similar traditions of thought and orientation.  Wide spans of territory are thereby connected into a single ecumene, in which, despite many differences in background and social affiliation, and even sharp political divisions between the dominant rulers of the region, the idioms of social interaction, the symbols of authority and power, the rules of etiquette, and even terms of dispute that define intense political antagonisms are similar.

Á ÁThe term “cultural tradition” is consciously used here to refer to the set of received understandings embodied in the symbolic forms through which the predominant peoples of this region have communicated, augmented and preserved their knowledgeand attitudes (cf. Geertz 1973:89). The primary focus of the term is on the content of those understandings and its manifestaitons is historical and social contexts. The term “cultural tradition” focuses on a wider spectrum of identifying cultural features and a cultural unit of a wider scale than the “cultures” that are associated with specific localities. As a sub©unit of a civilization it implies, as does the word “civilization” that the sets of understandings that distinguish it are shared among populations that may belong to different political units; when people take sides on an issue they more or less understand the terms of the argument. In any case, the emphasis is on cultural relations: social life is perpetuated in such physically observable forms as the rhetoric and knesics of communication, the architecture that houses social life, the iconography of social affairs and communion, and the calendrical and ritual observances of everyday life.

Á ÁWider social systems are importantly integrated through the movement of persons and goods, and changes in the technological means of interpersonal relations affect the scale of integrative social relations.  In the latter half of the nineteenth century, for instance, railroads on land and steamships on the sea fueled a radical thrust of European power in Asia.  Railroads “provided the infrastructure of transportation that would permit a vast increase in the tranfer of goods from the sites of production overland to points of transshipment on the coast.”  They radically reduced the cost of freight, “amounting in the last quarter of the nineteenth century to a decrease of more than 90 percent” (Wolf 1982: 293).  Similarly, the development of the steamship and the construction of the canals at Suez and Panama drastically reduced the cost of shippin on the high seas (1982: 293-5).  The technology of transport seems expecially useful for understanding certain features of civilizations and their historic transformations in their spatial contexts.  For civilizations are integrated through corridors of movement, protected by soical conditions and effected by the technologies of transport.  Such corridors are thus the lines through which a dominant “high” culture is carried.  Cultureal elements are diffused into different areas of a cultureal region at different rates.  In the zones of relatively greater movement and interaction the pace of trade and communication is more closely linked to affaris outside the region, and through these zones new cultural elemtns are introduced and assimilated into the cultural region as a whole.  ONly certain parts of India, said Braudel, “can really be said to have lived at the same pace as the outside world, keeping up with the trades and rhythms of the globe — and even then not without a measure of difficulty and time-lag … and what was true of India could be said of every popoulated area of the globe. … There are some ares [that] would history does not reach, zones of silence and undisturbed ingnorance … But even in advanced countries, socially and economically speaking, world time [ the process of the most actgive interaction among peoples] has never accounted for the whole of human existence” (Braudel 1984[1979]: 18).  The controllingfactor in this differential involvement in “the trades and rhythms of the globe” is of course the differntial flow of traffic.  Certain avenues of travel have formed in respect to the location of resources and the feasibility of movement and they have been further established as corridors of traffic by the developlment of improved means of transport.  Trasport systems and traffic corridors are the arteries of cultural regions.

RESIDUE
Geertz 1980:9 “… it [Negara] was still one example of a system of government once very much more widespread. … one can construct, therefore, a model of the ÃÃnegaraÄÄ as a distinct variety of political order, a model which can then be used generally to extend our understanding of the developmental history of Indic Indonesia (Cambodia, Thailand, Burma).”

4.  How historians have tried to deal with prob.  because is a historical problem.  define it more precisely.

Á ÁLeads me to the term ecumene/oikumene [Hodgson] that is used by historians.  Our interest in history as part of the cultural explanation for the structures we find “in place” drives us to consider more explicitly what we mean by ecumene — which is the historian’s gloss for what anthopologists have avoided labling as “civilizational areas” or, using the earlier terminology “culture areas”.

Kroeber’s usage, Hodgson’s usage, Frye’s usage.

Hevertheless, the problem of historians in specifying what they mean.

What I mean by ecumene:  A definition.  Then an series of examples from different periods in TurkoPersian history.

 X ÂThis def must assume varying degrees of influence spatially [centers]

 X ”” [socially, elites, middlemen,

 X Âvarying scales of hegemony: empirial, regional, local

End:  This is preliminary, but aimed at stimulating some discussion about how we should define the broader sociocultural units we examine.ÄÄ

A succession of ecumenes in the Islamic world

–Á ÁArabic dominated
Œ–Á ÁLater Abbasid period, rise of TurkoPersian societies; to Mongol invasion
Á ÁÁ ÁEcumenes:  [W] Arabic; [E] Turko-Persian

–Á ÁMongol-Timurid period:
Á ÁÁ ÁEcumenes:  Arabic; Turko-Persian
 X  X Âorganized sufi orders;

–Á ÁGun-powder period
 X  X ÂEcumenes:  Arabic/North African; Turko-Persian [Ottoman; Safavid; Central Asian/South Asian]

–Á ÁEarly contact with Europe and decline
Á ÁÁ ÁLocal and fractional alginments

–Á ÁTwentieth Century Period:  Secular
 X  X ÂRise of nation-states, with national educational and bureacratic institutions, growing sense of international relations, international arenas of contact and influence; Pan-Arabism; Pan-Turkism; Pan-Islamism

–Á ÁContemporary period

NB:  the periods are marked by developments not nec permanent or enduring in their contribution to the pool of symbols that are perpetuated into successive periods.  NB.  the gun-powder empires were succeeded by short-lived “empires” whose advantages accrued to advantages of the musket and portable gun as opposed to the canon, so the disorder of the Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah periods reflected the changes in technological advantages of local cavalry.  But both, as Wolf says, are manifestations of the “tributary mode” of production.

Arabic Islamic cultural period
L: 226-7.  The Arabs were transformed into an urba-dwelling occupational differentiated pop which included workers, artisans, mercnats, and anew religious elite of Q readers, schoalrs of law and Arabic letters, and scetic and charismatic preachers.  Tow popus were also stratified on the basis of political office holding, landownership, and tribal chieftainship,a dn organized into new religious sects and political movemetns. … the Caliphate acopted Byzantine and Saanian instituiosn and concepts of imperial rule while giveng them a new Islamic definition. … Abasid centerd on a royal court, govered thre provs through clients an servants of the rulers using a comb colaiton of elites. brought together Arab soldeire, Iraq, Egy

TP period:
L: 139.  … ME states came to be built around similar elites and institions.  Everywhere the old landowning and bureaucratic elites lost their authority and were replaced by new militaray and poltical elites composed of nomadic chieftains and slave soldier.  Everywhere the cohesion of the state came to dependupon slave armies and a semi-feudal form of administration.  Each state became the patron of a regional culture.  In the Arab provinces poetry, manuscript illumination, architecture, and minor arts developed.  In Iran a new regional type of Islamic civilization based on Persian language and arts emerged.  At the same time, the ulama and the Sufis, who in the earlier impoerial age had been the informal spokesmen of Islamic religious values, became the heads of communal organizations.  The preside over the conversion of ME peoples, organizsed schools of law, Sufi brotherhoods and Shi`i sects, standardized Islamic religious teachings and articulated an Islamic social and poiltical ethic.  Despite political fragmentation, a new form of Islamic state, community, and religion came into being.”

Mann, Michael. 1986. The  Sources of Social Power.  Vol 1, A history of power from the geginning to A.D. 1760.; 1993. .. Vol w The rise of Classes and Nation States 1760-1914.  Cambridge University Press.

[Sewell, p117: on Mann’s spatial assumptions:]  “societies” are not independently evolving wholes but always part of a larger complex.  Unitary societies don’t exist, or exist only as a limiting case.  Societies ..” are not unitary.  They are not social systems…; they are not totalities … Because there is no system, no totality, there cannot be’subsystems,’ ‘dimensions,

Or ‘levels’ of such a totality…. Because there is no bounded totality, it is not helpful to divide social change into ‘endogenous’ and ‘exogienous’ varieties.  Beacause there is no social system, there is no ‘evolutionary’ process within it.”  Socieites are in fact “conssittuted of multiple overlapping and intersection sociospatial networks of power” (1986: 1).  He specifics four forms of power, ideological, economic, political, and military.  … the “norm” has been  societies that are “confederal” rather than unitary and in which power-networks are diverse, overlapping, and non-isomorphic.  Concatenations of overlapping organizationsla neworkds …[for Mann] spatial form of social relations .. is closely connected to his thinking about the termporalities of social life [Sewell 119]. … changing conjunctgures between spatially distinct power networks.  120 he assumes a global contingency.  121 [following Mann the ideal analysis should] generate propostions whise potential generality is tested by their ability to illuminate the conjunctural unforlding of analy\ogous causal processes in the cases at hand. … an eventful concepto fof temporality implies a conception of social space made up of multiple, uneve, overlapping, and non-isomorphic networks rather than social systems.  [so gradual processes] tend to look like events.

See also Wolf Europe and the People…

 

Robert L. Canfield

 

 

The central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union – Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan – are being absorbed into a region of greater scope and centrality in the emerging world system. What was formerly a “region” within the Soviet empire has enlarged in the sense that, with the disappearance of the “Iron Curtain” these republics, now independent states, have direct access to the wider world ‒ other states, international corporations, and non-governmental organizations. They are becoming part of ever wider networks of interdependence based on economic relations, political activity, and military power. They are also becoming more central in the sense that their accessibility has allowed the industrial states of the world to compete for access to the relatively undeveloped natural resources of these states, not least among them their considerable hydrocarbons, for which many of the powers of the world are increasingly desperate.

This new strategic importance of this region has been called “one of the pivotal transformations of the twentieth century”.[1] It is now useful to speak of “Greater Central Asia”[2] as a zone where interdependencies are sufficiently intense and strategic issues sufficiently vital to prompt political and economic planners to track affairs in the region as a whole. Rajan Menon has explicitly made the case for seeing this constellation of countries as a single region:

The convention of defining Central Asia as a grouping of five states [the practice during the Soviet period] is of diminishing value for effective policy making and sound strategic analysis. A seamless web connects Central Asia proper, the South Caucasus, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and China’s Xinjiang province. Thinking in terms of a “greater Central Asia” captures the bigger picture and reflects how forces from one part of this extended region radiate across borders to other parts. Thus, an axiom of both policymaking and analysis should be that the consequences of a major change in one part of greater Central Asia will affect its other parts, often quickly and dramatically and through multiple networks (Menon 2003: 200-201).[3]

The heightened interest of the world in this region – now including, in its wider sense, the several states of the Middle East and South Asia immediately abutting these Central Asian states, and thus now to be called “Greater Central Asia” ‒ has induced observers to describe the emerging situation as a “great game,” a term, first coined by Lt. (later Cpt.) Arthur Connoly of the Sixth Bengal Native Light Cavalry and immortalized in Kipling’s masterpiece Kim. As it invokes the nineteenth century struggles for hegemony in Central Asia between (mainly) the Russians, who were pressing eastward into the region, and the British, who were anxious to secure the northwestern frontier of India, which they deemed vulnerable to invasion from Central Asia, the term “great game” evokes images of intrigue, mystery, and subterfuge, the stuff of adventure that can entice readers to take an interest in a far-away land that otherwise seems of marginal interest. But the enticing nuances of a vivid nineteenth century metaphor can mask critical realities in the twenty-first century. It is risky to impose the clichés of a storied past upon situations in the contemporary world (Stroehlein 2009), for the Central Asia of the present differs radically from that of even the recent past.

To clarify the nature of the new transformation I note here some of the major developments in infrastructure that are effecting this new centrality and enlarging political and economic linkage.

As the countries of central Eurasia have connected into the wider world they have become more closely interlinked with neighboring states than ever before. The interlinking has been enabled by major transformations in infrastructure of the region. Highways have been resurfaced and extended (e.g., from Kyrgyzstan to China[4]); air traffic facilities have been improved and air service expanded (e.g., direct services between Ashgabat and Beijing on Turkmen Airlines[5]); rail lines have been extended (e.g., between China and Kazakhstan; Alaomulki 2001:8-10); satellite telephony has been introduced (notably in Afghanistan)[6]; and deep sea ports have been built at Gwadar, Pakistan, and Chah Bahar, Iran.[7] Increasingly new possibilities are opening up for economic, social, and political interaction among the peoples of Greater Central Asia. Lands that were once forbidding and mysterious, separating the great population centers of Eurasia, are now corridors of economic and social interconnection to the wider world (Garret, Rahr, and Watanabe 2000; Kleveman 2003; Canfield 2008).

THE RACE TO DEVELOP INFRASTRUCTURE

Owing to its rich natural resources, this region has become the focus of intense development activities. The richest concentrations of hydrocarbons in Central Asia lie in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (the latter is now believed to have the world’s second largest gas reserves). Those in the Caucasus are well known and already being developed. And the gas and oil reserves of Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, which are as yet undetermined, may turn out to be substantial as well. Moreover, exploitable deposits of many other vital minerals exist in the region (Figure 0.1). [8]

Many countries have been racing to establish links to Central Asia in order to take advantage of the new access to these resources. Among the most aggressive competitions is to participate in the construction of pipelines into the the newly accessible gas and oil fields of Central Asia. The competitions entail political and military posturing as well as diplomatic maneuvering, for once they are built pipelines “signify and embody alliances and cooperation” and establish “axes for the international projection of influence” (Cutler 2007: 110).[9]

In the current context, many routes from production sites to consumers are possible. Russia was not the preferred route of export for the Central Asian republics when they became independent in the 1990s. Nor for the Americans

and other western powers, who tried to ensure that pipelines from Central Asia were diverted away from Russia, to minimize possibilities of interdiction. The Americans also opposed the construction of pipelines through Iran, seeing Iran as an adversary ever since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 (Klare 2002: 90). Owing to American involvement, the 1700 km pipeline from Baku servicing Europe, which was completed in 2005, successfully avoided both Russia and Iran, passing through Tbilisi to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea. The Americans also have favored the establishment of a Transcaspian link of Kazakhstan’s giant off-shore Kashagan field into the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.[10] But these routes are more expensive than the shorter ones through

Russia and Iran (which would connect to the Persian Gulf; Naughten 2008: 431). In May, 2007, pointedly rejecting American and European proposals, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia jointly announced that they will cooperate in building a gas pipeline from the Caspian Sea into Kazakhstan and Russia.[11] Nabucco, a six-company consortium sponsored by the EU, has plans to begin construction of a 3300 km pipeline from the Caspian Basin via Turkey to Bulgaria, Serbia and Croatia and western Hungary. Russian-owned Gazprom has responded to Nabucco’s project with a proposal to build a pipeline from Russia under the Black Sea to Bulgaria and thence to central Europe.  It is possible that both lines could be built, given the large expected demand in Europe.[12]

In this race Russia has a certain advantage because the infrastructure inherited (but aging) from the Soviet period converges on the Russian metropole. Blessed with the world’s largest gas supplies, the second largest coal reserves, and eighth largest oil supplies, Russia is already the world’s largest exporter of natural gas

Figure 0.1: Resources and Products of Greater Central Asia *

 

Northern States	Natural Resources	Agricultural Products	Industries (non-agricultural)
Kazakhstan	major deposits of petroleum, natural gas, coal, iron ore, manganese, chrome ore, nickel, cobalt, copper, molybdenum, lead, zinc, bauxite, gold, uranium	grain (mostly spring wheat), cotton; livestock	tractors and other agricultural machinery, electric motors, construction materials
Turkmenistan	petroleum, natural gas, coal, sulfur, salt	Cotton, grain; livestock	natural gas, oil, petroleum products, textiles, food processing
Uzbekistan	natural gas, petroleum, coal, gold, uranium, silver, copper, lead and zinc, tungsten, molybdenum	Cotton, vegetables, fruits, grain; livestock	textiles, food processing, machine building, metallurgy, natural gas, chemicals
Tajikistan	hydropower, some petroleum, uranium, mercury, brown coal, lead, zinc, antimony, tungsten, silver, gold	Cotton, grain, fruits, grapes, vegetables; cattle, sheep, goats	aluminum, zinc, lead, chemicals and fertilizers, cement, vegetable oil, metal-cutting machine tools, refrigerators and freezers
Kyrgyzstan	abundant hydropower; significant deposits of gold and rare earth metals; locally exploitable coal, oil, and natural gas; other deposits of nepheline, mercury, bismuth, lead, and zinc	tobacco, cotton, potatoes, vegetables, grapes, fruits and berries; sheep, goats, cattle, wool	small machinery, textiles, food processing, cement, shoes, sawn logs, refrigerators, furniture, electric motors, gold, rare earth metals
Southern States	Natural Resources	Agricultural Products	Industries (non-agricultural
Iran	petroleum, natural gas, coal, chromium, copper, iron ore, lead, manganese, zinc, sulfur	Wheat, rice, other grains, sugar beets, fruits, nuts, cotton; dairy products, wool; caviar	petrochemicals, textiles, cement and other construction materials, food processing (particularly sugar refining and vegetable oil production), metal fabricating, armaments
Afghanistan	natural gas, petroleum, coal, copper, chromite, talc, barites, sulfur, lead, zinc, iron ore, salt, precious and semiprecious stones	Opium, wheat, fruits, nuts, wool, mutton, sheepskins, lambskins	small-scale production of textiles, soap, furniture, shoes, fertilizer, cement; handwoven carpets; natural gas, coal, copper
Pakistan	natural gas, limited petroleum, poor quality coal, iron ore, copper, salt, limestone	Cotton, wheat, rice, sugarcane, fruits, vegetables; milk, beef, mutton, eggs	textiles and apparel, food processing, pharmaceuticals, construction materials, paper products, fertilizer, shrimp

* Source: Index Mundi: http://www.indexmundi.com/

 

and the second largest exporter of oil.[13] Moreover, it is strategically located as a natural route of export for the Central Asian republics. And its intermediate position between two broad energy consuming populations, European and Chinese, could eventually endow Russia with even more effective leverage.

But China is also a major player in the competition for access to Central Asia’s fossil fuels. Already the second largest consumer of oil in the world, and, with a growth rate of over 8% before the world economic decline introduced new uncertainties, China was expected to surpass U.S. consumption within a few years, a the pace that is likely to resume as soon as a general economic recovery develops. The Chinese have won permission to develop several oil fields in Uzbekistan (Atal 2005), and they have already completed a 1000-kilometer oil pipeline from Atasu, Kazakhstan, into Xinjiang that will deliver up to 200,000 barrels of oil per day (Kazakhstan-China oil 2006). They are building a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan that will be operational in 2009 (Naughten 2008: 433). Their largest state-owned oil company has acquired PetroKazakhstan, one of Kazakhstan’s major energy producers (Blank 2006), and they have initiated talks about constructing a natural gas pipeline all the way from Kazakhstan to Shanghai (Appelbaum 2005). At the same time they have established close ties with Iran, now their second largest oil supplier, for which they provide military assistance and nuclear expertise (Djalili and Kellner 2006). And in March, 2009, the two countries announced a $3.2 billion deal in which China will help develop the South Pars field, a huge cavity beneath the Persian Gulf that geologists believe is the world’s largest gas reservoir. China is Afghanistan’s largest investor, building highways to Iran and developing the giant copper mine at Aynak. Their aggressive advance into the region reflects an ambition vision to establish a “new Silk Road of modern railways and highways as a vehicle to project Chinese wealth and influence far westward, not only through Central Asia, but to Iran and the Middle East,” a project that will reshape power relations in Eurasia (Munro 1994: 235).

India has no less a requirement for energy, its demand being expected to rise more than three-fold by 2020. Having lost out to the Chinese in the bidding for PetroKazakhstan, the Indian government has turned to Iran and Turkmenistan. In 2005 the Indians signed a 25-year agreement with Iran to obtain 5 million tons of liquefied natural gas annually, and they plan to develop two Iranian oil fields. In another deal they have acquired rights to develop a portion of Iran’s North Pars gas field. By 2010 they will be importing about 60 million standard cubic meters of Iranian gas per day. And they have an interest in a plan to run a 1,750 mile natural gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan (which the Americans oppose; Kripalani 2004).[14] They have also arranged to buy five to six million tons of oil from Azerbaijan annually.[15] Like so many other countries, the Indian government has an interest in the projected natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan and Pakistan whenever it can be built.

Pakistan is in the race too. As soon as the former Soviet republics became independent Pakistan offered them economic assistance and credits – for instance, a loan of 55 million US dollars to Tajikistan in 1992, to build a hydro-electric power station (Lounev and Shirokov 1998). And like the other countries already mentioned Pakistan has a desperate interest in the projected Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan pipeline, as it would garner transit fees as well as gas for its own uses (Cutler 2007: 122). As mentioned above, the port for this pipeline has already been built at Gwadar. The conditions that compel Pakistan and India to cooperate in the transport of fuel are intensifying, but their long-running quarrel over Kashmir has so far defied every effort at resolution (Atal 2005).

Also joining in the race for Central Asian energy is Japan, the world’s second largest economy. As the Japanese import almost all their crude oil from the Middle East, their need for diverse energy sources is dire. They have invested in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, and in 2004 they inked a $2 billion deal to develop Iran’s massive Azadegan oilfield. Like so many other nations, Japan looks forward to the time when oil and gas can be exported through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the port of Gwadar, a plan that cannot advance as long as these countries are insecure.[16] Japan may be at a disadvantage in Central Asia, as it has an insignificant military force, but its large cash reserves give it leverage over the long run.[17]

The South Koreans likewise have an interest in Central Asia, as they have to import 97% of their energy; and they have been active: already 320,000 Koreans live in the region. Korea and Uzbekistan have established a 50-50 joint oil exploration venture in Uzbekistan and a joint project to mine molybdenum and tungsten.[18] Indeed, the Koreans are pursuing other mineral resources in the region. They have bought copper mines and a smelting plant in Kazakhstan (Alaolmulki 2001: 8-10), and the governments of Korea and Uzbekistan have agreed on several other cooperative projects. In 2008 they signed a $400 million deal for Korea to purchase 2600 tonnes of uranium between 2010 and 2016, an amount that will supply about 9% of South Korea’s annual demand for uranium. Already Korea has 20 nuclear reactors, which provide 40% of their electricity, and three more are in construction.

THE OTHER ISSUE: INSURGENCY

Any list of the reasons for the intense interest of the world in Greater Central Asia must include the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which worry many countries but especially their neighbors. Most of these insurgencies claim to be fighting an Islamic holy war against the corrupting influences of non-Muslim societies. But some of these groups were for many years actively recruited, trained, and equipped by the Pakistani intelligence service in order to produce a supply of willing troops for the struggle against India over Kashmir. While the government of Afghanistan has been weak for generations – ever since the Communist coup d’état of April, 1978 ‒ the weaknesses of the Pakistani state were less evident until 2008 and 2009. Until that time the Pakistani military had been solely concerned with the threat of India.  But by summer 2009 a specifically home-grown insurgency, the Pakistani Taliban, was challenging the army; the threat to the nation was now too blatant to ignore. The Taliban and Al Qaeda, ensconced in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, have united and been reinforced by experienced fighters from Iraq, fresh volunteers from the Arab Middle East, Uzbek dissidents fleeing the repressions of President Islam Karimov, and Uyghur nationalists avoiding Chinese repressions in Xinjiang. Together these fighters have created a loosely interlinked set of forces that threaten the stability of both Afghanistan and Pakistan.  While some of them are attacking Afghan, American, and NATO troops in Afghanistan, others are fighting their Pakistani sponsors.[19]

As long as insurgent groups can threaten infrastructural construction in Afghanistan and Pakistan the other nations interested in this region will delay producing the pipelines, highways, and railroads that are crucial for long term stability and economic prosperity. In the mean time, however, China and India have been establishing positions on the Indian Ocean that will eventually connect with transport facilities from Central Asia – the Chinese at the Pakistani port of Gwadar (to become, among other things, the port for the projected hydrocarbon pipelines from Turkmenistan), the Indians at the Iranian port of Chah Bahar (to be a port for overland shipping into landlocked Afghanistan).[20]

THE UNRULINESS OF EVENTS

As any region has “special unities embedded in numerous larger and wider units,” each of which may be “long-lasting but ultimately changing,” and at different rates (Fragner 2001), it is imperative that affairs in Greater Central Asia be tracked on many levels, national and local; and in many contexts, official and informal. In this work, we focus on specific situations in a few localities in the broader region. We describe the perspectives and concerns of various sorts of people, many of whom have narrower horizons and more immediate concerns than those of the world’s strategic planners. Such folks, acting from particular positions, with parochial interests and agendas, make sense of situations and events in their own terms, deploying familiar strategies in ways they see fit. They become aware of broad trends as the profiles of opportunity for them open or foreclose according to their fields of vision. When circumstances shift abruptly and the certainties of the past lose their salience ‒ as has been taking place in Greater Central Asia ‒ folks make new agreements tentatively, to be terminated when necessary. So, from the point of view of individuals and local groups caught up in the flow of history, relationships can be provisional, alliances fragile and transitory, and economic and political opportunities availed or ignored in respect to local understandings and the resources at hand (Monsutti 2005; Closson 2005).

This fluidity in relations and alliances introduces many uncertainties that defy the human ability to foresee.  Local, national and regional affairs have a life of their own and confound the predictions of experts. Especially, it would seem, in this region. Even though, for example, in the 1960s and 1970s, Iran was being studied by many social scientists, scarcely anyone anticipated the cataclysmic explosion of 1978-1979 that installed an entirely new Islamic order. The quiet implosion of the Soviet Union was “indisputably one of the most astonishing geopolitical events of the century” (Fuller 1994:19).[21] The general collapse of order in Afghanistan after the Soviets withdrew was pretty much unforeseen, and especially the ferocious battle for Kabul (1992-1996). Scarcely anyone expected the Tajiks and Uzbeks to seize and hold the capital city, as they did in 1992, instead of the Pushtuns who had always done so before. And virtually no one dreamed that an unknown loosely assembled Islamist group, the Taliban, would rise out of the refugee camps to dominate most of Afghanistan by 1998.

In such an unruly social world the course of events cannot be predicted, but we believe that whatever transpires in this region, the ordinary folks, with their particular perspectives and interests, will have a significant impact. As Olcott (1994:45) puts it, the “masses” exert “a kind of mute but implacable pressure” on the course of events. Because abrupt shifts in the course of affairs can be driven by unforeseen events, some observers have called for more studies of local and national as well as regional processes so as to identify more precisely “the root causes of particular conflicts” among these peoples (Garret, Rahr, and Watanabe 2000:2, 77). Still others, pleading for area studies generally but with the Middle East and Central Asia in mind, have complained that at a time when “globalization demands greater knowledge of the world than ever before, scholars today have less in-depth, committed knowledge than they did in the past.” There is now an even greater need, they say, for “deep study” of “the empirical and conceptual problems” of specific communities (Mirsepassi, Basu and Weaver 2003).[22]

CONCLUSION

“Games” of many sorts, local and regional, are being played in this region. And at every level the decisions made and policies implemented can affect the course of world affairs for the future.

 

LIST OF REFERENCES

 

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Cutler, Robert M. 2007. U.S.–Russian Strategic Relations and the Structuration of Central Asia. Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 6(1-3):109-125. http://www.robertcutler.org/download/pdf/ar06pgdt.pdf (accessed May 2, 2008).

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Fragner, Bert G. 2001. The Concept of Regionalism in Historical Research on Central Asia and Iran (A Macro-Historical Interpretation). In: Devin Deweese (Ed.), Studies on Central Asian History in Honor of Yuri Bregel. Bloomington: Indiana University Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies.

Fuller, Graham E. 1994. The New Geopolitical Order. In: Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner (Eds.), The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands. Bloomington: Indiana University.

Garret, Sherman W., Alexander Rahr, and Koji Watanabe. 2000. The New Central Asia: In Search of Stability. New York: Trilateral Commission.

Goswami, Manu. 2004. Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Gwadar Deep Seaport to Generate Two Million Jobs. 2007. Daily Times, January 5. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\01\05\ story_5-1-2007 _pg5_2 (accessed March 31, 2009).

Howden, Daniel and Philip Thornton. 2005. The Pipeline That Will Change The World. The Independent, May 25.

Kaplan, Robert D. and Rheinischer Merkur. 2009. China and India: Two Great Powers Duel in the Indian Ocean. March. Atlantic Community. http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/Global_Must_Read_Article/ China_and_India%3A_Two_Great_Powers_Duel_in_the_Indian_Ocean (accessed June 4, 2009).

Kashghar-Gilgit Bus Service Planned. 2006. Dawn, March 23. http://www.dawn .com/2006/03/23/nat2.htm (accessed March 30, 2009).

Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline Opens to Operation. 2006. Chinaview. http:// news3.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-07/12/content_4819484.htm (accessed March 31, 2009).

Kilcullen, David. 2009. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. New York: Oxford University.

Klare, Michael T. 2002. Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict. New York: Henry Holt.

Kleveman, Lutz. 2003. The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia. New York: Atlantic Monthly.

Kliment, Alexander. 2006. Afghan Oil Reserves “Bigger than Thought.” Financial Times (London) March 16.

Kripalani, Manjeet. 2004. How A Thirst For Energy Led To A Thaw. BusinessWeek, November 15. http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/ content/04_46/b3908046.htm (accessed March 31, 2009).

Lounev, Sergei and Gleryi Shirokov. 1998. Central Asia and the World: Foreign Policy and Strategic Issues. In: Yongjim Zhang and Rouben Azizian (Eds.), Ethnic Challenges Beyond Borders: Chinese and Russian Perspectives of the Central Asian Conundrum. London: Macmillan and Oxford: St. Anthony’s.

Manz, Beatrice. (Ed.). 1994. Central Asia in Historical Perspective. Boulder: Westview.

Masaki, Hisane. 2006. Japan joins the energy race. Asia Times, July 28. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/HG28Dh01.html (accessed March 31, 2009).

Menon, Rajan. 2003. The New Great Game in Central Asia. Survival 45(2): 187-204.

Mirsepassi, Ali, Amrita Basu, and Frederick Weaver. 2003. Localizing Knowledge in a Globalizing World: Recasting the Area Studies Debate. Syracuse: Syracuse University.

Moreau, Ron, Sami Yousafzai, and Michael Hirsh. 2006. The Rise of Jihadistan: Five years after the Afghan invasion, the Taliban are fighting back hard, carving out a sanctuary where they and Al Qaeda’s leaders can operate freely. Newsweek, October 2. http://msnbc.msn.com/id/ 14975282/site/newsweek/ MSNBC.com (accessed March 31, 2009).

Monsutti, Alessandro. 2005. War and Migration: Social Networks and Economic Strategies of the Hazaras of Afghanistan. New York & London: Routledge.

Mouawad, Jad. 2008. Conflict Narrows Oil Options for West. New York Times, August 13. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/14/world/europe/14oil.html (accessed March 31, 2009).

Munro, Ross H. 1994. Central Asia and China. In: Michael Mandelbaum (Ed.), Central Asia and the World: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

Naughten, Barry. 2008. Asia’s rising complex energy interdependence. International Journal of Global Energy Issues 29(4): 400-433.

Olcott, Martha Brill. 1994. Emerging Political Elites. In: Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner (Eds.), The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands. Bloomington: Indiana University.

Pannier, Bruce. 2009. What are the Prospects for Iran-Pakistan “Pipeline of Peace”?  May 25. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

Prime Minister Han Forges Important Deals with Uzbekistan. 2008. Korea, May 12. http://www.korea.net/News/news/NewsView.asp?serial_no=20080512005 &part=103&SearchDay= (accessed March 31, 2009).

Rashid, Ahmed. 2008. Descent into Chaos. New York: Viking.

Russia: Background. 2008. Energy Information Administration. http://www.eia. doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/Background.html (accessed March 31, 2009).

Russia Clinches Gas Pipeline Deal. 2007. The Agonist. May 12. http://agonist.org /20070512/russia_clinches_gas_pipeline_deal (accessed March 31, 2009).

South Korea Scouts for Energy in Central Asia. 2008. World Nuclear News, May 12. http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/ENFSouth_Korea_scouts_for_energy _inCentral_Asia_1205081.html (accessed March 31, 2009).

Starr, S. Fredrick. 2005. A “Greater Central Asia Partnership” for Afghanistan and Its Neighbors. Foreign Affairs 2(89):164-177. http://www.foreignaffairs. org/20050701faessay84412/s-frederick-starr/a-partnership-for-central-asia .html (accessed March 21, 2009).

Stroehlein, Andrew. 2009. Real security in Central Asia is not a Great Game. Alertnet. http://www.alertnet.org/db/blogs/3159/2009/01/20-160504-1.htm (accessed March 24, 2009).

Turkmenistan Gas Reserves Revealed. 2008. Kommersant. October 15. http://www.kommersant.com/p1041128/hydrocarbon_production_and_sales_Turkmenistan (accessed March 31, 2009).

Turkmen State Airlines Launches New Direct Flights to China. 2004. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Turkmen Report, August 9. http://www.rferl.org/ content/Article/1346979.html (accessed March 31, 2009).

Turkmen State Airlines Launches New Direct Flights to China. 2005. EurasiaNet: Turkmen Daily Digest. http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/ turkmenistan/ hypermail/200408/0002.shtml (accessed December 30, 2005).

Update 1-U.S. Throws Weight Behind EU’s Nabucco Pipeline. 2008. Reuters, February 22. http://uk.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=UKL22122411200 80222 (accessed May 20, 2009).

Uranium in Central Asia. 2009. World Nuclear Association, March. http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf118_centralasiauranium.html (accessed March 30, 2009).

Uzbekistan: Military: Energy. n.d. Global Security. http://www.globalsecurity. org/military/world/centralasia/uzbek-energy.htm (accessed March 31, 2009).

Weitz, Richard. 2006. Averting a New Great Game in Central Asia. The Washington Quarterly 29(3):155–167.

Won-sup, Yoon. 2007. Korea, Kyrgyzstan Sign Investment Pact. The Korea Times November 19. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2007/11/113_ 14005.html (accessed March 31, 2009).

The World. 2003. National Public Radio: BBC, June 10 and June 16.

Usher, Graham. 2009. Taliban v. Taliban. London Review of Books, April 9.

Zahab, Mariam Abou and Olivier Roy. 2004. Islamic Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection. New York: ColumbiaUniversity.

 

=====================

and China’s westernmost province, Xinjiang, along with the adjacent countries to the south, viz. Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan Kazakhstan, etc.

[1] Beissinger (2002:1). Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union Beissinger sees the event as essentially driven by internal dynamics; he discounts the impact of the Afghanistan war on public opinion within the Soviet Union and of other movements on the periphery of the empire, such as the Solidarity movement in Poland. We believe, to the contrary, that these events, once in motion, accelerated the collapse by inspiring other nationalist groups in the system. On the development of central Eurasia see also Garret, Rahr, and Watanabe (2000). Das (2004) believes that Central Asia will eventually overtake Europe in importance.

[2] Canfield 1992; Belokrenitsky (1994). For a list of publications that used this term before 2008 see “Vital Concerns for the World,” http://rcanfield.blogspot.com/2008/05/new-region-of-greater-central-asia-from.html.

[3] The strategic significance of this cluster of nations is further enhanced by the evident new importance of the Indian Ocean (Kaplan and Merkur 2009).

[4] Plans were drafted for the construction of roads, connecting the Central Asian states to South Asia via Pakistan’s Karakorum highway, although the earthquake of 2005 will no doubt slow down the project (Kashghar-Gilgit Bus Service 2006).

[5] Turkmen State Airlines (2004). Turkmen government sources claimed that over half of the available seats for the inaugural flight on August 4, 2005, were purchased several months in advance (Turkmen State Airlines 2005).

[6] The World (2003). An email notice from Muhammad Ghazi Jamakzai, Executive Assistant to the Minister, Ministry of Communications, entitled “Afghanistan and United States extend Bilateral Communications Cooperation,” indicates that “three and half years ago we had a limited access to telephone only in a few provinces, but now we have more than one million subscribers of digital and cellular phones in all provinces of Afghanistan. … [and that ] all 34 provinces [are connected] with the Capital through phone, internet, Fax and video Conference. … [W]e have already connected more than fifty districts through phone, net, Fax and video Conference and in every month we activate twenty districts, and hope to connect all districts till the end of this year” (contact@moc.gov.af). (accessed March 16, 2006)

[7] Gwadar Deep Seaport (2007); Starr (2005); Chah Bahar (n.d.).

[8] On Uzbekistan see Uzbekistan: Military (n.d.); On Turkmenistan, see Turkmenistan Gas (2008); on Afghanistan see Kliment (2006).

[9] The 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia, during which flows were briefly interrupted, demonstrated how crucial the pipelines in the Caucasus are to the Russian government (Mouawad 2008).

[10] The 1,760-kilometer Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was constructed to supply the needs of Europe. Eventually able to carry as much a 75 million tons of oil a year, it is projected to bring to Azerbaijan as much as $160 billion in revenue by 2030, a dramatic infusion of wealth that could transform the Caucasus (Abbasov and Ismailova 2005; Howden and Thornton 2005).

[11] Russia Clinches (2007).

[12] Update 1-U.S. Throws Weight (2008).

[13] Russia (2008).

[14] On May 24, 2009 Iran and Pakistan announced an agreement to build a 2,100-kilometer long pipeline from Iran’s South Pars gas field into Pakistan — at an estimated $7.5 billion. India so far has no part in the deal (Pannier 2009).

[15] Besides the deals made with the Central Asian, the Indians have sought crude oil from Israel’s Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline as well as natural gas from Qatar (Blank 2005a).

[16] Moreover, the Japanese are pursuing Central Asian uranium, another source of energy over which there is growing interest. Uranium prices are climbing as China and India are stepping up construction of nuclear power plants, and some nations in the west, including the United States, are revisiting the question of nuclear power as an energy source (Uranium 2009).

[17] Masaki (2006).

[18] Won-sup (2007); South Korea Scouts (2008); Prime Minister Han (2008).

[19] This topic is so large and the course of events so fluid that adequate attention cannot be given to it here. For more on the Taliban and guidance to the literature see Crews and Tarzi, 2008. On the Pakistan’s cultivation of Islamist organizations see Zahab and Roy (2004); Abbas (2005); Rashid (2008); Ali (2008); Usher 2009).

[20] Chah-Bahar (n.d.).

[21] As far as I know, the only person to hint at the Soviet collapse was the Afghan Professor Gholam Ali Ayeen (1367 A.H.), who pointed out as early as 1986 that the great empires of the past had collapsed when a few military reverses tarnished their image of invincibility; he was suggesting that the Afghanistan resistance movement, which was at that time embarrassing the Red Army, might actually undermine the Soviet Union’s apparent invincibility, with potentially momentous implications.

[22] David Kilcullen (2009) has argued that to deal with insurgencies an army needs to absorb the culture of the societies within which they subsist.

On China’s long-term plans to establish a robust presence in South and West Asia

From Foreign Affairs magazine January/February 2000 sponsored section page 7.  “Pakistan’s ports: Gateway to markets of billions.” This is an advertisement.

“Pakistani ports namely Karachi, neighboring Bin Qasim and the new deep water port at Gwadar — are set to become the regional entrepôt; with the Chinese market of 1.2 billion on the doorstep and one billion Central Asians to the north, Pakistan can easily service the landlocked Central Asian republics and capture trade to the Middle East and Africa…. the government is committed to accelerate the economy by upgrading the nation’s ports. … The implementation agreement finalizing construction of a floating LNG terminal at Port Qasim within a brisk 24-hour time-frame.”

“The Karachi Port trust … has an ambitious program of infrastructure development, encompassing a host of showcase projects underway … foremost among these are: the dredging of the world’s first 18 m container port, set for completion by 2013, the construction of a 1947-feet high Port Tower, Asia’s largest food street, a leisure complex along a scenic coastal stretch, and eye catching plans to connect the deep water container terminal with a cargo village via a cross harbor bridge spanning 300 m, and a berth reconstruction plan giving the Port the ability to accommodate the most modern vessels.

“The state-owned Pakistan national shipping Corporation is profitable despite a difficult global environment and has an extensive fleet modernization program…. Port Qasim Authority is Pakistan’s largest container handling and bulk cargo Port… The Port … will expand its operational capability further by increasing its all weather draught to 14 m, enabling larger vessels to birth. Port Qasim has attracted large foreign direct investment to the amount of US dollars 600 million for the development of a second container terminal, a grain and fertilizer terminal, and a coal and cement terminal, construction of which is underway.”

 

“Rethinking regional concerns in Central Eurasia”

For the symposium on “From the Hindu Kush to the Ganges:  Soldiers and traders, workers and poets, pilgrims and refugees” to take place in the 2010 meetings of the Association for Asian Studies in Philadelphia, March 25-28.

http://www.bgr.bund.de/nn_335082/EN/Themen/Energie/Erdoel/erdoel__inhalt__en.html

Robert L. Canfield

Preliminaries[1]

In my attempts to explain to friends and colleagues the significance of the current war in Afghanistan and Pakistan I have often had to turn to the wider context of the war.  For many people it hardly seems wise to carry on a war in a land so distant as Afghanistan and Pakistan, whose residents are so notorious for fierce opposition to foreign influences.  On the face of it the war seems costly and of little significance.

 

Such a view is mistaken, I think.  To make the case adequately I would actually have to address a number of issues, such as the attitudes and preferences of the local populations involved; the capabilities and agendas of the insurgent groups [Al Qaeda, the several Taliban groups, and the other “foreign fighters” who have found refuge among them]; the commitment and real agendas of the respective governments, and so on.  In this case I want to examine the geopolitical setting of the Afghanistan-Pakistan war, the wider neighborhood within which it is taking place.

 

As it happens, this is a strategic neighborhood.  In it are situated enormous reserves of oil and gas, most of which are underdeveloped.  The agreements now being made for the exploitation and transport of these resources will affect and be affected by the war, as the arrangements for exploiting the resources both reflect the way states align and constrain them to retain ties.  The instruments by which these resources are developed and transported constitute the material means by which military and political interests converge and populations are brought closer together.  They are the instruments of world shrinkage and of international alliance, capable of influencing the course of affairs by the options they open or foreclose by their very existence.

 

I present my argument in a series of maps.

 

Map 1: The Strategic Ellipsis[2]

This image was produced by the German firm BGR to show how the energy resources of the world are concentrated.  This edition of the map indicates that the large ellipsis covering most of western Eurasia [the “strategic ellipsis”] encloses 70% of the worlds known oil resources and 65% of the world’s known gas resources.  BGR has recently corrected these numbers upward:  74% for oil, 70% for gas.[3]

 

 

 

 

Countries in the Strategic Ellipse with the largest OIL reserves, in metric tons, in order of their rank in the world
1 Saudi Arabia			36 287
2 Iran			18 524
3 Iraq			15 646
4 Kuwait			14 150
5 United Arab Emirates			13 306
6 Russia			10 309
7 Libya			5 940
8 Venezuela			5 605
9 Kazakhstan			5 415
14 Qatar			2 068
18 Azerbaijan			1 300

 

Countries in the Strategic Ellipse with the largest GAS reserves, in Bcm,* in order of their rank in the world
1	Russia				106 000
3	Iran				11 000
4	Saudi Arabia				11 000
7	Turkmenistan				5 000
9	Iraq				4 000
14	Kazakhstan				2 500
15	Qatar				2 500
19	Azerbaijan				1 900
20	Uzbekistan				1 500
	United Arab Emirates		1 500
* Billions of normal cubic meters

 

This map merely represents known gas and oil reserves.  Of course more fossil fuel resources exist elsewhere and further exploration could expose other important concentrations.  What is important about this map is that, referring to the world’s reserves in so far as they are known, it portrays the way the world’s leaders think about the location of gas and oil supplies.  Map I can be read as an image of the relative importance accorded to the various localities around the globe and so reveals the places that the industrial powers are most likely to want access to.  The ellipsis encloses a zone of intense competition for access to such resources, “access” meaning the negotiated rights to the oil and gas reserves as well as to the technical means that will be used to produce these fuels and transmit them to the places where they can be consumed.

 

Map 2:  Pipelines of the Strategic Ellipse

This importance is displayed another way in Map 2.

 

The competition currently takes form as political and military posturing as well as diplomatic maneuvering.  In the end the pipelines that are built will “signify and embody alliances and cooperation” that will enable the respective powers to establish “axes for the international projection of influence” (Cutler 2007: 110).[4]

The social and political implications of these pipelines are numerous.

 

Some of the policy issues are the following.

 

The Americans and other western powers have tried to ensure that pipelines were diverted away from Russia, to minimize possibilities of interdiction, and away from Iran, as the Americans have seen Iran as an adversary ever since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 (Klare 2002: 90).

• Owing to American involvement, the 1700 km pipeline from Baku servicing Europe, which was completed in 2005, successfully avoided both Russia and Iran, passing through Tbilisi to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea.
• The Americans also have favored the establishment of a Transcaspian link of Kazakhstan’s giant off-shore Kashagan field into the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.[5] But these routes are more expensive than the shorter ones through Russia and Iran (which would connect to the Persian Gulf; Naughten 2008: 431).
• A six-company consortium sponsored by the EU, Nabucco, has announced plans to begin construction in 2011 of a 3300 km pipeline from the Caspian Basin via Turkey to Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia, and western Hungary.

But American and European wishes have not always been accepted.

• In May, 2007, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia jointly announced that they will cooperate in building a gas pipeline from the Caspian Sea into Kazakhstan and Russia.[6]
• Also, in response to the Nabucco announcement, Russian-owned Gazprom has proposed to build a pipeline from Russia under the Black Sea to Bulgaria and thence to central Europe.[7]

Any deals the Iranians work out frustrates American policy.

• In March, 2010, Iran opened the Dauletabad-Sarakhs-Khangiran pipeline that connected Iran’s northern region with a vast Turkmenistan gas field.
• The deal between Iran and Turkmenistan opens up possibilities for Turkmenistan to develop transportation routes to the world market through Iran, an strategic advantage to both countries.[8]
• Iran is now the second largest oil supplier for China, which in return provides military assistance (Djalili and Kellner 2006).[9]
• In March, 2009, the two countries announced a $3.2 billion deal in which China will help develop the South Pars field, a huge cavity beneath the Persian Gulf that geologists believe is the world’s largest gas reservoir.[10]

Turkmenistan also has been making deals contrary to the interests of the Americans and the EU.

• As recently as February and March, 2010, Turkmenistan was making deals that committed its entire gas exports to China, Russia and Iran – not what the Western powers had hoped for.

The Chinese have actively sought a firm position in Central Asia.

• They have won permission to develop several oil fields in Uzbekistan (Atal 2005), and they have already completed a 1000-kilometer oil pipeline from Atasu, Kazakhstan, into Xinjiang that will deliver up to 200,000 barrels of oil per day (Kazakhstan-China oil 2006).

• They built a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan that became operational in 2009.[11]
• China’s largest state-owned oil company has acquired PetroKazakhstan, one of Kazakhstan’s major energy producers (Blank 2006).
• Despite staggering costs, China is willing to construct an oil pipeline across Kazakhstan into its homelands.
• And they have initiated talks about constructing a natural gas pipeline all the way from Kazakhstan to Shanghai (Appelbaum 2005).

India has no less need requirement for energy, its demand being expected to rise more than three-fold by 2020. Having lost out to the Chinese in the bidding for PetroKazakhstan, the Indian government has turned to Iran and Turkmenistan.

• In 2005 the Indians signed a 25-year agreement to obtain 5 million tons of liquefied natural gas annually from Iran, and they plan to develop two Iranian oil fields.
• In another deal they have acquired rights to develop a portion of Iran’s North Pars gas field. By 2010 they will be importing about 60 million standard cubic meters of Iranian gas per day.
• The Indians also had an interest in a plan to run a 1,750 mile natural gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan (which the Americans opposed), but because of the strained relations with Pakistan they have more recently toyed with the idea of a more direct undersea line from Iran.[12]
• India has also arranged to buy five to six million tons of oil from Azerbaijan annually.[13]
• Like so many other countries, the Indian government has an interest in the projected natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan and Pakistan whenever it can be built.

The Pakistanis are active in Central Asia for the same reasons.

• They have a desperate interest in the projected Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan pipeline, as they would garner transit fees as well as gas for its own uses (Cutler 2007: 122).
• And they, with help from the Chinese, have developed Gwadar as the Indian Ocean terminus for this pipeline.
• Moreover, China wants to build a pipeline from Iran to China through Pakistan. [That would be a huge project: it would mean taking the pipeline through the Northern Areas of Gilgit-Baltistan over one of the highest mountain ranges in the world where the Khunjerab Pass is over 15,000 feet. Such is China’s interest in energy. And such is China’s belief that Pakistan is a “safe” territory over the long term — safe politically.  For China Iran and Pakistan are long term partners with whom it is necessary to develop enduring ties.]

The Japanese likewise have a desperate interest in the oil and gas of this region.

• They import almost all their crude oil from the Middle East.
• They have invested in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.
• And in 2004 the Japanese inked a $2 billion deal to develop Iran’s massive Azadegan oilfield.
• Like so many other nations, Japan looks forward to the time when oil and gas can be transported through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the port of Gwadar, a plan that cannot advance as long as fighting persists in these countries.[14], [15]

The South Koreans are no less dependent on fossil fuels from this region.

• Currently they import 97% of their energy, most of it from the Gulf region.
• The Koreans have established a 50-50 joint oil exploration venture in Uzbekistan and a joint project to mine molybdenum and tungsten there.[16]

Map 3:  Further Plans for Pipeline Construction in the Strategic Ellipse[17]

 

 

 

Map 3 is an addendum to Map 2.  It merely indicates visually some of the trajectories of the pipelines to be built in the future.

Routes through Russia:

• Kazakhstan hopes to expand its existing pipelines to link them with the Russian network of pipelines.[18]
• Azerbaijan wants to build a pipeline from Baku to Novorossiysk.

But Azerbaijan in general, along with Turkey, Georgia, and the United States, favors a western route, which avoids both Russia and Iran.[19]

 

The American oil company Unocal has proposed the construction of oil and gas pipelines from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan and later to India.[20]

 

Map 4.  Routes through Afghanistan

We are now in a position to examine Maps of the pipelines planned for Afghanistan.  These maps clarify the special importance Afghanistan has for Pakistan, whose future depends on its access to the resources of Central Asia.  Afghanistan is crucial to the Pakistanis.  Hence, the concerted attempts of the Pakistanis to ensure that a friendly administration is ensconced in Kabul.  Map 4 focuses specifically on two planned gas pipeline routes from Turkmenistan to Pakistan [and possibly from there to India, if the two sides could ever lay aside their feud over Kashmir].  Both turn eastward into Pakistan’s industrial heartland, and both avoid the troublesome area of Baluchistan.

 

 

 

Map 5 The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-IndianOcean route

But Baluchistan cannot be ignored because it is Pakistan’s frontage on the Indian Ocean.  Map 4 omits the direct route to the Indian Ocean that must pass through Baluchistan, a route indicated on Map 5, which was produced by the Bridas Corporation in 1997 when it was negotiating with the Taliban for the contract to build the pipeline.

 

 

This pipeline will terminate at Gwadar on the Indian Ocean.  Gwadar, in fact, has been built (finished in 2008) to be both a deep sea port and the terminus of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Baluchistan pipeline to the Indian Ocean, assuming it will eventually be built.

 

Conclusion

In this brief visual review of the major locations of fossil fuels and of the competing interests over pipeline construction in Greater Central Eurasia we have said that the Afghanistan-Pakistan war is situated in a zone of vital and continuing interest to the industrial world, and especially to the rapidly industrializing countries of Asia.  The war is not situated in a vacuum, and its progress and outcome will directly affect the competition among the world’s powers over access to the vital resources in its neighborhood.  This is a war of great significance for the world generally as well as the United States.

 

Note, in conclusion, what we have not said.  We have said nothing about the agendas and threat of Al Qaeda; or the long-running low-grade war between Pakistan and India, two countries already armed with nuclear weapons; or the risk of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of extremists; or Iran’s apparent race to acquire nuclear power; or the notorious and many-sided tug of war in the Middle East involving Israel – or any of the many other complicated issues in the region.  But what we have tried to demonstrate is that, with respect to the vital energy resources that the world expects to need in the near future, social and political conditions in Greater Central Eurasia, including Afghanistan and Pakistan, will profoundly affect the options of many countries of the world, the United States as much as any other.  This is at least one reason why the Americans and their allies have decided to invest in the struggle against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

 

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[1] I have benefitted from the the assistance of Sami Siddiq, who provided some the information included here and offered useful comments on the text.

[2] I reproduce this map because it describes both oil and gas within the ellipse.  BGR also produces a similar map of oil reserves.  It has been reproduced for other purposes at the following site:

http://www.oilcrisis.com/rempel/

[3] GDR defines “reserves” as “the amount currently technologically and economically recoverable”.  They use the term “resources” for “quantities that cannot be profitably recovered with current technology but might be recoverable in the future, as well as quantities that are geologically possible but not yet found.”   http://www.whymap.org/cln_109/nn_336024/EN/Themen/Energie/Produkte/annual__report__2009-summary__en.html

 

[4] The 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia, during which flows were briefly interrupted, demonstrated how crucial the pipelines in the Caucasus are to the Russian government (Mouawad 2008).

[5] The 1,760-kilometer Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was constructed to supply the needs of Europe. Eventually able to carry as much a 75 million tons of oil a year, it is projected to bring to Azerbaijan as much as $160 billion in revenue by 2030, a dramatic infusion of wealth that could transform the Caucasus (Abbasov and Ismailova 2005; Howden and Thornton 2005).

[6] Russia Clinches (2007).

[7] Update 1-U.S. Throws Weight (2008).

[8] Asia Times Online, January 8, 2010 “Russia, China, Iran redraw energy map,”
by M K Bhadrakumar. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/LA08Ag01.html.

[9] In the original deal China agreed to provide help with nuclear technology, but in April, 2008, China provided the United Nations with intelligence on Iran’s nuclear efforts after documents were published on how to “shape” uranium metal into warheads. [http://www.telegragh.co.uk/news/worldnews/1583682/China-reveals …]

[10] In addition to these activities China is Afghanistan’s largest investor, building highways to Iran and developing the giant copper mine at Aynak.

[11] Naughten 2008: 433 was an early source for this information on this project.

[12] On May 24, 2009 Iran and Pakistan announced an agreement to build a 2,100-kilometer long pipeline from Iran’s South Pars gas field into Pakistan — at an estimated $7.5 billion. India so far has no part in the deal (Pannier 2009).  On India’s antics see Kripalani 2004, Ranjan 2010, Zafir 2010.

[13] Besides the deals made with the Central Asian, the Indians have sought crude oil from Israel’s Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline as well as natural gas from Qatar (Blank 2005a).

[14] Moreover, the Japanese are pursuing Central Asian uranium, another source of energy over which there is growing interest. Uranium prices are climbing as China and India are stepping up construction of nuclear power plants, and some nations in the west, including the United States, are revisiting the question of nuclear power as an energy source (Uranium 2009).

[15] Masaki (2006).

[16] Won-sup (2007); South Korea Scouts (2008); Prime Minister Han (2008). The Koreans are pursuing other mineral resources in the region. They have bought copper mines and a smelting plant in Kazakhstan (Alaolmulki 2001: 8-10), and the governments of Korea and Uzbekistan have agreed on several other cooperative projects. In 2008 they signed a $400 million deal for Korea to purchase 2600 tonnes of uranium between 2010 and 2016, an amount that will supply about 9% of South Korea’s annual demand for uranium. Already Korea has 20 nuclear reactors, which provide 40% of their electricity, and three more are in construction.

[17]  For another useful map of planned contruction see:  http://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National_Office_Pubs/2008/A_Pipeline_Through_a_ Troubled_Land.pdf.

 

[18] http://www.worldpress.org/specials/pp/pipelines.htm

[19] http://www.worldpress.org/specials/pp/pipelines.htm

[20] From http://www.rumormillnews.com/cgi-bin/archive.cgi?read=32187.

Two stories by a friend from Afghanistan

First story

Farida has two daughters and a son. Also, another son, who is in a school in C. MO. Farida’s husband was with the intelligence section of the communist government under Najib (1986-1992). When Najib was killed by the Taliban (April, 1992), 25 days later they came to their house and took her husband out and killed him. They hid the children in the bedrooms and he told her not to resist because they would come in anyway. She eventually insisted on finding him and went around to some places to ask but got no help. Eventually someone whom he had known in the communist party called her and told her where to go. His body was in a certain hospital. She went there, got there early and insisted on opening the gate, was very upset and angry, and when she opened the gate someone hit her arm and broke it. They had refused entry to her but eventually after her arm was broken they let her in. But when she saw her husband’s body his face was so mangled and blue that she could not recognize him. She said she would not take the body home, and anyway her arm was broken. So she never was able to give him a burial.

Farida said she took her family about two weeks later to Pakistan. She went to the UN and asked for them to protect her. They said they would try to protect her for two weeks, but she would then be on her own, because they had no power. She had saved wealth in the form of jewels and also had money in both banks [Da Afghanistan Bank, Bank-I Milli] but so far has not recovered any of that. She sold some of her goods and then left by car to a point in Jaji-Manqal; eventually walked across the mountains to get into Pakistan. She had enough wealth to keep her family going and they lived in Pindi, after staying with a relative in Islamabad for two weeks. She also returned, under a burka with her son to Ghazni, the home of her husband, and sold his land, which she had inherited. The money kept them alive in Pakistan for three years.

Her husband had been a Parchami Communist for many years and so had been active in the party and apparently had some clout in the communist regime. He was Qizilbash, a Shi`a, and her family was Sunni. The difference didn’t seem to matter much because he alternately gave his children Sunni and Shia names. Qizilbash were considered desirable for Farida to marry because they were tall and considered handsome, and, as she put it, they were rich. Although Shi`a they were not looked down on.

She expressed regret at the way the Hazaras (other Shi`as) had to live; they could not be in schools and they could not get good jobs.

Second story

Farida’s mother was married to her father as part of a peace transaction between two estranged Pushtun lineages. Her grandfather was killed in a fight over land and after negotiations it was decided that the killer, rather than being killed, should hand over a girl to the deceased person’s family. But the killer didn’t have a child, so they took the daughter of his brother and gave her as a promised marital partner for the son of the deceased who was about 5 years old, the girl being barely a month old. So the girl was taken from her mother and given to the other family and raised in that family. When she was old enough she was then given to the son of the deceased. She had her first child at 14. This was Farida’s mother. The killer was her mother’s uncle and the victim was her grandfather.

TELLING WRONG FROM RIGHT
MORAL IMAGES IN A MUSLIM PRAYER BOOK

by

Robert L. Canfield
Department of Anthropology
Washington University in St. Louis

For the Saturday Seminar Series on
“Telling Right from Wrong: Morality and Literature”
Sponsored by University College
Washington University in St. Louis

Shortly after agreeing to give this lecture I came
upon a book with almost the same title as our series: Telling Right from
_______ _____ ____
Wrong: What Is Moral, What is Immoral, and What Is Neither One
______ ____ __ ______ ____ __ ________ ___ ____ __ _______ ___
Nor the Other.
___ ___ _____
The book had a grand aim–to rectify moral confusion in the world–but
its author fell short of it himself; for when submitting it
for consideration to the publisher he attached a forged letter
of recommendation.
In the published edition he describes the extreme circumstances
that led him to commit such a fraud and
the embarrassment that its discovery caused him.
It seems that even philosophers with world-redeeming moral
insights can
have as much trouble living up to their ideals as the rest
of us.
That ought to be no surprise, of course;
the attempt to maintain personal
rectitude in a morally problematic world
is presumably common among people everywhere.
But that attempt is not always obvious in other cultures, for
the ways it is expressed
vary widely around the world.
The moral images of people in other cultures
need to be interpreted if
their motives
and feelings are to be known.
The private devotional notebook to be examined
here demonstrates the problem,
for its moral concerns
are expressed in a strange, forbidding, even shocking imagery;
but once interpreted
it exposes
a struggle for moral rectitude and a desire for personal significance
that resembles our own.
That such a quest motivates this symbolism might be expected of a
devotional notebook.  What may come as a surprise is how
relevant the text is–even though over a century old–toÔ   h)         0*0*0*° °   ÔŒvital problems in our contemporary world.

1.  The Manuscript and Its Author
__  ___ __________ ___ ___ ______
The book was purchased in an antique
shop in Ghazni, Afghanistan, by Charles and Virginia Prewitt in
the early 1960s.
An antique dealer had drawn it from the rafters of
his shop and shown it to them furtively, to keep
friends and colleagues
nearby from seeing him offer it to
foreigners.  The book was wrapped in a scarf, as
sacred books normally are by the Afghans, this one in green silk.
Its thick leather covers
were embossed front and back with calligraphy and floral
designs.  Inside there were 271 pages (3 1/2″ x 6″) of text,
on each of which were seven carefully calligraphed lines within a
border consisting of black, blue, tan and green lines. The first page of each “chapter” in the book was decorated with floral designs in multiple colors and at odd points some
words and diacritical marks were
emphasized in red.
Except for a few notations by another hand on the inside back
cover, there were no other marks in the book:  no notes and no
commentary–Afghans do not make notes in sacred books.
But the manuscript bore the marks of much usage:  pages
were well fingered
(mainly in the upper right hand corner) and
worn at the edges.
Coming to us like a note in a bottle, with scarcely a trace
of its source, the manuscript nonetheless betrays something of
what the transcriber was
like.  He was an able calligrapher; and his care in
calligraphy and floral decoration indicate
his veneration for this material.
To him, this was a sacred text.  Also, someone–presumably the
copyist, but very likely also other people after him,
perhaps including the antique dealer himself–had
handled and no doubt read this
text numerous times.
Something about the text drew people to it:
it was not merely a
religious text kept with pious intentions or for public display, but
one well used and assiduously studied.  In that sense
this carefully traced and well-fingered text
manifests a personal quest.
C. S. Lewis^h1^s
once distinguished between “using” and
“receiving” a book, as a way of identifying great literature.
Most people, he said, “use” a book;
they read it to find out what
it says, and having found out, put it down.  But there are some
people  who turn back to a book to re-read it.
Having read it already and being well aware of its contents,
they nevertheless
become engrossed in it all over again.
This, says Lewis, is a different
kind of reading from the “use” people
commonly make of books.
In this case something about a situation or character
has captured their
imagination, presumably because it represents
something
personally significant to them, something in their own
experience and circumstance.
They re-read in order to reflect on their own lives.
A book
in such a case is not so much a tool for their use as a message
for them to hear, a revelation
for them to receive.  The manuscript we have
come upon has been for the calligrapher and others
a source of personal revelation,
personal  nourishment and self-discovery.  What
it has “said” to them, how it said it,
and why its message so
engrossed them, are things we must discover.
Beyond the physical form of the book there is little
internal evidence of what the transcriber was like.  At
the very end of the text, on the last page, is a final
inscription:  “Monday evening, 16 Dhul-Hujja, 1264.  The copyist
is Yaqub-i Kamtari.”  That date was the evening of November 13, 1848,
presumably the date on which the copying was completed.^h2^s
The copyist’s name, as given, means “Yaqub [Jacob] the
Less,” or “Yaqub the Small[er],” perhaps “Yaqub, Jr.”
The picture that is conjured of Yaqub on the basis of these
sketchy, faded details is of someone living somewhere in the
eastern realms of Islam, presumably in Ghazni itself,
who completed the copying
out of this text in November, 1848.
Such is what we know of the man, except for the world he
lived in.  It was a world in transition.  Beset on every side by
non-Muslim powers, the world of Islam to which he belonged–and
which, as we shall soon see, thoroughly informed his life–was
undergoing some radical transformations.  The most obvious of
these were losses in territory.  In 1798, a  half-century before
Yaqub completed his manuscript, the French had landed at
Alexandria and dazzled the Egyptians by their administrative
organization and their science and learning.
The Muslim sultanates of Java and Sumatra fell
to the Dutch in 1803 and
in 1812, the Ottomans lost control of
important territories in Bulgaria and the northern coasts of the
Black Sea.
By 1818 the lands of the once grand Moghals in India had fallen to the
British.
Even as Yaqub labored over his text
the Muslims of Central Asia were falling under the
sway of Russia, and the Persians were
making concessions to both the Russians and the British.
Afghanistan itself–assuming he lived there–had just
been in a war with the British, and Kabul was in fact in ruins.
Almost everywhere Islam was in retreat.
The retreat was generating
disorder and division among the Muslims themselves.
In the early part of Yaqub’s century
local Muslim groups had broken away from their Ottoman rulers.
various tribes and brigand groups–Afghans, Turkomen and
Turko-Persians–had overrun Safawid Iran and
Mughal India.
Wahabbi fanatics had rent Arabia asunder: trying to enforce a
stricter practice of Islamic rules and opposing
the veneration of saints and worship at tombs,
they had
destroyed the sacred tombs of Arabia, including even
Muhammad’s, and massacred Muslims in
Medina and Mecca.
Suppressed
in Arabia by the Ottomans in 1818, Wahabbi influences
inspired a holy
war against the Sikhs and British in India in the 1830s.
The frustration of Muslims would continue throughout Yaqub’s century.
Scarcely a decade after Yaqub had completed his
manuscript Muslims joined Hindus in the bloody Indian Mutiny
against the British.  And
a generation later Muslims of Sudan would rise up
against the British and, under the leadership of a man
who called himself “the Mahdi,” “the Rightly Guided One,”
would form an expressly theocratic Islamic state.
But the radical opposition of Muslims
against European
influences in Yaqub’s century were atypical:
most Muslims were trying to figure out how to absorb
Western culture.
Even as Yaqub was calligraphing his devotional
notebook,
Muslims in Egypt, Persia,
Ottoman Turkey, and Volga Tatary were grafting
Western secular learning into their educational  systems.  In
India, the Persian language, which had been the medium
of Islamic letters, diplomacy and
administration, was being discarded, and English
was being introduced in its place.
In India, in fact, Muslims at the
Muhammedan Anglo-Oriental College
at Aligarh,
under the motto “The more worldly progress we make the more glory
Islam gains,”
would set the pace in integrating
Western thought into an Islamic world view.
Thus,
despite the resistance of certain elements, Muslims were in general
willing to acquire not only
Western technology but also Western social and political attitudes.
This was, after all, the ninteenth century, and the heady hopes
for a modernizing world
inspired not only Europeans but also
the progressive cadres of many nations of the world, including those
of the Middle East and South Asia.^h3^s
But this busy world of competing Islamic
visions–from those who would bring back the “original” Islamic
way of life to those who would join the progressive surge
of the Western world–appears
never to have touched Yaqub the Less.
The world he lived in was far from
the swirl
of cultural mixing, melding and culling
that was taking place elsewhere in the Muslim
world.  He belonged to a tradition of Islamic thought
that had for seven centuries informed the life and
affairs of the vast body of Muslim peoples across Asia.
Indeed, Ghazni itself, where Yaqub’s notebook was sold and
where Yaqub
may have lived, was once,
much earlier, a center of medieval Islamic learning,
where some of the great works were written that
influenced the world of ideas in which Yaqub lived.
That was in the eleventh century.
Enriched by the flow of
commerce between India and Central Asia,
Ghazni was a prosperous city, with
the usual labyrinthine streets and alleys, walled
gardens, markets, and mosques; but as wealth flowed in from raiding
and trading,
grand monuments to conquests
in India and Iran were added, as well as a citadel,
elephant stables,
and a palace; also, above all, a great Mosque, immodestly
dubbed “The Bride of Heaven,” built
by artisans imported from India, to which was adjoined a
madrasa,
_______
a Muslim school of higher education,
burgeoning with books
filched from the libraries of Ray and Isfahan.  And to
illumine this bustling city of cosmopolitan merchants and zealous
Islamic knights the Ghaznawid ruler, Sultan Mahmud, courted–some
have said kidnapped–the most eminent men
of learning in the eastern Caliphate:
Al-Biruni, the mathematician- philosopher- astronomer-
sanscritist, came from Khwarizm (or perhaps Sindh?);
Unsuri, the poet and
revered master of reputedly 400 poets and learned men, came from
Balkh; and from Khurasan,
for a time at least, came Firdowsi, whose epic poem,
Shahnama, “The Book of Kings”, has for generations captured
________
the imagination of Persian speaking peoples.
(Avecinna, the
physician and theologian, whom Mahmud considered the best prize,
escaped his grip by fleeing to Khwarizm and, later, to Isfahan.)
And besides the prominent learned men brought into the city
there were others who were born
and raised there, notably,
Ali ibn Usman Hujwiri, the philosopher and author of the
first treatise on Sufism in the Persian language, and
Abdul Majid Majdud Sana’i,
the first great Persian Sufi poet,
whose images of hell
anticipated Dante.
Ghazni did not last long as a cultural center–it
was sacked and burned in 1150, a deed
for which its perpetrator proudly called himself, “The World
Burner”–and other great cities rose in its place.
But in the period roughly from the time of Ghazni’s rise
until as late as the nineteenth century
the eastern lands of Islam were largely informed, or at least
stimulated by, the great thinkers of Persian Islam,
not only those of Ghazni in its heyday
but also many others who lived and wrote
in the eastern Muslim world.
Their writings were the literary expression of a rich culture
that nourished the literate public
in a vast region from the Adriatic Sea to Indonesia.
A man from Bokhara in the nineteenth century, for instance,
reported that in his youth his favorite Persian poets
were Saadi and Hafiz
(from Shiraz), Sa’ib (from Isfahan), Nawai (from Herat),
Fuzuli (from Ottoman Turkey), and Bedil (from India).^h4^s
It was a culture that was essentially
Persian and Islamic: Persian was the language
of diplomacy as well as letters, Arabic the language of
law and jurisprudence, Turkish the language
of the military, and other languages were sometimes used by local
communities.
The preeminent medium of literary communication was poetry.
In this region Muslims made Persian poetry
.in 8
the central icon of their culture, the focus of emotion in which
every speaker of Persian felt he or she could see something essential
of himself or herself . … [Even the] illiterate
population … know by heart lines of Hafez and Saadi and
Mowlana Jalal ad-Din Rumi and … use them in their speech
the way speakers of other languages use proverbs. …
Turks of Anatolia and of Central Asia,
the Muslims of India and … Malaysia and Indonesia,
turned to Persian models when they created literature
in their own languages.  This vast area, from Turkey to Indonesia …
received an Islamic cultural mode
with a distinctly Persian flavor …^h5^s
.in 0
Today, the largest Muslim nations of the world–Indonesia
(with 119 million Muslims), India (with 82 million),
Pakistan (with 81 Million), Bangladesh (with 77 million), the
Soviet Union (with 47 million), Turkey (with 45 million), and Iran
(with 40 million)–are
heirs of that medieval Perso-Islamic culture.
It was the culture to which Yaqub belonged–or so
we surmise from
his apparent location and his linguistic skill, for his Persian
was flawless and his Arabic
slightly defective (he sometimes misused the article).
Thus, his notebook, even though personal and as far as I know
unique, is
a  particular expression of a
culture that once was the idiom of learning and international
affairs in a vast region in Asia
and even now is the idiom of social discourse among many of
the rural and isolated peoples of Iran, Afghanistan and Soviet
Central Asia.^h6^s

2.  The Text
__  ___ ____
As already indicated, the book is written in both Arabic and
Persian.  It begins with an invocation on Muhammad in Arabic,
followed by eleven pairs of texts,
the first of each pair in Persian and the second in Arabic.  The
final page is written in Persian, where the copyist’s name and
completion date are given.  The book appears to be–as already
implied in my reference to Yaqub as the “copyist”–a collection
of texts authored by someone else, presumably in a much earlier
time.  How Yaqub came by them we can only surmise, but his
notation of the date at the end of the book suggests that for him
it was a single piece; the work of assembling and editing, was
probably done by someone else, perhaps at a much earlier time.
Although this particular assemblage
of texts is, as far as I know, quite unkown to  scholars, it
is like many such collections sought out and preserved by pious Muslims
all over the Muslim world.  The practice of collecting sacred
Islamic materials is as old as Islam.
It began soon
after Muhammad’s death, when the preservation of information about
him became a vital concern of the Muslim
community.  Pious scholars collected from his
associates details about his life and habits
that could guide them in behavior and worship, and after their deaths
their descendants or disciples
were sought out for such information.
Eventually the personal collections
of sacred information of all kinds gleaned from Islamic scholars in
diverse places were much prized:
one renown
authority of information about Muhammad, when
arriving at Baghdad from Khurasan in the eleventh century,
was met and escorted into the city by a huge
crowd.^h7^s
It became usual
for pious students to travel far and wide to study under
eminent Islamic authorities and acquire
for themselves not only the last dregs of what was
known about Muhammad but also the best of other religious
works available,
juridical, theological,
philosophical and ritual.
By this means each
student acquired his own assemblage of
sacred texts, prayers, magical formulae, ideograms,
theological treatises, and the like.  Thus, their
collections of prayers were, like Yaqub’s,
evidentiary specimens of a widely respected
desire to know sacred truth.
Yaqub’s text is a
particular, concrete expression of a moral quest, couched in the
idioms of pious Muslims.  That quest
we have set out to uncover–only the idioms will appear at first
strange and enigmatic.

2.1  The Persian Story.
___  ___ _______ ______
In this book each
of the Persian texts is a story, sometimes only a brief one,
explaining the powers of the Arabic text following it, which
is always a prayer.
Of these Persian-Arabic pairs of text
I have chosen to examine one,
because of the
distinctive qualities of the Persian story;
the Arabic prayer is fairly typical.
The story represents a certain extreme imagery, and so exposes
in dramatic form a kind of behavior so shameful that it frightens and
repells.  In an exaggerated,
immoderate imagery, it portrays the outer
limits of moral outrage as understood by these people,
and so projects a sense of their inner life.
As even a people’s
fears take pictorial shape in the likeness of their real
life, their monsters betray something of what they are.
The Persian text is, in translation, as follows:
.in 8
Whoever recites this [prayer] will have a good name, will be
forgiven his sins, will have no trouble at all [in this life?], and
will not need to worry about the last judgement.
If this book is put in
the house of a family, the whole family will be preserved
against the devil, jinns and other unclean spirits.
There was a woman in Baghdad whose husband was a merchant.
He died and left lots of money and goods.  She had a lovely
boy, so handsome that she fell in love with her son.  She
loved him so much that people thought she was crazy.  The
son brought in doctors but she couldn’t get well.  But one
day an old lady living nearby came and asked her what had
happened to her.  She was pale and her heart was aching,
and she sighed.
The old woman said to her,
“I am sure you are in love with someone.
You must not hide this from me.  Tell
me so I can straighten it up for you.”  The mother answered, “I am in
love with my son.  I am in trouble.  I cannot eat well.  I
always feel sick.”  Then the old lady said, “I will help
you reach your goal.”  The woman gave permission to
explain her plan.  The old lady told her, “Put on nice clothes
at night and put mascara on your eyes and perfume on your
body and I will invite your son to my house.”  The mother
agreed.  In the evening the lady came and received the boy and
brought him delicious food.  After he ate, she brought in a
bottle of wine for him and he drank it.  An hour later he
was drunk and his mother, dressed like a drunken peacock,
came to her son.  The boy didn’t know her because he was drunk
and he committed adultery with her.
Four months later the mother’s pregnancy began to show.
The mother said to herself, “I don’t have
a husband.  If my pregnancy is known, people will say hard things
about me.”  She planned to go on pilgrimage so that she
would have the baby on the trip, and no one would know about it.
One day she told her son, “Your father left a lot of money and goods,
and I want to go to Mecca.”  So her son
prepared two camel loads of gold for her trip, and she
started toward Mecca.  When she reached Egypt she stayed in the
house of a man named Khorasan.  In the ninth month she gave
birth to a baby, a girl.  She stayed with the baby for three months
and she told Khorasan, “I will leave my daughter and the two
camel loads of gold with you.  Whenever this girl grows up, give
her in marriage to a rich, handsome man.”  She said, “Don’t
forget my request.”  And Khorasan accepted her request.
She returned back to her home country.
When she came near her city,
her son was told his mother was coming and he came to her, kissed
her feet with abundant welcoming.  He took her home and gave lots
of money [as a gift offering] to the poor.
After a few years her son wanted to
become a merchant.  He told his mother, “My father was a merchant,
and I want to do the same business.”  She gave him permission.  So the
son bought several caravans of camels which would carry goods and
clothes and he went on a trip to Egypt.  When he reached
Egypt, by chance he also went to the house of Khorasan and stayed there.
One day he was sitting with Khorasan and that young
girl came out of the house and he liked her and asked
whose daughter she was.  Khorasan said she was his.  The boy said,
“Would you be willing to give her to me in marriage?”  And Khorasan
looked at him and thought he was a handsome boy and had lots of
money, and the recommendation of the mother came to his mind, so
he gave the girl to the boy, and they were married.  And the son
returned back to his home country.
When he came close to the
village on the way back from Egypt someone sent a message to his
mother, and she came out happily to meet her son.  She saw that he had a
bride also with him.  When the mother looked at the face of the bride
she became suspicious that this could be her daughter.  They came to
the house and the mother asked the bride whose daughter she was and
the bride said, “Of Khorasan.”  “And in which city?”  He answered,
“The city of Egypt,” and she asked other questions until the mother knew
that this was her daughter.  The Mother wept, and ran out.   She kept
on hitting her head against a stone in the wall, and said, “What
an awful thing I have done!  No one has done such a thing!”  She was
crying and weeping.
Finally she went to the desert.  In the desert there
was a Shaykh.  She went to him and put her head on the ground and threw
dust on her head.  The man said, “What happened to you?”, and she
told him the whole story.  And the man of God said, “What an awful
thing you have done!  It is unforgivable.
But I know one prayer^h8^s
that
I will teach you.  If you recite it in belief, if
God wills, your sin will be forgiven.”  This is the
durud akbar [the great blessing].
_____ _____
So he taught this prayer to her for
several days, so that God would accept her request, and her sin
would be forgiven.  Later the lady went to the man of God
and said, “Thanks be to God!  I heard a sound from the sky that
said, ‘Because of this prayer, I will forgive your sin.’”  And she
said to the man, “After I die, tell my son about this and teach him
the prayer, that he may also be forgiven.”
After a short time she died, and the son gave the poor
good things [as an offering].
Then the man of God called for the son and told him the whole story.
The son
became angry, and took a pick and an axe and with several neighbors
went to remove the mother’s body [from the grave] and burn it.
He struck the
ground several blows and a voice came from the grave saying,
“Don’t bother people who rest in peace.”  Then he struck
the ground again, and he heard the voice again.
And the son said, “O, mother, you have done an awful
thing!  It is a terrible sin!  How can you be in peace?”  She said,
“Although it was a great sin, still I learned a prayer from the man
of God,  I recited it with belief, and God forgave my sin.
You must also go to the man and learn the prayer and recite it with
belief so that you will also be forgiven.”
So the boy
straightened up the grave and went to the man of God,
learned that prayer and was reciting it always.  And God
forgave him too.
Whoever recites this prayer with full belief, his
sin will be forgiven.  And people should not be in doubt.
.in 0
There is much that could be said
about this story–about, for example,
the location of the event in Baghdad, a bilingual Persian
and Arabic city; about the name of the innkeeper, which is
also the name of a Persian speaking region in eastern Iran and
Central Asia; or about the relationship of the women–but
I want to focus here on the
the most arresting feature of the story, which is, of course, the incest.
The central concern is the
oedipal relationship of the mother and the son, only in
this case, it is
a kind of obverse oedipal relationship, the mother
being passionately in love with him rather than he with her.
The oedipal attraction of a son for his mother
does appear, but transposed into an
attraction to his mother’s
daugther.
At issue in this story is the integrity of
the family and society.
Incest strikes at the
heart of society.  The proscription against incest is
the essential basis of human sociality, for it keeps
males
from cohabiting with the women in their family and so
preserves the family.  When Oedipus discoverd that the suitor of the
woman he loved,
the man he had killed, was his own father and
she his mother, he revolted against his passion and suppressed it.
Oedipus is thus a kind of archetype of the complex relationship
that forms the basis of the family,
entailing love and revulsion, jealousy and affection,
passion and self-control.
Freud regarded the locus of internalized societal norms
in the individual (the super-ego)
as “the heir of the Oedipus complex and
respresents ethical standards of mankind”.^h9^s
For Levi-Straus, the rules of
kinship and marriage, including the prohibition
against incest, “are the social state itself, reshaping
biological relationships and natural  sentiments…” (Levi-Strauss
1969 [1949]: 490).  “The prohibition of incest,” he says in
another place, “merely affirms, in a field vital to the group’s
survival, the preeminence of the social over the natural, the
collective over the individual,  organization over the arbitrary”.^h10^s
This is, then, a story about
the ultimate human social outrage.  The acts it describes were
against society, against “organization,” against human survival.
In the words of Levy-Bruhl incest is
“a monstrum,
________
a transgression spreading horror and fear.”^h11^s
It is the ultimate
offense against all that is considered virtuous and sublime.  And
here in this story we have it doubly–double monstrum, double
horror, double fear.
This is a myth in its most evocative strength, in which the
unthinkable is portrayed on a canvas of sheer appearance.  It
is a kind of archetypical representation, not an actual event, but
the projection of a fear; not a description of an actual
family, but of relations in families as they could be at their
worst, when all sociability breaks down.  It is an image of behavior at
its imagined end-point, the ultimate obscenity.  Levi-Strauss,
commenting on Freud’s interpretation of
Oedipus Rex, captures the
_______ ___
mythical power of this kind of story.
.in 8
“The desire for the mother or the sister, the murder of the
father and the son’s repentance, undoubtedly do not
correspond to any group of facts occupying a given place
in history.  But perhaps they symbolically express an
ancient and lasting dream.  The magic of this dream, its
power to mould men’s thoughts unbeknown to them, arises
precisely from the fact that the acts it evokes have never
been committed, because culture has opposed them at all
times and in all places.”^h12^s
.in 0
This story is an Islamic image of this
“ancient and lasting dream”,
and in that sense it represents the idealized
antithesis of the true Muslim, the kafir.
_____
The kafir in Quranic imagery is
_____
a denyer of the truth (Qur’an 50: 2-5), a worshiper of
other gods (28: 64), an adulterer (24: 4), and
unclean (9: 28).
In Afghanistan, the folk peoples, some of
whom I studied for the better part of two years,
have had little direct
contact with non-Muslims, except for the British and Russians
whom they fought in several wars.  Their concept of the
kafir, therefore, was until fairly recently
_____
relatively ideal, uncomplicated by direct experience with
“nice” unbelievers.  To them the
kafir is still an epitome of immorality, uncleanness and
_____
repulsiveness.
Their abhorrence of the
kafir is manifest, for instance, in their
_____
revulsion against pork, the most repulsive of foods,
forbidden to Muslims but eaten by kafirs.
______
In street parlance a kafir is a murdarkhor,
_____      __________
“a filth eater.”  More than
filthy, the pig is also said to be sexually promiscuous.  Someone
asked me, “Isn’t the pig the only animal that will mate
with his mother or sister?”
Besides actually touching and eating pork the
kafir will also drink wine, another food that,
_____
unlike Muslims almost everywhere else, the Afghan folk peoples have had
little experience with.  In popular
imagery wine makes people not only drunk but also lustful.  “It’s
not only the drunkennes that wine produces,” I once overheard a
mullah telling someone in a teashop, “it’s the other things that
go with it…”  The liscencious acts wine produces are the sorts
of things kafirs do.
______
Kafirs are suspected, of course, of
______
being promiscuous but also, worse, of being incestuous.  One
time, as I was sitting around a stove with a group of men in a
teashop, a  third-grade teacher asked me if
we marry in my country, or, he said, “do you do what the Russians
do?”  I wasn’t sure I had understood him, so he had to say it
again: “In your country do you marry or do you do what the
Russians do?”  One of the other men broke in to say, “Of course
they marry!  They don’t do what the Russians do!”  Naturally, I
wondered what the Russians do.  Eventually it came out that they
believed the Russians, rather than marry, simply cohabit
with whatever woman is at hand.  After that I
began to hear this idea in other contexts.  A man from Pul-i Khumri,
for example, who had travelled extensively in Soviet Central
Asia, told me that the Soviets put their children in nurseries
so they never know their parents or their siblings.
When they grow up, he said, “Who knows who they will take [in
marriage]!^h13^s
They could be
marrying their own sisters!”  Such is the image of the godless
Russian, a specific exemplication of the
kafir for these folk peoples.
_____
But beyond this, the image of incestuous
practice is not projected upon the Russians only, but upon
other “heretical” sect groups among themselves; and
as each Islamic sect group
considers the others heretical, they suspect each other of
clandestine incestuous rites.
Many Afghans
believe the Isma’ilis, a small and until recently isolated sect
who venerate the Aga Khan, practice secret rituals.  One
government official soberly explained to me that the Isma’ilis turn
the lights off and have sex with whomever they find in the
dark.  “Who knows?,” he said.  “They could be taking their own
mother or sister.”  “But,” he confided in me, “they will never
tell you.”  He was a Sunni speaking about Isma’ilis,
but eventually I heard this charge against
each of the three sects in Afghanistan–against Sunnis and Shi’ites
(the Iranian kind), as well as Isma’ilis.
And each time I was told,
“they will never tell you.”  Such, in the popular imagination,
is the behavior of people
beyond the pale of the proper religious order; they
are on the way, if not already being there, to being
sexually immoral, perhaps incestuous, perhaps even ritually
incestuous.
An aura of
obscenity is projected on those who
refuse to participate in legitimate Muslim society.  Heretics are,
like kafirs, unclean, even repulsive and filthy; they
______
consume wine; they will have sex with anyone, even a mother or
sister; they “turn out the lights”.
This is the horror of the young man’s predicament in our
story.  He has been duped into drinking wine like an ordinary
kafir and into committing incest like a kafir,
_____                                   _____
and worse, double incest.  The Qur’an says the kafir will
_____
be “troubled” and indeed in ordinary folk Afghan parlance another
synonym for kafir, besides “filth-eater,” is Qur’anzada,
_____                            __________
“Qur’an-cursed.”    No wonder the young man was overwhelmed with
remorse–and also his mother, once she saw the outcome of her
own immorality.
They were under the curse of the kafir.
_____
The story portrays the horror of an honorable
person caught in the unforgivable sin.
This is not only a story about a breach of the most
sacred of social mores, but also about
eternal virtues.  The offense, while an offense against the essential
fabric of decent society, is also an offense against God’s society,
against standards that
exist, eternal and sublime, in heaven.  For Muslims,
the ultimate moral authority is not society but God; in Islam God
has opinions about every person’s behavior, has a record of it, and
will someday hold them accountable for it.  His wrath lurks in this
story, stirring the mother and son to fear and grief and repentance, and
a search for redemption.
This why the hero of this story, if there is one, is the old
man.  For he has a specific and precious kind of knowledge, how to
win God’s forgiveness.  He is an
Islamic authority, a
custodian of the means of rectifying human failures, of
gaining forgiveness for sins, of asuaging feelings of guilt.
Through the resources he controls he can guide to
prosperity in this life and wellbeing in the
one to come.  His special provenience, as presented here, is
the Arabic prayer.  Once learned, although
because of its length the task may take several days, it can be
recited over and over again in order to gain deliverance,
as the Sufis recite the name of God and Hindus their
mantras.
The prayer has, as will
be seen, the overt appearance of worship and praise, but its
intent is petition, a request for redemption from an impossible
and seemingly unforgivable  circumstance.  The utilitarian intent
is made clear in the introduction, which promises “a
good name”, forgiveness of sins, “no trouble” in this life,
freedom from worry about the Last Judgement, preservation against
the devil and evil spirits.
This is a text about the quest for efficacy.  Indeed,
all the Persian texts in this book claim that the Arabic recitations
they introduce provide useful services.  One prayer, for instance,
is said to protect from knives and swords, from
guns and arrows, from “the magic of sorcerers” and
deceivers, from the evil eye and “every spirit,” from impotence,
damage by flood and fire, from blight and worms and
grasshoppers; it will also ease childbirth and, for the dying,
death; and it will help the dead during the
terrifying post-mortem doctrinal examinations of
the fierce angels, Munkir and Nakir.  The claims
made for the various texts in this book cover
what appears to be the gamut of life’s problems
in these people’s world, physical, social, economic,
and spiritual.  The prayers, therefore, despite their appearace as
moral texts, have useful
applications.  In the words of a mullah I knew, “they are tools, like
guns”.  They have power, and so provide a grip on
the problems and affairs of human existance.  The
line between worship and the quest for efficacy is thus vague, for
this Arabic recitation
can be as practical as it is worshipful.
Which is to say,
it is magic as well as religion.  This formula for
delivering the most culpable of sinners exemplifies a
method, a technique as well as a moral frame of mind.

2.2  The Arabic Text
___  ___ ______ ____
The Arabic text, then, in the economy of the medieval Islamic world
from which it sprang, is priceless.  You may wonder, when you see
it in translation, what makes it so special.  That’s the problem
with kabbalistic texts: they never sound right in translation
and anyway they
never work in translation.  The power is not in the meaning of
the text but in the worshipper’s identification with it.
The sacred power of the text is like that of the
Qur’an: it is experienced by a special
kind of personal identification, through which the
reciter internalizes its sacredness; the meaning is secondary.
Writing about the service the Qur’an renders in
worship, Hodgeson says
.in 8
[The Qur’an] was never designed to be read for information
or even for inspiration, but to be recited as an act of
committment in worship … What one did with the Qur’an was
not peruse it but to worship by means of it; not to
passively receive it but, in reciting it, to reaffirm it for
oneself…^h14^s
.in 0
A translation of the text does not get at its
special power and charm; whatever power it claims
comes through technical means, the main one here
being simply recitation.
The necessity of repeating sacred texts is explicitly stated in some
of the other Persian stories: one says its Arabic prayer, to work,
should be recited three times;
another should be recited every Friday.
These Arabic prayers could be–and presumably would be to a
Persian speaker who understood little Arabic–merely incantations.
I once learned
an incantation called the chihil qaaf, “the forty Ks,”
______ ____
from a man who in his youth had recited it countless
times in an attempt to get control of the jinns.  (It was to have
taken forty days, but after the first several days, when the boy had
become exhausted, his father intervened, and the regime was never
finished–and the jinns never conquered).  This incantation he
knew only as a burst of syllables, an unsegmentable string of
sounds–not even a word–so
he was incapable of teaching it to me.  I got it down only by
having him repeat it over and over again, listening for every
succeeding syllable until I had gotten all forty of them.  There
was no meaning in the  syllables themselves, only a power.
In such a case, the recitation of the text was a purely technical
exercise.
Besides recitation, there can be
other technical proceedures
for making a sacred text work.
One Arabic prayer,
according to its Persian introduction, has to be
written with musk and saffron, sealed with wax (in a scroll?),
washed in a pitcher and the washings drunk;
another has to be whispered  (“blown”) over crystaline sugar or
clean water and imbibed early in the morning.
The power of these texts is their
connection with the
unseen mechanisms of the cosmos that govern all earthly affairs.
One of the Arabic texts in this book is said to be written on
the side of God’s throne and on the palms of the hands of the
creatures who bear his throne; indeed, it is “because of the
spiritual blessing of the prayer [that] the throne is stabilized
in its place.”  Like the Qur’an, which is written in the language of
heaven, these recitations are intrinsic to God’s sacred
and virtual realms.  To know them and how to use them is to have
access to those realms.
This is why Arabic texts have such prominence in the Islamic
world, as they are the entre into the sacred reality.
The great modern author Jalal Al-e Ahmad once conveyed a sense of
their power to a pilgrim at an Iranian shrine:
.in 8
Words from the Koran echoed and re-echoed beneath the lofty
domes.  Those Arabic words poured out like rain and charged the
whole place with holiness.
On doors and walls, on the friezes, on the glasswork of the ceiling
which reflected in countless broken fragments the images of that
vast crowd, on the fronts and backs of Holy Books, on the prayer
books in men’s hands, on the threshold of the sepulcher and all
around it, on the great silver padlocks of the shrine–everywhere
those Arabic words were inscribed in thousands of designs and
figures and scrolls, on wood and tile, on brick, on silver,
on gold: everything was absorbed by their power.^h15^s
.in 0
It is this
mysterious grip on the mechanisms of the unseen world that the
old man’s Arabic prayer gave to the remorseful woman and her
son.  It gave them, the story claims, forgiveness and access to
God, a mighty precious commodity in a world whose mechanisms are
poorly understood and in any case are normally out of reach.
The power is appropriated through
the text directly.  It is
(alas) lost in translation.  If
you want the power, you’ll have to learn the Arabic.  All we can
do here is explain the meaning.
Actually, in fact, we can only summarize it.
The text, crammed into one paragraph, is as follows.
It begins, like almost everything Muslim, with the
phrase, “In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful.”
The rest of it, except for the last few lines, consists of
“benedictions”, blessings on Muhammad and other
sacred persons and on certain behaviors and statuses.
The first three lines stress his relationship to the
Prophets:  “Blessings on Muhammad, Lord of the Messengers” (the
term is rasul, i.e., the prophets); “Blessings on Muhammad, Lord
_____
of the Prophets” (nabi); “Blessings on Muhammad, Lord of the
____
representatives” (i.e., the prophets).  Then the blessings are
pronounced on good people generally: on the faithful, on Muslims,
on “the  straight,” the righteous, the generous (here the
term has a double meaning, the “generous” [karim] meaning also
_____
those endowed with sacred power), on those who pray, “the
conciliators, “the blessed” (again possibly referring to the
spiritually endowed), “the heartsick” (for God or goodness?),
“the noble” (possibly the spiritually endowed by virtue of
their descent), “the finest people”, those who  supplicate”
(again possibly referring to those with special access to God, as they
are often sought for intercessory help), “the holy
warriors”, “the assiduous”, “the wakeful” (for prayer),
“the spiritual guides”, “the intercessors on Judgement Day”,
“prophecy and the message”, the repentant, the contrite,
the repeaters, those in authority, those who affirm the
creed, the successors (of Muhammad), “the desirous” (for
spiritual things), and the victorious.  Blessings are then
pronounced upon the sacred persons and places associated with
Muhammad:  “Blessed be Muhammad, Lord of the Quraish (his
tribe)”, “Lord of the pure” (or fragrant), of the holy place, the
sacred mountains (presumably those that surround the two holy cities),
of Medina, Mecca, the Hashemites
(Muhammad’s clan), Taha and Ya Sin (Suras 20 and 36 of the
Qur’an), those who are “covered” (because of a chill during a
trance, as Muhammad once was), the covering, the flat land
(i.e., where the Ka’ba lies), the Hejaz, the Arabs (a term
not likely to have been invented by a Persian speaker).  This is
followed by a series of formulae for how
extensively Muhammad should be blessed.  “Blessed be Lord
Muhammad when the sun rises,” “… when the sun sets,”
“when the sun is at its zenith,” “when it sets,”
“when mountains move,” “when the earth declines,”
“when wild animals asssemble (in preparation for the
Judgement Day),” “when graves open (on the Judgement Day),”
“when hearts are exposed (for the Judgement),”
“when the books are read.”  This is followed by a
series of blessings pointing to Muhammad’s surperiority over the pious:
“Blessed be Muhammad, Lord of the satisfied,” “Lord of those
who stand up (to pray),” “the pure,” “those
born pure,” “those who pray at midday,” “the
truthful,” “the holy ones,” “the generous (or spiritually
endowed),” “those who fast,” “the patient,”
“the repeaters of the creed,” “the distinguished (for
virtue?),” “the intercessors,” “those born to mediate”
(i.e., between people and God),
“the godfearers,” “the regretful” (for
sin),” “the intimate” (with God), “the heirs (holy
descendants),” “the pioneers” (early Muslims), “later
believers,” “non-Arabs,” “the purest people,” “the
fastidious” (in ritual observance), “the honorable,”
“those who have the gospel” (= Christians?), “the strictly
careful” (in ritual observance), “the sent ones,” “the
guides,” “the good,” “writers” (of religious works),
“the blessed,” “the accepted” (by God),” “all created
things,” “the rich  (eloquent?) preachers,” “seekers
after forgiveness.”  There is another series on the supremacy of
Muahmmad over all sacred heroes, in which he is called “the Lord,
the finest prophet,” “Lord of the sons of Adam,” “Lord of the
beloved”, “of the noble,” “of the pure.”  And a series on his
personal  qualities: “the greatest creature,” “the chosen
prophet,” ” the sufficient prophet,” “the prophet and the
discriminating one,” “the truthful prophet,” “the illiterate
prophet,” “the one always for good,” “the one always with (even)
the bad,” “Lord of the dawn,” “Lord of the dusk.”  There is a
series on how many blessings should be recited: “as many as the
number of the faithful,” “as the sands of the sea,” “as the drops
of rain,” “as the stars,” “as trees and leaves,” “as the number
of months and days,” “as the number of plants,” “as days and
nights,” “as months and years,” “as birds and wings,” “as jinns
and humans,” “as people who pray,” “as people who do not pray,”
“as everything created,” “as should please you (God),” “as
creatures that swim,” “as grains and fruits,” “as creatures in
the sea,” “as angels,” and “infinitely, until the Judgement
Day.”
The prayer concludes with the following benediction and petition:
“And blessings be on the prophets
and holy messengers, and the angels
nearest God and His noble servants and all who obey him.  And be
merciful, You Who are merciful, the Most Merciful One.  I beg of
You mercy, O You, Who are the most merciful of the merciful.”
More could be made of this text than space allows
here, but the kinds of persons and behaviors considered venerable
seems worth noting, since that represents the structure
of honor and authority in this society.  The
following are singled out as deserving honor: prophets,
“representatives,” “sent ones”, intercessors, intercessors on the
Judgement Day, the Quraish tribe, the Hashemite clan, the
“heirs,” the “noble” lineages.  Also certain kinds of esteemed
behavior are recognized: the faithful, the straight,
the conciliators, the holy warriors, the victorious, the
truthful, the heartsick (for good), the  repentant, the contrite,
the spiritually minded, the patient, the God fearing, the
distinguished (for virtue), the assiduous (in ritual),
the fastidious, the
strictly careful, the prostrators, the wakeful, the creed sayers,
those who stand up to pray, those who fast, those who supplicate,
those who write (religious works).
The text is thus an index to the kinds of
persons admired in this Islamic culture,
who consist in general of three kinds: the pious and
devout in spirit, the fastidious and assiduous in ritual,
and the descendants (“heirs”) in a line of sacred
persons.
In whatever sense the qualities venerated here were understood
by those who recited this text they could have
informed their attitude and understanding.
The terms imply a range of images of what is good, in
stark contrast to the imagery of evil or moral misfortune
portrayed in the Persian text.
The antithesis of the evil portrayed in the Persian text is
developed as a set of positive qualities and sacred
persons in the Arabic text.
This list of qualities together describe what,
in this world view, is the ideal Muslim, the moral person
that the reciter, if he cannot in all respects achieve, must
at least in all possible ways, emulate.

3.  The Broader Relevance of the Text
__  ___ _______ _________ __ ___ ____
We have treated this Persian story and the Arabic recitation it
recommends as literary texts, even though they are, as far as I
know, unique.^h16^s
What they actually reveal is a certain imaginative world that
informed the lives of people in the eastern lands of Islam
in the medieval period.  People of varying sorts–the
“original” author, and a succession of individuals who copied
these texts, and other people
who used them (or some version of them)
over an indeterminate number of years–took
care to preserve them and to read and re-read them so as to
imbibe their essence, to internalize their values and
become imbued by and blessed by their
powers.  There are issues and themes in these texts that engrossed them,
gripped their imagination and so shaped their vision of the
world.
They gave substance to images of ideal behavior–in the case of the
Persian text to images of
the abhorrent, in the case of the
Arabic text, to images of the exemplary–and so,
ideally at least, they served to
constrain their behavior, keeping it in bounds, within
the limits of  discretion, and to induce it to
maintain good and honorable standards.  The texts thus served
as devices for internalizing values.  By means of them
people came
to understand themselves and to see their lives
in a moral and virtual context.
It was Ezra Pound, I think, who said that
“Literature is news that remains news.”  To these people these texts
remained news, despite many re-readings, because they dealt with
issues of lasting significance
in terms that seemed
thoroughly authentic.
The preeminent appeal of the texts, and
indeed of the whole
manuscript, is the hope of efficacy and
redemption.  This book promises relief from misfortunes of all
kinds and from the ultimate one, rejection and punishment in
the Last Judgement.  Here in this text are the expressions,
couched in the specific imagery of Persio-Islamic culture,
of what is presumably a universal fear, the fear of death, which,
to use the Biblical phrasing, subjects everyone to “lifelong
bondage”.^h17^s  If there are any themes that are
“always news”, certainly relief
from the fear of death is one of them.  If
there are any themes that make literature engrossing, it is its
ability to dramatize the quest for permanence
and significance.
For behind this concern with the Last Judgement is a less
explicit one, a concern to know one’s self, one’s
significance, one’s place in a wider, more enduring context.
There is a desire to understand what one wants to be;
how one wants to behave; how, in working out one’s life, one should
act to be true to oneself.
The repeated reading of the Persian myth and the
reciting of the prayer gives
a sense of what is good and
what evil, what is desirable and what repulsive.  It thus helps
induce people to cling to the good and desirable and to
recoil from the evil and abhorrant.  This text, with its
imagery of incest and redemption, is a text for internalizing
right from wrong–or better, in the emphasis of the Persian
myth, wrong from right.
The concerns with death and redemption evident in this text
are, we presume, selective.  Death, failure, sickness,
misfortune–these are no more
real than the other experiences of life: joy,
pleasure, pride, honor.  They
are not anyone’s only concern.  We must regard this story, the
imagery of sin, despair, horror and dread portrayed here, as one
set of concerns among many.
We have been looking at a mood, in itself common to all
of us, one mood among many.  We have
have, as it were, observed a pious Muslim
at prayer, in pursuit of efficacy and redemption.  It is indeed
one of the poses a Muslim would have struck; there would
have been other moods, other poses.  It is because we suppose
that the moods and poses presented here resemble our own that we
can suppose we understand something about Yaqub who appreciated
this book.  We have induced a picture
of a human being like ourselves, engaged in a
struggle like ours, the attempt to cope with failure, self-reproach, and
the fear of insignificance, and a struggle to have hope,
meaning, and a sense of purpose and significance
in a morally problematic world.
As always, such a universal quest is couched in the
specific imagery of a distinct cultural tradition,
in this case
an Islamic one.
In Islam it is called “the great
holy struggle.”  For the pious Muslim, it is a holy
war, a struggle against the nafs, the natural senses, or
____
what the Apostle Paul (whose imagery has shaped western thought
about this quest) would have called “the flesh.”  This
private, personal struggle is the honored tradition of holy war
among Muslims, the subject of a massive literature in Islam,
venerated and memorized
by even illiterate peoples; almost every great Islamic writer
since the beginnings of the movement in
the seventh century has had something memorable to say
about the war against the base impulses of the self.  It is also the
concern of fables and aphorisms used by people,
illiterate and literate alike, all
over the Muslim world.  The holy war against the weaknesses of
the flesh is a universally accepted and idealized theme of Muslim
literature, oral and written.
Now, consider how this
essentially private and moral concept
compares with the typical Western image of Muslim holy war.
For practically anyone able to read these words the term “holy war”
suggests the quest of a band of
incorrigable sectarian fanatics
who force their will on other people, even
attacking them in the name of God, to rob,
pillage and take hostage, wild men who
threaten the fabric of civilization.
It happens, in fact, that
the Ghaznawids,
builders of the great city in whose ruins Yaqub’s manuscript was
found, resembled that stereotype as nearly as any, for
in many successive invasions their warriors galloped
out of the Suleiman Khel mountains
onto the plains of India to conquor in
the name of God.  So also did the early
Safawids who from Anatolia invaded Iran in the fifteenth century,
announcing that, having distinguished themselves in the
great holy war against their carnal natures, they
were now ready to wage the lesser holy war against
infidels and the spiritually indifferent.^h18^s
Indeed, the concept of holy war has informed the behavior of
Muslims who have gone to war virtually
everywhere; the appeal to holy war–whatever the merits of
the particular occasion–has been the one common moral idiom
that has brought Muslim people together, stiffened their resolve,
given them the sense of purpose and meaning that the extreme
exertions of killing and dying in battle require.
Today, it has informed the acts of extremists
coming out of the Middle East.
Virtually every
extremist group in the Muslim world has declared itself in a
holy war.  Virtually every attack, whether against soldiers or
civilians, against Israelis or Arabs, against
Egyptians or Americans–every hijacking, every bombing–is an
act of holy war.  The result has been a dangerous tendency
among Westerners for
Islamic devotion and terrorist activity to be merged.
It has become a trend in the West to regard all
Muslims as extremsists, terrorists, or the harborers of
terrorists.
The pervasive moral ambience of
the  Muslim world is being reduced down to fanaticism and
barbarism.
What our manuscript reveals of course is that the real moral
ambience of Muslim life is considerably more subtile, more deeply
felt, more morally informed and
impelled than our Western stereotypes allow.
Our copyist, Yaqub, removed by a century in time and by half the
globe in space, is a specific exemplification of the underlying
quest of pious Muslims, or if you please, of all Muslims at their
pious best.  The true Muslim, the archetypical Muslim, would
eschew evil and assiduously cultivate the favor to God.
The extremists, coming out of that tradition use it, as Irish
extremists use Christian moral imagery, to justify what they do.
Morals, as they are wont to be, often end up serving practical
ends rather than controlling them.
I have called our copyist and his text medieval because they have
seemed more like a tradition now long past, more like the Islamic
world of the previous thousand years than like our own world
and time.  As it turns out, the term misleads.  These
texts, and the world of moral images they
represent, are contemporary, as much a part of our modern world
as we are.  Only most of us, including a fair number of
scholars, even as
recently as a decade ago,
would have treated this text as obscolescent, unworthy of the
extended attention paid it here.  This was because to the
Western scholarly mind the world was
modernizing.  Power was centralizing, government was becoming
more “rational” and organized, and society more
secular.  And religious ideals were being, it was said,
“rationalized” like everything else.  Politics was thus
presumed to be discrete from religion, and
a political culture could be developed
without the overt and intense concern for morals and
virtual ideals that religious institutions are concerned with.
This, many people supposed, was progress.
In such a world the moral imagery of an
isolated Muslim and his Persianate culture of
a century ago had only historical interest.
But events since 1978 have radically challenged the
modernist  supposition.  The most dramatic of them was of course
the Iranian Revolution.  Iran, one the most progressive nations
of the third world, where in the 1970’s you could buy virutally every
consumer product of the modern world, from sun glasses to
Mercedes trucks, and which, with American help, had become the
fourth strongest nation of the world, exploded.  Thousands of
people chanted Islamic slogans for hours on end.  People
flagellated themselves in the streets.
A million people greeted Khomeini at
Tehran airport.  That social convulsion shocked and confused many
social scientists.
It seemed too
medieval, too religious for the modern world.
It has, as we all know, remained virulent for years.
But the Iranian Revolution was not the only event to
challenge the modernization paradigm of Western social
scientists.  Another was the
response of the  Afghanistan peoples to the
Soviet invasion.  In a host of uncoordinated uprisings they
have created havoc for the Soviets
in every province of the country and limited
Soviet control to the main cities and to a few highways
during daylight–and
although their motives are diverse and by no means
wholly religious,
they have almost universally seen their cause as an Islamic
holy war.
The Afghanistan resistance groups have become generally
known as mujahedin, “holy war fighters.”
_________
And along side the  convulsive holy wars in Iran and
Afghanistan there have been others, notably the Iranian
war against Iraq, and the sectarian fighting in Lebanon, in
which every side regards its cause as a
holy war.
In these movements the moral imagery of the common
people has entered the public arena, even as the common people
themselves have become more directly involved.  This is perhaps what
might have been expected from the more culturally isolated
peoples of the
Islamic world, but interest in
holy war has been especially noticeable among the technologically
educated young Muslim leaders, who guide and instigate the current
attempts among Muslims all over the world
to establish institutions that are more explicitly Islamic.
Wrongly called Muslim “fundamentalists,”
they are, on the one hand, urbane and educated and, on the other,
zealous for Islamic cultural forms–a combination that confounds
the modernization paradigm.  Worse, they–at
least some of them–consider Western values alien
to Islam and a threat to its essential integrity.^h19^s
But the trend toward values and moral images once deemed moribund
is not limited to the Muslim world.  Everywhere there
has been a disenchantment with the secular ideals
associated with science and modernization,
and hope for religious and moral solutions has grown.
In the third world
there has been, for instance, a growing disappointment with
Western-sponsored development activities.  Heralded promises of
modernization have generally not materialized and the new
generations are frustrated.  Even in the West, as we
all now well know, there
are doubts about where science and modernization are going–caused
notably by twentieth century wars and, in the last few years,
by dramatic technological failures, and the growing prospect
of a nuclear holocaust.
The result has been a return to religious ideals all over the
world.  In the Islamic
world, where progressive agendas have dominated
public arenas for generations,
new voices have called Muslims back to a more zealous
Islam, defined somewhat variously, of course–some to a
more strictly pious Islam, some to a more nationalistic Islam.
And elsewhere in the world Buddhist, Hindu, Sikh and
Christian groups are showing fresh ability to stir
popular feeling.  Like Yaqub the Less
we ourselves are living in a changing world, where several kinds of
moral appeal compete for public acceptance,
where new agendas offer fresh hope for solutions to
contemporary problems.
Like him we don’t
clearly see a trajectory through the cacophony of voices;
the competing voices merely
confuse and distract.  It may be that, like him, we are on the verge of
seeing a new social paradigm
arise to capture the world’s imagination.
And, as he
may have felt about the distant thunder of Western ideas in his own
day, we may find some of the moral impulses
of our own day
alarming and forbiding.  It may be, in fact, that the
trajectory of change in our time will turn out to be the reverse of that
in his.  While his world was
tending to more secular idioms, ours may be tending
toward more religious ones.
Whatever the long-term
trajectory of change,
the moral images of a deeply religious sort
appear likely to remain virile
for a good while.
This is self evident,
at least, to most Muslims currently at war, for
whom all the ideals of the
private quest for morality and
significance are brought to bear upon desperate public issues,
to whom all wars,
inward against the flesh and outward against kafirs, are
______
always holy.  They are pure struggles, of the clean against
the filthy, the good against the abhorrant, the moral
against the debauched.
For the enemies are kafirs, of course.
______
The Shah was an impostor and infidel to Khomeini, and
Carter “the great Satan.”  More recently Reagan has
been to Khaddafi a “crusader” like the
kafirs who long ago invaded the Islamic Middle East.
______
And to the Afghan mujahedin
_________
the Soviets are the archetypical kafirs.
______
This was captured in a recent mujahedin
_________
cartoon of the real meaning of the hammer and
sickle: inside the Soviet logo
various horrors of the Afghanistan war are
portrayed, among them, in a central place, a wine glass and a
terrified woman cowering in the background.  The image of the
repulsive, lustful profligate unbeliever,
newly contextualized in a symbol of
the frantic struggle for
family and home and country,
now epidomizes the enemy of the Afghanistan people.
The moral imagery of this century-old Islamic
manuscript still lives, still guides
the behavior of people in
the Muslim world, still
provides a moral focus for social concerns.  However
obsolescent in style and individual in its moral appeal,
Yaqub’s prayer book expresses one of the powerful
moral appeals in our contemporary world.
.pa

Acknowledgements

I am indebted to several people for assistance that made
this article possible.  Two people helped in the translation
of the texts who, because of their personal circumstances,
cannot be named.
Charles and Virginia Prewitt gave permission to photocopy
the manuscript and refer to it in publication.
John Bowen made helpful comments on the original lecture,
as did several other people in the audience.
Frances Robinson drew my attention to Aini’s memoirs,
cited in footnote 4.  Jennifer Day helped produce the
manuscript.
.pa

Notes

1.  C. S. Lewis.  An Experiment in Criticism (Cambridge:
Cambridge University) 1961.

2.  November 13 was a Sunday on our calendar, but as “evening” of
an Islamic day begins at dusk, his “Monday evening” and
our “Sunday evening” were the same.  The date happens (?) to have
been an even two weeks before the beginning of the Islamic New
Year.

3.  There are many good sources on the modern history of Islam.
Besides other sources cited here,
I have consulted George E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle
East: From the Rise of Islam to Modern Times (New York: Praeger)
1964; Francis Robinson, Atlas of the Islamic World Since
1500 (New York: Facts on File) 1982.

4.  Sadriddin Aini, Pages from My Own Story: Memoirs
(Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House), 1958, p. 5.

5.  Roy Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and
Politics in Iran (New York: Simon and Schuster) 1985, pp. 161-2.

6.  The authoritative works on the Ghaznawids are by C. E.
Bosworth: The Ghazvawids, Their Empire in Afghanistan and
Eastern Iran 994-1040 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University), 1963;
The Later Ghaznawids in Afghanistan and Northern India,
1040-1186 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University), 1977; The Medieval
History of Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia (London: Vaviorum),
1977; “Gihad in Afghanistan and Muslim India”, in Israel Oriental
Studies IX (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University), 1983.
On the culture of the eastern lands of Islam see
Francis Robinson, op. cit.

7.  Roy Muttahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic
Society (Princeton: Princeton University) 1980, p. 142.

8.  The term here is da’wa, a recitation or petition.
_____

9.  The source is The Ego and the Id; quoted in Marvin K. Opler,
Culture and Social Psychiatry (New York: Atherton) 1967, p. 188.

10. Claude Levi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures of Kinship
(Boston: Beacon) 1963 [1949], pp. 490, 45.

11. Lucien Levy-Bruhl, Le Supernaturel et la Nature dans la
Mentalit~e Primitive (Paris) 1931, p. 247.

12. Op. cit, p. 491.

13. The Persian term was zan giriftan, which is ambiguous;
___ ________
it often means (but not necessarily) “to marry”.

14. Marshall Hodgeson, The Venture of Islam (Chicago: University
of Chicago) 1974, vol. I, p. 367.

15. Roy Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and
Politics in Iran (New York: Simon and Schuster) 1985, p. 292-3.

16. Professor Gerhild Williams has pointed out that the Persian
incest story resembles a thirteenth century European legend.

17. Letter to the Hebrews 2: 14, 15.

18. Michel Mazzaoui, The Origins of the Safawids: Si’ism,
Sufism and the Gulat (Weisbaden: Verlag) 1972, p. 75.

19. Much has been written on modern Islamic fundamentalism,
not all of it accurate.
The most helpful sources to me have been: Olivier Roy,
L’Afghanistan: Islam et Modernit~e Politique (Paris:
Editions du Seuil) 1985
(on the Afghan type, which he calls “Islamism”);
Roy Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet, op. cit,
(on the Iranian type, presented discursively but perceptively);
Ira Lapidus, “Presidential Address, 1984 Meeting of the Middle
East Studies Association” in Middle East Studies Association
Bulletin Vol. 19, No. 1 (July, 1985), pp. 1-8
(on the situation in the Muslim world generally, presented
succinctly and with authority).

---

---

Projects/CentralAsiaSources/ChinaFar East/ KaplanChinaAfghanistan

Robert L. Canfield

A region that might be called Greater Central Asia has been gaining in strategic importance in the new global geopolitics,^[1] a process that Beissinger (2002:1)[2] describes as “one of the pivotal transformations of the twentieth century.”[3] The term “great game” – first coined by Lt. (later Captain) Arthur Connoly of the Sixth Bengal Native Light Cavalry and immortalized in Kipling’s masterpiece Kim ‒ invokes the nineteenth century struggles for hegemony in Central Asia between (mainly) the Russians, who were pressing eastward into the region, and the British in India, who were trying to secure their northwestern frontier, which they deemed vulnerable to invasion from Central Asia. Their “game” conjoined the grand schemes of empire with the personal intrigues of local actors who could divert them for their own parochial ends, producing outcomes no one could foresee.

A NEW REGIONAL CONFIGURATION

The use of the term “great game” by contemporary observers[4] may seem appealing in evoking images of the intrigue, mystery, and subterfuge encountered by Russian and British adventurers into what was then “forbidden land.” But use of the term can mask critical realities in the twenty-first century. It is risky to impose the clichés of a storied past upon situations in the contemporary world (Stroehlein 2009), for the Central Asia of the present differs radically from that of even the recent past. The several countries of Greater Central Asia ‒ that is, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and China’s westernmost province, Xinjiang, along with the adjacent countries to the south, viz. Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. These countries have been drawn into more direct and immediate contact as infrastructural improvements have been introduced in the last half-century, but especially since the disappearance of the Soviet Union. Recently highways have been resurfaced and extended (e.g., from Kyrgyzstan to China[5]); air traffic facilities have been improved and air service expanded (e.g., direct services between Ashgabat and Beijing on Turkmen Airlines[6]); rail lines have been extended (e.g., between China and Kazakhstan; Alaomulki 2001:8-10); satellite telephony has been introduced (notably in Afghanistan)[7]; and deep sea ports have been built at Gwadar, Pakistan, and Chah Bahar, Iran.[8] Increasingly new possibilities are opening up for economic, social, and political interaction among the peoples of Greater Central Asia. Lands that were once forbidding and mysterious, separating the great population centers of Eurasia, are now corridors of economic and social interconnection among these populations (Garret, Rahr, and Watanabe 2000; Kleveman 2003; Canfield 2008).

The integrative effect of these improvements has brought the Soviet successor states and the neighboring countries of South Asia and the Middle East together into a region of strategic importance. It is now useful to speak of “Greater Central Asia”[9] as a zone where interdependencies are sufficiently intense and strategic issues sufficiently vital to prompt political and economic planners to track affairs in the region as a whole. Rajan Menon has explicitly made the case for seeing this constellation of countries as a single region:

The convention of defining Central Asia as a grouping of five states [the practice during the Soviet period] is of diminishing value for effective policy making and sound strategic analysis. A seamless web connects Central Asia proper, the South Caucasus, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and China’s Xinjiang province. Thinking in terms of a “greater Central Asia” captures the bigger picture and reflects how forces from one part of this extended region radiate across borders to other parts. Thus, an axiom of both policymaking and analysis should be that the consequences of a major change in one part of greater Central Asia will affect its other parts, often quickly and dramatically and through multiple networks (Menon 2003: 200-201).

THE RACE TO DEVELOP INFRASTRUCTURE

Owing to its rich natural resources, this region has become the focus of intense development activities. The richest concentrations of hydrocarbons in Central Asia lie in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (the latter is now believed to have the world’s second largest gas reserves). Those in the Caucasus are well known and already being developed. And the gas and oil reserves of Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, which are as yet undetermined, may turn out to be substantial as well. Moreover, exploitable deposits of many other vital minerals exist in the region (Figure 0.1). [10]

Many countries have been racing to establish links to Central Asia, currently to participate in the construction of pipelines into the newly accessible gas and oil fields, activities that entail political and military posturing as well as diplomatic maneuvering, for pipelines “signify and embody alliances and cooperation” and establish “axes for the international projection of influence” (Cutler 2007: 110).[11]

In the current context, many routes from production sites to consumers are possible.  Russia was not the preferred route of export for the Central Asian republics when they became independent in the 1990s. Nor for the Americans

and other western powers, who tried to ensure that pipelines from Central Asia were diverted away from Russia, to minimize possibilities of interdiction. The

Figure 0.1: Resources and Products of Greater Central Asia *

Northern States	Natural Resources	Agricultural Products	Industries (non-agricultural)
Kazakhstan	major deposits of petroleum, natural gas, coal, iron ore, manganese, chrome ore, nickel, cobalt, copper, molybdenum, lead, zinc, bauxite, gold, uranium	grain (mostly spring wheat), cotton; livestock	tractors and other agricultural machinery, electric motors, construction materials
Turkmenistan	petroleum, natural gas, coal, sulfur, salt	Cotton, grain; livestock	natural gas, oil, petroleum products, textiles, food processing
Uzbekistan	natural gas, petroleum, coal, gold, uranium, silver, copper, lead and zinc, tungsten, molybdenum	Cotton, vegetables, fruits, grain; livestock	textiles, food processing, machine building, metallurgy, natural gas, chemicals
Tajikistan	hydropower, some petroleum, uranium, mercury, brown coal, lead, zinc, antimony, tungsten, silver, gold	Cotton, grain, fruits, grapes, vegetables; cattle, sheep, goats	aluminum, zinc, lead, chemicals and fertilizers, cement, vegetable oil, metal-cutting machine tools, refrigerators and freezers
Kyrgyzstan	abundant hydropower; significant deposits of gold and rare earth metals; locally exploitable coal, oil, and natural gas; other deposits of nepheline, mercury, bismuth, lead, and zinc	tobacco, cotton, potatoes, vegetables, grapes, fruits and berries; sheep, goats, cattle, wool	small machinery, textiles, food processing, cement, shoes, sawn logs, refrigerators, furniture, electric motors, gold, rare earth metals
Southern States	Natural Resources	Agricultural Products	Industries (non-agricultural
Iran	petroleum, natural gas, coal, chromium, copper, iron ore, lead, manganese, zinc, sulfur	Wheat, rice, other grains, sugar beets, fruits, nuts, cotton; dairy products, wool; caviar	petrochemicals, textiles, cement and other construction materials, food processing (particularly sugar refining and vegetable oil production), metal fabricating, armaments
Afghanistan	natural gas, petroleum, coal, copper, chromite, talc, barites, sulfur, lead, zinc, iron ore, salt, precious and semiprecious stones	Opium, wheat, fruits, nuts, wool, mutton, sheepskins, lambskins	small-scale production of textiles, soap, furniture, shoes, fertilizer, cement; handwoven carpets; natural gas, coal, copper
Pakistan	natural gas, limited petroleum, poor quality coal, iron ore, copper, salt, limestone	Cotton, wheat, rice, sugarcane, fruits, vegetables; milk, beef, mutton, eggs	textiles and apparel, food processing, pharmaceuticals, construction materials, paper products, fertilizer, shrimp

* Source: Index Mundi: http://www.indexmundi.com/

Americans also opposed the construction of pipelines through Iran, seeing Iran as an adversary ever since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 (Klare 2002: 90). Owing to American involvement, the 1700 km pipeline from Baku servicing Europe, which was completed in 2005, successfully avoided both Russia and Iran, passing through Tbilisi to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea. The Americans also have favored the establishment of a Transcaspian link of Kazakhstan’s giant off-shore Kashagan field into the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.[12] But these routes are more expensive than the shorter ones through Russia and Iran (which would connect to the Persian Gulf; Naughten 2008: 431). In May, 2007, pointedly rejecting American and European proposals, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia jointly announced that they will cooperate in building a gas pipeline from the Caspian Sea into Kazakhstan and Russia.[13] Nabucco, a six-company consortium sponsored by the EU, has plans to begin construction of a 3300 km pipeline from the Caspian Basin via Turkey to Bulgaria, Serbia and Croatia and western Hungary. Russian-owned Gazprom has responded to Nabucco’s project with a proposal to build a pipeline from Russia under the Black Sea to Bulgaria and thence to central Europe.  It is possible that both lines could be built, given the large expected demand in Europe.[14]

In this race Russia has a certain advantage because the infrastructure inherited (but aging) from the Soviet period converges on the Russian metropole. Blessed with the world’s largest gas supplies, the second largest coal reserves, and eighth largest oil supplies, Russia is already the world’s largest exporter of natural gas and the second largest exporter of oil.[15] Moreover, it is strategically located as a natural route of export for the Central Asian republics. And its intermediate position between two broad energy consuming populations, European and Chinese, could eventually endow Russia with even more effective leverage.

But China is also a major player in the competition for access to Central Asia’s fossil fuels. Already the second largest consumer of oil in the world, and, with a growth rate of over 8% before the world economic decline introduced new uncertainties, China was expected to surpass U.S. consumption within a few years, a the pace that is likely to resume as soon as a general recovery develops. The Chinese have won permission to develop several oil fields in Uzbekistan (Atal 2005), and they have already completed a 1000-kilometer oil pipeline from Atasu, Kazakhstan, into Xinjiang that will deliver up to 200,000 barrels of oil per day (Kazakhstan-China oil 2006). They are building a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan that will be operational in 2009 (Naughten 2008: 433). Their largest state-owned oil company has acquired PetroKazakhstan, one of Kazakhstan’s major energy producers (Blank 2006), and they have initiated talks about constructing a natural gas pipeline all the way from Kazakhstan to Shanghai (Appelbaum 2005). At the same time they have established close ties with Iran, now their second largest oil supplier, for which they provide military assistance and nuclear expertise (Djalili and Kellner 2006). And in March, 2009, the two countries announced a $3.2 billion deal in which China will help develop the South Pars field, a huge cavity beneath the Persian Gulf that geologists believe is the world’s largest gas reservoir. China is Afghanistan’s largest investor, building highways to Iran and developing the giant copper mine at Aynak. Their aggressive advance into the region reflects an ambition vision to establish a “new Silk Road of modern railways and highways as a vehicle to project Chinese wealth and influence far westward, not only through Central Asia, but to Iran and the Middle East,” a project that will reshape power relations in Eurasia (Munro 1994: 235).

India has no less a requirement for energy, its demand being expected to rise more than three-fold by 2020. Having lost out to the Chinese in the bidding for PetroKazakhstan, the Indian government has turned to Iran and Turkmenistan. In 2005 the Indians signed a 25-year agreement with Iran to obtain 5 million tons of liquefied natural gas annually, and they plan to develop two Iranian oil fields. In another deal they have acquired rights to develop a portion of Iran’s North Pars gas field. By 2010 they will be importing about 60 million standard cubic meters of Iranian gas per day. And they have an interest in a plan to run a 1,750 mile natural gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan (which the Americans oppose; Kripalani 2004).[16] They have also arranged to buy five to six million tons of oil from Azerbaijan annually.[17] Like so many other countries, the Indian government has an interest in the projected natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan and Pakistan whenever it can be built.

Pakistan is in the race too. As soon as the former Soviet republics became independent Pakistan offered them economic assistance and credits – for instance, a loan of 55 million US dollars to Tajikistan in 1992, to build a hydro-electric power station (Lounev and Shirokov 1998). And like the other countries already mentioned Pakistan has a desperate interest in the projected Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan pipeline, as it would garner transit fees as well as gas for its own uses (Cutler 2007: 122). As mentioned above, the port for this pipeline has already been built at Gwadar. The conditions that compel Pakistan and India to cooperate in the transport of fuel are intensifying, but their long-running quarrel over Kashmir has so far defied every effort at resolution (Atal 2005).

Also joining in the race for Central Asian energy is Japan, the world’s second largest economy. As the Japanese import almost all their crude oil from the Middle East, their need for diverse energy sources is dire. They have invested in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, and in 2004 they inked a $2 billion deal to develop Iran’s massive Azadegan oilfield. Like so many other nations, Japan looks forward to the time when oil and gas can be exported through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the port of Gwadar, a plan that cannot advance as long as these countries are insecure.[18] Japan may be at a disadvantage in Central Asia, as it has an insignificant military force, but its large cash reserves give it leverage over the long run.[19]

The South Koreans likewise have an interest in Central Asia, as they have to import 97% of their energy; and they have been active: already 320,000 Koreans live in the region. Korea and Uzbekistan have established a 50-50 joint oil exploration venture in Uzbekistan and a joint project to mine molybdenum and tungsten.[20] Indeed, the Koreans are pursuing other mineral resources in the region. They have bought copper mines and a smelting plant in Kazakhstan (Alaolmulki 2001: 8-10), and the governments of Korea and Uzbekistan have agreed on several other cooperative projects. In 2008 they signed a $400 million deal for Korea to purchase 2600 tonnes of uranium between 2010 and 2016, an amount that will supply about 9% of South Korea’s annual demand for uranium. Already Korea has 20 nuclear reactors, which provide 40% of their electricity, and three more are in construction.

THE OTHER ISSUE: INSURGENCY

Any list of the reasons for the intense interest of the world in Greater Central Asia must include the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which worry many countries but especially their neighbors. Most of these insurgencies claim to be fighting an Islamic holy war against the corrupting influences of non-Muslim societies. But some of these groups were for many years actively recruited, trained, and equipped by the Pakistani intelligence service in order to produce a supply of willing troops for the struggle against India over Kashmir. While the government of Afghanistan has been weak for generations – ever since the Communist coup d’état of April, 1978 ‒ the weaknesses of the Pakistani state were less evident until 2008 and 2009. Until that time the Pakistani military had been solely concerned with the threat of India.  But by summer 2009 a specifically home-grown insurgency, the Pakistani Taliban, was challenging the army; the threat to the nation was now too blatant to ignore. The Taliban and Al Qaeda, ensconced in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, have united and been reinforced by experienced fighters from Iraq, fresh volunteers from the Arab Middle East, Uzbek dissidents fleeing the repressions of President Islam Karimov, and Uyghur nationalists avoiding Chinese repressions in Xinjiang. Together these fighters have created a loosely interlinked set of forces that threaten the stability of both Afghanistan and Pakistan.  While some of them are attacking Afghan, American, and NATO troops in Afghanistan, others are fighting their Pakistani sponsors.[21]

As long as insurgent groups can threaten infrastructural construction in Afghanistan and Pakistan the other nations interested in this region will delay producing the pipelines, highways, and railroads that are crucial for long term stability and economic prosperity. In the mean time, however, China and India have been establishing positions on the Indian Ocean that will eventually connect with transport facilities from Central Asia – the Chinese at the Pakistani port of Gwadar (to become, among other things, the port for the projected hydrocarbon pipelines from Turkmenistan), the Indians at the Iranian port of Chah Bahar (to be a port for overland shipping into landlocked Afghanistan).[22]

THE UNRULINESS OF EVENTS

Critical as these international struggles are for the course of affairs, however, they are not alone in shaping the course of affairs in such a strategic region. Regions have “special unities embedded in numerous larger and wider units,” each of which may be “long-lasting but ultimately changing,” and at different rates (Fragner 2001). It is imperative, therefore, that affairs in Greater Central Asia be tracked on many levels, national and local; and in many contexts, official and informal. Proper examination of affairs in this region need to focus on processes of change in specific situations in local contexts as well as the strategic policies of the world powers in the region. We need to know the perspectives and concerns of various sorts of people, many of whom have narrower horizons and more immediate concerns than those of the world’s strategic planners. Such folks, acting from particular positions, with parochial interests and agendas, make sense of situations and events in their own terms, deploying familiar strategies in ways they see fit. They become aware of broad trends as the profiles of opportunity for them open or foreclose according to their fields of vision. When circumstances shift abruptly and the certainties of the past lose their salience ‒ as has been taking place in Greater Central Asia ‒ folks make new agreements tentatively, to be terminated when necessary. So, from the point of view of individuals and local groups caught up in the flow of such a fluid history, relationships can be provisional, alliances fragile and transitory, and economic and political opportunities availed or ignored in respect to local understandings and the resources at hand (Monsutti 2005; Closson 2005).

This fluidity in relations and alliances introduces many uncertainties that defy the human ability to foresee.  Local, national and regional affairs have a life of their own and confound the predictions of experts. Especially, it would seem, in this region. Even though, for example, in the 1960s and 1970s, Iran was being studied by many social scientists, scarcely anyone anticipated the cataclysmic explosion of 1978-1979 that installed an entirely new Islamic order – indeed, how many “experts” predicted the new explosion of popular resistance in Iran? The quiet implosion of the Soviet Union was “indisputably one of the most astonishing geopolitical events of the century” (Fuller 1994:19).[23] The general collapse of order in Afghanistan after the Soviets withdrew was pretty much unforeseen, and especially the ferocious battle for Kabul (1992-1996). Scarcely anyone expected the Tajiks and Uzbeks to seize and hold the capital city, as they did in 1992, instead of the Pushtuns who had always done so before. And virtually no one dreamed that an unknown loosely assembled Islamist group, the Taliban, would rise out of the refugee camps to dominate most of Afghanistan by 1998.

In such an unruly social world the course of events cannot be predicted, but whatever transpires in this region, it is safe to presume that ordinary folks, with their particular perspectives and interests, can have a significant impact as well as the choices of the powerful leaders in the world’s capital cities. As Olcott (1994:45) puts it, the “masses” exert “a kind of mute but implacable pressure” on the course of events. Sometimes the pressure is more than “mute,” as demonstrated by recent events in Iran. Because abrupt shifts in the course of affairs can be driven by unforeseen events, it is crucial to have studies of local and national as well as regional processes so as to identify, as some have said. more precisely “the root causes of particular conflicts” among these peoples (Garret, Rahr, and Watanabe 2000:2, 77). Still others, pleading for area studies generally but with the Middle East and Central Asia in mind, have complained that at a time when “globalization demands greater knowledge of the world than ever before, scholars today have less in-depth, committed knowledge than they did in the past.” There is now an even greater need, they say, for “deep study” of “the empirical and conceptual problems” of specific communities (Mirsepassi, Basu and Weaver 2003).[24]

If we are to understand the course of affairs in this strategic region we need for more studies of such issues as government repression and the affects it has on the conditions and reactions of local communities, as the grounds of social coalition in local communities, the perspectives that inform their responses to the course of events, the devices of mutual support by which they cope with the ongoing challenges they face, and the informal grounds of authority and influence that those communities recognize.

That is, many “games,” local and regional, are being played among the diverse peoples in this strategic part of the world, some of them engaging the strategic choices of state leaders, others more local and parochial, driven by the exigencies that concern local social coalitions.  If we are to grasp the course of events in this region we must take note of the many sorts of games being played on many levels in this contemporary world.

LIST OF REFERENCES

Abbas, Hassan. 2005. Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War of Terrorism. Armonk NY: M.E. Sharp.

Abbasov, Shahin and Khadija Ismailova. 2005. Pipeline Opening Helps Spur Political Opposition In Azerbaijan. EurasiaNet, June 6. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav060605.shtml

Alaomulki Nozar. 2001. Life After the Soviet Union: The Newly Independent Republics of Transcaucasus and Central Asia. Albany: SUNY.

Ali, Tariq. 2008. The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Appelbaum, Alec. 2005. Rebuffed by Washington, China goes prospecting in Kazakhstan: With access to energy investment opportunities in the United States blocked for political reasons, China is turning its attention to Kazakhstan. EurasiaNet, August 15. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/ business/eav081505ru.shtml (accessed 12/29/05).

Atal, Subodh, 2005. The new great game: The re-emergence of the ancient Silk Road provides Central Asia with a promising alternative to another reincarnation of great power conquest in the region. The National Interest (October). http://www.nationalinterest.org/ME2/Default.asp (accessed December 30, 2005).

Ayeen, Gholam Ali. 1367 [1986]. Afghānestān wa Sarnawesh-i Imprāturihā: Ayā Tārikh Tikrār Khahed Shud? [Afghanistan and the Destiny of Empires: Will History Repeat Itself?] Mujahed Wollas, May 5.

Beissinger, Mark R. 2002. Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State. Cambridge: Cambridge University.

Belokrenitsky, Vyacheslav. 1994. Russia and Greater Central Asia. Asian Survey, 34(12):1093-1108.

Bhadrakumar, M. K. 2006. “The Great Game” comes to South Asia. Asia Times, May 24. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HE24Df04.html (accessed May 2, 2008).

Blank, Stephen. 2005a. Central Asia’s Energy Game Intensifies. EurasiaNet, September 1. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/ eav090105.shtml (accessed March 31, 2009).

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[1] I acknowledge with gratitude the assistance of Sarah Kendzior and Sami Siddiq in producing this text, and the advice and comments of Gabriele Rasuly-Palaczek on an earlier draft.  I also express appreciation for the assistance of JoAnn Urban for production assistance on this and all the chapters of this book.

[2] Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union Beissinger sees the event as essentially driven by internal dynamics; he discounts the impact of the Afghanistan war on public opinion within the Soviet Union and of other movements on the periphery of the empire, such as the Solidarity movement in Poland. We believe, to the contrary, that these events, once in motion, accelerated the collapse by inspiring other nationalist groups in the system.

[3] See also Garret, Rahr, and Watanabe (2000). Das (2004) believes that Central Asia will eventually overtake Europe in importance.

[4] For example, Bhadrakumar (2006); Weitz (2006).

[5] Plans were drafted for the construction of roads, connecting the Central Asian states to South Asia via Pakistan’s Karakorum highway, although the earthquake of 2005 will no doubt slow down the project (Kashghar-Gilgit Bus Service 2006).

[6] Turkmen State Airlines (2004). Turkmen government sources claimed that over half of the available seats for the inaugural flight on August 4, 2005, were purchased several months in advance (Turkmen State Airlines 2005).

[7] The World (2003). An email notice from Muhammad Ghazi Jamakzai, Executive Assistant to the Minister, Ministry of Communications, entitled “Afghanistan and United States extend Bilateral Communications Cooperation,” indicates that “three and half years ago we had a limited access to telephone only in a few provinces, but now we have more than one million subscribers of digital and cellular phones in all provinces of Afghanistan. … [and that ] all 34 provinces [are connected] with the Capital through phone, internet, Fax and video Conference. … [W]e have already connected more than fifty districts through phone, net, Fax and video Conference and in every month we activate twenty districts, and hope to connect all districts till the end of this year” (contact@moc.gov.af). (accessed March 16, 2006)

[8] Gwadar Deep Seaport (2007); Starr (2005); Chah Bahar (n.d.).

[9] Canfield 1992; Belokrenitsky (1994). For a list of publications that used this term before 2008 see “Vital Concerns for the World,” http://rcanfield.blogspot.com/2008/05/new-region-of-greater-central-asia-from.html.

[10] On Uzbekistan see Uzbekistan: Military (n.d.); On Turkmenistan, see Turkmenistan Gas (2008); on Afghanistan see Kliment (2006).

[11] The 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia, during which flows were briefly interrupted, demonstrated how crucial the pipelines in the Caucasus are to the Russian government (Mouawad 2008).

[12] The 1,760-kilometer Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was constructed to supply the needs of Europe. Eventually able to carry as much a 75 million tons of oil a year, it is projected to bring to Azerbaijan as much as $160 billion in revenue by 2030, a dramatic infusion of wealth that could transform the Caucasus (Abbasov and Ismailova 2005; Howden and Thornton 2005).

[13] Russia Clinches (2007).

[14] Update 1-U.S. Throws Weight (2008).

[15] Russia (2008).

[16] On May 24, 2009 Iran and Pakistan announced an agreement to build a 2,100-kilometer long pipeline from Iran’s South Pars gas field into Pakistan — at an estimated $7.5 billion. India so far has no part in the deal (Pannier 2009).

[17] Besides the deals made with the Central Asian, the Indians have sought crude oil from Israel’s Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline as well as natural gas from Qatar (Blank 2005a).

[18] Moreover, the Japanese are pursuing Central Asian uranium, another source of energy over which there is growing interest. Uranium prices are climbing as China and India are stepping up construction of nuclear power plants, and some nations in the west, including the United States, are revisiting the question of nuclear power as an energy source (Uranium 2009).

[19] Masaki (2006).

[20] Won-sup (2007); South Korea Scouts (2008); Prime Minister Han (2008).

[21] This topic is so large and the course of events so fluid that adequate attention cannot be given to it here. For more on the Taliban and guidance to the literature see Crews and Tarzi, 2008. On the Pakistan’s cultivation of Islamist organizations see Zahab and Roy (2004); Abbas (2005); Rashid (2008); Ali (2008); Usher 2009).

[22] Chah-Bahar (n.d.).

[23] As far as I know, the only person to hint at the Soviet collapse was the Afghan Professor Gholam Ali Ayeen (1367 A.H.), who pointed out as early as 1986 that the great empires of the past had collapsed when a few military reverses tarnished their image of invincibility; he was suggesting that the Afghanistan resistance movement, which was at that time embarrassing the Red Army, might actually undermine the Soviet Union’s apparent invincibility, with potentially momentous implications.

[24] David Kilcullen (2009) has argued that to deal with insurgencies an army needs to absorb the culture of the societies within which they subsist.

An example of a problem and a frame of reference:  structure in practice [incomplete].

Introduction

In 1966 – 1968 while doing field work among Hazaras in Shibar, Afghanistan, I discovered that in some places they were sharply divided between two kinds of Shi’ites, Ithnā `Asharīya (“Twelvers”) and Isma’ilis, even to the fracturing of small communities.  This is a memoir of the mare’s nest of disputes that came to light the more I probed into this society.  The explanation for the original division that drew me into these affairs will entail recounting the narratives about why and when various disputes took place, not only between the two sectarian groups but in particular within the Ismaili community.  In order to explicate these narratives I will rehearse the conventions of social practice that endowed these events with significance.

The Problem

The locality

The circumstance that prompted this cultural study existed in Shibar, Bamian Province, Afghanistan.  Shibar is a marginal area in several ways.  Topologically, it is a highland plateau at the extremities of three great riverine systems.  At the northeastern end of this plateau resides the Shibar Pass which divides waters flowing east and west.  To the east is Ghorband whose waters flow into the Kabul River, which eventually reaches the Indus and the Indian Ocean.  To the west of Shibar Pass water flows toward the center of Bamian where it joins the Bamian river then veers abruptly northward to race through the Shikari gorge, a great rift in the Hindu Kush Range, and then joins the Qunduz – Oxus river and the Aral Sea catchment basin.  On the southwestern end of the Shibar plateau lies another pass into Bamian, the Unai, which divides the water along another axis.  Northward the streams flow into Kalu a tributary of the Bamian valley.  Southward the water flows off the Unai Pass to form the headwaters of the Helmand, the great river that once nourished the famous Persian civilization of Sistan but now dies in the deserts of Registan and Dasht-e Margo.

Shibar is also a marginal area politically as it lies along the eastern edge of the province of Bamian, demarcating its boundaries with the current provinces of Parwan, Wardak, and Ghazni.  It is thus marginal administratively, lying at some distance from the capitals of these neighboring provinces.  The capital of Bamian province, the Markaz (the “center”), was in the 1960s several hours drive away.  Late in the nineteenth century the Kabul regime had to crush a rebellion of the Hazara peoples, including those in Shibar, although mostly those further west in the Hazarajat, and the government has been advancing its writ over the region ever since.  A local alaqadar, a sub-sub governor, was assigned to Shibar in the 1920s but his leverage there was minimal for at least a decade.  In the 1960s he and a small staff were situated in Shumbul, relatively close to the Shibar Pass.  His office was the first point of government contact with local affairs.[1]  The judiciary was situated in the Markaz but was broadly distrusted, even feared.  In earlier times rarely did anyone from Shibar dare to bring a dispute before the official courts; whatever redress a defrauded individual could have, if any, within the community was to obtained by appeal to the local notables.  But by the 1960s it was becoming more feasible to take one’s quarrel to court at the Markaz, even though that option was broadly condemned within the community.  Everyone believed dealing with the government was expensive and time consuming and in any case uncertain.

People survived in Shibar by irrigating wheat (rotated with fava bean) in the lower elevations and barley and rye higher up, and by keeping a few sheep and goats, which they protected indoors in winter and released to pasture the rest of the year.  Some parts of Shibar received enough rainfall for dry land farming of wheat and barley.  Households that dwelt along the main roads supplemented their subsistence by selling cash crops, wheat, potatoes and poplar trees.  Besides the peasants there, in those days (but not since about 1980) pastoral nomads climbed into the plateau in spring, bringing large flocks to pasture on the highland meadows and hilly slopes, and retreated in the fall.[2]

Survival here was a social and communal affair.  Truly, it was difficult if not impossible to live in these highlands without communal support, the environment being severe and the technology relatively undeveloped.  In winter, snow drifts could pile up as high as twenty feet.  Many of the valleys are oriented north and south and bounded by abrupt hillsides and cliffs, so they enjoyed sunlight for only a few hours of the day, except in high summer.  In spring, streams raced precipitously unless undammed for irrigation.  Agricultural means were pre-industrial:  the steep hillsides, if planted to benefit from rainfall, could be plowed only with oxen.  Until as late as the 1950s horses were common vehicles of transport.  The passes could be impassable for days in winder; vehicles were often stuck in snow and sometimes they slipped off precipices.  The main road was unpaved.  There was little cash; many transactions were in barter.  Matches, tooth brushes and other personal goods were being walked in by a trader.

In such a setting folks took it for granted that friends and neighbors should cooperate.  Neighbors and relatives sometimes shared oxen for plowing in spring (although the rush to plant as early as possible limited sharing) and threshing in fall.  They helped in construction of houses and walls.  They loaned each other money – a group of them collecting enough cash and goods for one of their number to pay the huge expenses of a bride and a wedding.  Relatives and neighbors attended each other’s special events — circumcisions, weddings, funerals – when food was served by the hosts.  On such occasions the women gave gifts to each other, to be reciprocated later, even years later.  Among the most critical activities of the community, which demonstrated and iterated their close interdependence, was the cleaning and refurbishing of the irrigation channels in early spring.  Many channels extended for miles up into the mountains and every meter needed attention after the winter snows; the task demanded many hands.  And after the channels were cleaned, their waters had to be shared by turns, a circumstance that required cooperation, agreement on water rights, and consensus as to responsibility and leadership.

Folks sought ways to reinforce their connections, one of the most important being through marital ties.  A sister or a daughter would be given in marriage to a neighbor or his son; brothers sometimes married sisters of a friendly family; or families arranged for an exchange of sisters.  Of course one marriage begat others; it could be replicated in the next generation; first-cousin or second-cousin marriage was common.  The obligations to help and share were thus reinforced and reduplicated among neighbors and relatives, enforced by the austere conditions.  Among these communities, and indeed throughout rural Afghanistan, the bonds that tied neighbors and relatives together were extensive, elaborate, and reduplicative.

This was a society that by every appearance seemed to be a typical peasant community of the sort familiar to sociologists.  Max Weber (1968: 37) would have described it as united by the “the sacredness of tradition,” even by “[t]he fear of magical evils” that reinforced “the general psychological inhibitions against any sort of change in customary modes of action”.  Emil Durkheim (????:  p.100) would have emphasized the common moral sensibility, a likemindedness that has “exceptional force” among these people because it is collectively embraced, conceived as universal, permanent and intrinsic.  The Marxist sociologist Raymond Williams (1994: 596-7) would have said that the economic, political, and cultural relations in this society were so mutually reinforcing as to constitute an integrated “sense of reality” for its members.

The fracture

So I was surprised to discover an awkward pattern of actual social relationships.  There were two religious sects, Twelver Shia (henceforth “Shia”) and Ismaili, in this area, and relations among them were not good.  It was, in practice, a major fault line.[3]  Shias and Ismailis, even if living nearby, did not speak to each other.  They did not greet each other when passing on solitary paths in the mountains.  (“They are silent with us,” said an Ismaili man from Bolola, speaking of his Shia neighbors.)  They did not help each other in the fields or combine their flocks under a single shepherd, the normal practice among friends and neighbors.  They did not share food:  a bitter quarrel took place when a Shia family threw away food given to them by an Ismaili family.  As an Ismaili elder put it, “If we want to borrow from them, they would send us away and tell us to go to our own kind.”  If a Shia man went looking to buy wheat in another neighborhood, as folks were sometimes obliged to do, he would buy from Shia, and if he had to stay overnight he would stay in a Shia household.  An Ismaili would buy from Ismailis and stay with Ismailis.  Craftsmen served one community or another:  Stone masons in the hamlets of Iljānak and Ghojurak served Ismailis; a stone mason for the Shia lived in the valley of Jowlā.  Blacksmiths for the Ismaili were located in the valleys of Iraq, Shumbul, Daki, Birgilich and Sheikh Ali; Shia blacksmiths were in Jowlā and the hamlet of Gholam Ali in Shumbul.  The sectarian division between Shia and Ismaili seemed to reified the ancient quarrel over rights to leadership of the Islamic community in their social practice, as if the dogmatic argument over succession and dogma had acquired contemporary social and political implications in Shibar.

The spatial distribution of these sects in Shibar did not always match the pattern of house construction.  As one might expect, most of the valleys, alluvial plains spilling down from the high ground, were occupied by one or another sect group.  For instance, the valley of Lajow was occupied by Shias; the valley of Lida was occupied by Ismailis.  And in some valleys both sects were represented.  For example, as one person explaining it to me, put it:  “The valley of Ashur is half Shia and half Ismaili; the valley of Kaaka is one third Shia and two thirds Ismaili.”  Labmushak and Lablabu were similarly divided.   But in some places the division was surprising.  The houses built on the alluvial planes were clustered roughly in groups of four to a dozen houses.  These were agnatic kinship groups, qawms, but they were not always of the same religious sect.  The extended family of Gholam Ali occupying a hamlet high up in Labmushak was divided; the extended family of Kida occupying a village just off the main road near the Shibar pass was divided.   That is, even though many of the the hamlets appeared to be communal units, recognizing obligations to help and share, some of them fractured.  The hamlet of Rezagâ in Labmushak was divided:  “ten or twelve” of its households were Shia, I was told by an Ismaili elder; he could be more specific with respect to the number of Ismailis there:  eight.  “These are all related,” he said.  “The Shia changed from Ismailia about 15 years ago.”  In one hamlet I met a woman who denied any relationship to the family living in the adjacent house.

The configuration of sectarian loyalties throughout Shibar, in some places dividing hamlets as well as neighborhoods, suggested that Shibar had been rent asunder by a major social cataclysm, a rupture in the social fabric.  It was as if a great earthquake had fractured the whole plateau of Shibar, dividing neighborhoods, breaking through valleys, ripping hamlets apart, leaving a dramatic ideological scar across the plateau.[4]  Whatever commuity life existed in which traditional bodns of solidarity and mutuality were effected by an economic and social interdependency that might have constituted  an “absolute” social reality, as Raymond Williams would have put it, had little resemblance to the appearances on the ground.  What once was the basis of communal solidary at the time these houses and hamlets were constructed had by all appearances been refigured.  This society had been reconstituted in a sharply different pattern of loyalty, cooperation, and solidarity.

The obvious contrast between actual social practice and the shape of the built environment prompted me to ask many questions.  My quest for an explanation of the situation and of his comments drew me into history, the series of events that produced this peculiar situation.  It led me into a study of the relationships that constituted the social world of folks in Shibar.  Eventually I would hear stories about what had happened in Shibar, how the unthinkable in fact took place.  Social practices, statuses of authority, strands of influence, marriage and inheritance patterns – all these were disrupted by a social cataclysm.  Unsurprisingly, the events that produced this great fault line was a topic of public interest all over the eastern-central region Afghanistan.  Shibar was the epicenter.

These affairs took place in a region relatively distant from the mechanisms of state control.  These folks preferred to deal with their problems without involving the government.

The events that produced this fracture were in every sense public and political.  That is, this society – somewhat marginal to the effective reach of the government — had a public sphere and a politics.  Reputed authorities have claimed that apart from the royal family and a small urban elite Afghanistan had “no politics.”[5]  The reality of course was otherwise:  Folks in Shibar were highly politicized.[6]  In this environment they had to cooperate to live, as they were obliged by their setting and resources to enlist help from each other:  to build a house for themselves or a wall around it, to construct and maintain an irrigation channel, to resolve disputes and enforce agreements – and without involving the government whenever possible.  They managed their social concourse, their conventions of practice, and their means of enforcement on their own – activities that were essentially political and ideological.  In fact, as I would discover, there were, in a sense, two parallel networks of social concourse, that among the women and that among the men.  The social intercourse of the men stood somewhat apart in that among the men there were leaders who interacted with the wider society.  Notably there were mirs (also called maliks by the government) who acted as intermediaries between the local community and the government.  Mirs normally entertained the men of the community fairly often, when issues of broader interest had to be discussed, and they of course fairly often trecked to the offices of the Alaqadar, the local official ensconced in government buildings at the mouth of Shumbul, in Shibar, and sometimes also took a bus or truck to the provincial offices in Bamian.  The men, that is, men occasionally in the guest rooms of the mirs and other notable figures in the community and so constituted an active communication network.  Among the women there were networks of communication that functioned in the form of gossip in the hamlets and in the social convocations that took place among relatives on the occasion of weddings, circumcisions, or funerals.  On those occasions the men and women gathered separately, objectifying the different communications of the two sexes.  There were, that is, even in this relatively isolated rural neighborhood, “public spheres” where information was broadly shared, mainly through informal means.[7]

To understand the political affairs of these people I had to examine the conditions in which their informal relations established grounds for cooperation, and the exercise of power and influence.  I was forced to ask more general questions about how this society was constituted: how social control and influence were effected, how social affairs were given order where the institutions of the state were feared and avoided, how the conditions under which a fracture of the sort extant in Shibar could take form as a sectarian division.

Conceptual issues:  History and theory

The case obliges us to reflect on how to explain events culturally.  The events that created this peculiar configuration of alliances in Shibar and the wider neighborhood raise the question of what a culturally necessary and culturally sufficient explanation for an event or series of events should entail.  Whatever took place in Shibar must be explained culturally as well as historically.  An event such as the disputes that fractured society in Shibar was an actualization of a “structure,” a cultural system, that preceded it, a structure in place.

We have to distinguish here between event and structure.[8]  Meaningful communication (as in speech, Saussure’s parole) is made possible by the existence of a invisible code (his langue) that is understood by members of a community.  The signs that constitute the code are mutually defining, conceptually integrated according to a logic that is internal and unique to itself.  They are arbitrary with regard to the world they reference:  different languages terminologically index different sectors of the color continuum, for instance.

The disorderly flow of human affairs — speech, writing, behavior, social event — is given significance by the system of mutually defining signs that people employ in order to make sense of their experience.  Their conscious use of symbolic resources in practice makes social life referential; behaviors become “actions” and specific happenings become “events” as they are given significance by general concepts (Sahlins 1985: 145).[9]  Events are thus overt manifestations of a structure in place, and thus logically are its product (Bourdieu 1968: 24).  Explaining an event entails identifying the cultural resources that informed the understanding of the participants and shaped their response to it.

But if structure gives meaning to events, events can reshape structure (Giddens, Sahlins).  As human life takes place in a world that has its own properties, its own caprice[10], the use of certain signs to characterize a situation constitutes a certain risk to the system and to those who deploy them, for the categories deployed may not apply:  people may misinterpret each other’s intentions, or the situation may in fact contradict the presumptions of those who sought to characterize it.  The deployment of a sign in real situations thus subjects it to possibilities of change.  When a turn of affairs surprises, producing unforeseen outcomes, the signs deployed to inform them can be forced to take on new implications.  When used to encompass situations in a world that escapes human presuppositions signs take on new meanings – a revaluing of the signs that can ripple through the system, the signs being systematically related in according to the logic of the system.  So in practice “event” – parole – can determine “structure.”

As happenings become events, and behaviors acts, when they are perceived in meaningful terms, events and acts become history.  Events and actions produce history,  and history — the memory of events past – become structure.  Events and actions remembered join the elements of structure, both to modify and be modified by the structure in place (Giddens ????).  Human action repeated and reiterated in practice becomes a habitus, a “product of history [that] produces individuals and collective practices, and hence history in accordance with the schemes engendered by history” (Bourdieu 1977 [1972]:82).

Moreover, besides the revisions in structure imposed by events in a world that has its own relationships there are the strains imposed on it by the ways that folks make use of it.  Individuals make use of the cultural resources at hand in order to fulfill their own purposes.  And they act from different positions and with “widely varied interests, capacities, inclinations, and knowledge” (Sewell 2005:209).  In social interactions individuals with personal agendas and personal perspectives deploy cultural devices – speech, gesture, objective creations – to define the situation in their own terms, so encompassing it with their own presuppositions.  Their actions in turn become objectifications of the presuppositions that can become a public possession, a social fact that can be deployed by others for their own purposes with their own meanings.  The attempt to control how a situation is defined is a political act, and the struggle to make one’s own formulation of the situation accepted by the wider community is a political struggle.  A definition of the situation that stands in ebb and flow of public dispute is of course the dominant one.  As people set in motion new meanings by bending categories to fit their own ends (cf. Sewell 2005:204) they create possibilities that escape their control.  For the signs put to use in defining situations are public and what becomes public has its own life, with implications that deployable for new purposes, to fulfill individual intentions.

Our project is to produce an “eventful account” of what took place in Shibar, an endeavor that will entail merging history with its social and cultural context, a linking of adventitious affairs with the meaningful contexts that gave them significance.  If contingency is one (not the only) principle of all history (cf. Gould 1989: 283)[11], and historical accidents continually deflect the course of events (Mann 1986)[12] , the affairs of human beings (unlike other creatures) are informed by and directed by frames of meaning that have properties of a different order from the caprice of events.  Life for human beings is never a haphazard series of accidents, for humans perceive each happening as an instance of an imagined order of reality.  An explanation for a particular event such as the conditions that broke these communities apart must place the contingent and the incidental within the idealized “realities” of those who lived it, and within the historic trends that the events displayed.

THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK

But this view of the human condition necessarily confronts the problem of how human beings can act willfully and creatively within a system of conventional practice.  If idealized “realities” define human experience and shape human action, how can human beings, as sentient agents, be acting on their own volition?  The events examined here were a product of humans acting intentionally as agents; human actors produced this configuration of relations.  What is the relation between the structures that inform human experience and human creative action?   A cultural explanation of an event or series of events depends on the relationships among three entities:  event, the imaginative structure within which it takes place, and the agents acting willfully in the event.  Here I offer four propositions about these relationships preliminary to proposing how an event or series of events may be explained culturally.  Each proposition is given in abstract terms and then emended to clarify its relation to the irregularities of actual social life.

1. Events are actualizations of “structures” that the participants bring to the events

By “structure” we mean a system of mutually defining symbols – language, codes of behavior, conceptions of the material world and its mechanics – through which people make sense of their experience.[13]  These symbolic systems, invisible except in their overt manifestations – as in speech, behavior, social conventions, mythical narratives, monuments, emblems and the like – are constituted according to their own internal logics, logics that are arbitrary with regard to the world they reference:  different languages, for instance, terminologically index different sectors of the color continuum, and different cultures recognize different causes of disease and death.  It is of these symbolic systems that human conceptions of reality are made; through such cultural forms humans understand and respond to what happens to them (Geertz 1973: 216).

The human dependence on symbolic resources makes social life referential; behaviors become “actions” and specific happenings become “events” as they are given significance by general concepts (Sahlins 1985: 145).[14]  People read situations and react to them in terms of the cultural resources, symbolic frames of reference, available to them.  “The significance we impute to the observed events of life is always affected by the frame in which we place them and the keys with which we read them.  …[p158].  [W]hen observing human interaction we must identify correctly the keys that the parties to such interaction themselves are using, as the events unfold” (Barth 1993:157-158).  As events follow upon one another, people are continuously reading and reacting to them in terms of imagined orders of reality.  Events are in this sense products of structure, overt expressions of conventional practices in a society.

Event Analysis in Practice.  Such is the relation of event to structure in the abstract.  The complication in this abstract notion is that in actual affairs of course individuals can hold different views of an event.  They can bring different frames of reference to a happening and so define its significance in contrary ways.[15]  And so in the course of events folks can misinterpret each other.  As the significance of the event is disputed, the event can acquire new properties depending on the frame of reference accorded it.  So the human process of imaginatively encompassing events in terms of idealized notions of significance may yield little agreement or conherent behavior (Barth 1993:7).[16]

A cultural explanation for an event must expose what the participants see in it and how they do or do not share a common understanding of its significance. It must identify the cultural resources that constituted and informed the “realities” of the participants and shaped their responses to it.  And it must note the different ways that the various participants interpret and respond to situations.

1. Structures are also shaped by events.

Human life takes place in a world that has its own properties, its own caprice.[17]  Whatever conventional understandings we bring to events, the events need not conform to our idealized notion of it (Sahlins 1981:6).[18]  When used to encompass situations in a world that escapes human presuppositions the symbolic elements of a code may take on new implications, creative nuances:  “[E]very use of a word in and for a world we do not control is a risk to its meaning” (Sahlins 2004:146).  And not only words but every meaningful social convention.  As symbols are deployed to bring meaning to situations they take on fresh nuances according to the circumstances of their deployment (cf. Sewell 2005:204).  In practice, if structure can inform event, event can shape structure (Giddens, Sahlins).  Even more, events produce history, and history – selective remembrances of events past – becomes structure.  Events as they take place are sedimented in conceptions of reality that are being continuously revised by experience.  “If the culture … reproduces itself, it reproduces itself in an altered state” (Sahlins 2004: 292).  As events reproduce the structure in place they also revise it through continuous flow of idealized enactments.

And as there are multiple readings of what is taking place, there are multiple concepts of what has occurred in the past.  Disputed events lead to disparate memories and disputed histories, and to disparate notions of the importance of particular events.  And beyond the diverse readings of events by participants in an event there are the properties of the world – that is, the empirical nature of the situation itself, which exerts an influence that is extraneous to the imaginations of those present.  So the parameters of the event, the conjuncture of persons and viewpoints and agendas and positions, are conditions that can escape immediate recognition and nevertheless endow it with a significance that becomes important in subsequent settings.  Events considered insignificant at one time can in other contexts be accorded critical significance.

An adequate cultural explanation for an event, therefore, must also include not only the conditions that gave the event significance but also the revisions in the structure that the event created.  It means identifying the way human beings through their collective and separate activities creatively produce the realities they live in (Barth 1993:8, 6-7).

III.  Human beings are agents and creators of the structure in place.

The cultural frames within which humans act, the keys by which they interpret events are never singular; multiple readings and reactions to them are possible.   Moreover, individuals have “widely varied interests, capacities, inclinations, and knowledge” (Sewell 2005:209) they pursue particular agendas, making use of the cultural resources available to them in order to fulfill their individual purposes.  People are creative agents in the world, making decisions about how to understand their experience and how to react to it, deploying the resources of culture in respect to their individual agendas.  In the process of creating their cultural realities people elaborate or discard their customary practices according to the exigencies of their everyday affairs (Barth 1993: 1993:8, 6-7).  Structure is in this sense a repertoire of meaningful forms — categories, images, ideals, narratives – that folks deploy with a view to giving significance to their experiences.  They are in effect sifting the cultural resources available to decide what are most workable in their immediate contexts (Barth 1993:5).

1. What humans create reflects and reproduces the cultural conventions in place. Humans are products of structure as well as its creators; the relationship is reciprocal.

The form a certain action takes and the significance it acquires derives from social conventions already established.  As people deploy the cultural resources familiar to them so as to encompass their experiences, they act according to conventions already familiar to them.  In their behavior they exemplify presuppositions already inherent in customary practice.  As folks read situations and react to them in terms of conventions already established they reinforce and reiterate those practices.  The habitus, cognitive and motivating structures of “regulated improvisations” are a “product of history [that] produces individuals and collective practices, and hence history in accordance with the schemes engendered by history” (Bourdieu 1977 [1972]:78, 82).  The pattern of behavior is in this sense “unconscious” in that it is shaped by and informed by scenarios already in place, scenarios that suggest ways of behaving and typical ways that affairs may proceed, or ways that natural phenomena relate, and that people typically react to particular circumstances.  Such unexamined practices have been called the “doxa,” ways of life and thinking that are taken for granted, considered “natural” (Bourdieu 1977 [1972]: 164; Amossy 2002).[19]

So the culturally constituted “realities” that creative actors produce authorize not only the events but also the individuals who produce them.  Sentient agents, acting on their own volition, carry out and behaviorally display patterns of social behavior already immanent in their ways of life (Sahlins 2004:157).  Sahlins 2004: 155 “… persons can be empowered to represent collectivities:  to instantiate or personify them, sometimes even to bring them into existence, without, however, losing their own individuality.  … history makes the history-makers.  Sahlins 2004: 291.  “The event was contingent, but it unfolded in the terms of a particular cultural field, from which the actors drew their reasons and the happening found its meanings.”  “… the structural coherence of a contingent outcome …  ”   Sahlins 2004: 292.  “Who or what is a historical actor, what is a historical act and what will be its historical consequences:  these are determinations of a cultural order, and differently determined in different orders.  No history, then, without culture.  And vice versa, insofar as in the event, the culture is neither what it was before nor what it could have been.”

We then presume that a cultural explanation of an event then entails recounting

• what individuals did in culturally constructed situations,
• how their action evinced the structure in place, and
• how it also deflected affairs according to the specific styles/ actions/agendas of the actors involved.

It is possible to say of an event, as Sahlins did about Bobby Thomson’s dramatic hit ??? in “The situation put him in a position to make a difference, and the situation constituted the significance of the difference he made” (Sahlins 2004: 157).

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Our frame of reference for examining and interpreting the course of events that created the fractured community of Shibar includes, therefore, the following terms:

• structure (the categorically constituted system of meanings in place),
• event (the exigent, discursive, jumbled, even tumultuous flow of human affairs),
• world (the materially constituted conditions of place and circumstance, including other animate beings),
• and agents (actors with individual purposes wielding cultural forms to cope with the practical exigencies of life),
• habitus (the set of socially learnt dispositions, skills and ways of acting that are taken for granted, acquired through the activities and experiences of everyday life).

Notes

^[1] The British make no mention of an alaqadari (a sub-governor) in Shibar in the 19th century (Adamec.  ??? Gazatteer, Bamian).  The first alaqadar was not well received.  My notes:  [8-78] Mir Ali Ahmad Beg and Arbaab Kabir [of Bolola] said the first Alaqadaari was set up in Bulola (I think first by Amanullah).  The Saqaw sent a man whom they did not accept (some trouble with him at least) and the real alaqadar was set up finally by Nadir Khan [r. 1929-1933].  This was first in Bulola.  He stayed in the guest room of Bulola.  He fought with someone (over what?) and finally he left and went to house of Mir Mowladaad [in Shumbul] for a while, then moved back again to Bulola.  He was for a while in the house of Sayed Taalib Shaa (in Shumbul) and then back to Bulola, etc.  People didn’t want him.  Eventually a place was made for him and his staff in Shumbul.

^[2] The number of pastoral nomads holding land in the region was increasing as they often loaned money to the peasants with the land as collateral; failure of the borrower to pay could entail losing his property (cf. Ferdinand 1962 [Nomadic expansion]).

^[3] I here use the term “Shia” as that is the usual term for the “Athna’asharia Shi’a” in the region.  To keep my narrative clear I will avoid using the more the more presice term.

^[4] I avoided answering this question for many years because telling that story required giving information that could have been used against the various parties involved, for the precipitating issues were still alive.  All the figures in this affair are no longer on the scene:  most have passed away.

^[5] Paul, Jim.  1980.  “The Khalq Failed to Comprehend the Contradictions of the Rural Sector:  Interview with Feroz Ahmed.”  Middle East Research and Information Project Reports, No. 89 10:6 (July-August), pp. 13-14.

^[6] The political situation in Shibar seemed to exemplify the pervasive mechanisms of social control that Foucault emphasizes in his work.  He sees power as permeating all of social life, acting in a plethora of small and insignificant contexts.  Rather than deriving power and influence from large institutions such as a state or the influence of certain classes, he stresses the informal relations and encounters of social life, which work in disparate and conflicting ways to solidify conventions of practice.  Power for him is manifest “through ceaseless struggles and confrontations” that form “a chain of connections, a system.”  “[L]ocal conditions and particular needs” give form to the flow of events “in piecemeal fashion” to create larger aggregations of the collective will.

Foucault, Michel.  1978 [1976].  The History of Sexuality:  An Introduction, Volume I.  Translated from the French by Robert Hurley.  New York:  Vintage.  Pp. 92-93; Foucault, Michel.  1972. Power/Knowledge. New York: ????, p. 159.

^[7] It seems unnecessary to derive the contrast between family life and public life from the Greeks, as Habermas does.  Rather, we see in the Greek categorical distinctions that Habermas adduced a particular instance of how societies develop social controls even in the absence of a state.

^[8] The original formulation was articulated by Ferdinand de Saussure for the study of language and extended and elaborated by Claude Levi-Strauss for the study of all cultural products, and later emended by other social scientists (Sahlins, Giddens, Bourdieu, Ortner).  Saussure’s primary interest was in exposing the structure of the code that informed speech; Levi-Strauss’s interest was analogous, only on a cultural level:  he sought to elucidate the “unconscious” patterning of meanings in the products of the human mind, as in (the topics of his own work) kinship systems, patterns of economic exchange, and the construction of myth (cf.  Crick, Malcom.  1976.  Explorations in Language and Meaning.  London:  Malaby).

^[9] Sahlins, Marshal.  1985.  Islands of History.  Chicago:  University of Chicago.

^[10] Bourdieu’s critique of structuralism, as well as Marxism, is that they obscure the essential uncertainty of the human condition (1977: 5 ff.).  Sahlins’s critique (1981, 1985) seeks to correct the emphasis by noting how categorical systems are revised in practice:  “The world may not conform to the presuppositions by which some people talk about it” (1981:6)..

^[11] Gould, Stephen Jay.  1989.  Wonderful Life:  The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History.  New York:  Norton.

^[12] Mann, Michael.  1986.  The Sources of Social Power, Vol I:  A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1720.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University.

^[13] The fundamental distinction between event and structure was articulated by Ferdinand de Saussure for the study of language, famously extended and elaborated by Claude Levi-Strauss for the study of other human products.  Saussure’s primary interest was in exposing the structure of the code that informed speech; Levi-Strauss’s interest was analogous, only on a cultural level:  he sought to elucidate the “unconscious” patterning of meanings in the products of the human mind, as in — the topics of his own work — kinship systems, patterns of economic exchange, and the construction of myth.  Structuralist thought has been emended in different ways by other social scientists (Sahlins, Giddens, Bourdieu, and others).

^[14] Sahlins, Marshal.  1985.  Islands of History ….????

^[15] Sewell (2005:205 ff.), in an effort to make Sahlins’ frame of reference more usable to historians, emends Sahlins’s frame of reference in ways that seem fully compatible with the original intent.  Sewell notes (what Sahlins well knew) that actual societies are never informed by a single structural system; societies are instead “sites of a multitude of overlapping and interlocking cultural structures … [that] are only relatively autonomous.”  Because these disparate “cultural structures” “contain common symbols, … [that] refer or lay claim to common objects, and … coexist in and hence inform the subjectivities” of the members of a society ?? (Sewell ?????).

^[16] We do not insist that imagined structures of significance are perfectly consistent, only that as the elements of a system are elements of an idealized order they more or less “seek” consistency.

^[17] Bourdieu’s critique of structuralism, as well as Marxism, is that they obscure the essential uncertainty of the human condition (1977: 5 ff.).  Sahlins’s critique seeks to correct the emphasis by noting how categorical systems are revised in practice.

^[18] Sahlins, Marshall.  1981.  Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities.  …???

^[19] Amossy, R.  “How to do things with doxa: Toward an analysis of argumentation in discourse”  Poetics Today [fall, 2002] Vol 23 no. 3: pp 465-487.